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Why we need to look beyond Putin to understand how today's Russia actually worksMedia and public discussion tends to understand Russian politics as a direct reflection of Vladimir Putin's seeming omnipotence or Russia's unique history and culture. Yet Russia is remarkably similar to other autocracies—and recognizing this illuminates the inherent limits to Putin's power. Weak Strongman challenges the conventional wisdom about Putin's Russia, highlighting the difficult trade-offs that confront the Kremlin on issues ranging from election fraud and repression to propaganda and foreign policy.Drawing on three decades of his own on-the-ground experience and research as well as insights from a new generation of social scientists that have received little attention outside academia, Timothy Frye reveals how much we overlook about today's Russia when we focus solely on Putin or Russian exceptionalism. Frye brings a new understanding to a host of crucial questions: How popular is Putin? Is Russian propaganda effective? Why are relations with the West so fraught? Can Russian cyber warriors really swing foreign elections? In answering these and other questions, Frye offers a highly accessible reassessment of Russian politics that highlights the challenges of governing Russia and the nature of modern autocracy.Rich in personal anecdotes and cutting-edge social science, Weak Strongman offers the best evidence available about how Russia actually works

Secure property rights are central to economic development and stable government, yet difficult to create. Relying on surveys in Russia from 2000 to 2012, Timothy Frye examines how political power, institutions, and norms shape property rights for firms. Through a series of simple survey experiments, Property Rights and Property Wrongs explores how political power, personal connections, elections, concerns for reputation, legal facts, and social norms influence property rights disputes from hostile corporate takeovers to debt collection to renationalization. This work argues that property rights in Russia are better seen as an evolving bargain between rulers and rightholders than as simply a reflection of economic transition, Russian culture, or a weak state. The result is a nuanced view of the political economy of Russia that contributes to central debates in economic development, comparative politics, and legal studies

The political logic of economic and institutional reform -- Political polarization and economic inequality -- The pace and consistency of reform -- Political polarization and economic growth -- Political polarization and policy instability: the view from the firm -- Nationalism and endogenous polarization -- Russia: polarization, autocracy, and reform -- Bulgaria: polarization, democracy, and reform -- Poland: robust democracy and rapid reform -- Uzbekistan: autocracy and inconsistent gradualism

Introduction: the problem of social order -- Institutions and social order: sociological and economic approaches -- Self-governance and social order: a more political approach -- Benign neglect: self-governance on currency futures markets -- The meddlesome Leviathan: self-governance on the commodities markets -- Toward a politics of social order: self-governance on the equities market -- What governs? Organizational competition and the weak Russian state -- State policy and self-governance: the political roots of social order -- The Bear's bear: institutional developments and the crash of 1998 -- Conclusion: social order and social science

Does democracy promote the creation of market economies and robust state institutions? Do state-building and market-building go hand in hand? Or do they work at cross-purposes? This book examines the relationship between state-building and market-building in 25 post-communist countries from 1990 to 2004. Based on cross-national statistical analyses, surveys of business managers, and case studies from Russia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Uzbekistan, Timothy Frye demonstrates that democracy is associated with more economic reform, stronger state institutions, and higher social transfers when political polarization is low. But he also finds that increases in political polarization dampen the positive impact of democracy by making policy less predictable. He traces the roots of political polarization to high levels of income inequality and the institutional legacy of communist rule. By identifying when and how democracy fosters markets and states, this work contributes to long-standing debates in comparative politics, public policy, and post-communist studies

How do citizens respond to extreme violations of democratic institutions, such as the January 6th, 2021 insurrection at the US Capitol? Using an online survey of 900 employed respondents conducted January 5–9, 2021, I find that those interviewed just hours after the insurrection were about 10% points less likely to identify as Republicans, reported greater dislike for Donald Trump, and expressed less attachment to conservatism even controlling for prior levels of party identification. Self-reported Trump voters interviewed after the insurrection were also less likely to identify as Republican and expressed a less favorable view of Donald Trump. The findings only reflect the short-term reactions of employed respondents but are robust to alternative specifications and the very narrow temporal window of the analyses helps to isolate the impact of the insurrection. These results offer evidence in the on-going debate over how to interpret the events of January 6th, 2021.