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Abstract
When, and for whom, does it pay to make high-quality products? This article models how quality competition incentivizes producers to make products of particular qualities. Quality is defined as an abstract property of products that explains relative markups on prices that buyers will pay for otherwise comparable goods. Relative differences in quality sustain interlinked quality niches whose appeal to producers vary. The ordering of niches by quality and its implications for profitability establish the market's quality order of production. The model yields testable predictions for the locus of quality-related innovations. An analysis of the bottle closures used on 52 880 German wines by 1028 winemakers in three winemaking regimes supports the general claim that, and a specific claim as to how, quality competition incentivizes producers to pursue different quality-related strategies. The presented model situates quality competition and the socially embedded quality order of production at the heart of a socio-economic account of markets.

Virtualization fundamentally changes how social relations form, but its effect on network structure in collaborative teams is poorly understood. This paper compares team networks from nine government-funded projects that were conducted virtually because of the COVID-19 pandemic with 15 prepandemic projects from the same funding program. Results of our comparative analysis of 2,746 dyadic ties in 24 teams showed lower levels of network density, clustering, and structural cohesion in virtualized projects, indicating fragmented virtual teams. Furthermore, expressive networks, defined by the sharing of personal information, were affected more than instrumental networks, which revolve around the sharing of expert knowledge.