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La población mundial, que cuenta dos mil millones de habitantes alrededor del año 1950, ha crecido a un ritmo casi exponencial en las décadas siguientes hasta 4 mil millones y 5,3 en 1990 (Naciones Unidas - Departamento de Asuntos Económicos y Sociales, 2010). Sin duda un gran aumento tanto en términos absolutos cuanto relativos. Según las estimaciones de las Naciones Unidas, la población mundial se estima que alcanzará los ocho millones y medio de 2025. Estas tasas de crecimiento se producen, obviamente, tanto en Europa, donde la población ha crecido de 550 millones en 1950 a 750 millones en 2010, y en Italia, donde en el período 1861 a 2008 hubo un aumento de la población de 22 millones de habitantes a casi 60 millones (fuente: ISTAT, 2010). La población ha crecido, sin embargo, a tasas más altas en los países en desarrollo, con una tendencia a la constante en los países industrializados en las últimas décadas. Dicha población mundial intenso tiene consecuencias directas sobre el territorio urbano, mientras que lleva a una extensión de las actuales áreas urbanas menores y pequeñas ciudades. Todo esto, cada vez más, dar lugar a problemas de gestión y uso del suelo, produciendo un crecimiento del componente de la vulnerabilidad en la ecuación de riesgo. Crecimiento de la población no justifica un aumento de las condiciones hidrogeológicas de la inestabilidad. Si es así, ya que la población se ha convertido en firme en los últimos años, al menos en la mayoría de los países industrializados, no hay que hacer frente a riesgos cada vez mayor. En cambio, el modelo de desarrollo económico, basado principalmente en redes e infraestructuras, así como los asentamientos, por supuesto, produce un doble efecto: un aumento de los activos expuestos a la amenaza, una presión sobre el territorio, capaz de hacer la activación de los fenómenos peligrosos más frecuentes. Los fenómenos naturales también tienen un impacto en el marco socio-económico, ya que son responsables de la pérdida de bienes y servicios y, en ocasiones, una pérdida en términos de vidas humanas. En tal situación, la vulnerabilidad de la zona está relacionado con el desarrollo de su sistema de infraestructura social, civil y urbano. Este concepto se expresa claramente en la declaración "Los desastres ocurren cuando los riesgos se encontra con la vulnerabilidad" (Wisner et al., 2004). Esto nos lleva a considerar los desastres naturales como los fenómenos sociales reales. Cuando se habla de riesgo geomorfologicos y de políticas ambientales, uno de los pioneros es, sin duda, Earl E. Brabb, que ya en 1991 en un artículo titulado "El problema de movimientos de ladera del mundo", sostuvo que los deslizamientos son un problema mundial que cientos causa de muertes y miles de millones de dólares de daño cada año en todo el mundo. Los poblemas geomorfológicos son y serán un tema importante y un requisito fundamental del conocimiento para la política de toma de decisiones. A pesar de 20 años han pasado desde que el trabajo Brabb, la situación no parece haber cambiado. No son aún insuficientes los procedimientos de todo el mundo aunque sólo sea compartida que permite evaluar la calidad y precisión de un inventario de deslizamientos o la forma de clasificar en términos de susceptibilidad a los deslizamientos de un área y para evaluar cuantitativa y cualitativamente el rendimiento predictivo. Las imágenes y escenas de devastación, destrucción y muerte que ocurren cada año, hacen que el problema de los riesgos geomorfológicos en un problema social. ¿Quien es el responsable? Seguimos construyendo, incluso en lugares que no son adecuados para la construcción. Tenemos que admitir por lo menos una doble responsabilidad. Si bien es cierto que los acontecimientos que causar un derrumbe apenas son "previsibles", por el contrario sí podemos identificar y predecir donde estos fenómenos se producen con mayor capacidad destructiva, produciendo más daños y reducir al mínimo la vulnerabilidad. Por lo tanto, si no es posible evitar, ya que no es posible predecir, la palabra clave debe ser "la prevención". Cada vez deslizamientos de tierra u otros eventos con características destructivas y letales, que a menudo se supone y se define como "impredecible", nos ofrece con el escenario de las víctimas, los heridos y desaparecidos, el público se estremece y recuerda la vulnerabilidad de los bienes de la comunidad y direciona la discusión sobre el tema de prevención de los desastres naturales o por lo menos tratar de minimizar las consecuencias trágicas que lo acompañan. La ola emocional que sigue a la fase de emergencia se produce entre las llamadas a "enrollar las mangas" a una "cultura de prevención" que "nunca vuelva a suceder", e induce a los legisladores y los técnicos para intervenir con una variedad de medidas urgentes de mitigación y obras y de intervención inmediata, tal vez proponiendo también las regulaciones y leyes dirigidas a "evitar otro desastre similar". Hoy Saponara, ayer Génova, el día antes Giampilieri y San Fratello y así sucesivamente durante décadas: Salerno (1954) con 318 víctimas, 250 heridos y sin hogar cerca de 5.500, y el Longarone y el desastre de Vajont (1963) con cerca de 2.000 muertes de Agrigento, (1966), Valtellina (1987) 53 muertes y 4.000 millones de liras de los daños, el deslizamiento de tierra en el Val di Stava de julio de 1985 (269 muertos), las corrientes rápidas del 5 de mayo de 1998 y Sarno y Quindici y otras áreas de la región Campania, con 153 muertes, Maierato (2010), son algunos de los eventos más importantes que lleva a más de 4.000 las muertes causadas por movimientos gravitativos en medio siglo, un promedio de 4 muertes por mes, además de un daño económico incalculable. Pero cada día hay una lista de los deslizamientos de tierra, carreteras y puentes bajando, a pesar de que pasa desapercibido. A falta de una cultura de prevención y un aumento de la cultura de emergencia en su lugar. Y la protección civil se ve ahora como la única ancla de salvación y la asistencia de los municipios y la población involucrada. Italia es un País que se desmorona debido a la negligencia del hombre y a la falta de prevención. Hay 5,596 sobre 8,101 municipios en riesgo hidrogeológico, el 84% de los centros de población se define en riesgo. Esto sin duda demuestra que las construcciones se construyeron cuando no se podia. De estos municipios, 1.700 (alrededor del 21%) están en riesgo de deslizamientos, 1.285 (casi el 16%) en riesgo de inundación y 2.596 (32%) se encuentran en una combinación de deslizamientos de tierra y riesgo de inundación. El área total clasificada como de alto riesgo asciende a 36.551 km2 (7,1% del total nacional) dividido en km2 de áreas de deslizamientos de tierra y 7.791 km2 de áreas inundadas 13.760. Estas cifras ponen de relieve la inestabilidad hidrogeológica con el que cada región debe enfrentar, tarde o temprano, contra la cual el flujo de millones de euros, a menudo sólo le prometió, no servirá de mucho para la estabilización y obras de medida de seguridad. El informe de Legambiente revela que los municipios son la punta de lanza de una evidente debilidad de nuestro territorio. No hay una única manera de preparar los mapas de susceptibilidad, como lo demuestra la enorme cantidad de artículos científicos producidos incluso durante la última década, y lo mismo es cierto en cuanto a la zonificación de los peligros y los riesgos involucrados, todavía sigue siendo un problema sin resolver en gran medida (Carrara et al., 2009). La contribución de este trabajo las siguientes fases de un estudio con el fin de definir la estructura de la sensibilidad, los riesgos y peligros de un área: 1. Construcción de la base de datos: en este trabajo las diferentes técnicas y métodos de detección de deslizamiento de tierra y delimitación se comparan directamente (trabajo de campo) e indirectamente (fotografías aéreas, software de visualización remota del territorio) y su posterior despliegue en un sistema GIS. 2 Elección y definición de la escala de análisis: De hecho, uno de los problemas más actuales de la proposición se relaciona con los métodos de evaluación de susceptibilidad a escala múltiple. 