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As economic integration deepens globally and even more so within the European Community, national capacities to regulate and to tax mobile capital and firms are reduced, whereas governance at European or international levels is constrained by conflicts of interest among the governments involved. The effectiveness of problem solving at the national and European and international levels varies considerably from one field to another. Identifies factors that could explain the varying intensity and direction of competitive pressures on national regulatory systems, as well as the greater or lesser political feasibility of European or international regulation. (Original abstract - amended)

IN THE POST-WAR DECADES, ADVANCED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES HAVE DEVELOPED IN SYMBIOSIS WITH DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS WITH A HIGH CAPACITY FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION AND WELFARE-STATE COMPENSATIONS. AS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION DEEPENS GLOBALLY AND EVEN MORE SO WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, NATIONAL CAPACITIES TO REGULATE AND TO TAX MOBILE CAPITAL AND FIRMS ARE REDUCED, WHEREAS GOVERNANCE AT EUROPEAN OR INTERNATIONAL LEVELS IS CONSTRAINED BY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED. NEVERTHELESS, AS THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VOLUME SHOW, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING AT THE NATIONAL AS WELL AS AT THE EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELS VARIES CONSIDERABLY FROM ONE FIELD TO ANOTHER. IN THIS INTRODUCTION, THIS ARTICLE IDENTIFIES THE FACTORS THAT COULD EXPLAIN THE VARYING INTENSITY AND DIRECTION OF COMPETITIVE PRESSURES ON NATIONAL REGULATORY SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS THE GREATER OR LESSER POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF EUROPEAN OR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION.

This Working Paper is an attempt, occasioned by the evaluation of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, to provide a conceptual framework within which institute research on multi-level European problem solving could be discussed in the context of a more comprehensive overview of the literature. The framework combines an institutional dimension (distinguishing between supranational, joint-decision and intergovernmental modes of EU policy making) and a policy dimension (distinguishing between market-creating, market-enabling, market-correcting and redistributive policies). As institutional modes differ in their capacity for conflict resolution, and as policy types differ in the likelihood of severe policy conflict, greater or lesser problem-solving capacity can be explained by the location of a particular policy area on both of these dimensions. ; Aus Anlass der Evaluierung des Max-Planck-Instituts für Gesellschaftsforschung entwickelt dieses Working Paper einen Bezugsrahmen, in dem die Ergebnisse der am Institut betriebenen Forschung zur europäischen Mehrebenenpolitik im Kontext der internationalen Literatur eingeordnet und diskutiert werden können. Der Bezugsrahmen verbindet eine institutionelle Dimension (in der zwischen supranationalen, verflochtenen und intergouvernementalen Interaktionsformen unterschieden wird) mit einer Policy-Dimension (in der zwischen marktschaffenden, marktfördernden, markt-korrigierenden und redistributiven Policy-Typen unterschieden wird). Da Interaktionsformen sich in ihrer Konfliktregelungskapazität, und da Policy-Typen sich in ihrer Konfliktwahrscheinlichkeit unterscheiden, kann die größere oder geringere Problemlösungsfähigkeit in einem bestimmten Politikfeld durch dessen Lage in beiden Dimensionen erklärt werden.