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Tämän pro gradu -työn tavoitteena on tunnistaa ja analysoida Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien turvallisuusneuvoston (UNSC) suojeluvastuun periaatteen (R2P) mukaiset toimet, joita se on käyttänyt Jemenin kriisin ratkaisemiseen ajanjaksolla 2011 – 2018, inhimillisen turvallisuuden viitekehyksen avulla, joka priorisoi yksilöä valtion sijasta. Metodina käytetään laadullista sisällönanalyysiä, ja datan koostuu YK:n turvallisuusneuvoston dokumenteista ja julkilausumista, joista suojeluvastuun periaatteen mukaisia toimia etsitään. R2P rinnastetaan usein virheellisesti sotilaallisen voiman käyttöön, ja tästä johtuen on esitetty väitteitä, että kansainvälinen yhteisö on sivuuttanut Jemenin kriisin. Kaiken lisäksi Jemenin kriisin käsittely mediassa on huomattavasti vähäisempää kuin alueen muiden kriisien käsittely. Vaikka inhimillinen turvallisuus on Jemenissä täysin puutteellinen, olisi harhaanjohtavaa ja epäoikeudenmukaista väittää, että kansainvälinen yhteisö olisi jättänyt Jemenin huomiotta. Tämä pro gradu -työ pyrkii osoittamaan, että kansainvälinen yhteisö on toiminut Jemenissä suojeluvastuun periaatteen mukaisesti. Suojeluvastuun periaatteen toteuttaminen on Jemenissä myös aiheellista, sillä on syytä epäillä, että kaikki konfliktin osapuolet ovat syyllistyneet törkeisiin ihmisoikeusrikkomuksiin, mukaan lukien mahdollisiin sotarikoksiin ja rikoksiin ihmisyyttä vastaan. YK:n turvallisuusneuvosto on toteuttanut Jemenin tapauksen käsittelyssä suojeluvastuun periaatteen pilareita II ja III, jotka vaativat turvallisuusneuvoston valtuutuksen. Näihin toimiin lukeutuvat useat siirtymäkauden aikana (2011 – 2014) neuvotellut sopimukset, kaksi eri selvitysvaltuuskuntaa, sanktioita ja rauhanneuvotteluyrityksiä. Nämä toimet jo osoittavat, että kansainvälinen yhteisö on toiminut edistääkseen Jemenin konfliktin ratkaisemista. Vaikka kriisiä ei ole saatu ratkaistua, se ei silti tarkoita sitä, etteikö tätä olisi yritetty. On kuitenkin huomattava, että Jemenin konflikti on vaikea ratkaistava sen vaikeaselkoisuuden, monitahoisuuden ja osaltaan myös YK:n turvallisuusneuvoston kokoonpanon vuoksi. Jemenin kriisin, kuten minkä tahansa muunkin konfliktin ratkaisu, joka uhkaa kansainvälistä rauhaa ja turvallisuutta, vaatii suunnattomasti poliittista tahtoa paikallisesti, alueellisesti ja kansainvälisesti. ; The purpose of this master's thesis is to recognize and analyse the approach of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to the ongoing crisis in Yemen during the time period of 2011-2018 with the theoretical framework of human security, which prioritizes the safety of an individual over a state. This thesis seeks to identify measures authorized by the UNSC that belong under the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine through qualitative content analysis. Yemen does not receive a lot of media attention, as there are other troubled states in the region that often steal the spotlight in the Western media, due to potential refugee flows, for example. R2P is often erroneously equated to mean the use of military force, and thus there have been those, who argue that the international community has forgotten and ignored the crisis in Yemen. This thesis presents that this is not true: even though the human security situation is catastrophic in Yemen, it would be unfair and inaccurate to claim that the people of Yemen have been ignored by the UNSC. This thesis recognizes clear R2P measures that the UNSC has implemented in Yemen in hopes to resolve the conflict, or at least alleviate human suffering. Implementing the principles of R2P are necessary in the case of Yemen, as there is reasonable grounds to believe that all parties to the conflict have perpetrated mass atrocity crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UNSC has applied pillars II and III of R2P, which include negotiated agreements during the transitional period (2011 – 2014), two different fact-finding missions, sanctions and mediation efforts. These measures prove that the international community has acted in accordance with the R2P doctrine. However, it needs also to be acknowledged that due to the complexity of the crisis, its multifaceted nature and the composition of the UNSC, the crisis in Yemen is a very difficult one to resolve. This is true with any crisis that threatens international peace and security. They require an immense amount of political will locally, regionally and internationally.

