Local David Versus Global Goliath: Populist Parties and the Decline of Progressive Politics in Italy
In: Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series No. 144 https://doi.org/10.36687/inetwp144
12 results
Sort by:
In: Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper Series No. 144 https://doi.org/10.36687/inetwp144
SSRN
This PhD Thesis discusses the actual and potential impacts of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) on the economy and assesses these impacts – quantitatively and qualitatively – by considering the economic policy and performances of 27 European countries.We start discussing the different definitions of RRPs (Chapter 1) and their position on economic issues (Chapter 2 We derive an original taxonomy of RRPs' positions on economic matters confirming the heterogeneity between RRPs. In Chapter 3, we critically review the literature on the political determinants of the economy and identify three conceptualisations of the 'political' in neo-classical economics: opportunistic, partisan, and institutional models. Chapter 4 tests our main hypotheses by using a dynamic panel data model. Results show no significant and robust evidence in support of an impact on authoritarian (e.g. security) and populist (e.g. deficits) indicators. We find evidence in support of a nativist impact, different in Eastern and Western European countries. In Eastern Europe, RRPs' electoral scores, as well as their inclusion in a ruling coalition, are a significant predictor of increased imports and decreased exports. In Western Europe, RRPs' strength and presence in a ruling coalition are a significant predictor of increasing gap in unemployment rates between native and foreign workforce.In order to understand the mechanisms behind our results, Chapter 5 proposes an original contribution to Amable and Palombarini (2005)'s neo-realist approach. We argue that economic policy is the result of the political regulation of social conflict and illustrate our framework with the case study of the Italian Lega Nord. ; Cette thèse porte sur les impacts réels et potentiels des partis de droite radicale (PDR) sur l'économie et évalue ces impacts - quantitativement et qualitativement - en considérant la politique économique et les performances économiques de 27 pays européens.Nous commençons par discuter les définitions de pdr (chapitre 1) et leur position sur les questions économiques (chapitre 2). Nous en déduisons une taxonomie des positions de ces partis sur les questions économiques et confirmons l'hétérogénéité entre les PDR sur ces questions. Le chapitre 3 résume la littérature sur les déterminants politiques de l'économie, dont nous tirons nos hypothèses. Le chapitre 4 teste ces hypothèses à l'aide d'économétrie sur des données de panel. Nous montrons que la présence de PDR semble avoir des effets sur l'économie mais différent en europe de l'est et de l'ouest. En europe de l'est, les scores électoraux des PDR, ainsi que leur inclusion dans une coalition au pouvoir sont significativement liés à l'augmentation des importations et de la diminution des exportations. En europe de l'ouest, leur inclusion dans une coalition au pouvoir est lié à l'accroissement de l'écart entre les taux de chômage de la main-d'oeuvre autochtone et étrangère.Afin de comprendre les mécanismes qui sous-tendent nos résultats, le chapitre 5 propose une contribution originale à l'approche néo-réaliste d'amable et palombarini (2005). Nous soutenons que la politique économique est le résultat de la régulation politique des conflits sociaux et illustrons notre point de vue avec l'étude de cas de la ligue du nord italienne.
BASE
This PhD Thesis discusses the actual and potential impacts of Radical Right Parties (RRPs) on the economy and assesses these impacts – quantitatively and qualitatively – by considering the economic policy and performances of 27 European countries.We start discussing the different definitions of RRPs (Chapter 1) and their position on economic issues (Chapter 2 We derive an original taxonomy of RRPs' positions on economic matters confirming the heterogeneity between RRPs. In Chapter 3, we critically review the literature on the political determinants of the economy and identify three conceptualisations of the 'political' in neo-classical economics: opportunistic, partisan, and institutional models. Chapter 4 tests our main hypotheses by using a dynamic panel data model. Results show no significant and robust evidence in support of an impact on authoritarian (e.g. security) and populist (e.g. deficits) indicators. We find evidence in support of a nativist impact, different in Eastern and Western European countries. In Eastern Europe, RRPs' electoral scores, as well as their inclusion in a ruling coalition, are a significant predictor of increased imports and decreased exports. In Western Europe, RRPs' strength and presence in a ruling coalition are a significant predictor of increasing gap in unemployment rates between native and foreign workforce.In order to understand the mechanisms behind our results, Chapter 5 proposes an original contribution to Amable and Palombarini (2005)'s neo-realist approach. We argue that economic policy is the result of the political regulation of social conflict and illustrate our framework with the case study of the Italian Lega Nord. ; Cette thèse porte sur les impacts réels et potentiels des partis de droite radicale (PDR) sur l'économie et évalue ces impacts - quantitativement et qualitativement - en considérant la politique économique et les performances économiques de 27 pays européens.Nous commençons par discuter les définitions de pdr (chapitre 1) et leur position sur les ...
