Search results

The primary purpose of this report is to explore the evolution of 's position on nuclear weapons, from its Post-War origins through until its contemporary contributions to the non-proliferation and disarmament agendas. Until recently, the origins of this topic have been the subject of omission or misrepresentation in Australian defence history, which, more often than not has neglected broader strategic policies in preference to celebrating particular events, episodes, tragedies and personalities. As a result, Australia's nuclear position has almost exclusively been associated with its well-publicized diplomatic non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. This, however, was not always the case. The ongoing release of declassified government documents from the Post-War and Cold War periods, aided by the commendable research efforts of numerous historians, has demonstrated the need for revision of this 'impeccable' image. Where it is commonly conceived that Australia remained on the peripheries of the Cold War arms race, this report sets out that from 1946-1972 successive Australian Cold War governments held strong interest in the possession of nuclear weapons, came remarkably close to possessing them, and were hostile to non-proliferation initiatives dating from the mid 1950's. These origins make Australia's commonly known position on nuclear weapons, that of a leading middle-power disarmament advocate, all the more remarkable. It amounts to a policy reversal that is almost unexplainable within the terms of traditional international relations scholarship. Where traditional (realist) theory stresses that in an anarchic, competitive international system, states always seek to maximise their own power against others, Australia's rejection of nuclear weapons amounts to the opposite. An alternative and more comprehensive analysis is possible within a social constructivist frame work. This approach has been adopted by the author, and in the interests of scholarly integrity, the theoretical assumptions of constructivism are (briefly) laid plain at the outset. Australia's contributions to non-proliferation and disarmament following its 1972 ratification of the Treaty against the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are also assessed. The secondary purpose of this report is to examine Australia's current status in non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, and to draw some conclusions about what role it should play in pursuit of these interrelated objectives into the 21st century. Here, the report argues that Australia has become inactive in its engagement with Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) on disarmament issues, and that this is incommensurate with the importance it claims to attribute to this goal.