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International audience ; Until recently, little attention has been paid to the consequences of Hume's theory of action upon intertemporal decision. Nonetheless, some of their specicities have been emphasized by G. Davis 2003, A. Lapidus 2000, 2010, and I. Palacios-Huerta 2003. Through recurring discussions, concerning situations of conicting choice between a close and a remote objective, which run from the Treatise, Book 2 (Hume 1739-40), to the second Enquiry (Hume 1751) to the Dissertation (Hume 1757), intertemporal decision appears, at least for a part of it, as an outcome of the role of the natural relation of contiguity in the formation of a structure of desires, dierent from the structure of pleasure. This paper shows, and expresses formally, that Hume's approach provides alternative conditions explaining on the one hand time-consistency and, on the other hand, time-inconsistency when the link between contiguity and the violence of the passions is taken into account. The possibility of time-inconsistency is acknowledged by Hume as giving rise to general aversion, therefore constituting a key argument for explaining the origin of government.

International audience ; Until recently, little attention has been paid to the consequences of Hume's theory of action upon intertemporal decision. Nonetheless, some of their specicities have been emphasized by G. Davis 2003, A. Lapidus 2000, 2010, and I. Palacios-Huerta 2003. Through recurring discussions, concerning situations of conicting choice between a close and a remote objective, which run from the Treatise, Book 2 (Hume 1739-40), to the second Enquiry (Hume 1751) to the Dissertation (Hume 1757), intertemporal decision appears, at least for a part of it, as an outcome of the role of the natural relation of contiguity in the formation of a structure of desires, dierent from the structure of pleasure. This paper shows, and expresses formally, that Hume's approach provides alternative conditions explaining on the one hand time-consistency and, on the other hand, time-inconsistency when the link between contiguity and the violence of the passions is taken into account. The possibility of time-inconsistency is acknowledged by Hume as giving rise to general aversion, therefore constituting a key argument for explaining the origin of government.

In this paper, we develop a Principal-Agent model to analyze the optimal composition of the compensation policy with both monetary and nonmonetary incentives. We characterize nonmonetary benefits as symbols to capture a large set of non-wage compensations such as fringe benefits, status, identity (or self-image) or even sanctions. We show that when the agent's preference relation over monetary and nonmonetary benefits is common knowledge to both parties, nonmonetary incentives are always more efficient, that is Pareto-dominate, monetary incentives. We also characterize the optimal composition of the compensation policy when the principal imperfectly knows the agent's preferences. In particular, we show that a fixed fringe benefits coupled with a variable wage improves profits under this imperfect knowledge structure. ; Cet article développe un modèle principal-agent pour analyser la composition optimale des politiques de rémunérations en présence d'incitations monétaires et non monétaires. On caractérise les bénéfices non monétaires comme des symboles pour capturer un ensemble large de compensations non monétaires telles que les avantages en natures, le statut, l'identité ou même les sanctions. Nous montrons que lorsque les préférence des agents sont de connaissance commune les incitaions non monétaires sont toujours plus efficaces que les incitations monétaires. Nous caractérisons également la compostion optimale du schéma de rémunération lorsque le principal ne connaît qu'imparfaitement les préférences des agents. En particulier, nous montrons que des avantages en nature fixes combinés à un salaire variable sont plus rentables pour le principal dans ce contexte.

In this paper, we develop a Principal-Agent model to analyze the optimal composition of the compensation policy with both monetary and nonmonetary incentives. We characterize nonmonetary benefits as symbols to capture a large set of non-wage compensations such as fringe benefits, status, identity (or self-image) or even sanctions. We show that when the agent's preference relation over monetary and nonmonetary benefits is common knowledge to both parties, nonmonetary incentives are always more efficient, that is Pareto-dominate, monetary incentives. We also characterize the optimal composition of the compensation policy when the principal imperfectly knows the agent's preferences. In particular, we show that a fixed fringe benefits coupled with a variable wage improves profits under this imperfect knowledge structure. ; Cet article développe un modèle principal-agent pour analyser la composition optimale des politiques de rémunérations en présence d'incitations monétaires et non monétaires. On caractérise les bénéfices non monétaires comme des symboles pour capturer un ensemble large de compensations non monétaires telles que les avantages en natures, le statut, l'identité ou même les sanctions. Nous montrons que lorsque les préférence des agents sont de connaissance commune les incitaions non monétaires sont toujours plus efficaces que les incitations monétaires. Nous caractérisons également la compostion optimale du schéma de rémunération lorsque le principal ne connaît qu'imparfaitement les préférences des agents. En particulier, nous montrons que des avantages en nature fixes combinés à un salaire variable sont plus rentables pour le principal dans ce contexte.