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The saber rattling rhetoric of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has fueled fears that Iranian-driven Shia politics may polarize the region and spark conflict or civil strife. Israel remains notably unsettled by Iran's nuclear program and Ahmadinejad's belligerent public remarks, floating rumors of a 30-day war with Iran. Ironically, Ahmadinejad lacks the power to act on such rhetoric, as control over Iran's military resides with its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamanei. In light of these regional tensions, what is the emerging strategic reality vis-a-vis Iran? In the policy sphere there exists a debate over whether a pan-Shiism unified leadership may destabilize the region or whether the more pressing challenge lies in containing Iranian efforts to assert strategic and cultural hegemony in the region. This paper focuses more on the strategic considerations and role of Iran's cyber capability in regards to regional instability and future conflict. There are offensive and defensive aspects to that strategic equation, which must be understood and addressed. Iran has shown a willingness to employ cyber tools to maintain the power of the regime at home as well, it appears, to influence the policies or posture of other nations towards Iran in order to deter cyber attacks or other action that Iran deems hostile to its interests. We believe that Iran will pursue an aggressive regional policy that employs cyber tools that affect its neighbors and the West. These tools include malware that can disable critical infrastructure, create confusion, distrust, deception, disruption, support or to drive psychological operations that deter hostile activity or otherwise achieve strategic or tactical objectives. Weapons like Stuxnet offer the threat of cyber weapons without tying them to a particular strategic need or a state's capacity to mount operations. The tools may offer particular value in complementing kinetic strategies and tactics. Iran seems likely to take steps that increase or leverage its influence among Shia populations. Iran will not likely voluntarily relinquish development of its nuclear arms program. It will try move to strengthen military and economic ties with Russia, China, and India, and try to manipulate those relationships to evade or minimize the impact of international sanctions. Until Iran has improved its cyber offensive and shored up its defensive capabilities, it seems unlikely to engage in a near-term regional conflict. To fortify its hold on power at home, the ruling regime must strengthen its ability to withstand kinetic cyber attacks. Offensive cyber capabilities are equally important since they enable Iran to exert influence that may, at a minimum, keep its perceived adversaries off balance and potentially de-stabilize their internal political dynamics. Adapted from the source document.

Cyber technology represents digital military capability with the purpose of causing damage to the military strength and the social infrastructure of a potential enemy. War using conventional weapons may be preceded by or combined with a war using cyber technology. This paper introduces such technology into the theory of conflicts, suggesting the striking proposal that the expected return on cyber investment is convex. It is shown that an asymmetric successful cyber program results in an option for a pre-emptive cyber attack. These features of the model make the cyber technology a first-ranked military investment. The optimal scale of a cyber program of a country expected to have access to a superior cyber capability is derived. It is shown that the asymmetric cyber capability reduces the international arms race but nevertheless raises the likelihood of a war reducing the deterrence.

AbstractThis article presents a discussion of neurocognitive hacking and its potential for use at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of cyber conflict. Neurocognitive hacking refers to the ability to activate specific neural areas of the brain, via subliminal or supraliminal stimuli, to shape the behavioral outcomes of an adversary. Research suggests that awareness of mortality-related stimuli has neural correlates in the right amygdala and left anterior cingulate cortex and mediates negative behavior toward out-group members, including unconscious discriminatory behavior. Given its in-group/out-group dynamic, the phenomenon could be exploited for use in information operations toward target populations, specifically ones that are multiethnic, multicultural, or multireligious. Although development of the theoretical framework behind neurocognitive hacking is ongoing, mortality-related stimuli are proposed to activate one's unconscious vigilance system to further evaluate the locus and viability of the suspect stimuli. Research suggests that the subsequent discriminatory affective reactions directed toward out-group members are representative of automatic heuristics evolved to protect the organism in the event a stimulus represents a more serious threat to survival. Therefore, presenting mortality-related stimuli over computer networks to targeted audiences may facilitate the ingestion of tailored propaganda or shaping of specific behavioral outcomes within a population, including sowing division in a target community or weakening support for a specific political regime.

The 2013 Defence White Paper includes security against major cyber attacks on Australia as an element of our �defence of Australia� national strategic interest. It devotes a separate section to cyber in its strategic outlook. While the White Paper makes heartening comment about the need to integrate cyber power into national strategy, it provides no insights into how this might be achieved, nor does it set any real strategic direction for an improved whole-of-nation effort. It does not attempt to identify any cyber objectives that should underpin Australia�s national security strategy. Australia needs to develop a current baseline cyber posture, derive a consolidated view of all requirements and gaps, and develop future remediation and implementation plans in an integrated fashion. Without this, cyber capability gaps across the Australian Government will continue to hinder the agencies� ability to plan for and conduct effective operations. Accordingly, this article calls for a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment, a national cyber capability plan, and an implementation plan (with specific actions and implementation responsibilities, timeframes, and performance measures) and a funding strategy for addressing any gaps resulting from the assessment. It also calls for a clearer articulation of operational planning considerations, including dealing with the conflation of electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and the use of uninhabited aerial vehicles for improved intelligence collection and network penetration.

The 2013 Defence White Paper includes security against major cyber attacks on Australia as an element of our �defence of Australia� national strategic interest. It devotes a separate section to cyber in its strategic outlook. While the White Paper makes heartening comment about the need to integrate cyber power into national strategy, it provides no insights into how this might be achieved, nor does it set any real strategic direction for an improved whole-of-nation effort. It does not attempt to identify any cyber objectives that should underpin Australia�s national security strategy. Australia needs to develop a current baseline cyber posture, derive a consolidated view of all requirements and gaps, and develop future remediation and implementation plans in an integrated fashion. Without this, cyber capability gaps across the Australian Government will continue to hinder the agencies� ability to plan for and conduct effective operations. Accordingly, this article calls for a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment, a national cyber capability plan, and an implementation plan (with specific actions and implementation responsibilities, timeframes, and performance measures) and a funding strategy for addressing any gaps resulting from the assessment. It also calls for a clearer articulation of operational planning considerations, including dealing with the conflation of electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and the use of uninhabited aerial vehicles for improved intelligence collection and network penetration.

