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A MODEL OF LEGISLATIVE VOTE AND EXPLANATION IS DEVELOPED TO EXPLORE HOW LEGISLATOR'S VOTING DECISIONS ARE AFFECTED BY BY THE NEED TO JUSTIFY THESE DECISIONS TO HOME CONSTITUENTS. THE PRINCIPAL FINDING IS THAT THE NEED TO EXPLAIN VOTES IMPROVES THE DISTRICT'S PAYOFFS RELATIVE TO THE CASE OF NO EXPLANATION. THIS OCCURS IN TWO WAYS, DEPENDING ON THE PENALTIES FOR LEGISLATORS BEING DISCOVERED NOT TO HAVE TOLD THE TRUTH WHEN JUSTIFYING THEIR LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR TO CONSTITUENTS.

THIS PAPER EXAMINES WHY VOTERS IN MULTI-DISTRICT CONTESTS BEHAVE AS IF VOTING IN A SINGLE-DISTRICT CONTEXT, AND DEVELOPS A MODEL WHICH DEALS WITH POST-ELECTION COALITION FORMATION AS A MEANS OF DETERMINING THE REASONS FOR THIS BEHAVIOR. THE AUTHOR INVESTIGATES SUBSTANTIAL CONDITIONS ON THE PARTY AGGREGATION RULES SUFFICIENT TO GENERATE EQUILIBRIUM AND CHARACTERIZED SUCH EQUILIBRIUM.

The author reviews the literature on the spatial theory of electoral competition, initiated by Downs. Two main lines of inquiry are distinguished. The first is concerned with the purely analytical properties of majority preference as an aggregation rule for mapping individual preferences into social preferences. And the second is devoted to providing explanations of the choices of political decisionmakers, and the consequences of these choices, within a simple plurality electoral system. These two lines are intimately related and in the review the author seeks to explore this relationship.

IN THE SEPTEMBER 1987 ISSUE OF "AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW," THE AUTHORS DEVELOPED A GAME-THEORETIC MODEL OF COMMITTEE OR LEGISLATIVE DECISION MAKING, SHOWING THE EXTENT TO WHICH MEMBERS MAY HAVE INCENTIVES TO SHARE, OR CONCEAL, INFORMATION. IN THIS ARTICLE, THEY OFFER A CORRECTION TO THE FORMAL ANALYSIS AND STATEMENTS OF RESULTS FOR THE MODEL.