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A couple of months before the Swedish election in 1998, the incumbent government distributed 2.3 billion SEK to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities. This was the first wave of a four-year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development. This temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. In this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters.

In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision-making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck–Weibull/Dixit–Londregan model, in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do not, however, find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters.

In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters.

A couple of months before the Swedish election in 1998, the incumbent government distributed 2.3 billion SEK to 42 out of 115 applying municipalities. This was the first wave of a four-year long grant program intended to support local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development. This temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision making power given to the incumbent central government. In this paper we investigate whether there were any tactical motives behind the distribution of these grants. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study in order to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck-Weibull/Dixit-Londregan model in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do however not find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfer money to its own supporters.

We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable of monitoring voter turnout, a common scenario in secret-ballot polities. As advanced by recent literature, the ability to monitor turnout rather than vote choice implies that politicians should use targetable private goods to mobilize voters. However, politicians also deploy non-excludable local public goods, which have low mobilization potential because of free-rider incentives. We argue that vote-buying politicians reserve local public goods for loyal constituencies (where they enjoy support from most voters that bother to turn out) and provide private goods in other constituencies where they gain from motivating less committed supporters to turn out. We test aggregate-level implications of our theory on Venezuela's social programs. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

We consider the behavior of an incumbent that can deploy local public goods and private goods to buy votes, and is unable to verify vote choice but capable of monitoring voter turnout, a common scenario in secret-ballot polities. As advanced by recent literature, the ability to monitor turnout rather than vote choice implies that politicians should use targetable private goods to mobilize voters. However, politicians also deploy non-excludable local public goods, which have low mobilization potential because of free-rider incentives. We argue that vote-buying politicians reserve local public goods for loyal constituencies (where they enjoy support from most voters that bother to turn out) and provide private goods in other constituencies where they gain from motivating less committed supporters to turn out. We test aggregate-level implications of our theory on Venezuela's social programs.

Social scientists tend to agree that public opinion influences public policy. As the agricultural industry faces increased scrutiny from public officials and citizen advocacy groups, agricultural communication professionals are faced with the challenge of targeting messages that encourage public confidence in the industry. Research-based marketing segmentation may hold the key to effective political marketing for the industry. While some consumer research has been conducted to better understand food purchasing decisions, more is needed to better understand public attitudes toward the larger agricultural industry and to better recognize any segmentation in public opinion. This study's findings—drawn from the Agriculture Institute of Florida's 2006 survey, the 2000 United States Census of Population and Housing, and the 2002 United States Department of Agriculture Census of Agriculture—may help guide future industry messages toward the public.

This paper studies a very pure form of "vote purchasing". We consider whether it may be in the interest of a party to discriminate between groups that, possibly except for size, are identical in all welfare relevant spects, i.e. the groups are assumed to have the same income, needs, etc. To emphasise this aspect we label the groups brown-heads and redheads. The interpretation is that they differ only in some characteristic that is entirely irrelevant from a welfare perspective. There are no systematic differences between people with the same income. Taking two samples of people from an income class their political support will be identically distributed. We will show that even with these uniformity assumptions there can be strong incentives for political parties to undertake vote purchasing by favouring one of the identical groups at the expense of the other.

Analyse der Diskussionen über die Auswirkungen der Verteilung von Staatseinnahmen auf die Staaten der Föderation einerseits und die innenpolitisch konkurrierenden Kräfte andererseits. Mit wirtschaftlichen Modellrechnungen wird nachgewiesen, daß viele Debatten der zweiten Republik über Veränderungen der Finanzverteilung zwischen Zentrale und Unionsstaaten zwar durch Hoffnung auf Stimmenzuwachs motiviert waren, jedoch ohne Chance auf wirkliche Veränderung blieben. (DÜI-Wsl)

Regional transfers are assumed to have an impact on the public opinion towards the benefactor, but empirical evidence is still scarce. In this paper we test this hypothesis for the structural funds of the European Union (EU) by combining detailed data on regional transfers with public opinion surveys. A positive impact of transfers on public support for the EU can be confirmed. Moreover, we scrutinize the role of awareness of being a recipient of funds in this process. In particular, we find that the impact of the amount of transfers on the individual's awareness is heterogenous and particularly depends on education. Finally, we show that the type of information source which arouses the citizen's awareness of the transfers affects the impact on his opinion.

An FBI investigation of county purchasing activities in the mid 1980s resulted in the conviction of 55 of Mississippi's 410 county supervisors. Analyzing data from the state's 1987 county supervisor elections and hypothesizing that candidates' demands for votes increase as the gains from holding public office increase, we predict larger voter turnouts in the 26 of the state's 82 counties where supervisor corruption was exposed. Holding constant average voter turnout in the preceding U.S. presidential election and controlling for the competitiveness of supervisor races, we find that more Mississippians indeed voted in corrupt than in non-corrupt counties.