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AbstractBehavioral research demonstrates a critical transition in preschooler's mental‐state understanding (i.e., theory of mind; ToM), revealed most starkly in performance on tasks about a character's false belief (e.g., about an object's location). Questions remain regarding the neural and cognitive processes differentiating children who pass versus fail behavioral false‐belief tasks and the extent to which there is continuity versus change in the ToM neural network. To address these questions, we analyzed event‐related spectral power in the electroencephalogram (EEG) to investigate how preschoolers' neural activity during passive viewing of false‐belief scenarios related to their explicit behavioral ToM performance. We found that neural activity during passive viewing of false‐belief events (6–9 Hz EEG 'alpha' suppression in right temporoparietal [RTP] electrodes) strongly related to children's explicit ToM. However, children's RTP alpha suppression differed depending on their explicit behavioral ToM performance: Children who did better on a broad battery of standard ToM tasks and who passed explicit behavioral false‐belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression when the character's belief first became false (during the 'location‐change' event); whereas children who did worse on the ToM battery and who failed explicit behavioral false‐belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression only later when they could evaluate the character's behavior in the context of prior events (during the 'active‐search' event). Findings shed light on what differentiates preschoolers who pass versus fail explicit false‐belief tasks and raise questions about how to interpret existing neuroscience data from ToM tasks across infancy to adulthood.Research Highlights
Preschool children's neural activity (EEG 6–9 Hz suppression in right temporoparietal [RTP] electrodes) during passive‐viewing of false‐belief events was related to their explicit behavioral theory‐of‐mind performance.
Children who did better on a theory‐of‐mind (ToM) battery and passed explicit false‐belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression when the character's belief first became false.
Children who performed worse on the ToM battery and failed explicit false‐belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression later when observing the character's search behavior.
Findings reveal change in preschoolers' ToM neural correlates and suggest that the presence of RTP activity does not necessarily indicate 'mature' theory of mind.

AbstractIn the present study we examined the neural correlates of facial emotion processing in the first year of life using ERP measures and cortical source analysis. EEG data were collected cross‐sectionally from 5‐ (N = 49), 7‐ (N = 50), and 12‐month‐old (N = 51) infants while they were viewing images of angry, fearful, and happy faces. The N290 component was found to be larger in amplitude in response to fearful and happy than angry faces in all posterior clusters and showed largest response to fear than the other two emotions only over the right occipital area. The P400 and Nc components were found to be larger in amplitude in response to angry than happy and fearful faces over central and frontal scalp. Cortical source analysis of the N290 component revealed greater cortical activation in the right fusiform face area in response to fearful faces. This effect started to emerge at 5 months and became well established at 7 months, but it disappeared at 12 months. The P400 and Nc components were primarily localized to the PCC/Precuneus where heightened responses to angry faces were observed. The current results suggest the detection of a fearful face in infants' brain can happen shortly (~200–290 ms) after the stimulus onset, and this process may rely on the face network and develop substantially between 5 to 7 months of age. The current findings also suggest the differential processing of angry faces occurred later in the P400/Nc time window, which recruits the PCC/Precuneus and is associated with the allocation of infants' attention.

AbstractMany psychological theories posit foundational links between two fundamental constructs: (1) our ability to produce, perceive, and represent action; and (2) our ability to understand the meaning and motivation behind the action (i.e. Theory of Mind; ToM). This position is contentious, however, and long‐standing competing theories of social‐cognitive development debate roles for basic action‐processing in ToM. Developmental research is key to investigating these hypotheses, but whether individual differences in neural and behavioral measures of motor action relate to social‐cognitive development is unknown. We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children's (N = 26) EEG mu‐desynchronization during production of object‐directed action, and explored associations between mu‐desynchronization and children's behavioral motor skills, behavioral action‐representation abilities, and behavioral ToM. For children with high (but not low) mu‐desynchronization, motor skill related to action‐representation abilities, and action‐representation mediated relations between motor skill and ToM. Results demonstrate novel foundational links between action‐processing and ToM, suggesting that basic motor action may be a key mechanism for social‐cognitive development, thus shedding light on the origins and emergence of higher social cognition.

AbstractTheory of mind requires belief‐anddesire‐understanding. Event‐related brain potential (ERP) research on belief‐ and desire‐reasoning in adults found mid‐frontal activations for both desires and beliefs, and selective right‐posterior activationsonlyfor beliefs. Developmentally, children understand desires before beliefs; thus, a critical question concerns whether neural specialization for belief‐reasoning exists in childhood or develops later. Neural activity was recorded as 7‐ and 8‐year‐olds (N = 18) performed the same diverse‐desires, diverse‐beliefs, and physical control tasks used in a previous adult ERP study. Like adults, mid‐frontal scalp activations were found for belief‐anddesire‐reasoning. Moreover, analyses usingcorrecttrials alone yielded selective right‐posterior activations for belief‐reasoning. Results suggest developmental links between increasingly accurate understanding of complex mental states and neural specialization supporting this understanding.

Using a standardized assessment instrument, the authors compared 182 adults with congenital deaf-blindness and those with acquired deaf-blindness. They found that those with congenital deaf-blindness were more likely to have impairments in cognition, activities of daily living, and social interactions and were less likely to use speech for communication.

The internal consistency and validity of the interRAI Community Health Assessment and Deafblind Supplement were tested with 182 persons with deaf-blindness. All subscales demonstrated good to excellent internal consistency, and expected associations provided evidence of convergent validity. This instrument can facilitate standardized service planning for persons with deaf-blindness.