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"Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Theories and Empirical Evidence" published on by Oxford University Press.

This article examines the implications of possession of nuclear weapons for war between India and Pakistan. Existing literature derived from us-Soviet interaction during the Cold War may have little relevance to conflicts between developing nations with small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals. Applying power cycle theory within a regional context, this study explores possible global ramifications of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Power cycle theory suggests that Indo-Pakistani military competition may accelerate shifts in the relative power trends throughout Asia, causing abrupt changes in future foreign policy expectations and security that could ultimately affect the nuclear programs of both Russia and the United States.

The relationship between dyadic power balances and the onset of war is a principal element in realist theories of international politics. The influence of the status quo orientation of the belligerents has also been specified in power transition theory as a factor which impacts on the patterns of conflict. However, despite this theoretical underpinning, the question of the probabilistic identity of war initiators constitutes a gap in the understanding of factors associated with international conflict. This study examines the identity of war initiators as it relates to both power balances and status quo orientation for a set of nation-dyads that have formed long-term rivalries. The results of the analysis indicate that for rival dyads: (1) status quo challengers rather than defenders are the most probable war initiators; (2) status quo challengers are equally likely to initiate wars whether they are superior or inferior in capabilities to their rivals; and (3) status quo defenders initiate wars almost solely under unstable military balances. This last pattern suggests that stable military balances of either preponderance or parity are generally interpreted by status quo defenders as supportive of deterrence, whereas unstable balances producing capability shifts or transitions are deemed dangerous enough to provoke preemptive military action. The distribution is such that it approximates a necessary condition for the initiation of war by the status quo defender in an enduring rivalry. All three of the above findings are consistent with A.F.K. Organski's original formulation of power transition theory.

Most theories of war and lesser forms of international conflict rest on assumptions of rational choice. Moreover, many of these explanations explicitly incorporate decision maker estimates of relative power among competitors. However, a major theory of great power war-power transition theory-postulates initiation by the weaker contender. This study demonstrates that among the strongest states an interactive relationship exists between the static power balance, differential growth rates in capabilities, and conflict initiation: initiation patterns are associated with changes in a state's relative military/economic power and power potential. The findings are consistent with the inherent logic of power transition theory and are consonant with an assumption of rational calculation in decisions involving conflict initiation. The results may be interpreted as reinforcing the realist contention that a shifting power balance is of critical significance among the causes of war and peace.