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"Ben Ansell, one of the world's leading experts on the dilemmas facing modern democracies, vividly illustrates how our collective goals-- democracy, equality, solidarity, security, and prosperity-- are undermined by political traps and why today's political landscape is so tumultuous. We want equality, but we are loathe to give away our own wealth. We want solidarity but we are much better at receiving it than offering it. We want security but not if it constrains our freedom. And we want to end the climate crisis but we also want a prosperous economy. In every case, we want a collective goal, but are undermined by our individual actions. Our aims are altruistic, our actions governed by self-interest. Ansell then comes full circle and through brilliant storytelling and pathbreaking research vividly illustrates how we maneuver through the traps of the messy, complicated world of politics that block common sense solutions to the just, equitable, prosperous, and environmentally sane society we all want."

"Ben Ansell, one of the world's leading experts on the dilemmas facing modern democracies, vividly illustrates how our collective goals-- democracy, equality, solidarity, security, and prosperity-- are undermined by political traps and why today's political landscape is so tumultuous. We want equality, but we are loathe to give away our own wealth. We want solidarity but we are much better at receiving it than offering it. We want security but not if it constrains our freedom. And we want to end the climate crisis but we also want a prosperous economy. In every case, we want a collective goal, but are undermined by our individual actions. Our aims are altruistic, our actions governed by self-interest. Ansell then comes full circle and through brilliant storytelling and pathbreaking research vividly illustrates how we maneuver through the traps of the messy, complicated world of politics that block common sense solutions to the just, equitable, prosperous, and environmentally sane society we all want."

Owning a house is the most important economic choice most families will ever make. Yet, our understanding of the political causes and consequences of homeownership is rather thin. This review argues that political scientists need to take housing much more seriously, not least because of the unprecedented surges and collapses of house prices over the past two decades. The housing market is both a proxy for and a cause of growing social cleavages that shape how citizens view political issues from the size of the welfare state to the attractiveness of populist campaigns. The article begins by re-examining classic work on property from the nineteenth century as a still-relevant guide to the winners and losers from property market shocks and regulations. It then turns to the postwar era and work that suggests that the welfare state and property ownership are in some sense substitutes. It concludes by examining the role housing plays in shaping contemporary political preferences, both as a direct measure of individuals' wealth and welfare and as a proxy for the relative fortunes of different places.

Higher education policy has been subject to considerable reform in OECD states over the past two decades. Some states have introduced tuition fees, others have massively increased public funding for higher education, and still others remain in stasis, retaining the elitist model with which they began the postwar era. This article develops the argument that higher education policy in the OECD is driven by a set of partisan choices within a trilemma between the level of enrollment, the degree of subsidization, and the overall public cost of higher education. The author develops a formal model of the micromechanisms underlying movements within this trilemma, noting the importance of partisan politics, existing enrollment, tax structure, and access. These propositions are tested statistically on a sample of twenty-two OECD countries and through case histories of higher education reform in England, Sweden, and Germany. (World Politics / SWP)

Higher education policy has been subject to considerable reform in OECD states over the past two decades. Some states have introduced tuition fees, others have massively increased public funding for higher education, and still others remain in stasis, retaining the elitist model with which they began the postwar era. This article develops the argument that higher education policy in the OECD is driven by a set of partisan choices within a trilemma between the level of enrollment, the degree of subsidization, and the overall public cost of higher education. The author develops a formal model of the micromechanisms underlying movements within this trilemma, noting the importance of partisan politics, existing enrollment, tax structure, and access. These propositions are tested statistically on a sample of twenty-two OECD countries and through case histories of higher education reform in England, Sweden, and Germany.

Ansell and Lindvall present the first comprehensive analysis of the origins of modern public services. Recounting conflicts among parties and religious groups over the political control of services, from prisons to schools and asylums, the book is for anyone interested in political science, public administration, history, and political sociology.

Research on the economic origins of democracy and dictatorship has shifted away from the impact of growth and turned toward the question of how different patterns of growth - equal or unequal - shape regime change. This book offers a new theory of the historical relationship between economic modernization and the emergence of democracy on a global scale, focusing on the effects of land and income inequality. Contrary to most mainstream arguments, Ben W. Ansell and David J. Samuels suggest that democracy is more likely to emerge when rising, yet politically disenfranchised, groups demand more influence because they have more to lose, rather than when threats of redistribution to elite interests are low

Cover -- Half-Title page -- Series page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Preface -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Why Democracy? -- 1.2 Democracy or Property? The Redistributivist Thesis -- 1.3 Puzzles for the Redistributivist Approach -- 1.4 Democracy and Property? -- 1.5 Democracy, Property, and Elite Competition -- 1.6 Plan of the Book -- 2 Inequality, Development, and Distribution -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Inequality and Class Structure: A Thought Experiment -- 2.3 Inequality and Class Structure: Historical Examples -- 2.4 Conclusion: Implications of Social Tables -- 3 Actors and Interests -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Inequality, Income, and Interests -- 3.3 Inequality, Income, and Interests and the 2nd Reform Act -- 3.4 Other Cases -- 3.4.1 Imperial Germany -- 3.4.2 Nineteenth-Century Sweden -- 3.4.3 Twentieth-Century South Korea -- 3.4.4 Contemporary China -- 3.5 Conclusion -- 4 An Elite-Competition Model of Democratization -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 The Redistributivist Approach -- 4.2.1 Introduction -- 4.2.2 Boix's Argument -- 4.2.3 Acemoglu and Robinson's Argument -- 4.3 Rethinking Assumptions -- 4.4 An Elite-Competition Model of Democratization -- 4.4.1 Introduction -- 4.4.2 The Economic Model -- 4.4.3 The Political Model -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 4.6 Appendix: Thinking about Asset Mobility -- 5 Assessing the Relationship between Inequality and Democratization -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Quantitative Research on Inequality and Regime Change -- 5.3 Dependent and Independent Variables -- 5.3.1 Conceptualizing Democracy -- 5.3.2 Conceptualizing Inequality -- 5.3.3 Control Variables -- 5.4 Empirical Analysis -- 5.4.1 Democracy as a Dichotomous Measure, 1820 to 1992 -- 5.4.2 Democracy as a Dichotomous Measure, 1955 to 1999 -- 5.4.3 Democracy as a Continuous Measure, 1820 to 1992.