Introduction: small states and cyber capabilities -- Mind the gap: the literature on cyber security and international relations -- Explaining cyber capability development -- Distribution of power and cyber capability development -- Strategic culture and cyber capability development -- Cyber capabilities as a foreign policy instrument -- Conclusion: small states in cyberspace.

The development of cyberspace defense capabilities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been making steady progress since its formal introduction at the North Atlantic Council Prague Summit in 2002. Bolstered by numerous cyber attacks, such as those in Estonia (2007), Alliance priorities were formalized in subsequent NATO cyber defense policies adopted in 2008, 2011, and 2014. This monograph examines the past and current state of cyberspace defense efforts in NATO to assess the appropriateness and sufficiency to address anticipated threats to member countries, including the United States. The analysis focuses on the recent history of cyberspace defense efforts in NATO and how changes in strategy and policy of NATO writ large embrace the emerging nature of cyberspace for military forces as well as other elements of power. It first examines the recent evolution of strategic foundations of NATO cyber activities, policies, and governance as they evolved over the past 13 years. Next, it outlines the major NATO cyber defense mission areas, which include NATO network protection, shared situational awareness in cyberspace, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism, support to member country cyber capability development, and response to crises related to cyberspace. Finally, it discusses several key issues for the new Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy that affirms the role that NATO cyber defense contributes to the mission of collective defense and embraces the notion that a cyber attack may lead to the invocation of Article 5 actions for the Alliance. This monograph concludes with a summary of the main findings from the discussion of NATO cyberspace capabilities and a brief examination of the implications for Department of Defense and Army forces in Europe. Topics include the roles and evolution of doctrine, deterrence, training, and exercise programs, cooperation with industry, and legal standards. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1422/thumbnail.jpg

Intro -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. Conducting Cyber Effect Operations: Definitions and Data -- 2. Mind the Gap: Trends in Cyber Policy and Activity -- 3. Not a Level Playing Field -- 4. A Typology of Cyber Actors -- 5. The Elements of an Offensive Cyber Capability -- 6. The Effect of Experience -- 7. Intentional Interstate Capability Transfers -- 8. Unintentional Interstate Capability Transfers -- 9. The Role of Non-State Actors -- Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography -- Index -- Back Cover.

Lisää oa-artikkeli, kun julkaistu. ; Cyber security has become one of the biggest priorities for businesses and governments. Streamlining and strengthening strategic leadership are key aspects in making sure the cyber security vision is achieved. The strategic leadership of cyber security implies identifying and setting goals based on the protection of the digital operating environment. Furthermore, it implies coordinating actions and preparedness as well as managing extensive disruptions. The aim of this article is to define what is strategic leadership of cyber security and how it is implemented as part of the comprehensive security model in Finland. In terms of effective strategic leadership of cyber security, it is vital to identify structures that can respond to the operative requirements set by the environment. As a basis for national security development and preparedness, it is necessary to have a clear strategy level leadership model for crises management in disturbances in normal and in emergency conditions. In order to ensure cyber security and achieve the set strategic goals, society must be able to engage different parties and reconcile resources and courses of action as efficiently as possible. Cyber capability must be developed in the entire society, which calls for strategic coordination, management and executive capability. ; Peer reviewed

Cyber security has become one of the biggest priorities for businesses and governments. Streamlining and strengthening strategic leadership are key aspects in making sure the cyber security vision is achieved. The strategic leadership of cyber security implies identifying and setting goals based on the protection of the digital operating environment. Furthermore, it implies coordinating actions and preparedness as well as managing extensive disruptions. The aim of this article is to define what is strategic leadership of cyber security and how it is implemented as part of the comprehensive security model in Finland. In terms of effective strategic leadership of cyber security, it is vital to identify structures that can respond to the operative requirements set by the environment. As a basis for national security development and preparedness, it is necessary to have a clear strategy level leadership model for crises management in disturbances in normal and in emergency conditions. In order to ensure cyber security and achieve the set strategic goals, society must be able to engage different parties and reconcile resources and courses of action as efficiently as possible. Cyber capability must be developed in the entire society, which calls for strategic coordination, management and executive capability. ; peerReviewed

This article is the result of an international research project organized by the Federmann Cyber Security Research Center at Hebrew University to consider the feasibility of establishing an international attribution mechanism for hostile cyber operations, as well as the usefulness of such a body. The authors observe that, at present, states wielding significant cyber capability have little interest in creating such a mechanism. These states appear to be of the view that they can generate sufficient accountability and deterrence based on their independent technological capacity, access to expertise and to offensive (active defense) cyber tools, political clout, security alliances, and other policy tools, such as sanctions. However, countries with limited technological capacity and less ability to mobilize international support for collective attribution are more amenable to the prospect. To date, proposals to establish an international attribution mechanism have not acquired momentum. However, the authors suggest that progress remains possible by focusing on the three logical constituencies for such a body—States with limited technological, intelligence, and diplomatic capacity; States interested in generating broad collective attribution of attacks perpetrated against them; and international and regional organizations operating a cyber-related sanctions regime. Such a focus, combined with greater granularity, would significantly improve the prospects for the establishment of an international attribution mechanism and its eventual utilization by the international community.