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This Element describes Latin American innovations in trials and truth commissions, evaluating both the Huntingtonian and Justice Cascade approaches; influential in showing variation in TJ outcomes. It argues that scholars should complement these approaches with one that recognizes the importance of state capacity building and institutional change.

"Courts in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

Interviews play a pivotal role in process tracing (PT) by allowing researchers to delve deep into the intricacies of agency, inter-agent interactions and relationships, and the processes underlying meaning and decision-making. These dimensions are essential for evaluating process theories connecting causes to outcomes in specific cases. Testing theoretical arguments via PT bears implications for how we conceive interviewing. We provide recommendations for scholars to design interview research aligned with PT best practices, focusing on sampling and the design of interview protocols, and being sensitive to differences between PT approaches. Aligning interviews with PT's specific requirements strengthens the weight and inferential power of evidence. While the methodological foundations of PT and related data analysis techniques are well-documented in the literature, there is still a gap concerning data collection and generation. We aim to address this by encouraging process tracers to think systematically about their interviewing plans at the design stage.

AbstractAs nationalist sentiments gain traction globally, the attitudinal and institutional foundations of the international liberal order face new challenges. One manifestation of this trend is the growing backlash against international courts. Defenders of the liberal order struggle to articulate compelling reasons for why states, and their citizens, should continue delegating authority to international institutions. This article probes the effectiveness of arguments that emphasise the appropriateness and benefits of cooperation in containing preferences for backlash among the mass public. We rely on IR theories that explain why elites create international institutions to derive three sets of arguments that could be deployed to boost support for international courts. We then use experimental methods to test their impact on support for backlash against the European Court of Human Rights in Britain (ECtHR). First, in line with principal‐agent models of delegation, we find that information about the court's reliability as an 'agent' boosts support for the ECtHR, but less so information that signals Britain's status as a principal. Second, in line with constructivist approaches, associating support for the court with the position of an in‐group state like Denmark, and opposition with an out‐group state like Russia, also elicits more positive attitudes. This finding points to the importance of 'blame by association' and cues of in/out‐group identity in building support for cooperation. The effect is stronger when we increase social pressure by providing information about social attitudes towards Denmark and Russia in Britain, where the public overwhelmingly trusts the Danes and distrusts the Russians. Finally, in contrast to Liberal explanations for the creation of the ECtHR, the study finds no evidence that highlighting the court's mission to promote democracy and international peace contains backlash. We show that the positive effects of the first two arguments are not driven by pre‐treatment attitudes such as political sophistication, patriotism, internationalism, institutional trust or political preferences.

Scholars who conduct process tracing often face the problem of missing data. The inability to document key steps in their causal chains makes it difficult to validate theoretical models. In this article, we conceptualize "missingness" as it relates to process tracing, describe different scenarios in which it is pervasive, and present three ways of addressing the problem. First, researchers should contextualize the data generation process. This requires characterizing the process whereby the actors that populate models decide whether to leave traces of their actions and motives. Researchers can thus assess whether or not incentives to produce missingness are compatible with the microfoundations of the theory, and consequently, whether or not missingness is disconfirmatory. Second, researchers may invest in indirect tests of causal mechanisms. Generating out-of-context data about microfoundations offers a plausible window into inaccessible mechanisms. Third, specifying the analytical status of steps in the causal chain allows scholars to make up for deficiencies in evidentiary support.

"Clientelism in Latin American Politics" published on by Oxford University Press.

AbstractFoundations provide key funds for nongovernmental organizations. We know little about what they do for transnational activism or the mechanisms via which they seek/achieve influence. We carve a middle ground between those who see donors as supporting actors in transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and those who think they distort activism through impersonal market forces. Our negotiation-oriented approach looks at the micro-dynamics of donor–grantee relations. We argue that influence is a function of donors' organizational characteristics. Only some, especially foundations, have the vision/means to shape grantees. However, internal complexity can cause coordination problems, complicating influence. Additionally, if many donors exist, recipients' leverage increases. It does so too if their expertise is in short supply. Using archival evidence, we reconstruct how Ford tried to shape the Inter-American Human Rights Institute, a pillar of the region's human rights regime, and the factors conditioning success. For Ford, the Institute could play a role in a fledging TAN, but only if it downplayed its emphasis on research and directly engaged activists. Coupled with analyses of USAID's relationship with the Institute and Ford's relationship with Americas Watch, we shed light on the activities of an important class of donor and illuminate foundations' role in the development of TANs.

AbstractCourts prosecuting corruption serve a critical horizontal accountability function, but they can also play a role in moments of vertical accountability when voters can sanction corrupt candidates. This article documents the strategic use of corruption lawsuits, demonstrating the presence of an electoral cycle in filing new corruption accusations against politicians. Using an original dataset of daily corruption complaints filed in federal courts against members of Argentina's main political coalitions between 2013 and 2021, we document increased corruption accusations against and by politicians in the periods immediately preceding an election. A second dataset of daily media coverage of corruption accusations in two leading newspapers suggests that corruption is more salient before elections, offering politicians a temporal focal point to prepare and launch especially impactful lawsuits. Our findings shed new light on using courts for accountability and debates about the so-called 'lawfare' in Latin America.

Anti-vote-buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same degree, or does the mass public have a more conditional view of the acceptability of vote buying? We theorize that normative evaluations of vote buying vary based on individuals' understanding of the transaction itself and abstract societal costs associated with the practice. We assess this perspective using survey experiments conducted in several Latin American countries that present hypothetical vote-buying situations for evaluation by respondents, varying the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client and the client's political predispositions. We find that the disapproval of vote buying is highly conditional on the attributes of the hypothetical client and that evaluations of vote buying depend on conceptions of the concrete benefits and abstract costs of vote buying as a part of electoral politics. Adapted from the source document.

Anti‐vote‐buying campaigns led by NGOs and political elites denounce the practice as a crass economic transaction detrimental to democracy. Do potential clients stigmatize vote buying to the same degree, or does the mass public have a more conditional view of the acceptability of vote buying? We theorize that normative evaluations of vote buying vary based on individuals' understanding of the transaction itself and abstract societal costs associated with the practice. We assess this perspective using survey experiments conducted in several Latin American countries that present hypothetical vote‐buying situations for evaluation by respondents, varying the socioeconomic status of the hypothetical client and the client's political predispositions. We find that the disapproval of vote buying is highly conditional on the attributes of the hypothetical client and that evaluations of vote buying depend on conceptions of the concrete benefits and abstract costs of vote buying as a part of electoral politics.