3 Unidades cartográficas: las diferentes unidades se utilizan para la cartografía y zonificación del territorio, cuya previsión de resultados se comparan con el fin de ser capaces de identificar las unidades de la asignación básica más adecuada para la planificación y para fines de defensa civil, teniendo en cuenta la exactitud científica de que la modelo debe soportar. 4 Elección de los factores control: en el trabajo, es la posibilidad de identificar el conjunto más probable de los factores que se consideran relacionados directamente o indirectamente a la inestabilidad de la ladera. Se proponen procedimientos de prueba y seleccionar el conjunto de posibles factores de control, así como la construcción de modelos específicos para cada tipo de deslizamientos. 5 Construcción de modelos: como para la construcción de un modelo geo-estadístico, las soluciones se comparan diferentes y el modelo de presentación de los mismos resultados y la objetividad que se elija, teniendo en cuenta que las necesidades de una implementación más bajo en términos de costo y tiempo. 6 Validación: los modelos están sujetos a diferentes técnicas de validación, que luego se comparan entre ellos. 7 Exportación espacial de un modelo de susceptibilidad: este es un ensayo para definir y validar los términos de susceptibilidad a los deslizamientos de una amplia zona en los gustos de cientos o miles de kilómetros cuadrados, en base a los estudios de detalle de algunos sectores que lo representan. Al igual que muchos otros autores, con el propósito de este trabajo es hacer una contribución a la comunidad científica, tratando de ofrecer una modesta contribución en la solución de algunos problemas en este campo a través de experimentos y modelos realizados en una variedad de contextos y comparar los resultados entre ellos. En este sentido, unas pruebas se llevaron a cabo en algunas áreas, previamente seleccionadas, será probado y verificado el resultado de algunos de los procedimientos en los años de investigación doctoral. A continuación, un resumen de los resultados vendrán de estas pruebas experimentales TEST 1a: TUMMARRANO river basin: Model Exportation En el marco de un estudio de la susceptibilidad de deslizamientos regional en el sur de Sicilia, una prueba se ha realizado en la cuenca del río Tumarrano (unos 80 km2) tiene como objetivo caracterizar las condiciones de su susceptibilidad movimientos de ladera mediante la exportación de un modelo, definido y entrenado en el interior un número limitado (unos 20 km2) representativas del sector ("el área de origen''). Además, la posibilidad de explotar software de Google Earth y el banco de datos de fotos para producir imágenes de los archivos deslizamiento de tierra ha sido comprobado. El modelo de susceptibilidad se define, de acuerdo con un enfoque multifactorial basadas en el análisis condicional, con unidades únicas condiciones (UCUs), los cuales fueron obtenidos mediante la combinación de cuatro factores seleccionados control: litología afloramiento, la pendiente, la curvatura del plan y el índice de humedad topográfica. La capacidad de predicción del modelo de exportación, formado con 206 deslizamientos de tierra, se compara con la estimada para toda el área estudiada, mediante el uso de un archivo completo de deslizamiento de tierra (703 deslizamientos de tierra), para ver hasta qué punto el mayor tiempo/dinero necesario se tienen en cuenta los costos para. TEST 1b. Tummarrano river basin: modelo de susceptibilidad basado en la Forward logistic regression La regresión logística con pasòs hacia adelante, nos ha permitido obtener un modelo de susceptibilidad por los flujos de tierra en la cuenca del río Tumarrano, que se definió mediante el modelado de las relaciones estadísticas entre un archivo de eventos 760 y un conjunto de 20 variables predictoras. Para cada movimiento del inventario, un punto de identificación de deslizamientos (LIP) se produce de forma automática, como corresponde al punto más alto a lo largo de la frontera de los polígonos de deslizamientos de tierra. Los modelos equilibrados (760 stable/760 inestable) se presentaron a adelante el procedimiento de regresión logística. Una estrategia de construcción del modelo se aplicó para ampliar la zona considerada en la preparación del modelo y para comprobar la sensibilidad de los modelos de regresión con respecto a los lugares específicos de las células se considera estable. Un conjunto de dieciséis modelos se preparó de forma aleatoria extraer los subconjuntos diferentes céldas estables. Los modelos fueron sometidos a regresión logística y validado. Los resultados mostraron que las tasas de error satisfactoria y estable (0,236 en promedio, con una desviación estándar de 0,007) y AUC (0.839, para la formación, y 0.817, para conjuntos de datos de prueba). Como en relación a los predictores, la pendiente en el barrio de las células y la curvatura topográfica de gran perfil y plan local-fueron seleccionados de forma sistemática. Litología arcillosa afloramiento, drenajes midslope, crestas locales y midslope y los accidentes geográficos cañones eran también muy frecuentes (de 8 a 15 veces) en los modelos de la selección hacia adelante. La estrategia de construcción del modelo nos ha permitido producir un modelo de flujo de tierra realizando la susceptibilidad, cuyo modelo de ajuste, la predicción de la habilidad y solidez se estimaron sobre la base de los procedimientos de validación. Test 2. Imera river basin: modelo de susceptibilidad por flujo de tierra basado en las unidades de ladera. Un mapa de susceptibilidad de un área, que es representativa en términos de marco geológico y los fenómenos de inestabilidad de ladera de grandes sectores de los Apeninos de Sicilia, fue producida usando unidades de ladera y un modelo multiparamétrico univariado. La zona de estudio, que se extiende por aproximadamente 90 km2, fue dividida en 774 unidades de la pendiente, cuya ocurrencia esperada avalancha se estimó un promedio de siete valores de vulnerabilidad, determinado para el control de los factores seleccionados: litología, pendiente media del gradiente, SPI en