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International audience ; We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values.

International audience ; We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values.

International audience ; We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values.

International audience ; We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values.

International audience ; Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price. ; Bien qu'un système mondial de quotas échangeables soit considéré par de nombreux chercheurs comme la solution la plus efficace pour réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, les gouvernements des pays en développement refusent d'entrer dans un tel système à court terme. De nombreux universitaires et d'autres parties prenantes, y compris la Commission européenne, ont de ce fait proposé pour les pays en développement plusieurs types d'engagements qui paraissent moins contraignants, comme les approches sectorielles. Nous fournissons une évaluation macroéconomique d'une telle approche ...

International audience ; Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price. ; Bien qu'un système mondial de quotas échangeables soit considéré par de nombreux chercheurs comme la solution la plus efficace pour réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, les gouvernements des pays en développement refusent d'entrer dans un tel système à court terme. De nombreux universitaires et d'autres parties prenantes, y compris la Commission européenne, ont de ce fait proposé pour les pays en développement plusieurs types d'engagements qui paraissent moins contraignants, comme les approches sectorielles. Nous fournissons une évaluation macroéconomique d'une telle approche sectorielle appliquée aux pays en développement. Nous examinons en particulier deux scénarios dans lesquels les pays développés maintiennent les engagements absolus de type Kyoto, tandis que les pays en développement adoptent un système d'échange de quotas d'émissions limité à la production d'électricité et lié au système de quotas échangeables des pays développés. Dans le premier scenario, les quotas de CO2 sont mis aux enchères par le gouvernement, qui distribue forfaitairement le produit des enchères aux ménages. Dans le deuxième scenario, les revenus de la vente aux enchères sont utilisés pour réduire les impôts sur la production d'électricité ou pour subventionner cette dernière. L'analyse quantitative présentée, obtenue par un modèle d'équilibre général, montre que ces options apportent presqu'autant de réductions d'émissions qu'un système mondial de plafonnement-échange. De plus, dans le second scenario sectoriel, les pertes de PIB dans les pays en développement sont bien plus faibles qu'avec un système mondial de quotas échangeables et il en est de même de l'impact sur le prix de l'électricité.

International audience ; Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price. ; Bien qu'un système mondial de quotas échangeables soit considéré par de nombreux chercheurs comme la solution la plus efficace pour réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, les gouvernements des pays en développement refusent d'entrer dans un tel système à court terme. De nombreux universitaires et d'autres parties prenantes, y compris la Commission européenne, ont de ce fait proposé pour les pays en développement plusieurs types d'engagements qui paraissent moins contraignants, comme les approches sectorielles. Nous fournissons une évaluation macroéconomique d'une telle approche sectorielle appliquée aux pays en développement. Nous examinons en particulier deux scénarios dans lesquels les pays développés maintiennent les engagements absolus de type Kyoto, tandis que les pays en développement adoptent un système d'échange de quotas d'émissions limité à la production d'électricité et lié au système de quotas échangeables des pays développés. Dans le premier scenario, les quotas de CO2 sont mis aux enchères par le gouvernement, qui distribue forfaitairement le produit des enchères aux ménages. Dans le deuxième scenario, les revenus de la vente aux enchères sont utilisés pour réduire les impôts sur la production d'électricité ou pour subventionner cette dernière. L'analyse quantitative présentée, obtenue par un modèle d'équilibre général, montre que ces options apportent presqu'autant de réductions d'émissions qu'un système mondial de plafonnement-échange. De plus, dans le second scenario sectoriel, les pertes de PIB dans les pays en développement sont bien plus faibles qu'avec un système mondial de quotas échangeables et il en est de même de l'impact sur le prix de l'électricité.

International audience ; Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the governments of developing countries refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have thus proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. A macroeconomic assessment of such a sectoral approach is provided for developing countries. Two policy scenarios in particular are assessed, in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, while developing countries adopt an emissions trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade systems. In the first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes its revenues as a lump sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction revenues are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. The quantitative analysis, conducted with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emissions reduction as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system, as is also the effect on the electricity price. ; Bien qu'un système mondial de quotas échangeables soit considéré par de nombreux chercheurs comme la solution la plus efficace pour réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre, les gouvernements des pays en développement refusent d'entrer dans un tel système à court terme. De nombreux universitaires et d'autres parties prenantes, y compris la Commission européenne, ont de ce fait proposé pour les pays en développement plusieurs types d'engagements qui paraissent moins contraignants, comme les approches sectorielles. Nous fournissons une évaluation macroéconomique d'une telle approche sectorielle appliquée aux pays en développement. Nous examinons en particulier deux scénarios dans lesquels les pays développés maintiennent les engagements absolus de type Kyoto, tandis que les pays en développement adoptent un système d'échange de quotas d'émissions limité à la production d'électricité et lié au système de quotas échangeables des pays développés. Dans le premier scenario, les quotas de CO2 sont mis aux enchères par le gouvernement, qui distribue forfaitairement le produit des enchères aux ménages. Dans le deuxième scenario, les revenus de la vente aux enchères sont utilisés pour réduire les impôts sur la production d'électricité ou pour subventionner cette dernière. L'analyse quantitative présentée, obtenue par un modèle d'équilibre général, montre que ces options apportent presqu'autant de réductions d'émissions qu'un système mondial de plafonnement-échange. De plus, dans le second scenario sectoriel, les pertes de PIB dans les pays en développement sont bien plus faibles qu'avec un système mondial de quotas échangeables et il en est de même de l'impact sur le prix de l'électricité.

Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, developing countries governments refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Hence, many scholars and stakeholders, including the European Commission, have proposed various types of commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches. In this paper, we assess such a sectoral approach for developing countries. More precisely, we simulate two policy scenarios in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, whereas developing countries adopt an emission trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade system. In a first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes the auctions receipts lump-sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction receipts are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation. Our quantitative analysis, led with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options provide almost as much emission reductions as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than with a global cap-and-trade system and so is the impact on the electricity price.