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Purpose
This paper aims to study how the timing of these decisions affects the total profit and the individual profits of the two agents.


Design/methodology/approach
This paper study a supply chain for a network good where there is a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price and its share in the retailer's advertising cost while the retailer decides the retail price and the advertising cost.


Findings
This paper finds that a stronger network externality leads to higher prices and higher advertising efforts. This increases the profits of both manufacturer and retailer, but the manufacturer's share of advertising costs depends on the order in which the supply chain enterprise make their decisions, the strength of network externality and the effect of advertising determines which decision timeline results in a higher price and greater advertising effort. The manufacturer prefers the price decision to be made before the advertising decision, while the retailer prefers these decisions to be made simultaneously.


Research limitations/implications
Although this paper studies the price and advertising decision-making order preferences of channel members based on network externalities, this research can also be expanded from the following aspects based on network effects. First, network externality affects advertising cooperation between both parties in the situation such that the pricing power of retail prices is transferred from the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer relies on revenue sharing (revenue sharing contract, nonwholesale price contract. Second, the manufacturer dominates the issues in the supply chain, but in reality, a retailer can also be the dominator or there are no dominators (Nash equilibrium). Finally, it is possible to consider pricing and advertising decisions in situations where two manufacturers or retailers compete.


Practical implications
When the price is reasonable, advertising investment is the main determinant of product sales. The greater the intensity of network externalities the more retailers will be willing to invest in advertising. An increase in the intensity of network externalities may not necessarily enhance manufacturers' motivation or cooperative advertising, but it depends on the decision-making sequence. The strength of network externalities determines the decision-making sequence preferences of supply chain channel members whose preferences vary leading to conflicts of interest.


Originality/value
The impact of cooperative advertising or decision sequence on corporate decision-making has not been considered. To fill this gap, the paper integrates network externality and supply chain cooperative advertising models, focusing on the impact of network externality on pricing and advertising decisions, as well as on the sequence of decisions.

AbstractIn a typical assemble‐to‐order system, a customer order may request multiple items, and the order may not be filled if any of the requested items are out of stock. A key customer service measure when unfilled orders are backordered is the order‐based backorder level. To evaluate this crucial performance measure, a fundamental question is whether the stationary joint inventory positions follow an independent and uniform distribution. In this context, this is equivalent to the irreducibility of the Markov chain formed by the joint inventory positions. This article presents a necessary and sufficient condition for the irreducibility of such a Markov chain through a set of simultaneous Diophantine equations. This result also leads to sufficient conditions that are more general than those in the published reports. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011