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"Perfect Deterrence Theory" published on by Oxford University Press.

THE AUTHOR DISCUSSES GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS, FOCUSING ON "RATIONALITY AND MISPERCEPTIONS IN DETERRENCE THEORY" BY R. HARRISON WAGNER.

Because of its parsimony and power, deterrence theory is the most important American theory of international relations. Yet it has many faults. The boundaries outside of which it does not apply are not clear; it does not tell how a state can change an adversary's motives; it does not deal with the use of rewards. Current scholarship of the third wave of deterrence theory, including George and Smoke'sDeterrence in American Foreign Policy, has increased our knowledge by providing empirical evidence on when and how deterrence fails. Examination of the details of decision making reveals the ways in which attempts to deter can go wrong. Recent work stresses the role of each side's intrinsic interest in an issue, and argues that earlier formulations of the theory exaggerated the importance of commitment. The third wave also introduces a larger political element by focusing attention on states' goals and the context of their behavior.

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Abstract Recently, some researchers have attempted to resurrect deterrence theory. These researchers have focused on the relationship between certainty and severity of punishment and subsequent rates of crime. An inverse relationship has been found, leading these researchers to conclude that penal sanctions deter crime. This paper presents another hypothesis, namely, that increases in crime may overburden existing legal machinery, and thus cause decreases in the certainty of punishment as a result. Using the same data employed in past deterrence studies, this paper demonstrates that crime may affect certainty of punishment more strongly than certainty of punishment affects the crime rate, a finding which seriously questions the ability of legal threats as currently administered in American society to deter crime.

"The Concept of Deterrence and Deterrence Theory" published on by Oxford University Press.

The causes and effects of the use of force raise crucial questions of substance and method. Issues are multiple and often are confused with each other. Thus, while many case-study findings contradict "second-wave" deterrence theory, they are consistent with some rational deterrence theories. Many findings, however, cannot be squared with the assumptions of rationality. Policies are suboptimal and behavior is often inconsistent. Furthermore, the actor's values, beliefs, and calculations are exogenous to rational theories and can only be supplied by empirical analysis.

Authors of several case studies of international conflict have claimed that the frequency with which statesmen are surprised by the way other governments respond to challenges is inconsistent with rational deterrence theory. Some have contended that the behavior of decision-makers is better explained by theories of cognitive or even affective psychology. The main issue raised by these critics is decision-makers' use of the information available to them, especially information about the commitments of other governments, and their incentive to protect their reputations by carrying out their threats. Only recently, however, have game-theoretic techniques been developed which permit the formalization of theories of deterrence that incorporate incomplete information, learning and the development of reputations. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the question of how much misperception by foreign policy decision-makers is consistent with rationality, in light of these new developments in game theory.

A critical analysis of case studies of international conflict in which the frequency with which statesmen are suprised by how other governments respond to challenges is viewed as inconsistent with rational deterrence theory, & better explained by theories of cognitive or even affective psychology. The main issue raised by these critics is decisionmakers' use of available information, especially about the commitments of other governments, & their incentive to protect their reputations by carrying out their threats. Game-theoretic techniques have recently been developed that permit the formalization of theories of deterrence that incorporate incomplete information, learning, & the development of reputations. The degree to which misperception by foreign policy decisionmakers is consistent with rationality is reexamined here in light of these new developments in game theory. 3 Figures, 36 References. Adapted from the source document.