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According to the theological worldview of J. R. R. Tolkien, the principal work of a Christian is to know, love, and serve God. Why, then, did he devote so much time to creating an entire family of imaginary languages for imaginary peoples in an imaginary world? This paper argues that the stories of these peoples, with their 'eucatastrophes,' have consoling value amid the incomplete stories of our own lives. But more fundamentally, secondary creation is proper to the adopted children of God and can be a way of drawing closer to God. Such work also witnesses to the freedom of the children of God, not only to receive salvation from God, but to contribute to the enrichment of creation and eternal life.

In this paper I offer an argument against one important version of panentheism, that is, mereological panentheism. Although panentheism has proven difficult to define, I provide a working definition of the view, and proceed to argue that given this way of thinking about the doctrine, mereological accounts of panentheism have serious theological drawbacks. I then explore some of these theological drawbacks. In a concluding section I give some reasons for thinking that the classical theistic alternative to panentheism is preferable, all things considered.

AbstractThe growth paradigm assumes that economic growth is objectively good because it leads to increased prosperity and utility maximization. Christian ethics oppose this worldview because it rejects the idea that economic prosperity is objectively good. Instead, Christian ethics are theocentric, assuming that God and the relationship with the divine is objectively good. Material prosperity is seen to interfere with this relationship. Still, there are at least two views of the human-divine relationship that have implications for environmental ethics. The first and most popular view argues that the human-divine relationship is mediated by the human-in-community relationship. Alternatively, individualistic theism posits that the human-divine relationship is individually available without community-centeredness. This individualistic view has been criticized as leading to an insufficient ethic of environmental care, however, here we argue that a radical dualism consistent with the Christian Gospels can lead to an ethos of environmental benevolence.

AbstractThe purpose of this exploration is to probe the more sustainable type of thinking promoted by the oft-neglected French philosopher Michel Onfray in his latest work Cosmos. Attempting to resuscitate the long tradition of philosophical hedonism and materialism in Western civilization, Onfray proposes a different, sensual way of being in the world that he persuasively contends is paramount to the continued existence of the human race. As the philosopher himself candidly admits, Cosmos is a practical guide that could be used as a starting point for changing the way we think and live in the Anthropocene epoch.

AbstractThe common practice of outsourcing manufacturing to countries in which factories' production costs and environmental standards are far lower than in the West indicates an underlying issue: a refusal to take responsibility for the environment, in favor of economic profitability. In confronting this problem, I suggest the need to reflect on the idea of the 'distinction between righteousness and profit' that is emphasized in Confucianism. Through an analysis of primary texts, I explain how the Confucian emphasis on ecological harmony implies a need for economic development as well as individual wealth, as it views humans as part of nature with a need to thrive as moral beings. The Confucian view of the economy informs contemporary attitudes by offering a richer way of thinking about economic development.

AbstractI explore the intersection of environmental spirituality and environmental justice with special attention given to indigenous ecologies. Indigenous communities often employ the language of discrete "sacred sites" to protect portions of their lands from environmental harm. However, the concept of the sacred in Western traditions is typically accompanied by its binary opposite, the profane. Do protected sacred sites implicitly license harm to such "profane" sites as low-income sacrifice zones? Is environmental spirituality in tension with environmental justice? After explicating this problem, I resolve it by exploring indigenous notions of the sacred—notions that are not binary. Indigenous notions allow for treating some discrete lands as places of special power and healing while still maintaining that all lands are sacred and worthy of environmental protection. These are not hierarchical notions of the sacred but variegated ones (or what I call hózhó sacred weaves).

Panentheism is best understood as a philosophical research program. Identifying the core of the research program offers a strong response to the demarcation objection. It also helps focus both objections to and defenses of panentheism — and to show why common objections are not actually criticisms of the position we are defending. The paper also addresses two common criticisms: the alleged inadequacy of panentheism's double "in" specification of the relationship between God and world, and the "double God" objection. Once the research program framework is in place, topics like these become opportunities for panentheists to engage in the kind of careful constructive work in theology and philosophy — historical, analytic, and systematic — that is required for making long-term, positive contributions to our field.

The perhaps most challenging problem for a panentheistic paradigm in Christian god-talk consists in integrating the trait of personhood in the monistic horizon of this approach. A very helpful way to this goal seems to be the concept of imagination. Its logic of an "as if" represents a modified variation of Kant`s idea of the postulates of reason. Reflections of Jürgen Werbick, Douglas Headley, and Volker Gerhardt substantiate the philosophical and theological capabilities of this solution which also include a sensibility for the ontological commitments included in the panentheistic approach.

One of the main tasks for an account of the Christian doctrine of the atonement is to explain how and in what ways the salvifically relevant work of Christ heals the damage wrought by human sin on our souls, our relationships with one another, and our relationship with God. One kind of damage often neglected in philosophical treatments of the atonement, but discussed at some length in Eleonore Stump's forthcoming At-one-ment, is what she, following St. Thomas Aquinas, calls the stain on the soul. The stain on the soul comprises the "moral leftovers" of serious evil, damage to the soul that goes beyond the guilt, shame, and separation from God brought about by sin and that lingers in a person even after she has repented and been forgiven. In this paper, I critically examine Stump's account of how the work of Christ deals with the problem of the stain on the soul. I offer reasons for thinking that if the stain is exactly as she describes it, then it is indelible; and then I explore possible ways forward for her account of the atonement.

This paper presents Cusanus' dialogue of 1462, named after and centred on the concept of non-aliud, and exploits its speculative resources for conceiving the relationship between God and the realm of finite entities. Furthermore, it points to the elements of self-constitution of the absolute and of the latter's grounding relation towards the contingent. Finally, it is argued that Cusanus' concept of non-aliud offers a valuable contribution to the present debate about an adequate concept of God.

TBA

The article reviews different antitheodicies in response to Toby Betenson's article "Anti-Theodicy". Antitheodicies involve rejecting the position that God or meaning exist only, if evils have justifying morally sufficient reasons. The article builds on Betenson's division into moral and conceptual antitheodicies and his characterization of antitheodicies as a metacritique of the problem of evil. Moral antitheodicies are problematic, as they do not address the key conceptual issues and might end up in question-begging or moralism. Dissolving the problem of evil requires a conceptual antitheodicy that exposes its presuppositions as speculative metaphysics. Religious conceptual antitheodicies help to focus on different ways of sense-making that do not fall into theodicism.