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Other written product issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) new rule on selective disclosure and insider trading. GAO noted that: the new rule would address three issues: (a) the selective disclosure by various issuers of material nonpublic information; (b) when insider trading liability arises in connection with a trader's "use" or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information; (c) when the breach of a family or other nonbusiness relationship may give rise to liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading; and (d) SEC complied with applicable requirements in promulgating the rule."

AbstractWe experimentally study the interaction between a persuader and a decision‐maker. The former would like to persuade the latter to approve a project by providing evidence on the project's value. He may choose a selective disclosure strategy on the basis of his private information. Our experimental design contrasts situations where the persuader observes private information or not and where the decision‐maker interacts with a human or robot persuader. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction that the human persuader manipulates the production of evidence. Although the decision‐maker does not adequately take into account such manipulation, the comparative static analysis across treatments is mostly consistent with theoretical predictions with a rational decision‐maker. Our findings on the welfare effect of the persuader's manipulation on the decision‐maker are consistent with theory. In particular, the decision‐maker may benefit from such manipulation. However, the welfare effect on the persuader is not always consistent with theory, in that there are instances in which the persuader is not hurt by manipulation even though theory predicts that he is.

Under increased pressure to report environmental impacts, some firms selectively disclose relatively benign impacts, creating an impression of transparency while masking their true performance. We theorize circumstances under which firms are less likely to engage in such selective disclosure, focusing on organizational and institutional factors that intensify scrutiny and expectations of transparency and that foster civil society mobilization. We test our hypotheses using a novel panel data set of 4,750 public companies across many industries that are headquartered in 45 countries during 2004–2007. Results show that firms that are more environmentally damaging, particularly those in countries where they are more exposed to scrutiny and global norms, are less likely to engage in selective disclosure. We discuss contributions to research on institutional theory, strategic management, and information disclosure.