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Employing data from a representative population survey conducted in New Zealand in 2016, this paper examines factors that influence, or are at least associated with, public trust in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). The large number of specifically designed questions allows studying the relationship between six dimensions and RBNZ trust: (i) economic situation, (ii) monetary policy knowledge, (iii) nonspecific trust, (iv) interest and information search, (v) politicians and government, and (vi) socio‐demographic indicators. Using ordered logit models, we find that at least one indicator from each of these six dimensions has a statistically significant conditional correlation with individuals' trust in RBNZ. Satisfaction with own financial situation, objective knowledge about the RBNZ's main policy objective, responsibility for interest rate setting, subjective knowledge about inflation, trust in government institutions, desire to be informed about RBNZ, age, and full‐time selfemployment have a positive relationship with RBNZ trust. The reverse is found for respondents who do not keep up with RBNZ and believe that politicians are long‐term oriented. In terms of economic relevance, institutional trust has the largest single impact on RBNZ trust and the subjective and objective knowledge indicators show a strong combined influence.

Employing data from a representative population survey conducted in New Zealand in 2016, this paper examines factors that influence, or are at least associated with, public trust in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ). The large number of specifically designed questions allows studying the relationship between six dimensions and RBNZ trust: (i) economic situation, (ii) monetary policy knowledge, (iii) nonspecific trust, (iv) interest and information search, (v) politicians and government, and (vi) socio-demographic indicators. Using ordered logit models, we find that at least one indicator from each of these six dimensions has a statistically significant conditional correlation with individuals' trust in RBNZ. Satisfaction with own financial situation, objective knowledge about the RBNZ's main policy objective, responsibility for interest rate setting, subjective knowledge about inflation, trust in government institutions, desire to be informed about RBNZ, age, and full-time selfemployment have a positive relationship with RBNZ trust. The reverse is found for respondents who do not keep up with RBNZ and believe that politicians are long-term oriented. In terms of economic relevance, institutional trust has the largest single impact on RBNZ trust and the subjective and objective knowledge indicators show a strong combined influence.

Central banks have been made more independent in many countries. A common rationale has been the existence of a credibility (or lack-of-trust) problem for monetary policy. This indicates a possible and until now unexplored link between social trust and central-bank independence. Our empirical findings, based on data from 149 countries, confirm that there is such a link, in the form of a u-shaped relationship. We suggest that two factors help explain this finding: the need for this kind of reform and the ability with which it can be implemented. At low trust levels, the need for central-bank independence is strong enough to dominate the low ability; at high trust levels the ability for reform is high and dominates the low need; at intermediate trust levels there is neither need nor ability strong enough to generate very independent central banks.

Central banks have become more independent in many countries. A common rationale has been the existence of a credibility (or lack-of-trust) problem for monetary policy. This indicates a possible and until now unexplored link between social trust and central-bank independence. Our empirical findings, based on data from 149 countries, confirm such a link, in the form of a u-shaped relationship. We suggest that two factors help explain this finding: the need for this kind of reform and the ability with which it can be implemented. At low trust, the need for central-bank independence is sufficiently strong to bring it about, in spite of a low ability to undertake reform. At high trust, the ability to undertake reform is sufficiently strong to bring high independence about, in spite of a low need for it. At intermediate trust levels, lastly, neither need nor ability is strong enough to generate very independent central banks. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

In this paper we study the determinants of citizens' trust in the European Central Bank during the start-up phase from 1999-2004. Using a country panel based on the Eurobarometer survey, we find that higher inflation rates reduce trust. Thus people appear to evaluate the performance of the ECB on the basis of its success in achieving its primary objective, namely price stability. However, national income also has a strong impact, which poses a dilemma to the ECB, as there is a general consensus among academics that monetary policy cannot increase economic growth in the long run. Unemployment does not have a significant impact on trust in the ECB, while unemployment spending exerts a trust-building impact. Possibly, automatic stabilizers serve as substitutes for ECB interventions, which would lower people's trust. Interestingly, active labor market policies, which can be interpreted as proxies for the public's perception of the urgency of the problem of high unemployment, tend to decrease trust.

The article considers the tendencies of citizens' trust in the central bank in Ukraine as well as in the countries of the European Union as a whole. The main reasons for reducing the level of trust to this institution are revealed. The importance of public trust in the activities of the central bank is determined. The necessity of ensuring a sufficient level of trust in central banks in the context of providing independence in the course of realization of monetary policy and establishing the limits of its legitimacy is proved. The main factors that influence the formation of citizens' trust in the central bank are determined – macroeconomic - GDP growth per capita, unemployment rate, inflation as well as social factors. The consequences of the influence of each factor on the trust in the central banks are revealed and summarized