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Bringing together emerging ethnographies on kinship in South Asia, this book explores the idea of kinship as fiction in intimate relationships. This volume resurrects the idea of fiction and fictive-ness to understand how intimate relationships may use these particular labels, or create an experiential understanding around relationships

Venus in India: Love Adventures in Hindustan is an erotic novel about a soldier, Captain Deveraux, who has been sent to Hindustan. In the first volume he is awaiting orders when he begins an affair with another soldier's wife, who confides her own erotic adventures to him. In the second volume he is sent to the hinterlands where he becomes entangled with his commanding officer's family

Telling fictional stories and engaging with the fictional stories of others is an important and pervasive part of human culture. But people not only tell and engage with fictional stories. They also reflect on the content of stories, and on the way these are told. Grappling with the many issues such reflection uncovers has long been a concern of professional academics in language departments and other academic programs with a focus on language. Philosophers should be included on this list. The concept of fiction gives rise to a number of intriguing and complex philosophical issues, and the philosophy of fiction has now become an acknowledged part of mainstream philosophy, with a history that goes back at least to the early debates about the role of poets and dramatists found in the works of Aristotle and Plato. The issues in question broadly relate to fiction as a mode of representation—a way of describing individuals and events—that is strikingly different from representation concerned with truth, the latter long a dominant theme in philosophy. Not only is faithfulness to truth in the ordinary sense not a requirement in fiction; fiction may even depart from truth in the things it talks about, which typically include nonexistent individuals and even members of nonexistent kinds (Holmes and hobbits, for example)—see the entry on fictional entities. There are also more indirect reasons for taking fiction seriously as a philosophical topic. The last few decades have seen a surge of interest in interpreting prominent yet (arguably) philosophically problematic areas of enquiry—areas as far apart as mathematics and morality—as involving something akin to fiction, a position known as fictionalism about those areas. On such views, we should not believe the central claims of the area because of their commitment to entities like numbers and objective moral facts; instead we should treat them the way we treat a distinctively fictional claim like "Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective": something we know not to be literally true (after all, there never was a Sherlock Holmes) but accept as true in some derivative or at least nonliteral sense (unlike "Holmes was a plodding policeman", say). The continuing rise of fictionalism presents us with a new reason for treating fiction as a significant philosophical topic, since it is a position that is difficult to motivate independently of an understanding of what is distinctive about fiction (Armour-Garb and Woodbridge 2015). (For more on fictionalism and its ties to fiction, see the entry on fictionalism.) One fundamental question raised by the notion of fiction is a conceptual one: What makes something a work of fiction as opposed to a work of non-fiction? A first attempt at saying what fiction is might portray it as a kind of writing whose product is a written text (a work of fiction) that misrepresents how the world actually is, although not in order to deceive intended readers. This opposes it to non-fiction; even if a work of non-fiction misrepresents the world, it is not intended by its author to be recognized as something that misrepresents the world. It doesn't take much to see that this rough characterization is in fact far too rough. A work of fiction needn't be a written text, but could be a picture (or series of pictures) or a representation in some other medium like film. And the characterization lets in too much: a newspaper article attacking some political position by engaging in the relentless use of irony, say, is not a work of fiction but a work of non-fiction that uses irony. The problem of saying how fiction differs from non-fiction is just one of the hard problems faced by the philosophical study of fiction. Another problem is that of specifying the sense in which a fictional sentence can be true despite misdescribing how matters stand in the world. (A sentence like "Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective", for example, is not true if it is construed as a claim about brilliant detectives our world has known, but counts as true if it is stated as an answer to a quiz question "Who was Sherlock Holmes?" By contrast, "Sherlock Holmes was a plodding policeman" would count as false in this context.) But in what sense can the sentence be true, given that the world does not contain any such person as Sherlock Holmes? One promising thought is that when we hear the sentence as genuinely true we regard it as elliptical for something like "In the Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective". On this suggestion it is the truth of the latter prefixed sentence that provides the sense in which "Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective" counts as true. But even if this is right, what still needs explaining is what it is for such a prefixed sentence to be true. What makes "In the Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective" true (but not "In the Holmes stories, Sherlock Holmes was a plodding policeman"), when there never was such a person as Sherlock Holmes? In addition to the problem of how to understand the notion of truth in a work of fiction, there is also a deep puzzle about the way we respond emotionally to such truths. When we engage with fiction, we often do so at a highly specific emotional level—we may not only be enthralled by elements of the plot but also affected by what befalls particular characters. Thus, we may find ourselves feeling pity for Anna Karenina as we near the end of Tolstoy's novel because we are aware of Anna's suffering. But the claim that we pity Anna Karenina is deeply puzzling: we know there is no Anna Karenina, and that it is only true in Tolstoy's novel that Anna Karenina is suffering, so how can there be genuine pity for Anna? This is the so-called paradox of fiction, one of a batch of puzzles that have been raised in the philosophy of fiction about our engagement with works of fiction. These are by no means the only philosophical questions thrown up by fiction. In fact, the paradox of fiction immediately suggests others. Taken at face value, a statment like "Sherlock Holmes was a brilliant detective" seems at best to be true in a work of fiction rather than true outright. By contrast, a statement like "Many readers pity Anna Karenina" seems to be true outright. (The same goes for other statements relating fictional characters to the real world, for example "Conan Doyle created Holmes", "Frodo doesn't exist", and "Holmes is more famous than any real detective".) This raises the thorny issue of the ontological commitments of talk involving fiction. If it is genuinely true that many readers feel pity for Anna Karenina or that Doyle created Holmes, then presumably there are things—Anna Karenina and Holmes—about whom this is true. But how is the claim that there are such objects consistent with the obvious truth that Holmes and Anna Karenina don't exist? And what could such nonexistent objects be like? We leave detailed commentary on such ontological and metaphysical questions to the entry on fictional entities. The present entry is devoted to the nature of fiction and its "truths", including our emotional engagement with these truths—topics that can be discussed independently of whether one is a realist or an antirealist about fictional entities. Before we begin, it is worth noting that the study of these topics is not the province of philosophers alone. Just what is fiction, for example, is a question that also engages narratologists and historians of fiction (see, e.g., Gallagher 2006, Walsh 2007), although they approach the issue from different academic perspectives, often with somewhat different aims in mind. The present entry focuses mainly on the work of philosophers.

Intro -- Arundhati Roy -- The Ministry of Utmost Happiness -- Summary -- Anjum -- Anjum's guesthouse -- Garson Hobart -- Tilo -- The Ministry of Utmost Happiness -- Character study -- Anjum -- Tilo -- Biplab Dasgupta -- Naga -- Musa -- Saddam Hussain -- Zainab -- Major Amrik Singh -- Miss Jebeen the Second -- Analysis -- A postcolonial novel -- Contemporary Indian society -- Kashmir -- Poverty -- Gender -- Style -- Further reflection -- Further reading.

This topical, lively and wide-ranging book examines the material conditions under which the contemporary English novel is produced and consumed. Its starting point is the general economic emergency which showed up these conditions with unusual clarity in the early 1970s. The first section of the book, 'Crisis and Change', considers the changing patterns of institutional book-purchase, inflation and novel-production, the 'Americanisation' of the British book trade, and the present state of fiction reviewing. The second section, 'State Remedies', surveys such interventions, and failed interventi