Search results

Adversarial science—sometimes referred to as "litigation science" or "junk science"—has a bad name. It is often associated with the tobacco industry's relentless use of science to manufacture uncertainty and avoid liability. This Article challenges the traditional conception that adversarial science should be castigated simply because it was developed for litigation. Rather, this Article urges that adversarial science is an important informational asset that should, and indeed must, be embraced. In the ecological context, adversarial science is vital to understanding the ecological effects of long-term toxic exposure. Government trustees and corporate defendants fund intensive scientific research following major ecological disasters like oil spills as part of a process known as natural resource damage assessment ("NRDA"). During this process, lawyers engage scientists to advance advocacy positions, either to support or to defeat claims for natural resource damages. The NRDA process presents an unparalleled opportunity to intensively study the effects of toxic exposure to ecosystems at the very moment those impacts are unfolding. At the same time, the science that emerges is adversarial; it suffers from the same conflicts of interests and perceptions of bias as other result-oriented science. While scientists and legal scholars have written extensively about the conflicts of interest embedded in other forms of policy-relevant science, surprisingly little scholarly attention has been given to the influence of litigation on NRDA science or the implications of that influence on the broader scientific understanding of ecological harms. This Article casts a bright light on adversarial science, using the scientific literature to expose the influence of litigation on NRDA science. More importantly, this Article—while acknowledging the risks of adversarial science—urges policymakers to embrace it. Ultimately, this Article offers solutions that both release adversarial science from traditional clouds of suspicion and allow ...

Un arbitre doit décider d'un litige entre deux parties dans le cadre d'une procédure purement accusatoire. Sa décision peut reposer uniquement sur ses a priori, en l'absence d'information supplémentaire ; ou bien elle peut reposer sur les éléments de preuve additionnels soumis volontairement par les parties au litige. Lorsqu'elle décide de témoigner, et moyennant un coût, chaque partie peut déformer la réalité en sa faveur. À l'équilibre, les parties ne témoignent jamais simultanément. Une partie ne témoigne que si les faits sont suffisamment en sa faveur, mais son témoignage présente alors une version exagérée de cet avantage. Inversement, si les faits sont proches de l'évaluation a priori du décideur, aucune des parties ne témoigne. Nous comparons cet équilibre à celui qui serait obtenu avec une procédure purement inquisitoire où c'est l'arbitre qui décide du nombre de témoignages.