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AbstractTunisia's political system suffers from recurrent problems with governability and proportionality. A volatile party landscape, frequent cabinet reshuffles, and political gridlocks repeatedly jeopardized stability and democratic progress since the Arab Spring. Major and minor electoral reforms were undertaken in 2014, 2017, 2019, and 2022, but they were unable to diffuse either of these issues. This analysis is therefore driven by two central questions: How have Tunisia's electoral laws changed since the Arab Spring? And why have these reforms failed to improve both governability and proportionality? It will be argued that because Tunisia's party landscape is fractured and volatile only on the secularist side of the spectrum, coalitions with and against Ennahda are costly to all parties involved, worsening the overall quality of political representation. By analyzing the trajectory of major and minor electoral reforms longitudinally, this paper finds that Tunisia's electoral reforms incrementally restricted the electoral system by limiting parties' and candidates' capacity to compete in elections. Through modifying legislation on campaign finance and subsidies, gender parity, and candidacy requirements, and finally abolishing Tunisia's closed list PR-system in 2022, reforms benefit established older parties and wealthier candidates while fortifying the electoral system against newer and less wealthy contenders. Tunisia's electoral reforms are inadequate in addressing governability and proportionality because restricting electoral competition alone cannot improve the quality of representation through political parties.

Just days after the US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Taliban seized power. Hager Ali argues that the US army and its allies foundered because they couldn't resolve two simple questions: What was the democratic end state actually supposed to look like? And was it ever attainable through military involvement?

In Sudan kämpfen die wichtigsten Sicherheitskräfte des Landes gegeneinander. Eine schnelle militärische Entscheidung ist angesichts des relativ ausgeglichenen Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen den Sudanesischen Streitkräften (SAF) und den Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nicht zu erwarten. Durch dieses strategische Patt sind die Chancen auf eine erfolgreiche Vermittlung nicht ausweglos. Dafür müssten Sudans internationale Partner aber von dem seit Jahrzehnten dominierenden Ansatz Abstand nehmen, Gewaltakteuren die Hauptrolle in Verhandlungen zuzugestehen. Zivile Akteure haben eine breite Anti-Kriegs-Koalition gebildet, die bei Friedensgesprächen von Anfang an den Ton angeben sollte. Dies könnte durchaus auch im Interesse der Konfliktparteien sein, denn diese brauchen einen dritten Akteur, der ihr Verhältnis in Zukunft moderieren kann. Die Bundesregierung sollte sich um eine stärkere Koordination internationaler Vermittlungsansätze unter ziviler Führung aus Sudan bemühen. In der EU sollte sie eine Initiative zur Eingrenzung des finanziellen Spielraums der sudanesischen Gewaltakteure anstoßen. (Autorenreferat)

Sudan's two main security forces are fighting each other. A swift military outcome is not to be expected in view of the relatively balanced power between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This strategic stalemate means that the chances for successful mediation are not hopeless. For this to happen, however, Sudan's international partners would have to abandon the approach that dominated negotiations for decades, namely giving violent actors a leading role in negotiations. Civilian actors formed a broad anti-war coalition that should set the tone for peace talks from the very beginning. This could well be in the interest of the parties to the conflict, as they will need a third actor to arbitrate their relationship in the future. The German government should strive for stronger coordination of the international mediation approaches under civilian leadership from Sudan, while the European Union (EU) should initiate constrains on the financial leeway of Sudan's violent actors. (author's abstract)