STUK-YTO-TR 167 ; The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the IAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the IAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in Finland under the national and international safeguards is very limited, the main objects under control being four light-water reactors with a once-through uranium-based fuel cycle. On the other hand, the national safeguards system is strong and competent. Therefore, Finland should be able to fulfill the provisions of the Additional Protocol fast and well. Also the state-level evaluation of Finland by the IAEA can be assumed to be quite straightforward. An IS system suitable to the Finnish conditions would put an end to the interim routine inspections and to the use of permanent camera surveillance. On the other hand, the IAEA could carry out one unannounced or short-notice inspection per year in Finland. The Agency would also get continuosly up-to-date information of all nuclear activities in the country. The Finnish SSAC is assumed to be maintained and further developed also in the future. The national safeguards inspections and measurements by Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) would be continued. The implementation oft the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the application of the IS system in Finland requires good cooperation, mutual trust and division of work between four actors of the play: the operators of the nuclear facilities, STUK, Euratom and the IAEA. Each of them shall have the well-specified roles and functional responsibilities. The international safeguards agencies should utilize the national resources more effectively than before. ; The IAEA has requested several member states to present their proposal of the application of the Integrated Safeguards (IS) system in their nuclear facilities. This report contains a IS proposal for Finland prepared under the Task FIN C 1264 of The Finnish Support Programme to IAEA Safeguards. The comprehensive safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been one of the main tools in the fight against nuclear proliferation since the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty three decades ago. In the 1990s some of the inherent weaknesses of this so-called traditional safeguards system were revealed first in Iraq and then in North Korea. Therefore, the member states of the IAEA decided to give the Agency additional legal authority in order to make its control system more effective as well as more efficient than before. This was accomplished by the approval of the so-called Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) in 1997. Straightforward implementation of new safeguards measures allowed by the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC540) without careful review of the old procedures based on INFCIRC153 would only result in increased costs within the IAEA and in the member states. In order to avoid that kind of outcome the old and new means available to the Agency shall be combined to form an optimised integrated safeguards (IS) system. When creating an effective and efficient system a necessary approach is a state-level evaluation, which means that each state shall be assessed by the IAEA separately and as a whole. The assessment of a country's nuclear field shall result in credible assurance of the absence of diversion of declared nuclear materials to prohibited purposes and of the absence of clandestine nuclear activities, facilities and materials. Having achieved that assurance and being able to maintain it in a state the IAEA can leave some traditional routine safeguards activities undone there. At present, the nuclear fuel cycle in Finland under the national and international safeguards is very limited, the main objects under control being four light-water reactors with a once-through uranium-based fuel cycle. On the other hand, the national safeguards system is strong and competent. Therefore, Finland should be able to fulfill the provisions of the Additional Protocol fast and well. Also the state-level evaluation of Finland by the IAEA can be assumed to be quite straightforward. An IS system suitable to the Finnish conditions would put an end to the interim routine inspections and to the use of permanent camera surveillance. On the other hand, the IAEA could carry out one unannounced or short-notice inspection per year in Finland. The Agency would also get continuosly up-to-date information of all nuclear activities in the country. The Finnish SSAC is assumed to be maintained and further developed also in the future. The national safeguards inspections and measurements by Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) would be continued. The implementation oft the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the application of the IS system in Finland requires good cooperation, mutual trust and division of work between four actors of the play: the operators of the nuclear facilities, STUK, Euratom and the IAEA. Each of them shall have the well-specified roles and functional responsibilities. The international safeguards agencies should utilize the national resources more effectively than before.