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Abstract
Despite the flurry of democratic transitions in the 1990s, the African political arena continues to be dominated by Big-Man rulers who have appropriated and embraced many of the personalistic traits of their predecessors. This is demonstrated, among others, by leaders who seek to circumvent the new constitutional rules to prolong their hold on power. The perpetuation of personalism and deep-rooted presidentialism has led numerous observers to contend that these powerful and personalized forms of rule are reflective of the wider African political culture that is disposed to accept personal rule. Thus far, the argument that ordinary Africans are supportive of personal rule has been based primarily on the inability of elections to dislodge many of the Africa's strongmen from power without directly testing the attitudes and opinions of ordinary Africans about the type of leadership that they have and want. Using data from five waves of surveys covering a total of 15 countries that were carried out in 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2014, we examine popular attitudes on the type and nature of leadership that is preferred by ordinary African citizens. The findings show that while most Africans recognize the prevalence of powerful and personalistic rule, they nonetheless overwhelmingly reject these forms of leadership. Africans, in other words, are not getting the type of leadership they want.

Between 20 and 22 May 2014, over five million Malawians participated in the fifth election since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1994. For the first time since 1994 voters simultaneously cast ballots for president, members of parliament, and local government councilors. Turnout was consistent with earlier multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections, with 71% of registered voters casting votes. Although election day passed peacefully at most polling centers, there were isolated cases of violence in Malawi's two largest cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe as voters protested shortages of voting materials at several polling stations. This forced the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) to extend voting for an additional two days in 45 of 4445 polling centers. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

Four African leaders died in 2012. This article explores the constellation of factors that together led to a constitutional succession after President Bingu wa Mutharika's death in Malawi, despite plotting by the late President's allies to circumvent the constitution and install their own candidate over Vice-President Joyce Banda. We present data on executive deaths in office since 1961 and executive transfers of power 2010-12 in order to situate the Malawi transition within the broader African context, and draw especially on comparisons to executive successions that followed the death-in-office of presidents in Nigeria (2010) and Zambia (2008). We assert from these cases that constitutional provisions on executive succession are necessary in precipitating peaceful transitions, but also argue that periods of delay indicate that such provisions are insufficient on their own. We contend that presidential death is more likely to lead to transition than presidential incapacity. The Malawian case in particular illustrates how a constitutional transition requires support from key actors, particularly the Cabinet, military leaders, judiciary, civil society, and the independent media. Public rejection of military or authoritarian rule, and the growing precedent for constitutional succession in Africa, are additional drivers of peaceful transitions. Adapted from the source document.

In comparative politics, economic development is a requisite to democracy (Lipset, 1959). Democracy is deemed to fail in less developed countries as poverty has proven to be detrimental to democratic performance. This study offers a perspective on the effects of poverty on the fate of democracy in Africa. Models are estimated for the Poverty-Democracy linkages using variables derived from merged Afrobarometer survey data (2002-2018). The results indicate that poverty in Africa has a mixed effect on democracy more generally. In particular, the analysis indicates that the experience of poverty, which we have termed 'lived poverty', has a negative effect on demand and supply of democracy as well as on a number of attributes of political participation. The fact that the poor demand democracy less than the well-to-do while at the same time perceiving limited supply of democracy, in our view explains why more African regimes are consolidating as hybrid regimes instead of moving towards democratic consolidation

Abstract
After the re-introduction of multiparty system of governance in Malawi in 1993, ethnic associations have become popular for mobilising and re-asserting identity. Some of the most notable ethnic associations are Chewa Heritage Foundation, Mulhakho wa Alhomwe, and Mzimba Heritage Association. These associations mainly claim that their establishment is mainly to promote and preserve their culture while some go further to add that they also aim at facilitating socio-economic development of its membership or community. At the center of this mobilisation process are highly publicised annual cultural festivals which bring together members of the ethnic community led by their traditional leaders and political figures. This paper discusses the ethnic mobilisation through cultural associations in Malawi. The paper examines key actors, their roles and interests. The paper also discusses implications of ethnic groups on mobilisation for national building.