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This book asks what distinguishes peaceful plural democracies from violent ones and what distinguishes violent ethnic groups from peaceful ones within the same democracy. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it suggests that ethnic groups and their political demands are not inherently intransigent and that violence is not a necessary corollary of ethnic politics. The book posits that ethnic identity serves as a stable but flexible information shortcut for political choices, influencing party formation and development in new and maturing democracies. It furthermore argues that political intransigence and violence expressed by some ethnic groups stem from circumstances exogenous to ethnic affiliations. In particular, absolute restrictions on ethnic access to the executive produce conditions under which ethnic group incentive to participate in peaceful electoral politics is eliminated. A number of case studies and statistical analysis of all electoral democracies since 1945 are used to test and support the formal argument

Katz and Mair's provocative Cartel Party argument continues to create fertile ground for debate. This article contributes to under-explored areas of this debate by enhancing the theoretical and empirical understanding of the change in the relationship between parties and voters resulting from the introduction of the cartelizing condition of public funding. To this end, the article examines vote stability empirically, changes in turnout and individual public opinion data, before and after public funding was instituted. By disconfirming the hypothesized expectations of deteriorating voter—party relationships as a result of funding, the empirical analysis pinpoints a number of contradictions in current understanding of party system change. The article concludes by suggesting that still bound financially to voters at large, parties provide a good that is valued by constituents. If, however, these last ties are severed, rather than being at the cusp of a post-cartel system, the future of party systems is more akin to the elite systems of old.

Recent theory on ethnic identity suggests that it is constructed and highly influenced by contextual factors and group leaders' strategies. Therefore, while the notion that social cleavages stabilize electoral politics is well established, which cleavages matter and why remain open questions. This article argues that in new democracies the effects of diffuse ethnic cleavages on electoral politics diverge depending on the amount of information they provide to their constituency. The information provision, in turn, depends on how well the cleavage lends itself to the formation of ethnic parties. A formal model of voting stability is developed and empirically tested using data on electoral volatility in all new democracies since 1945 and on individual voting in democratizing Bulgaria. The results show that in the sample examined only identity that centers on language jump‐starts party‐system stabilization, while race and religion do nothing to stabilize the vote in early elections.

Funding of parties is common and controversial in new democracies. Nonetheless, the nascent literature about the effects of money in new party systems largely sidesteps the issue of public funding. This article seeks to begin filling this theoretical and empirical void. Two hypotheses are formulated about the expected effects of introduction and marginal increases in public funding on institutionalization of the party system. The hypotheses are then tested in a statistical study of all new democracies in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and other former Soviet Republics. The results show strong support for the idea that public funding increases institutionalization of new party systems. This is in stark contrast to theories about more established democracies that hold introduction of public funding decreases institutionalization of the party system. Furthermore, the results suggest that differing thresholds to public funding have divergent effects on political institutionalization, but this effect is not necessarily linear.

The costs of party formation potentially alter representation and change electoral dynamics before allocation rules come into play. Furthermore, the interaction of formation rules and demographic conditions occasionally produces in new democracies unintended effects on representation that are quite distinct from the effects of other electoral barriers. Currently, however, the literature does not systematically consider the role that institutions play in party formation and party survival in new democracies. This article considers the theoretical importance of formation rules on representation in the context of party-system development. The principal hypothesis proposed is that, while not a sufficient condition for the emergence of separate ethnic political parties, elimination of spatial registration rules, which mandate registration that exceeds the group's geographic distribution, is a necessary condition. (InWent/DÜI)

What determines which identity cleavage, ethnicity or religion, is mobilized in political contestation, be it peaceful or violent? In contrast to common predictions that the greatest contention occurs where identities are fully segmented, most identity conflicts in the world are between ethnic groups that share religion. Alternatives in Mobilization builds on the literature about political demography to address this seeming contradiction. The book proposes that variation in relative group size and intersection of cleavages help explain conundrums in the mobilization of identity, across transgressive and contained political settings. This theory is tested cross-nationally on identity mobilization in civil war and across violent conflict in Pakistan, Uganda, Nepal and Turkey, and peaceful electoral politics in Indonesia. This book helps illustrate a more accurate and improved picture of the ethnic and religious tapestry of the world and addresses an increasing need for a better understanding of how religion contributes to conflict.

Why do some insurgent groups with associated electoral parties target civilians despite the costs of doing so? Organizations with peaceful electoral wings and violent factions operating at the same time are common in contemporary democracies. One of the more consistent observations in the literature is that insurgent targeting of civilians is costly to their electoral counterpart, and insurgents are aware of this cost. Yet, many insurgent groups continue to target civilians. In this article, we suggest a localized effect of violence on electoral outcomes of parties with ties to violent groups offers an explanation for why such insurgent groups might continue to perpetrate violence. Specifically, we suggest insurgent benefits, measured as electoral costs to the incumbent for failure in stemming the violence, likely outweigh the localized electoral costs to insurgent-affiliated parties from the violence. Our subnational analysis of violence and electoral results across Peruvian provinces strongly supports our story.