el pie, el índice de humedad topográfica y la curvatura del perfil, y el rango de altitud. Cada uno de los reconocidos 490 deslizamientos de tierra estuvo representada por su punto de centro de gravedad. Sobre la base de análisis condicional, la función de la susceptibilidad aquí adoptada es la densidad, calculado para cada clase. Modelos univariante fueron preparados para cada uno de los factores que controlan, y su rendimiento predictivo se estimó por curvas de tipos de predicción y la relación de efectividad aplicada a la categorías de vulnerabilidad. Este procedimiento nos permitió discriminar entre factores efectivos y no efectivos, de modo que sólo la primera se combinó posteriormente en un modelo multiparamétrico, que fue utilizada para producir el mapa de susceptibilidad final. la validación de este último mapa nos permite comprobar el rendimiento y la fiabilidad de la predicción modelo. Los principales factores reguladores resultaron: la litología y, subordinadamente, el SPI a el pies de la unidad, y tambien el gradiente medio de la pendiente, la curvatura del perfil, y el índice de humedad topográfica dieron resultados satisfactorios. ; The World population, which counted two billion inhabitants around 1950, has grown at an almost exponential rate in the following decades up to four billion in 1980 and 5,3 in 1990 (United Nations – Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010). Definitely a high increase both in absolute and relative terms. According to estimates by the United Nations, the World population is estimated to reach eight billion and a half around 2025 (Chart 1.1), and then it will become steady around ten billion in 2050 because of the expected decline in fertility. These growing rates occur, obviously, both in Europe, where population has grown from 550 million in 1950 to 750 million in 2010, and in Italy, where in the period from 1861 to 2008 there was a surge in population from 22 million inhabitants to almost 60 million, (source: ISTAT, 2010). The population has grown, however, at higher rates in developing Countries (Fig. 1.1), with a tendency to become steady in industrialized Countries in the last decades. Such an intense world population has direct consequences on urban territory while leading to a spread of current minor urban areas and small towns. All this will, increasingly, result in management and land use problems, producing a growth of the vulnerability component in the risk equation. Population growth alone does not justify an increase of hydro-geological conditions of instability. If so, since the population has become steady in recent years, at least in most industrialized countries, we should not face increasing risks. Instead, the economic development model, largely based on networks and infrastructures, as well as settlements of course, produces a double effect: an increase of assets exposed to threat; a stress on the territory, able to make the activation of hazardous phenomena more frequently. It is however true that recent disasters with great loss of lives (i.e., Sarno Giampilieri, Aulla, Genova and Saponara) are actually the results of the response (letting nature take its course) to the changes in territorial asset occurred after the war. Another cause may be found in environmental changes: when the stress regime in a region changes (such as extraordinary rainfall intensity), the response is obviously new for both sides/slopes and the population. The WWF notes that from 1956 to 2001, urbanized areas in Italy have increased by 500 times and it is estimated that from 1990 to 2005 we have transformed 3.5 million hectares of land. The problem of interaction between humans and the natural environment is a very complex and diversified issue, not often approached in a systematic way, also because of the severe limitations of sources to be invested on research on a medium and long-term, for a better and effective knowledge of the environment, primarily on measures aimed at reducing risk (Plattner, 2005). Natural phenomena also have an impact within the social-economic framework as they are responsible for the loss of goods and services, and sometimes, a loss in terms of lives. In such a situation, the vulnerability of the area is related to the development of its social, civil, and urban infrastructural system. This concept is well expressed in the statement "disasters occur when hazards meet vulnerability" (Wisner et al., 2004). This leads us to consider natural disasters as real social phenomena. This condition is strongly valid especially with regard to landslides (Brabb and Harrod, 1989; Brabb, 1991). Since economic problems common to all countries do not allow either to invest in research projects on a medium and long-term or the stabilization of structures or areas on a large-scale, a new philosophy of environmental policy opens up for all active political and administrative subjects that should govern the use and exploitation of the territory. For this reason, the scientific community is engaged in a continuous search for methods and techniques to estimate the degree of real and potential instability, using the minimum amount of equipment and possible economic resources. Usually there is a substantial difficulty in identifying the most reliable procedures, that allow to approach this matter in a non-traditional manner based on modeling and investigative techniques built on the exchange of experiences between experts and conducting studies and experiments on all continents, and showing different strategies and possible technical combinations depending on the type and/or the number and complexity of the investigation, producing susceptibility, hazard and risk maps, used as the basis for decision-making processes in land management. In this framework, further efforts are needed in trying to make the different methods more objective and shared by all in order to be simple and reproducible, and most of all in transferring the knowledge gained in laws that underpin territorial planning, building regulations, and in civil defense plans (Guzzetti, 2006). When discussing about landslides and environmental policies, one of the pioneers is undoubtedly Earl E. Brabb, who already in 1991 in a paper entitled "The World Landslide Problem", sustained that landslides are a worldwide problem that cause hundreds of deaths and billions of dollars of damage every year all over the world. The same added that these losses can be reduced if the problem is identified and acknowledged in time, but many countries are simply equipped with maps showing where landslides produced problems in the past and they have even less susceptibility maps that could allow policy makers control land use. Landslides, adds Brabb, are generally more predictable and controllable than other natural events of catastrophic nature such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and storms, but despite this, few countries have taken advantage of this knowledge to reduce landslide hazard. Geomorphological problems are and will be an important issue and a fundamental requirement of knowledge for the politics of decision-making. Although 20 years have gone by since Brabb's work, the situation does not seem to have changed. There are still insufficient globally shared procedures even just allowing to assess the quality and accuracy of a landslide inventory or how to classify in terms of landslide susceptibility of an area and to evaluate quantitatively and qualitatively predictive performance. 