Ten months into the war in Sudan, the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo dramatically overturned the battle against Abdelfattah Al-Burhan and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF). Their capture of Sudan's breadbasket in December 2023 is the culmination of new regional networks, changing weapons, and tactical sabotage - and it does not bode well for Sudan's future. In Khartoum's urban battlefield, the SAF and RSF cannot concentrate their forces against the other, resulting in a stalemate. Outside Khartoum, the RSF chipped away at the SAF's infrastructure and cut off its supply chains through sieges. The RSF have also dragged the fight closer to its networks outside Sudan, shortening their own supply routes. The RSF's old and new equipment made them more adept at rural and desert warfare. Sudan is surrounded by major arms-trafficking hubs, which the RSF uses to reinforce its supply lines against the SAF. Fuel, ammunition, weapons, and other cargo are smuggled through Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, and via the Red Sea. Weapons also arrive from Uganda and South Sudan. The United Arab Emirates and the Wagner Group cooperate closely to supply the war through these countries. The SAF and RSF may not be able to terminate the violence anymore because command structures within and between troops have eroded. The SAF's losses provoke defections from its ranks. Factions that joined the war in Darfur and in Kordofan can supersede Al-Burhan's and Dagalo's authority on a municipal level and use the war for their group-specific goals.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power after the military ousted President Morsi in July 2013 following widespread protests and strikes. With the tenth anniversary of the Arab Spring uprising approaching, it has become clear that civil-military relations, infrastructure development, and population growth remain three interrelated challenges for Egypt that have persisted throughout the last decade.
The military is historically tied to politics and remains a highly popular institution in Egyptian society. Simultaneously, socio-economic grievances and its importance as an employer continue to push the military into Egypt's domestic politics.
Infrastructure development is on a split course: On one hand, because of its resources and manpower, the military can invest in mega-projects in hopes of long-term economic benefits. On the other hand, urbanisation has remained stagnant due to the crackdown on booming illegal, albeit urgently needed, housing.
There is acknowledgement among policymakers that population growth is stifling infrastructure and development, yet there is little incentive for change. Measures targeting women fail to gain traction because of societal pressure to bear children, and because access to education, employment, and political participation remain unsafe given rampant sexual violence in public spaces.
Through supporting socio-economic advancement in Egypt, Germany and the EU can facilitate the military's withdrawal from politics over the long term. Active support for infrastructure development implemented by civilian actors will over time reduce the need for the military's economic engagement. Improving women's safety will enable their access to work and political participation, which in turn can lower birthrates more effectively than the provision of birth control alone.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi kam im Juni 2013 an die Macht, nachdem das Militär Präsident Morsi im Kontext anhaltender Massenproteste des Amtes enthoben hatte. Zehn Jahre nach dem Beginn des Arabischen Frühlings wird deutlich, dass die zivil-militärischen Beziehungen, die Entwicklung der Infrastruktur sowie das Bevölkerungswachstum drei weiterhin ungelöste und miteinander in Verbindung stehende Herausforderungen für Ägypten darstellen.
Das ägyptische Militär ist historisch eng mit dem politischen System verzahnt und genießt nach wie vor eine große Beliebtheit in der Bevölkerung. Aufgrund sozio-ökonomischer Missstände und seiner Bedeutung als Arbeitgeber ist das Militär kontinuierlich in die Politik involviert.
Die Problemlagen bei der Infrastrukturentwicklung sind vielschichtig. Einerseits engagiert sich das Militär mit seinen finanziellen und menschlichen Ressourcen in Großprojekten, die langfristig ökonomische Vorteile versprechen. Andererseits wird die urbane Entwicklung massiv blockiert, weil die Regierung den Bau von dringend benötigtem Wohnraum, der bisher vorwiegend illegal stattfindet, behindert.
Zwar erkennen politische Entscheidungsträger an, dass das Bevölkerungswachstum infrastrukturelle und entwicklungspolitische Impulse konterkariert, allerdings gibt es kaum Anreize, dies zu ändern. Maßnahmen zur Bevölkerungskontrolle, die sich an Frauen richten, laufen ins Leere, da diese einem immensen gesellschaftlichen Druck ausgesetzt sind, Kinder zu gebären. Der Zugang zu Bildung, Arbeit und politischer Teilhabe wird Frauen zudem durch weitverbreitete sexualisierte Gewalt im öffentlichen Raum genommen.
Deutschland und die EU können den Rückzug des ägyptischen Militärs aus der Politik durch langfristig orientierte sozioökonomische Entwicklungsmaßnahmen unterstützen. Eine Förderung von zivilen Akteuren, die Infrastrukturprojekte implementieren, kann zukünftig die Notwendigkeit eines ökonomischen Engagements des Militärs verringern. Eine Verbesserung der Sicherheitslage für Frauen würde deren berufliche und politische Teilhabe verbessern, was wiederum die Geburtenrate effektiver absenkt als das Verteilen von Verhütungsmitteln.