Search results

This article analyzes the practice of opportunistic poaching of consultants by clients, with particular reference to the business consulting industry. The strategic interaction of consulting groups, client firms, and consultants gives rise to a market equilibrium in a mixed economy. Under very general conditions, whenever a match client‐consultant is formed, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where the consulting group pleases the client's request and the consultant is poached by the client. Thus, the equilibrium quality of the consulting services market does not depend only on the consulting group's assignment strategy but also on the clients' poaching behavior (consumption externality).

SUMMARY
This paper quantifies the macroeconomic effects of three major structural reforms (i.e. service sector liberalizations, incentives to innovation and civil justice reforms) undertaken in Italy in the last decade. We employ a novel approach that estimates the impact of each reform on total factor productivity (TFP) and markups in an empirical micro setting and uses these estimates in a dynamic general equilibrium model to simulate the macroeconomic effects of the reforms. Microeconometric estimates indicate that the reforms imply a sizeable increase in TFP and a reduction in service markup. Structural model–based analysis shows that, accounting for estimation uncertainty, the increase in the level of GDP at the end of the current decade would be between 3.5% and 8%, with non-negligible effects on the labour market.