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It was shown previously that in the symmetric contest game of two players, equilibrium bidding is lower in the case of private information than in the case of public information about the players' costs. I consider symmetric contests of an arbitrary number of players with continuously distributed private costs and discuss the existence and properties of equilibrium bidding functions. I show that with more than two players the relationship between equilibrium bids in the cases of public and private information is no longer universal. While high-cost players still bid less in the private information case, relatively low-cost players may bid above or below their corresponding public information bids. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

RESEARCH ON POLITICAL AMBITION AND RECRUITMENT HAS YET TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE ROLE OF PRIVATE LIFE AND ESPECIALLY THE FAMILY IN A POTENTIAL CANDIDATE'S CALCULATION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RUNNING FOR OFFICE. USING THE CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 1972 CONVENTION DELEGATE STUDY, THIS ARTICLE INVESTIGATES THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF FAMILY ROLES, SUBJECTIVE CONFLICT, AND POLITICAL AMBITION.

The European Central Bank (ECB) carried out a study of the social and private costs of different payment instruments with the participation of 13 national central banks in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It shows that the costs to society of providing retail payment services are substantial. On average, they amount to almost 1% of GDP for the sample of participating EU countries. Half of the social costs are incurred by banks and infrastructures, while the other half of all costs are incurred by retailers. The social costs of cash payments represent nearly half of the total social costs, while cash payments have on average the lowest costs per transaction, followed closely by debit card payments. However, in some countries, cash does not always yield the lowest unit costs. Despite countries' own market characteristics, the European market for retail payments can be grouped into fi ve distinct payment clusters with respect to the social costs of payment instruments, market development, and payment behaviour. The results from the present study may trigger a constructive debate about which policy measures and payment instruments are suitable for improving social welfare and realising potential cost savings along the transaction value chain.