Search results

In an effort to contribute to our knowledge of managing territorial disputes, I demonstrate the effects of territory on third party initiated mediation. My findings suggest that previous arguments regarding territorial disputes and mediation are too simplistic. Explaining the effects of territory without consideration of third party characteristics and interaction terms leads to a completely different set of conclusions about the nature of territorial disputes than when these two sets of variables are considered. An analysis of the two different empirical models suggests strong linkages between third party interests and territorial disputes compared to disputes over other issues.

Motivations for conflict management are rarely discussed in terms of commitments that potential third-parties have toward one or both disputants. The current study addresses this lacuna by examining how alliance designs affect conflict management behavior. Specifically, we argue that third-party states' willingness to manage interstate conflicts depends on both the existence and depth of an alliance relationship. We test this argument using data on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. We find that allies are more likely than non-allies to manage their partner's disputes. Underneath this aggregate relationship, however, we also find that the depth of alliance commitments strongly influences this behavior. Deeper commitments - both across and within alliance types - increase the likelihood of conflict management significantly. Adapted from the source document.

Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946–2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict.

Research on interstate mediation tends to assume (implicitly) that regional factors have little effect on the occurrence of mediation. We relax this assumption and advance an explicit regional theory of mediation in which regional ties create a type of bias that motivates both (potential) third parties to mediate conflicts within their region and disputants to select or accept these regional actors as mediators more frequently than non-regional actors. This bias first appears when states belong to the same region. In such situations, the potential third party and disputants likely understand one another better and share common security concerns. Yet regional membership does not explain the variation in mediation behavior within regions. To account for this, we argue that regionally more powerful states, as well as those that share (regional) institutional memberships with the disputants, have greater incentives to mediate than some regional counterparts. We empirically test the effect of these characteristics on the likelihood of mediation in militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. Our findings uncover support for our argument and suggest that accounting for regional bias is important in explaining mediation patterns in interstate conflict. Adapted from the source document.