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Medicare, a United States social insurance program operated by the United States federal government, began operating in a deficit in the year 2010. More funding was expended than revenue received for medical care, creating significant shortfalls for the Medicare Trust Fund. This study examined possible initiatives to describe Medicare funding related to issues as financial shortfalls utilizing mathematical modeling and simulation. The Park Conceptual Model is a framework created to identify internal and external changes that influence bankruptcies related to municipalities, and this Model served as the theoretical basis for this study. The following study addressed insolvency as negative cash flow and solvency as positive cash flow for the Medicare Trust Fund measured in United States dollars. Independent variables included: age increases, tax increases, and fraud reduction. These variables were modeled individually and in combinations to simulate Medicare revenue impacts in relationship to solvency that equate to break even or positive revenue for the Medicare Trust Fund. Mathematical models and multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine if Medicare solvency could be obtained for years 2013 to 2030. The results from this study demonstrate that a 2.9% Medicare payroll tax increase prevented Medicare insolvency for years 2013 to 2030.

AbstractThis article examines how coalition forces sought to weaponise the counting of civilian casualties in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2014. Drawing on interviews with senior coalition officials, recently declassified documents, and coalition data on civilian harm, it will explain how these figures were used to calibrate the violence inflicted on the Afghan people, ensuring that commanders applied sufficient force to achieve their objectives without causing unnecessary harm to civilians and jeopardising the success of military operations. The article examines the formation of the Civilian Casualty Tracking Cell (CCTC), which was created by General David McKiernan in 2008. It also traces the formation of the Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT), which was established by General John Allen in 2011. Furthermore, it explores how this data was deployed by coalition officials to minimise civilian harm where possible and to rationalise this harm where necessary. Rather than simply documenting the death and destruction, these counts were complicit in the violence experienced by Afghan civilians, helping to enable and enhance the effectiveness of military operations. As such, I argue that these counts failed to contest the violence of war or the continued dehumanisation of Afghan civilians.

AbstractIn my contribution to this forum, I want to focus on the silencing of human shields within the prevailing frames of war/law. Focusing on the destruction of al-Jalaa tower by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), I argue that Human Shields: A History of People in the Line of Fire enables us to see how the figure of the human shield was invoked to legitimize this violence whilst denying the victims a voice within debates about the harm inflicted upon them. Although the book enables us to trace how the discourse on human shielding works to dehumanize and depoliticize the victims, I encourage the authors to think about the silences and omissions in their own work and to think about what could be done to contest these silences. I draw on the work of Gayatri Spivak, Jacques Rancière, and Banu Bargu to illustrate my concerns about the problem and potential solutions to this problem.

Coalition forces have spent upwards of $50 million on condolence payments to Afghan and Iraqi civilians. These condolence payments were intended as an expression of sympathy rather than an admission of fault, and the programme itself has been criticised for the arbitrary, inconsistent, and low valuation of civilian lives. Rather than focus on the practical problems associated with condolence payments or normative arguments about whether belligerents ought to compensate those harmed, this article will trace the strategic imperatives that underpinned this programme and shaped its development. As coalition forces began to recognise the strategic costs of civilian casualties, they used a variety of tactics to mitigate the effects of civilian casualties on the success of military operations. This article will argue that condolence payments should not be seen as a humanitarian gesture designed to recognise and respond to the suffering of ordinary civilians, but will argue that condolence payments should be viewed as a weapons system aimed at securing specific military goals. As such, this article will argue that condolence payments continued to objectify and devalue the lives of Afghans and Iraqis by treating them as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves.

AbstractCoalition forces have spent upwards of $50 million on condolence payments to Afghan and Iraqi civilians. These condolence payments were intended as an expression of sympathy rather than an admission of fault, and the programme itself has been criticised for the arbitrary, inconsistent, and low valuation of civilian lives. Rather than focus on the practical problems associated with condolence payments or normative arguments about whether belligerents ought to compensate those harmed, this article will trace the strategic imperatives that underpinned this programme and shaped its development. As coalition forces began to recognise the strategic costs of civilian casualties, they used a variety of tactics to mitigate the effects of civilian casualties on the success of military operations. This article will argue that condolence payments should not be seen as a humanitarian gesture designed to recognise and respond to the suffering of ordinary civilians, but will argue that condolence payments should be viewed as a weapons system aimed at securing specific military goals. As such, this article will argue that condolence payments continued to objectify and devalue the lives of Afghans and Iraqis by treating them as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves.

Between 2006 and 2007 an average of one Iraqi civilian was killed or injured at a coalition checkpoint each day. In many cases, civilians were shot because soldiers had misinterpreted their behaviour as hostile or as a demonstration of hostile intent. In other words, the soldiers responsible thought that they were acting in self-defence against an imminent threat. Some analysts have argued that these killings can be explained by ambiguities in the rules of engagement, but such explanations wrongly assume that the decision to kill is a purely rational calculation. Drawing upon the work of Sara Ahmed, William Connolly and George Yancy, I will argue that the interpretation of hostile intent and the decision to use lethal force are affective judgements rather than purely conscious decisions and, as such, are shaped by feelings, moods and intuitions. Moreover, I will argue that these judgements are never entirely neutral but clouded by a set of pre-existing assumptions that mark certain bodies as dangerous before they even have a chance to act. Drawing upon an archive of incident reports filed in the aftermath of these shootings and interviews with former soldiers, this article will show how seemingly innocuous behaviours were so readily mistaken for hostile acts with decidedly deadly consequences for the local population.

There has been renewed interest in the relationship between ethics and war. Traditionally, it has been thought that a robust set of principles could reduce the overall destructiveness of war but a growing body of more critical scholarship argues that it may actually enhance it. This article reviews three recent books on the ethics of war by Adil Ahmad Haque, Maja Zehfuss and James Eastwood. Defending more conventional accounts, Haque sets out to develop a normative framework that can be used to assess, clarify and refine the existing rules. Zehfuss and Eastwood, by contrast, argue that the invocation of ethics may work to legitimise, normalise and obscure the effects of this violence. This article suggests ways in which these texts might help to reinvigorate debates about ethics and war, opening up lines of inquiry that were previously foreclosed.

On 15 January 2010, two soldiers killed an unarmed boy in the Afghan village of La Mohammad Kalay before dismembering his body and posing for photographs with his corpse. Although the soldiers were eventually sentenced to prison for their involvement in this attack and two other incidents, very little has been said about the nature of the violence they inflicted on the bodies of their victims. Drawing on the work of the Italian feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero, this article will explore the violence inflicted by the so-called Afghan Kill Team, focusing particular attention on the ethical questions posed by a violence that 'overshoots the elementary goal of taking a life and dedicates itself to destroying the living being as a singular body' (Cavarero, 2011: 12). I will argue that this level of violence is no longer concerned with questions of life and death, but seeks to destroy the body as body, challenging the ways in which we have traditionally conceptualised the pain and suffering caused by war. This argument will refocus our attention on the constitutive vulnerability of the body, as well as the processes of dehumanisation that leave certain bodies more vulnerable than others.