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SummaryMajor overhauls of aid policies and institutions are comparatively rare. When they happen, they are usually ascribed to pressures arising from outside donor agencies. Where internal forces for change are identified, the focus is on field operatives rather than political entrepreneurs based in donor head offices. This article homes in on the role of the political entrepreneur and shows how this actor can help effect top‐down reforms to overseas development assistance. It does so by combining a political entrepreneurship perspective with a broader theorisation of policy change, historical institutionalism, and applying this innovative framework to French aid reforms over the years (2001–2010) when Jean‐Michel Severino was Managing Director of the Agence Française de Développement. It finds that, although historical institutionalism can explain the broad direction of French changes in terms of "structural factors" such as exogenous shocks and new institutional configurations, it struggles to account for incremental shifts and the emergence of "new" ideas. Political entrepreneurship addresses these issues through its emphasis on individual human agents and their operational and ideational strategies. It concludes that this relatively parsimonious framework could provide an enhanced understanding of other reforms in the international development field and beyond.

ABSTRACTAgainst the background of conflict in the Great Lakes Region, the UK and France promised, at their 1998 Saint-Malo summit, to set aside rivalries and cooperate on Africa. In subsequent Anglo-French gatherings, they singled out the DRC and pledged to work together there to promote peace and tackle poverty. This article asks whether this coordination took place and whether it involved a 'deconflictualisation' of approaches, 'coincidental' cooperation, or 'sustained and reciprocal' collaboration. It looks for evidence of institutionalisation of UK-French ties and policy cooperation in the fields of peacebuilding and poverty reduction. It then identifies the pressures for, and barriers to, collaboration, focusing particularly on the role of interests, foreign policy norms, institutional factors and resource constraints. It concludes by setting out the wider implications of UK-French cooperation and the limited prospects of closer future collaboration.