Search results

This article deals with the allez and retour provisions (Claes 2005: 84 f) of the Swedish constitution in relation to IU membership. What are the rules governing the transfer of sovereignty to the Union? And what are the provisions for assessing the constitutionality of the incoming tide of Union law into the domestic legal order? I have three objects in this essay. First, to describe how these two groups of constitutional rules were actually modified in the 2010 revision of the 1974 Instrument of Government. 1 find that neither was changed in any material way. Second, to try to explain the apparent reluctance of the parties involved to clarify the constitutional implications of EU membership. I find that this reluctance is rooted in a belief that European integration is not furthered if the rules contained in the allez and retour provisions are made stricter and more precise. Third, to confront a question conspicuously omitted by the parties in their revision: namely, by what criterion should the allez. and retour provisions be intertwined, if an optimum of hi-level constitutionalism is to be achieved? I argue that, in the end, the underlying issue is whether Swedish citizens want to see the principle of free movement applied as widely as possible. Do they want this principle to be applied across the board? Or would they prefer instead to restrict its application to the case of capital and goods, thus leaving them free to structure the labour market and welfare state as they themselves see fit? Adapted from the source document.

This article explores the ongoing debate on whether popular government is a continually improving or a continually deteriorating constitutional principle in Scandinavian politics. In particular, three recent articles that address this question are reviewed. One puts an almost entirely positive light on developments in Denmark. By contrast, the authors of the articles on Sweden and Norway are less inclined to see any parallel between economic growth, a sustainable welfare state and good public finances, on the one hand, and improved popular government, on the other. The aim here is to bring some clarity into this paradoxical picture by distinguishing between popular government as such and the prerequisites for popular government's long‐term legitimacy. What makes popular government self‐reinforcing, this article concludes, is the underlying, more fruitful question to pose. This query should be brought into the open and answered.