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This study attempts to reveal the impact of distribution inequality of electoral districts on the election outcomes in Jordan. Since 1993 elections, electoral laws and regulations have been adopted that underestimate population density in Jordan, meaning that some regions with lower population densities have obtained more parliamentary seats than regions with high population density, including the governorates of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa. Successive Jordanian governments' strategies have intentionally ignored electoral geography, which reduces the chances of mainly the Palestinian component obtaining significant numbers of seats in the Parliament. Governments have also sought to mitigate the chances of Islamic, Leftist and Nationalist parties obtaining a majority of seats in the Parliament, and thus being able to exert effective pressure to hold the executive authority accountable and responsible for its actions. In addition, low levels of confidence of most Jordanian citizens in Parliament have resulted in a lack of true desire to vote, which has led to an increase in the percentage of wasted votes compared with the cast votes. The study concludes that the executive authority's domination in drawing and dividing electoral districts as part of its hegemony and control over the general policy of elections has purposefully neglected population density and geographical criteria. In light of the study results, an urgent need arises to endorse an election law that accomplishes the standards of distributive justice, maximizes the role of supportive and opposition parties, raises citizen confidence in Parliaments, reduces the percentage of wasted votes and finally activates a truly representative Parliament.

AbstractThis study aims to shed light on the experience of the Jordanian constitutional reforms during the era of King Abdullah II and the Arab Spring. Moreover, this study provides a comprehensive and integrated view of these vital reforms and the democratic process in Jordan. With due consideration to the fact that the constitution represents the backbone of any political regime, constitutional developments in Jordan have been reviewed since the first Jordanian Constitution was drafted in 1928. By analyzing the most recent constitutional amendments, we identify the main features of these amendments as well as their strengths and weaknesses, potential for success or risk of failure, and the positive and negative reactions thereto. This study provides a summary and recommendation, notably, the need for further constitutional amendments to consolidate the process of reform and democracy in Jordan.

AbstractThis study aims to identify the concept, mechanisms and motives of political reform under the reign of King Abdullah II of Jordan. Concisely, the study attempts to identify obstacles to and opportunities for political reform in Jordan. To this end, the weaknesses and challenges facing the process of political reform in Jordan as well as opportunities to achieve political reform will be addressed. The opportunities are represented in the new constitutional amendments and the new laws governing political life (political parties and election laws). The main finding of this study is that since Jordan's problem today is not just economic, there is a pressing need for political reform. The political reform in Jordan, as a form of adjusting and accommodating, is the best alternative for the regime to face the popular pressures. This is probably so because Arab Spring regimes with minimal capacity to 'bend' or respond to change had eventually collapsed.