Original Sin and Judicial Independence
In: Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 189
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In: Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 189
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Numerous Americans, perhaps especially American lawyers, have since the 1780s presumed to tell other peoples how to govern themselves. In 2006, that persistent impulse was once again echoed in an address to the American Bar Association by a Justice of the Supreme Court. The purpose of this essay is to question the wisdom of this evangelical ambition, especially when the form of instruction includes military force. It is draws on Spreading America's Word (2005) and directs attention to the hopes of American Protestant Zionists to make a democratic republic in Ottoman Palestine. It suggests that chances were better in 1919 than they are in 2008, but were none to good at that time. It rejects the appeal of the militant "neo-conservatives" who expressed their hopes and expectations in The Project for A New American Century, an instrument that should be read and remembered for centuries to come.
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Reviewing Samuel P. King & Randall W. Roth, Broken Trust: Greed, Mismanagement, & Political Manipulation at America's Largest Charitable Trust (2006)
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In: The Journal of law & [and] politics, Volume 15, Issue 3, p. 515-530
ISSN: 0749-2227
I come to the First Amendment not as a member of the cogno- scenti, but as an observer of the secondary effects on judicial institutions of some interpretations of the Amendment made over the last thirty-five years or so. I deplore those specific effects and I will be direct in saying so. But in considering them, I have been struck by the extent of the federal courts' progress in subordinating to their own governance a wide range of other issues of great concern to citizens, all in the name of the First Amendment, a text intended to foster democratic institutions.
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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1 Edward H. Levi -- 2 Harry Kalven, Jr. -- 3 Karl Llewellyn -- 4 Philip Kurland -- 5 Kenneth Culp Davis -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Table of Cases -- Index -- About the Author
Independence from extrinsic influence is, we know, indispensable to public trust in the integrity of professional judges who share the duty to decide cases according to preexisting law. But such independence is less appropriate for those expected to make new law to govern future events. Indeed, in a democratic government those who make new law are expected to be accountable to their constituents, not independent of their interests and unresponsive to their desires. The Supreme Court of the United States has in the last century largely forsaken responsibility for the homely task of deciding cases in accord with preexisting law and has settled into the role of a superlegislature devoted to making new law to govern future events. Citizens who see our judges as primarily engaged in this political role are understandably less tolerant of their claim to independence and are more intent on holding them to account for unwelcome decisions. Such popular dissatisfaction, or even unrest, with our judiciary is a source of prudent concern expressed by Justices, among others. This Article responds to that shared concern with a proposal to restore the Supreme Court to a more purely judicial role by reviving the duty of Justices to decide cases. It would require the Court to decide numerous cases certified by a group of experienced lower federal court judges as the cases most in need of their judicial attention. This proposal is intended not only to strengthen the claim to independence of the Supreme Court, but also that of other courts subject to its leadership.
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In: Critical America 56
In 1983 Harvard law professor Duncan Kennedy self-published a biting critique of the law school system called Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy. This controversial booklet was reviewed in several major law journals-unprecedented for a self-published work-and influenced a generation of law students and teachers. In this well-known critique, Duncan Kennedy argues that legal education reinforces class, race, and gender inequality in our society. However, Kennedy proposes a radical egalitarian alternative vision of what legal education should become, and a strategy, starting from the anarchist idea of workplace organizing, for struggle in that direction. Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy is comprehensive, covering everything about law school from the first day to moot court to job placement to life after law school. Kennedy's book remains one of the most cited works on American legal education.The visually striking original text is reprinted here, making it available to a new generation. The text is buttressed by commentaries by five prominent legal scholars who consider its meaning for today, as well as by an introduction and afterword by the author that describes the context in which Kennedy wrote the book, including a brief history of critical legal studies