Search results

Aus russischer Sicht

The article examines the NATO «open door» policy in connection with the aggravated security dilemma and the strategic choice of Finland and Sweden. The socio-political moods in both countries that changed with start of the Russian special forces in Ukraine – towards choosing to join NATO and, accordingly, abandoning the traditional policy of non-alignment, became one of the key disturbing trends within the European security system and architecture. NATO's interest in Finland and Sweden making a decision to join the alliance puts them in a situation of tough choice, which rather cannot be postponed, but carries really high challenges and risks both for these countries and for the development of the military-political situation in Europe, including the risks of Russia – NATO escalation. The article shows that the problem of the status of Finland and Sweden in relations with NATO is not solely a consequence of the current escalation of the Ukrainian conflict. Scenarios for their entry into the alliance have been considered since at least the middle of the last decade, in connection with fundamental changes in Europe as a result of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014. Now both states must take into account, on the one hand, the «new norm» in Europe to which the alliance is appealing, as well as the risks of being left without a NATO umbrella in the event of a confrontational developments and crises, and on the other hand, other political and military risks owing to potential joining NATO option, which could undermine sovereignty and security of both.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the evolution, nature and content of Russia-EU political relations, formally established by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994. The paradigm of building a united Europe and a common European security space in line with overcoming post-bipolar confrontation and the emergence of post-Soviet Russia as well as the European Union, established in 1992, as new actors in international arena became the basis for their cooperative relations, which was built towards strategic partnership. It was strengthened at the turn of the 2000s, including on the basis of mutual strategies of relations, when Russia's "European choice" was declared and the EU's "new dynamics" in security and defense dimension were initiated. However, the NATO-centric model of European security and the policy of expanding Euro-Atlantic institutions to the East created a potential for conflict, and Russia-EU cooperation entered a phase of a latent crisis, especially as a result of differing interests in the so-called common neighborhood. Attempts at a new strategic start by the adoption of Russia-EU Roadmaps on the four common spaces and by planning the negotiations on a new basic agreement failed to overcome fundamental disagreements and contradictions. The Ukrainian conflict became the culmination of the Russian-European crisis and fundamentally changed the direction and content of Russia — EU relations. The defining of the future strategy of relations is becoming increasingly acute, which is considered in the article as a challenge of strategic choice for the parties. The author substantiates the prospect of overcoming the "new normality", which is boils down to maintaining a controlled mutual deterrence, although it does not exclude the option of terminating the Russia-EU legal relations ("breakesit").