Search results

Background: There has been insufficient attention to a fundamental force shaping healthcare policies-conflicts of interest (COI). We investigated COI, which results in the professional judgement of a policymaker or healthcare provider being compromised by a secondary interest, in relation to antimicrobial use, thereby illuminating challenges to the regulation of medicines use more broadly. Our objectives were to characterise connections between three groups-policymakers, healthcare providers and pharmaceutical companies-that can create COI, and elucidate the impacts of COI on stages of the policy process.Methods: Using an interpretive approach, we systematically analysed qualitative data from 136 in-depth interviews and five focus group discussions in three Asian countries with dominant private healthcare sectors: Cambodia, Indonesia and Pakistan.Findings: We characterised four types of connections that were pervasive between the three groups: financial, political, social and familial. These connections created strong COI that could impact all stages of the policy process by: preventing issues related to medicines sales from featuring prominently on the agenda; influencing policy formulation towards softer regulatory measures; determining resource availability for, and opposition to, policy implementation; and shaping how accurately the success of contested policies is reported.Interpretation: Our multicountry study fills a gap in empirical evidence on how COI can impede effective policies to improve the quality of healthcare. It shows that COI can be pervasive, rather than sporadic, in influencing regulation of medicine use, and highlights that, in addition to financial connections, other types of connections should be examined as important drivers of COI.

Background Global attention to antimicrobial resistance has increased interest in tackling the widespread inappropriate dispensing of antibiotics by informal, for-profit healthcare providers (HCPs). We provide new evidence on an understudied group of informal HCPs: invisible medicine sellers (IMS) who operate without any marked facility. We investigated factors that influence community decisions on which HCPs to purchase medicines from, focusing on reasons for using IMS, and compared different HCPs' knowledge of antibiotic use. Methods We conducted community focus group discussions (FGDs) in seven purposively selected villages representing high and low informal HCPs use in two peri-urban districts in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Using information from the FGDs to identify HCPs that sell medicines, we interviewed 35 participants: 21 HCPs (including five IMS) and 14 key informants, including government HCPs and village leaders. We adopted an interpretative approach and conducted a thematic analysis. Results Community members typically knew of several formal and informal HCPs selling medicines nearby, and IMS were common, as were doctors that sell medicines covertly. Two factors were most salient in influencing the choice of HCP for medicine purchasing. The first was trust in the effectiveness of medicines provided, judged by the speed of symptomatic relief. This pushed HCPs to provide several medicines, including antibiotics, at the first consultation. The second was the convenience offered by IMS and other informal HCPs: supplying medicines when other facilities are closed, accepting delayed payments, providing incomplete courses of medication and selling human antibiotics for animal use. Conclusion This first study focusing on IMS indicates that it is important, but challenging, for public health agencies to engage with them to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics. Although public health facilities must fill some gaps that informal HCPs are currently addressing, such as access to medicines at night, reducing demand for unnecessary antibiotics is also critical. ; This project is funded by an MRC Joint Health Systems Research Initiative Foundation grant (MR/R003467/1).

BACKGROUND: Global attention to antimicrobial resistance has increased interest in tackling the widespread inappropriate dispensing of antibiotics by informal, for-profit healthcare providers (HCPs). We provide new evidence on an understudied group of informal HCPs: invisible medicine sellers (IMS) who operate without any marked facility. We investigated factors that influence community decisions on which HCPs to purchase medicines from, focusing on reasons for using IMS, and compared different HCPs' knowledge of antibiotic use. METHODS: We conducted community focus group discussions (FGDs) in seven purposively selected villages representing high and low informal HCPs use in two peri-urban districts in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Using information from the FGDs to identify HCPs that sell medicines, we interviewed 35 participants: 21 HCPs (including five IMS) and 14 key informants, including government HCPs and village leaders. We adopted an interpretative approach and conducted a thematic analysis. RESULTS: Community members typically knew of several formal and informal HCPs selling medicines nearby, and IMS were common, as were doctors that sell medicines covertly. Two factors were most salient in influencing the choice of HCP for medicine purchasing. The first was trust in the effectiveness of medicines provided, judged by the speed of symptomatic relief. This pushed HCPs to provide several medicines, including antibiotics, at the first consultation. The second was the convenience offered by IMS and other informal HCPs: supplying medicines when other facilities are closed, accepting delayed payments, providing incomplete courses of medication and selling human antibiotics for animal use. CONCLUSION: This first study focusing on IMS indicates that it is important, but challenging, for public health agencies to engage with them to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics. Although public health facilities must fill some gaps that informal HCPs are currently addressing, such as access to medicines at night, reducing ...

Background: Global attention to antimicrobial resistance has increased interest in tackling the widespread inappropriate dispensing of antibiotics by informal, for-profit healthcare providers (HCPs). We provide new evidence on an understudied group of informal HCPs: invisible medicine sellers (IMS) who operate without any marked facility. We investigated factors that influence community decisions on which HCPs to purchase medicines from, focusing on reasons for using IMS, and compared different HCPs' knowledge of antibiotic use. Methods: We conducted community focus group discussions (FGDs) in seven purposively selected villages representing high and low informal HCPs use in two peri-urban districts in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Using information from the FGDs to identify HCPs that sell medicines, we interviewed 35 participants: 21 HCPs (including five IMS) and 14 key informants, including government HCPs and village leaders. We adopted an interpretative approach and conducted a thematic analysis. Results: Community members typically knew of several formal and informal HCPs selling medicines nearby, and IMS were common, as were doctors that sell medicines covertly. Two factors were most salient in influencing the choice of HCP for medicine purchasing. The first was trust in the effectiveness of medicines provided, judged by the speed of symptomatic relief. This pushed HCPs to provide several medicines, including antibiotics, at the first consultation. The second was the convenience offered by IMS and other informal HCPs: supplying medicines when other facilities are closed, accepting delayed payments, providing incomplete courses of medication and selling human antibiotics for animal use. Conclusion: This first study focusing on IMS indicates that it is important, but challenging, for public health agencies to engage with them to reduce inappropriate use of antibiotics. Although public health facilities must fill some gaps that informal HCPs are currently addressing, such as access to medicines at night, reducing demand for unnecessary antibiotics is also critical.

BACKGROUND: There has been insufficient attention to a fundamental force shaping healthcare policies—conflicts of interest (COI). We investigated COI, which results in the professional judgement of a policymaker or healthcare provider being compromised by a secondary interest, in relation to antimicrobial use, thereby illuminating challenges to the regulation of medicines use more broadly. Our objectives were to characterise connections between three groups—policymakers, healthcare providers and pharmaceutical companies—that can create COI, and elucidate the impacts of COI on stages of the policy process. METHODS: Using an interpretive approach, we systematically analysed qualitative data from 136 in-depth interviews and five focus group discussions in three Asian countries with dominant private healthcare sectors: Cambodia, Indonesia and Pakistan. FINDINGS: We characterised four types of connections that were pervasive between the three groups: financial, political, social and familial. These connections created strong COI that could impact all stages of the policy process by: preventing issues related to medicines sales from featuring prominently on the agenda; influencing policy formulation towards softer regulatory measures; determining resource availability for, and opposition to, policy implementation; and shaping how accurately the success of contested policies is reported. INTERPRETATION: Our multicountry study fills a gap in empirical evidence on how COI can impede effective policies to improve the quality of healthcare. It shows that COI can be pervasive, rather than sporadic, in influencing regulation of medicine use, and highlights that, in addition to financial connections, other types of connections should be examined as important drivers of COI.