1.2 Basic concepts One of the most obvious effects of rapid territory development in the past decades is the increasing impact that natural disasters have on man and his activities. Institutions are therefore committed to investing their resources in both the implementation of structural interventions to mitigate the risk as well as implementation of early warning systems and defining guidelines for land management; the latter activities allow, in fact, to avoid or minimize damage to persons and property, produced by natural phenomena, without necessarily investing in expensive resources and long structural interventions. The term "risk" is used in relation to the various components of the social and territorial fabric, as an expression of the expected consequences in the assets as a result of this disastrous phenomenon of assigned intensity at a given time interval. Within the guidelines for the preparation of prevention and management plans in terms of geological risk of the Sicilian Civil Protection Service (Regional Hydro-geological and Environmental Risks department), the term Hydro-geological Risk means the effect on different parts of the territory led by natural disasters such as landslides (geomorphological risk) and floods (hydraulic risks) triggered by events related to climate and its changes. Two main components contribute to the definition of risk: territorial hazard (geomorphological and hydraulic) and vulnerability. The latter depends on both the physical resistance of structures or assets exposed to the threat and the so-called vulnerability of social organization, which is linked, in fact, to the capacity of disaster prevention and management that a community has developed prior to the same disaster. The propensity of a territory to be affected by new landslides, the degree of hazard or risk that characterizes it, are usually expressed with the help of a map in which the area is divided into different zones according to the different values that qualify it. In this mapping, the territory is zoned or divided into homogeneous zones or user-defined fields/areas, whose ranking is defined according to their real or potential degree of landslide hazard (Varnes, 1984). Over the decades, many research groups and national and international commissions have tried to provide precise definitions, trying to reduce the existing confusion of terms in the management of natural hazards. In this section, some basic concepts are expressed as well as the terminology that will be used in the thesis below. Landslide events that develop in a given area involve a large number of environmental variables, to determine undoubted difficulties in identifying a suitable action of management, control and planning. In order to do so, understanding the problem without having a clear conceptual framework and method to be used may not be sufficient. The "forecast" of the phenomena and therefore the modeling phase is always required to designated public administration bodies and territorial control, carried out by the creation of digital simulation models which become crucial at the time when decisions must be taken/made. The creation of maps indicating the different vocation planning of an area, based for example on landslide hazard maps, not only allows you to compose the scene of the incident consequences of a given failure, but also to react under emergency, if magnitude, area, and associated potential damage are known. Planning is a subject which studies and regulates the processes of local governance and to evaluate the resulting dynamics of evolution and development. The principles guiding the choice of planning require development policies coherent with the principles of environmental protection and sustainability in an effort to control the excessive human presence, able to transform irreversibly natural systems and preserve the quality of life for future generations. Information, territorial knowledge and assessment of its natural predisposition and vulnerability are the basis of planning. These forms of knowledge and the use and application of the best technologies available to facilitate information processing and optimization of procedures for evaluation and zoning of the territory, will yield the best design solutions to achieve the desired objectives. Planning is aimed to government land use and management of spatial information, and is achieved by regulating the area according to different uses, which should be awarded taking into account the natural predispositions. Planning activities can affect a large portion of territory, in other words include a supra-municipal area or one that does not match with administrative boundaries (e.g. Provincial Territorial Coordination Plan, Hydro-geological Plan) or urban (e.g. General Regulation Plan). The geological, geomorphological, hydro-geological and seismic component should be placed at the base of the strategic development of the territory. In national legislation, water management is understood both as a natural resource but also as an element of risk, and has been regulated at the watershed level since the nineties (national framework law 183/89 on soil protection). This allow us to overcome divisions and inconsistencies produced by the adoption of targeted areas having only administrative boundaries that, therefore, do not take into account natural dynamics. The zoning of landslide hazard area is considered the most effective level of knowledge for territorial planning and territorial governance purposes. A map showing portions of an area classified as "hazardous" is of great importance due to the fact that these areas are subject to limitations and constraints that also affect the usability or simply the economic value. 1.2.1 Landslides and soil protection Italy, besides having a territory particularly prone to heavily collapse, has a highly populated territory with a density of 189 inhabitants per km2, much higher than France (114 inhabitants/km2) and Spain (89 inhabitants/km2), in Lombardy and Campania respectively, the density changes to 379 and 420 inhabitants per km2. As clear from the Report on landslides in Italy (National Geological Survey, 2007), commissioned by the ISPRA (National Institute for Environmental Protection and Research), in the last 50 years almost 500 thousand landslides have been recognized and recorded for an area of about 20 thousand km2, corresponding to 6.6% of the entire national territory. These data should be updated. As indicated by the last study conducted by the Ministry of the Environment (2010), 9.8% of the national area is to be ranked highly hydro-geological critical and 6.633 municipalities are involved, representing 81.9 percent of the national territory. This value, according to a report EURISPES ( Report Italy, 2010) is "largely underestimated", therefore agreeing that "a reliable estimate is made up of about 2 million phenomena and consequently the percentage of the Italian territory subject to ongoing phenomena is more than 20%." The Ministry of Environment, through the work for the realization of development plans undertaken by the hydrogeological Basin Authority, estimated a funding requirement of almost 40 billion euros to hydro-geologically secure the entire country, and 4.1 billion for more urgent works. Undoubtedly, the amounts are considerably high, but it is enough to consider that almost 21 billion euros were spent just to stanch the damages by hydro-geological disasters occurred in the decade 1994-2004. 