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This article addresses the question of what it means to think of a distinctly international ethics by developing a radical reinterpretation of Waltzian neorealism from a Derridean deconstructive perspective. The core argument of the article is that Derridean deconstruction effectively explains why there is an ethics of neorealism in the first place, and why this ethics cannot be easily overcome. Underpinning this argument is a notion in Derrida's philosophy of survival as an unconditional affirmation of life, which finds an equivalent in Waltz's theory of international life in the anarchic system. On this basis, I claim that Waltz's theory is ethical, not despite its focus on the structural conditions of survival, but precisely because of it. Moreover, the article shows how this notion of ethics renders universal ethical ideals, beyond relations of violence, not only impossible, but undesirable. They are undesirable because to actually fulfil them would be to undermine the conditions that make international life possible in the first place. In this way, various attempts to theorize the meaning and implications of international ethics that hold on to the notion of ethical ideals beyond relations of violence become untenable. Instead of aspiring towards such ideals, the article concludes, international ethics should be thought of as an unconditional affirmation of the incalculable future that structures international life and inevitably exposes it to the worst forms of destruction, but also enables the making of responsible decisions.

Tangier, a seaport in the northwestern corner of Africa totalling 225 square miles with a population of 60,000 inhabitants, was internationalized by a Convention signed on December 18, 1923, by Great Britain, France, and Spain, who agreed on its permanent neutrality. Spain occupied the area in 1940, removed British employees, and in 1941 deposed the Moroccan native ruler.

This title provides an international legal analysis of the most important legal questions that have been raised since 2002 regarding Iran's nuclear program, and it sets those legal questions in their historical and diplomatic context. Its purpose is to clarify how the relevant sources of international law - including primarily the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency treaty law - should be properly applied in the context of the Iran case. It provides an instructional case study of the application of these sources of international law, the lessons which can be applied to inform both the ongoing legal and diplomatic dynamics surrounding the Iran nuclear dispute itself, as well as similar future cases

Victims' Rights and Advocacy at the International Criminal Court introduces readers to the most significant restorative feature of the ICC's procedure: direct victim participation in war crime trials. Under this new model, the ICC has given victims a voice to speak out against their abusers. T. Markus Funk presents the first comprehensive guidance on this innovative dynamic, analyzing not just the procedural rules that apply, but also the practical problems in advocating for victims before the ICC.

Claus Dieter Classen sucht die Kriterien für das erforderliche Niveau demokratischer Legitimation näher zu bestimmen. Er folgt der Leitidee, dass diese nur mit Blick auch auf das Rechtsstaatsprinzip, konkret das Gebot der Sicherung möglichst sachgerechter Entscheidungen entwickelt werden können. Im internationalen Kontext kommt die "offene Staatlichkeit" hinzu. Wie dieses Ziel erreicht werden kann, muss primär der Gesetzgeber entscheiden. Die Konsequenz ist, dass die herkömmliche Vorstellung, die demokratische Legitimation im Bereich der Verwaltung könne vor allem über die hierarchisch organisierte Ministerialverwaltung sichergestellt werden, sich so als korrekturbedürftig erweist - und zwar nicht nur im Bereich der Selbstverwaltung, für den sich das Bundesverfassungsgericht schon bislang großzügig gezeigt hat. Vielmehr kann etwa auch im Übrigen gesellschaftlicher Sachverstand in die staatliche Entscheidungsfindung einbezogen werden - ohne dass man deswegen, wie dies häufig geschieht, das Legitimationssubjekt, das als solches verfasste Staatsvolk, in Frage stellen muss