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Confusion surrounding the appropriateness of long‐run considerations in effluent regulation has arisen in the literature and recently carried over into textbooks. We use a factor input model under oligopsony to show that, when firms can influence the level of marginal damages, a linear pollution tax does not satisfy the long‐run entry‐exit condition. Previous results to the contrary are shown to depend on restrictive assumptions. Efficient policy design requires a lump‐sum refund or any one of various non‐linear pricing schemes. JEL Classification: Q2, L1Il y a beaucoup de confusion dans les débats qui entourent la réglementation des effluents, et son caractère plus ou moins appropriéà long terme, tant dans la littérature spécialisée que dans les manuels. Les auteurs tentent d'éliminer cette confusion en analysant les émissions à l'aide d'un modèle standard de demande d'intrant. Quand les entreprises peuvent influencer la valeur présente des dommages marginaux, un impôt linéaire sur la pollution n'entraîne pas nécessairement les décisions appropriées d'entrée et de sortie. On peut corriger le problème à l'aide d'un remboursement forfaitaire ou de l'une ou l'autre des formes de tarification non‐linéaire.

Marginal-cost pricing of municipal water in water-scarce regions is both an efficient way to achieve conservation goals and an efficient revenue source for municipalities. Nevertheless, marginal-cost water pricing is quite unusual and often prohibited, probably because water revenues are perceived to have an unfairly regressive incidence. To examine the validity of this perception, Census data from San Antonio, Texas, is used to estimate the income elasticity of demand for water there. This result and similar estimates elsewhere suggest that the regressivity of water revenues compares favorably with published regressivity estimates for traditional municipal revenue sources. Moreover, a form of two-part water pricing is shown capable of increasing progressivity without inefficiency. Revenue under this pricing regime is flexible, which allows authorities to meet a range of preset revenue targets, trading off neither efficiency nor fairness.

Continuing concerns over air quality have prompted calls for governmental targeting of alternative fuels. This paper uses methanol targeting as an example to address the role for public policy in terms of underlying theory and policy options. The paper shows that mandates promoting a transition to alternative fuels are inferior to other policy alternatives. It proposes market‐based alternatives instead.