1.3 Aims and scientific contribution There is no single way to prepare susceptibility maps, as evidenced by the enormous amount of scientific papers produced even during the last decade, and the same is true as for the zoning of the hazard and risk involved, still remaining a largely unsolved problem (Carrara et al., 2009). The contribution of this paper the following phases of a study in order to define the susceptibility structure, hazard and risk of an area. 1 Construction of the landslide database: in this work different techniques and methods of landslide detection and delimitation are compared, directly (field work) and indirectly (aerial photographs, remote viewing software of the territory) and their subsequent deployment in a GIS system. 2 Choice and definition of the analysis scale: the problem of scale models of susceptibility is approached. In fact, one of the most actual problems of the proposition is related to approaches to multi-scale susceptibility evaluation. 3 Mapping units: different units are used for mapping and zoning of the territory, whose foresight results are compared in order to be able to identify the basic mapping units most suitable for planning and for civil defense purposes, taking into account the scientific accuracy that the model must bear. 4 Choice of controlling factors: during the work, it is the possible to identify the most probable set of factors considered to be directly or indirectly related to the instability of the slope. Procedures for testing and selecting the set of possible controlling factors are proposed as well as the construction of specific models for each type of landslide. 5 Model building: as for the construction of a geo-statistical model, different solutions are compared and the model presenting the same results and objectivity is chosen, considering it needs a lower implementation in terms of cost and time. 6 Validation: models are subject to different validation techniques, which are then compared to each other. 7 Spatial exporting of a landslide susceptibility model: this is a trial to define and validate the terms of landslide susceptibility for a wide area in the likes of hundreds or thousands of square kilometers, based on studies of some fields that represent it. Having clear that the result of this type of study is intended to provide maps that can be used by planners in a useful manner, these must be characterized by an immediacy in understanding even by non-experts and they must also be easy to read and interpret. Therefore, these methods should be as simple as possible, for example, susceptibility levels must be clearly expressed not only in quantitative but also in descriptive terms (Clerici et al., 2010). Like many other authors, the purpose of this work is to make a contribution to the scientific community by trying to offer a modest contribution in solving some problems in this field through experiments and modeling carried out in a range of contexts and comparing the results between them.

The main motivation that guides this article is the need to contribute to broadening and deepening the objects of study addressed by feminist perspectives in international relations. This is for two related reasons: firstly, to contribute to the process of ontological revisionism of the discipline that has been inaugurated by these kinds of approaches; and, secondly, to contribute to the visibility of international practices and dynamics that perpetuate logics of subordination and exclusion towards different corporeality based on the matrix of colonial, capitalist and patriarchal domination. This article departs from the premise that international cooperation is a complex and multidimensional object of study that has historically been approached by the liberal tradition of international relations (Pereyra Rodríguez, 2014). Gradually, different approaches to the discipline began to inquire about the motives, procedures and outcomes as a result of the growing importance that these interactions acquired as fundamental dynamics of international relations. In the framework of the academic literature on feminisms, international cooperation has received less attention with respect to another set of processes associated with development, conflicts, and peace and security. In this sense, the purpose of this article is to contribute to the problematization of international cooperation from feminist perspectives broadly, and from decolonial feminism in particular. This will be done in a systematic way based on the methodology of documentary review. It is important to state that in the field of international relations, feminist perspectives express a "set of ideas woven around the critique of patriarchal values and dynamics on which states and global societies were structured" (Villarroel Peña, 2007, p. 66). According to the author, the new approaches implied a series of disruptions in the ontological, epistemological and methodological dimensions that, consequently, motivated the formulation of new models of knowledge production. In such context of emergence, feminist perspectives were considered dissident proposals in relation to the traditional mainstream theoretical schools because they aimed to highlight the insufficiency of paradigmatic investigations of the discipline that had been based on a partial and not neutral approach of international dynamics and practices (Villarroel Peña, 2007; Salomón, 2002). In order to achieve the proposed aim, in the first section of this article, the general panorama in which gender studies in the Social Sciences was inserted shall be described. Likewise, the conditions of emergence and enunciation of feminisms in the discipline of international relations will be addressed, and their main ontological, epistemological and methodological contributions will be made explicit. In the second section, the specificity of the situated narrative of decolonial feminisms, understood as a disruption of the homogenizing and falsely universalistic postulates of hegemonic feminisms, will be analyzed. Based on the guidelines offered by the first two sections, the third section will inquire into the implications of international cooperation for feminisms in general, and decolonial feminisms in particular. The goal here is to elucidate to what extent a perpetuating mechanism of asymmetries is expressed, and how it is possible to overcome patriarchal logics from an emancipatory perspective. Finally, brief conclusions will be