Search results

Decapitation strategies have often been linked to counterterrorism. The existing literature suggests the results of these strategies are mixed. Previous studies suggest that the death of a prominent leader may not necessarily end the crisis; it all depends on the group's infrastructure, ideology, leadership traditions, and extent of its penetration in society. This article takes a critical look at the impact of a recent leadership decapitation in Nigeria. Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the Boko Haram movement in the Lake Chad Basin countries, was killed on 19 May 2021 by a faction of the movement known as the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP). This article argues that Shekau's case has paradoxically helped to strengthen ISWAP's position, giving it new recruits and other resources and perhaps most importantly reinforced its position with local communities. This has implications for the Nigerian state, its neighbours and, because of Boko Haram's links to ISIS, the wider war on terrorism.

Résumé En 1999, le Nigeria a renoué avec la démocratie électorale après une période prolongée de pouvoir militaire 1 . Depuis, trois autres élections ont été organisées : en 2003, 2007 et 2011. Or ces élections s'accompagnent d'une escalade continue de violences. Celle de 2011 constituent cependant un intéressant paradoxe. Alors que la saison pré-électorale a été marquée par des formes inédites de tactiques de la terreur, les élections elles-mêmes ont été libres, équitables et sans violence. Mais immédiatement après l'élection présidentielle du 16 avril 2011, certaines parties du nord du Nigeria se sont embrasées pendant trois jours, faisant plusieurs centaines de victimes.

This paper reflects on the ability of the African Union (AU) to implement its conflict management mechanism. The response of the AU to the 'military coup' in Togo and its mission in Sudan are used as case studies. The emerging picture is that African leaders are now alive to their responsibilities for making, building and keeping peace in Africa. African leaders know that the days of non-interference and expecting the rest of the world to resolve conflict situations created by them are over. The AU would, however, achieve better results if the member states are more committed to removing the problems faced by the organisation. The most salient include the poor commitment of some African leaders to positive peace, the regional organisation is still as under funded as the former OAU, and the problem of weak national armies in some member states compromises efficiency of peace support operations. (Afr Dev/GIGA)

This paper reflects on the ability of the African Union (AU) to implement its conflict management mechanism. The response of the AU to the 'military coup' in Togo and its mission in Sudan are used as case studies. The emerging picture is that African leaders are now alive to their responsibilities for making, building and keeping peace in Africa. African leaders know that the days of non-interfer- ence and expecting the rest of the world to resolve conflict situations created by them are over. The AU would, however, achieve better results if the member states are more committed to removing the problems faced by the organisation. The most salient include the poor commitment of some African leaders to posi- tive peace, the regional organisation is still as under funded as the former OAU, and the problem of weak national armies in some member states compromises efficiency of peace support operations.

This paper discusses the immigration of the Igbo into the city of Kano; the context in which the hostility between them and the Hausa-Fulani host population was built up and the extent to which this could be said to have threatened the safety of the Igbo in Kano. (DÜI-Hff)