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Ronald L. Cohen Justice is a central moral standard in social life. It is invoked in judging individual persons and in judging the basic structure of societies. It has been described as akin to a "human hunger or thirst" (Pascal, Pensees, cited in Hirschman, 1982, p. 91), "more powerful than any physical hunger, and endlessly resilient" (Pitkin, 1981, p. 349). The most prominent contemporary theory of justice proceeds from the claim that justice is "the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is systems of thought" (Rawls, 1971, p. 3). However, as the following chapters demonstrate, justice has a complex and controversial history. If, as has been claimed, justice is a central category of human thought and a central aspect of human motivation, can it also be the case that to invoke justice is no more than "banging on the table: an emotional expression which turns one's demand into an absolute postulate" (Ross, 1959, p. 274)? If justice is the first virtue of social institutions, can the concept of social or economic justice at the same time be "entirely empty and meaningless" so that any attempt to employ it is "either thoughtless or fraudulent" (Hayek, 1976, pp. xi-xii)? In a formal sense, justice concerns ensuring that each person receives what she or he is due.

Recent social psychological work on procedural justice suggests that people given the opportunity to participate in a decision are more likely to see that decision as just than those given no such opportunity. The operation of this "fair process effect" in legal settings contributes to the legitimacy of those settings and to the stability of their structure over time. A similar, limited opportunity for participation by experimental subjects playing the role of employee in situations designed to model hierarchical, profit-oriented business enterprises produces a similar effect in some cases, but a 'frustration" effect in others. In this latter case, limited participation leads people to see the decision as less just than when no participation is allowed. Previous interpretations of these data neglect the possibility that those in the role of employees recognize a basic conflict of interest with employers in such enterprises and see limited participation as a strategic device to induce loyalty and commitment. This paper reinterprets these data in light of that possibility and argues that various forms of participation may benefit or harm the interests of employers and employees differently.

I Conflict, Power, and Justice -- 1 Cooperation, Conflict, and Justice -- 2 Justice and Power: An Exchange Analysis -- 3 Justice Considerations in Interpersonal Conflict -- 4 Power and Justice in Intergroup Relations -- II Theoretical Perspectives on Justice -- 5 Justice Ideology and Social Legitimation: A Revised Agenda for Psychological Inquiry -- 6 The Experience of Injustice: Toward a Better Understanding of its Phenomenology -- 7 Thinking about Justice and Dealing with One's Own Privileges: A Study of Existential Guilt -- 8 Rethinking Equity Theory: A Referent Cognitions Model -- III Norms and Justice -- 9 Social Context and Perceived Justice -- 10 Levels of Interest in the Study of Interpersonal Justice -- 11 The Need Principle of Distributive Justice -- 12 Group Categorization and Distributive Justice Decisions -- 13 Children's Use of Justice Principles in Allocation Situations: Focus on the Need Principle -- IV Applications of Justice Research -- 14 Two Rotten Apples Spoil the Justice Barrel -- 15 Justice as Fair and Equal Treatment before the Law: The Role of Individual Versus Group Decision Making -- 16 The Psychology of Leadership Evaluation -- 17 When Expectations and Justice Do Not Coincide: Blue-Collar Visions of a Just World -- 18 The Distributive Justice of Organizational Performance Evaluations -- Author Index.