shared. In summary, some relevant conclusions have been found through the elaboration of the article. In the first place, it is important to note that, although international cooperation does not represent the object of study most in-depth analyzed by feminist perspectives in international relations, this focus is fundamental for the same two reasons that justify this article. That is, due to the need to contribute to the ontological revisionism of the discipline, and the need to make visible the ways in which international practices and dynamics perpetuate logics of subordination and exclusion towards different corporeality based on the matrix of colonial, capitalist and patriarchal domination. Secondly, the study of international cooperation from perspectives –like feminism- that seek to contribute to the transformation of unequal and hierarchical gender social relations is fundamental not only in academic terms, but also in a practical way. Indeed, the combination of research and political activism promulgated by feminisms should radiate in the elucidation of the practices and dynamics of international cooperation because it is precisely in this field that important opportunities can be detected to make visible and socialize conditions of existence, resistance and struggle shared between different social groups located in different places. In effect, research must be thought of as an inessential component of political practices inasmuch as it offers horizontal action guidelines, and as it contributes to identifying the perpetuation of mechanisms that reproduce asymmetric logics in an androcentric, cisgeneric and colonial way. Thirdly, intersectionality -such a significant category for feminist approaches- can become a central hermeneutical perspective to formulate instances of international cooperation that are devised in a respectful way with the particularities of local identities, interests and expectations. Likewise, it can be shown that it allows for the provision of pragmatic content to the decolonial strategy of building alliances between social groups to promote demands that were historically invisibilized. In short, it has been demonstrated that international cooperation itself does not represent a sign of progress, evolution or emancipation. On the contrary, we state that it is a mere interaction whose content and planning must be based on the capacity of agency of local actors, and whose development must be in accordance with the particularities expressed by each social group. In addition, feminist criticisms of the ways in which international cooperation was traditionally conducted should not be limited to advocating a greater incorporation of female officials as the ultimate goal of the demands. Indeed, recovering the criticism directed towards hegemonic feminism, particular attention should be paid to promoting pinkwashing initiatives that in no way contribute to dismantling the underlying problems that emerge from the matrix of colonial, capitalist and patriarchal domination. On the contrary, it is emphasized that international cooperation should only be a possibility in so far as it is structured on the basis of the demands of the groups involved. In this sense, initiatives must be bottom-up, and should be respectful of local identities and expectations. Lastly, we can conclude that as long as international cooperation initiatives are not structured in a situated and contextual way, it will be very unlikely that collective emancipation strategies can be articulated. Moreover, this will only contribute to reaffirming the reproductive mechanisms of gender asymmetries in the international system. Contributions from decolonial feminisms, therefore, are essential to generate limitations to the reproduction of unequal and hierarchical gender social relations both in the areas of international cooperation policy formulation, and that of theory formulation. ; La motivación principal que orienta el presente artículo está justificada por la necesidad de contribuir a ampliar y profundizar los objetos de estudio abordados por las perspectivas feministas en Relaciones Internacionales por dos motivos: en primer lugar, para coadyuvar al proceso de revisionismo ontológico de la disciplina inaugurado por esta clase de enfoques; y, en segundo lugar, para aportar a la visibilización pragmática de prácticas y dinámicas internacionales que perpetúan lógicas de subordinación y exclusión hacia distintas corporalidades en base a la matriz de dominación colonial, capitalista y patriarcal. Se parte de la premisa de que la cooperación internacional representa una interacción básica de las relaciones internacionales y que, en el marco de la literatura académica de los feminismos recibió menor atención con respecto a otro conjunto de procesos asociados con el desarrollo, los conflictos, la paz y la seguridad. En tal sentido, el propósito del presente artículo consiste en contribuir a la problematización de la cooperación internacional desde las perspectivas feministas de manera general y de los feminismos decoloniales de modo particular de forma sistematizada a partir de una metodología de revisión documental. Para poder dar cuenta de ello, en la primera sección se describirá el panorama general en el que se insertaron los estudios de género en las Ciencias Sociales. Asimismo, se abordarán las condiciones de emergencia y enunciación de los feminismos en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales y se explicitarán sus principales aportes ontológicos, epistemológicos y metodológicos. En la segunda sección, se analizará la especificidad de la narrativa situada de los feminismos decoloniales entendida como una ruptura hacia los postulados homogeneizantes y falsamente pretendidos universalistas de los feminismos hegemónicos. En base a los lineamientos ofrecidos por las dos primeras secciones, en la tercera sección se indagará acerca de las implicancias de la cooperación internacional para los feminismos de manera general y de los feminismos decoloniales de modo particular con el propósito de dilucidar en qué medida se expresa un mecanismo perpetuador de asimetrías y de qué forma es posible lograr una superación de las lógicas patriarcales en clave emancipatoria. Finalmente, se compartirán unas breves conclusiones.

