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Conventional approaches to fiscal decentralization suggest that decentralization
lowers the power of redistribution, but recent theories
argue that fiscal decentralization can work as a commitment device.
The former effect is argued to cause an increase in inter-county inequality,
while the latter suggests a decrease.
This article first clarifies the relationship between fiscal decentralization
and inter-county inequality by using cross-sectional data for the
United States. Our result indicates that the achievement of autonomy
by fiscal decentralization in poor (low-income) counties contributes to
decreased inter-county inequality, but that this effect is not as large as
the dominating adverse effect fiscal decentralization has on rich (highincome)
counties.

This paper considers a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment. The central government is benevolent but cannot commit. The local governments strategically act while accounting for the ex post motive of the central government. We then investigate inefficiency in the subgame perfect equilibrium. We analyze the effect of central control on local borrowings. It is revealed that the central control is of no use. The model is extended to the case with residential mobility which gives different policy implications.

The Japanese government is heavily indebted but the yield on the Japanese government bond (JBG) remains low to date. We hypothesize that the presence of the Japanese government as a large stable investor of JGBs exerted a stabilizing influence on private

The Japanese government is heavily indebted but the yield on the Japanese government bond (JBG) remains low to date. We hypothesize that the presence of the Japanese government as a large stable investor of JGBs exerted a stabilizing influence on private

Theoretical studies suggest that corruption may counteract government failure and promote economic growth in the short run, given exogenously determined sub optimal bureaucratic rules and regulations. As the government failure is itself a function of corruption, however, corruption should have detrimental effects on economic growth in the long run. In this paper, we measure the rate of economic growth for various time spans—short (1998–2000), middle (1995–2000) and long (1991–2000)—using previously uninvestigated state-level cross-section data for the United States. Our two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates with a carefully selected set of instruments show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is indeed negative and statistically significant in the middle and long spans but insignificant in the short span.