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Since the late 1990s, river basin planning has become a central idea in water resources management and a mainstream approach supported by international donors through their water programs globally. This article presents river basin planning as a function of power and contested arena of power struggles, where state actors create, sustain, and reproduce their bureaucratic power through the overall shaping of (imagined) bureaucratic territory. It argues that river basin planning is not an antidote to current 'dysfunction' in water resources management, rooted in overlapping jurisdictions, fragmented decision making, and bureaucratic competitions between various government agencies. On the contrary, it illustrates how river basin planning becomes a new 'territorial frontier', created and depicted by different government agencies as their envisioned operational boundary and as a means to sustain and increase their bureaucratic power and sectoral decision-making authority, amidst ongoing processes of federalism in Nepal.

Since the late 1990s, river basin planning has become a central idea in water resources management and a mainstream approach supported by international donors through their water programs globally. This article presents river basin planning as a function of power and contested arena of power struggles, where state actors create, sustain, and reproduce their bureaucratic power through the overall shaping of (imagined) bureaucratic territory. It argues that river basin planning is not an antidote to current 'dysfunction' in water resources management, rooted in overlapping jurisdictions, fragmented decision making, and bureaucratic competitions between various government agencies. On the contrary, it illustrates how river basin planning becomes a new 'territorial frontier', created and depicted by different government agencies as their envisioned operational boundary and as a means to sustain and increase their bureaucratic power and sectoral decision-making authority, amidst ongoing processes of federalism in Nepal. ; Peer Review

El artículo destaca el tradicional enfrentamiento que ha existido en América Latina entre el Estado y el mercado por un lado, y el Estado y los ciudadanos, por el otro. Como excepción a este enfrentamiento destaca la experiencia chilena que demuestra que es posible superar ese debate ideológico polarizado y excluyente, y que es posible construir una relación eficiente entre el Estado y el mercado. Chile es un país que en democracia ha consolidado la liberalización de su economía y conseguido altas tasas de crecimiento económico sostenido, aplicando al mismo tiempo un conjunto de políticas públicas exitosas. El caso chileno se destaca por su capacidad de hacer compatibles Estado y mercado, libertad y justicia social, mercado y bienestar compartido, afirmación nacional y apertura a la globalización. ; This article emphasizes the traditional confrontation that always has existed in Latin America between the State and the market by one side, and the State and the citizens by the other. As an exception to this confrontation it is the Chilean experience that shows that it is possible to overeóme this ideological and exclusive debate and that is possible to build an efficient relation between the State and the market. Chile is a country which in democracy has Consolidated a free market and ¡t has achieved high rates of constant and sustaíned economic development, applying at the same time a successful set of public policies. The Chilean case is well known for its capacity to make compatible the State and the market, the freedom and social justice, market and well fare, national reinforcement and the opening to globalization.

Examines legislative & regulatory reforms in France, Germany, the Netherlands, & the US that led to new actors & levels in migration control. An analysis of differences & similarities in immigration control among these four countries emphasizes the role of ideas, interests, & institutions. A look at possible explanations for recent trends in immigration includes the partial delegation of migration policy to a range of actors outside the central nation-state bureaucracies. It is contended that it has become necessary to rethink traditional views of national sovereignty to recognize that the delegation of policy competence does not necessarily indicate a loss of sovereignty. The role of various national institutions, including the courts, in constraining migration is discussed. It is maintained that looking at coalitional distributions & institutional arrangements at the national, international, & local levels sheds light on which agencies/political actors dominate at each level & increases understandings of policy outcomes. The importance of security at all levels is emphasized. 1 Table, 86 References. J. Lindroth