I governi occidentali, consapevoli dell'impatto negativo delle attività umane sulla salute dell'ambiente e il benessere delle persone, hanno elargito programmi a lungo termine, atti a mitigare l'inquinamento e a ridurre il consumo di risorse energetiche e materiali. Contestualmente, sia l'industria che il mondo accademico stanno incanalando i loro sforzi verso la ricerca di nuove soluzioni "green". Un esempio concreto sono le bio-raffinerie, sviluppate come controparte delle nocive industrie petrolchimiche, che sono in grado di produrre intere classi di composti chimici e combustibili come una vera e propria raffineria. La differenza sostanziale tra una raffineria e una bio-raffineria è la fonte di carbonio che, nel caso di quest'ultima, deriva da risorse rinnovabili: l'anidride carbonica viene catturata dall'atmosfera e fissata all'interno di alcuni microorganismi e piante, seguendo così il suo ciclo naturale. L'acido adipico (AdA) è stato scelto come caso base, data la sua continua crescente domanda e la mancanza di alcuni dati importanti per un ulteriore sviluppo in campo bio. La domanda attuale di AdA copre un mercato di 3.7 milioni di tonnellate all'anno con una domanda che cresce del circa 4.1% a causa delle prosperanti industrie automobilistiche, di vernici, tessili, dei beni di consumo, elettriche ed elettroniche, di cablaggio e di imballaggio che continueranno a stimolarne la domanda nel periodo 2017-2025. Nonostante i 70 anni di maturità tecnologica, il processo tradizionale di produzione dell'AdA basato sull'utilizzo di benzene è tutt'ora al centro di controversie riguardanti la sicurezza e l'impatto ambientale. Per tali ragioni sia le istituzioni di ricerca private che pubbliche hanno perseguito strade alternative bio (e chimiche) per la produzione di tale composto chimico, ma sfortunatamente, nessuno di tali processi ha raggiunto l'industrializzazione a causa della caduta del prezzo del greggio nel 2014. Questo evento mise in luce la principale debolezza delle bio-raffinerie, ovvero la necessità di competere in termini di costo con le tecnologie oramai consolidate e ottimizzate. Nel caso di prodotti chimici di massa derivanti da processi bio si rende necessario lo sviluppo di un approccio nuovo e innovativo: il design concettuale acquisisce quindi un ruolo di fondamentale importanza nella fase iniziale di sviluppo di processo e le capacità di stimare consistentemente costi e proiezioni e definire saldamente le strategie di ricerca e sviluppo sono i punti chiave della buona riuscita del progetto. Data l'enorme quantità di letteratura disponibile e l'interdisciplinarietà del progetto, il primo passo è stato la raccolta e l'organizzazione di tutta la conoscenza accessibile e l'identificazione delle alternative di processo attuali e attuabili. A tale riguardo si è deciso di scegliere un processo a due step che prevede un passaggio biotecnologico seguito da uno puramente chimico in grado di dare buone rese e una potenziale sostenibilità ambientale ed economica. Più nel dettaglio il processo scelto consiste in una prima fermentazione per la produzione di acido muconico (MA) partendo da glucosio (derivante dal trattamento della cellulosa) o da acida benzoico (derivante dalla lignina). Successivamente l'MA così prodotto viene idrogenato tramite processi catalitici ad AdA. La Tesi di Dottorato riguarda lo studio della reazione di idrogenazione dell'acido muconico (un acido dicarbossilico di-insaturo) ad acido adipico con particolare attenzione al meccanismo di reazione. Inoltre, grazie alla collaborazione con un gruppo di ricerca del Politecnico di Milano è stata eseguita un prima stima dei parametri cinetici di reazione ed è stata sviluppata la superstruttura dell'intero nuovo processo. Questo ha permesso di poter effettuare una prima stima di fattibilità economica e di evidenziare i colli di bottiglia del nuovo processo. Il Capitolo 1 fornisce un'introduzione all'oggetto della ricerca e la discussione dei principali utilizzi e processi di produzione dell'AdA. Nel Capitolo 2 viene descritto lo scopo della tesi, mentre all'interno del Capitolo 3 sono introdotti e descritti gli strumenti utilizzati durante la parte sperimentale del lavoro. Il Capitolo 4 descrive accuratamente il metodo analitico sviluppato per la valutazione della conversione e della resa dei prodotti e la sua consistenza. Nel Capitolo 5 vengono riportate le procedure sperimentali e i risultati ottenuti utilizzando catalizzatori commerciali a base di metalli nobili (Pt e Pd). Dopo la raccolta dei primi dati sperimentali si è proceduto alla regressione cinetica dei parametri di reazione e alla modellizzazione del meccanismo di reazione (Capitolo 6). Nel Capitolo 7 viene descritta la procedura di sintesi di catalizzatori a base di nanoparticelle di Pd supportate su carboni attivi e i risultati ottenuti riguardo l'idrogenazione dell'MA e del sodio muconato in ambiente acquoso. Infine, il Capitolo 8 riguarda lo studio di sostenibilità ambientale ed economica del nuovo processo. ; The awareness of the negative impacts of human activities against environment and public health have pushed western governments to support long-term programs aimed at mitigating pollution and reducing resource consumptions. In this spirit, both industry and academia are searching for new solutions towards a "green" manufacturing practice, and the concept of "biorefinery" is taking place, as a renewable counterpart of the ill-famed oil industry. Biorefineries are supposed to produce entire classes of chemicals and fuels just as a real refinery. The great difference is that the carbon source derives from renewable resources, following the natural cycle of CO2, which is captured from atmosphere and fixed into living organisms (plants, algae, bacteria). Adipic acid (AdA) production was chosen as base case due to the continuous increasing demand and the lack of some experimental data necessary for further developments. The current AdA production covers a market of 3.7 million tons per year (with a 4.1% of yearly growth) and increasing applications of AdA in various end-use industries, automobiles, textiles, consumer goods, electrical and electronics, wires and cables and food and packaging industry is expected to boost the AdA production during the forecast period (2017-2025). Despite 70 years of technological maturity, the traditional benzene-based processes still raise serious safety and environmental concerns.7 For these reasons, both private and public research institutions have pursued alternative bio (and chemical) routes for AdA production. However, none of these processes has reached industrialization yet, also due to the oil-price fall in 2014. This event evidenced the main weakness of drop-in biorefineries: the need to compete in costs with a well-established and optimized technology. A novel approach to process development is therefore required for the case of bulk bio-derived chemical with low added value. Conceptual design acquires particular importance from the early stage of process development, to produce reliable cost estimates and projections, and to define a strategy for R&D. Due to the extensive and interdisciplinary literature available, the first task was to collect and reorganize the accessible knowledge, identifying the current alternative processes. A two steps biological-chemical process was considered worth of more detailed investigation for its good yields and sustainability potential. This process consists in a first fermentation to produce muconic acid (MA), starting from either glucose (from cellulose) or benzoic acid (from lignin).11 In the second step the so produced MA is catalytically hydrogenated to AdA. This doctoral thesis deals with the study of the hydrogenation of MA (a double unsaturated dicarboxylic acid) to AdA with particular attention to understand the reaction mechanism. Moreover, thanks to the collaboration with Politecnico di Milano, a first estimate of the kinetic parameters was performed, and a process superstructure was designed. This