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The main focus of this monograph is to synthesize the top research on leadership and leader development and to highlight the needs for developing individuals committed to careers of service across the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. The foundation for the research is based on ideas drawn from leadership and management literature, government doctrine and reports, think tank studies, and case studies. The Army has long sought to be innovative in its leader development. Most recently, the Army's Human Development White Paper supports TRADOC Pamphlet 5250301, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, "Win in a Complex World" document (2014), by emphasizing the Army's desire to become the nation's leader in "human development." In short, the Army Operating Concept requires that emerging leaders must understand the political-social-military environmental context, the defense-diplomatic-development (the 3-Ds) policies of the U.S. Government, and their roles as emerging leaders and followers in a variety of operational settings. Collaboration, not just within the Army, but across government agencies will be crucial to success in this complex operating environment. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1442/thumbnail.jpg

In Washington, DC, on June 24, 2009, the Bush School of Government and Public Service, the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at Texas A&M University, and the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute conducted a conference on Leadership and Government Reform. Two panels discussed "Leader Development in Schools of Public Affairs" and "Leadership, National Security, and 'Whole of Government' Reforms." The theme focused on the need for significant changes in leader development and government reform to improve the alignment, coordination, integration, and interoperability among largely autonomous U.S. Government agencies. The two conference panels were challenged to discuss leadership in a broader sense rather than focusing solely at the top, or on presidential leadership. The aim was to think more generally about reform-minded leadership from the top, middle, and entry levels, in order to better prepare the nation for the new security challenges of this still-young 21st century.

Key Insights: • The initiatives for the extensive national security reform that is required to meet current threats will have to come from outside of the executive branch bureaucracy. This is true even though former senior members of the Project on National Security Reform are holding key executive branch positions. • The 3-D's (defense, diplomacy, development, as 3 overlapping circles) has been a harmful way to portray the capacities, requirements, and relationships for policy and operational effectiveness, especially in ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. The current 3-D's model is incorrect, as these functions are not properly represented by circles, are not the same size in terms of capacity and resources, and in many significant ways they do not overlap in several respects in the key areas necessary for effective integration, alignment, and coordination. • The Obama Administration still has much work to do in organizing development efforts to focus on the need for stronger political, economic and social development structures, resources, and leadership. Given the ongoing efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is an urgent need for better defining the roles and responsibilities.

For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1070/thumbnail.jpg

For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1020/thumbnail.jpg

For more than 3 decades, the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Department of National Security and Strategy has faced the challenge of educating future strategic leaders on the subject of national security, or grand strategy. Fitting at the top of an officer's or government official's career-long professional development program, this challenge has been to design a course on strategy that incorporates its many facets in a short period of time, all within the 1-year, senior service college curriculum. To do this, a conceptual approach has provided the framework to think about strategy formulation. The purpose of this volume is to present the USAWC strategy formulation model to students and practitioners. This book serves as a guide to one method for the formulation, analysis, and study of strategy--an approach which we have found to be useful in providing generations of strategists with the conceptual tools to think systematically, strategically, critically, creatively, and big. Balancing what is described in the chapters as ends, ways, and means remains at the core of the Army War College's approach to national security and military strategy and strategy formulation. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1118/thumbnail.jpg