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AbstractThe rapid increase in South African electricity prices in the past eight years has been overseen by a proactive, policy‐oriented regulator, National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA). Regulatory governance theory proposes that regulation is most effective when the roles of different organizations are clearly defined. While the laws establishing the regulator comply with this requirement, effectiveness of regulation is challenged by a weak ministry, overlapping spheres of regulatory influence and competing goals among the parties involved. It is hypothesized that this impacts the outcomes of the regulatory institution. Using an institutional analysis and development methodology, the interactions between the regulator, the energy ministry, municipal electricity distributors and National Treasury are investigated. Attempts to change the institutional rules have largely been unsuccessful because of the threat they posed to the constitutional and financial interests of municipalities. The regulator, with support from National Treasury, has been largely successful in ensuring compliance by municipalities to its administrative processes and its prescribed tariff escalation rates. It has been less successful at ensuring standardization of business tariffs across electricity distributors. The regulator's tariff objectives have prioritized protection of the poor rather than economic development. The major pro‐poor initiative of the regulator is the inclining block tariff (IBT) which has effectively subsidized electricity consumption of low usage households. This occurred at the expense of municipal revenues, rather than other consumers.

Two of the most defining trends of the nineteenth century were the growth of international trade and the increased role of government activities in the economy. In the conjuncture between these developments lie taxes on foreign trade. Sweden was one of the examples where customs revenue became the single most important source of revenue before WWI. This article sets out to test how this source of revenue could increase as much as it did. The analysis focuses mainly on trade policy and how tariffs were set and how that affected revenue. The results show that Swedish liberalisation of trade forced a switch in the fiscal structure of tariffs, moving revenue to fewer commodities. Increased importance was given to consumption goods with lower elasticity of demand. Trade continued to increase under fiscal taxation, which led to increases in revenue. During the early period increased revenue was achieved with higher tariffs on a few key commodities. Towards the end of the century tariffs on agricultural and capital goods became more fiscally relevant, which could have clashed with protectionist intentions. The article highlights that more work is needed on this fiscal component of trade policy. ; The Impact of Tariffs on the Swedish Economy: Fiscal Policy, Efficient Protection, and Trade Flows, 1783-1914

This is a conference paper. ; Ghana is pursuing strategic plans towards the achievement of water coverage targets set under the UN Millennium Development Goals by year 2015. About 75% of the population is expected to have access to potable water supply for domestic use. One of the key factors that may derail the achievements of this target in rural communities and small towns is high water tariff. Water tariff setting is achieved under two different legislations. Whereas the Public Utility Regulations Commission and Ghana Water Company Limited regulates water tariff for urban communities, the Community Water and Sanitation Agency facilitates water tariff setting for rural communities and small towns. The level of water tariff is related to the level of patronage of water facilities, especially in rural communities. It is therefore a critical factor to be considered when planning towards achievements of water coverage targets for the MDGs.

Introduction. The article aims to investigate the forms of partners' opportunistic behavior in a public-private partnership (PPP). The article highlights key features of a PPP that involves construction and operation of a railroad in Eastern Kazakhstan. Research methodology. This qualitative study employs in-depth interviews as a principal data collection method. Theoretical framework. The article's theoretical underpinnings stem from highlighting the meaning of opportunism in general and from defining opportunistic behavior in a PPP in particular. Results. The article reveals the typical reasons behind opportunistic behavior such as intent to pay for unplanned project expenses and a need to turn project's losses into profits. The article concludes that the government, by rejecting applications for tariff raises, aims at receiving the greater PPP value for money and, hence, serves the PPP interest as well as the interests of taxpayers and consumers. Conclusion. The opportunistic private sector partner behavior that pursues its own interest, rather than that of a partnership, diminishes the PPP value for money. Instead of raising a tariff, a private operator should look for ways of cutting costs and increasing the project's efficiency. Key words: public-private partnership (PPP), opportunistic behavior, tariff setting, public services.