Article(electronic)#1November 12, 2010
Allocating Profit Among Rational Players in a Fuzzy Coalition: A Game Theoretic Model
In: Group decision and negotiation, Volume 21, Issue 4, p. 439-459
ISSN: 1572-9907
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Article(electronic)#2April 17, 2024
How to choose a compatible committee?
In: Public choice
ISSN: 1573-7101
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Article(electronic)#3November 24, 2022
The Generalized Shapley Value of Cooperative Games as a Social Preference Function
In: Group decision and negotiation
ISSN: 1572-9907
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Article(electronic)#52020
Consolidating Marginalism and Egalitarianism: A New Value for Transferable Utility Games
In: QMS Research Paper 2020/12
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Article(electronic)#6
A Solidarity Value for Network Games: Characterizations and Implementation
In: YGAME-D-22-00068
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Article(electronic)#7September 2021
Probabilistic network values
In: Mathematical social sciences, Volume 113, p. 169-180
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Open Access#82021
Probabilistic network values
In: Borkotokey , S , Chakrabarti , S , Gilles , R P , Gogoi , L & Kumar , R 2021 , ' Probabilistic network values ' , Mathematical Social Sciences , vol. 113 , pp. 169-180 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.003 , https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.07.003
We consider a class of cooperative network games with transferable utilities in which players interact through a probabilistic network rather than a regular, deterministic network. In this class of wealth-generating situations we consider probabilistic extensions of the Myerson value and the position value. For the subclass of probabilistic network games in multilinear form, we establish characterizations of these values using an appropriate formulation of component balancedness. We show axiomatizations based on extensions of the well-accepted properties of equal bargaining power, balanced contributions, and balanced link contributions.
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