BASE
In: Migrations société: revue trimestrielle, Volume 149, Issue 5, p. 99-114
ISSN: 2551-9808
In: Revue française de science politique, Volume 70, Issue 2, p. 181-207
ISSN: 1950-6686
Nous interrogeons les modalités de recrutement des candidat.e.s aux élections municipales en mettant l'accent sur le cas du Front national (FN) en 2014. La présence de nombreux individus avec les mêmes patronymes au sein des listes du FN semble indiquer un recours massif aux réseaux familiaux des candidat.e.s afin de les compléter. Nous expliquons cette observation en considérant les difficultés organisationnelles des listes du FN. Nos analyses confirment nos hypothèses sans toutefois exclure deux explications supplémentaires : un effet stigmate pénalisant le recrutement de candidats et une préférence des candidats du FN pour concourir en famille. Nos analyses nous font pencher pour la première explication.
In: Revue française de science politique, Volume 70, Issue 2, p. 181-208
ISSN: 0035-2950
World Affairs Online
SSRN
In: Contemporary Italian politics, Volume 10, Issue 3, p. 224-242
ISSN: 2324-8831
In: European Union politics: EUP, Volume 19, Issue 2, p. 321-343
ISSN: 1741-2757
This article explores the differences in radical right parties' voting behaviour on economic matters at the European Parliament. As the literature highlights the heterogeneity of these parties in relation to their economic programmes, we test whether divergences survive the elections and translate into dissimilar voting patterns. Using voting records from the seventh term of the European Parliament, we show that radical right parties do not act as a consolidated party family. We then analyse the differences between radical right parties by the means of different statistical methods (NOMINATE, Ward's clustering criterion, and additive trees) and find that these are described along two dimensions: the degree of opposition to the European Union and the classical left–right economic cleavage. We provide a classification of these parties compromising four groups: pro-welfare conditional, pro-market conditional, and rejecting. Our results indicate that radical right parties do not act as a party family at the European Parliament. This remains true regardless of the salience of the policy issues in their agendas. The article also derives streams for future research on the heterogeneity of radical right parties.
In: Political psychology: journal of the International Society of Political Psychology, Volume 43, Issue 5, p. 913-929
ISSN: 1467-9221
This research examines the relationship between populist thinking and global crisis‐solving motivations concerning climate change and the COVID‐19 pandemic. Using data from five European countries (Switzerland, France, Finland, Greece, and Italy), we test a model where crisis‐related science skepticism—understood as the defense of commonsense knowledge against scientific expertise—mediates the association between populist thinking and crisis‐mitigation attitudes. The results show considerable convergence across national contexts. Relative deprivation predicts endorsement of two core components of populism's thin ideology, people sovereignty and antielitism. These subdimensions of populism are linked to science skepticism, although variably across contexts. Science skepticism then leads to a lower sense of personal responsibility for climate change mitigation and to negative attitudes towards a governmental measure to contain the COVID‐19 pandemic. Findings further show that under specific conditions, the populist request for greater democratic participation may mobilize individuals to get involved in crisis mitigation. Overall, our results highlight the role of politicized common sense in motivating and justifying opposition to measures and policies based on scientific expertise. We conclude that science skepticism, rather than populism per se, explains cynical and dismissive attitudes towards global crises.