lead to a first economic and environmental feasibility analysis that allowed to highlight the bottle neck of this new process. Chapter 1 introduces the subject of the thesis including a discussion on the application of AdA. Chapter 2 describes the aim of the thesis. Chapter 3 illustrates the analytical instrument used during the experimental work. Chapter 4 accurately describes the analytical method developed for the evaluation of conversion and selectivity. Chapter 5 talks about the experimental details and the results obtained using noble metals (Pt and Pd) supported commercial catalysts. After the collection of the first experimental data, a regression of the kinetic parameter and a modelling of the reaction pathway was performed as reported in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 describes the experimental details for the preparation of home-made catalysts and their characterization. Moreover, the results obtained from the hydrogenation of muconic acid and sodium muconate are reported. Finally, Chapter 8 provides a first study about the environmental and economic feasibility analysis of the new purposed process.

Desde la irrupción de los medios de comunicación de masas en el entorno comunicacional de las sociedades, su accionar y la influencia que pueden ejercer en las decisiones sociales han despertado un gran interés, no solo en la comunidad académica sino también en la clase económica y política que han visto en ellos el camino para alcanzar el poder. Dado que la construcción de los significados se produce en un entorno comunicativo social, los medios de comunicación gestionan ese espacio público en donde se desarrolla la producción del significado para los actores sociales y, por tanto, en donde se establece la opinión pública. Así, desde una visión política, estos medios se constituyen en actores activos de la política de los países. Ellos intervienen directamente en la formación de la opinión pública, la cual condiciona las decisiones políticas. El entorno comunicacional ecuatoriano no es la excepción. Los medios de comunicación han sido parte activa del proceso político que ha hecho del Ecuador un país altamente conflictivo, con un sistema político que se ha mantenido en una permanente inestabilidad, producto de las perturbaciones internas y externas del sistema, derivadas de la lucha por el poder. Uno de los sucesos que marcaron al gobierno del presidente Rafael Correa fue el intento de golpe de Estado ejecutado el 30 de septiembre de 2010 (30-S). Los eventos acontecidos aquel día mostraron la fragilidad del sistema democrático ecuatoriano, revelando varios aspectos de la lucha de los diferentes sujetos políticos y sociales por alcanzar el poder. No obstante, la comunidad académica, por lo menos desde nuestro conocimiento, no ha desarrollado, hasta el momento de la redacción de esta memoria doctoral, un estudio que profundice en la estructura de la agenda mediática de los medios de comunicación ecuatorianos en los meses previos a la revuelta policial. Así mismo, se tiene conciencia del uso que se hizo de las redes sociales por la ciudadanía durante los acontecimientos de septiembre de 2010. Sin embargo, no se ha analizado la agenda establecida por los medios en ese entorno virtual y cómo esta información fluyó al interior de las redes sociales (específicamente en «Twitter»). Esta tesis doctoral busca llenar este vacío en el análisis de la participación de los medios de comunicación ecuatorianos en los hechos ocurridos previo y durante el 30-S. Por una parte, se desarrolla un análisis del proceso de establecimiento de la agenda mediática en dos de los periódicos ecuatorianos más representativos: El Universo—periódico privado— y El Telégrafo—periódico público—, durante y tres meses antes de la sublevación policial del 30 de septiembre de 2010. Nuestra intensión es dar respuesta a varias hipótesis y preguntas que nos surgen acerca del «poder simbólico» ejercido desde estos medios, con respecto a los acontecimientos acaecidos en aquella jornada. No se buscamos establecer responsabilidades, dado que esa no es nuestra función ni interés, lo que pretendemos es analizar la estructura de la agenda mediática propuesta por esos diarios, para aportar al estudio del accionar de los medios ecuatorianos como actores políticos. Por otra parte, presentamos los resultados de un análisis empírico de la difusión de la información en «Twitter», producida por los dos diarios bajo estudio, durante y tres meses antes del 30 de septiembre de 2010. Nos interesa responder a varias hipótesis y cuestionamientos que nos surgen acerca del flujo de la diseminación de la información que resultó de los tweets que emitieron ambos periódicos. El periodo de estudio correspondió a la etapa de discusión de la Ley Orgánica de Servicio Público en la Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, uno de los detonadores de las protestas policiales. Los resultados nos muestran que la información difundida por esos periódicos en «Twitter», durante ese periodo, presentó una estructura mucho más compleja que el modelo de dos pasos. De esta forma, en este trabajo doctoral presentamos aportaciones al estudio del accionar comunicacional y político de los medios de comunicación ecuatorianos, tanto desde el ambiente tradicional (prensa) como desde el virtual («Twitter»). ; Since the irruption of mass media in the communicational scene, their action and influence in societal decisions have provoked great interest not only within academic communities but also among economic and political classes, which have assimilated it as an effective strategy to achieve power; thus, mass media fulfill an essential role for the establishment of power. Considering that constructing significances occur in a social communicative environment, mass media emerge as an ideal agent for managing public space for such objective, while defining public opinion; therefore, it also become an active public mean in forming social judgement and conditioning political decisions. Ecuadorian communicational reality confirms such phenomena: mass media have been an active agent in the nation's political scene, contributing to its highly conflictive and unstable history, always characterized by internal and external struggles for power. In such context, one of the events that stroke Rafael Correa's presidential period the most, was the failed coup d'état occurred on September 30th 2010 (30-S). Such event showed the fragility of Ecuadorian democratic system, while revealing data about the struggle for power among several social and political groups. Despite this event's importance, any study has analyzed the structure of Ecuadorian media agenda during the previous months of this police revolt; at least not from our knowledge at the moment of writing this dissertation. Similarly, the media´s agenda while using social network (especially Twitter) during this episode, remains under studied and analyzed. This dissertation seeks to fulfill this gap through the analysis of Ecuadorian mass media's participation before and during 30-S occurrence. The study offers an analysis of the agenda establishment for two most representative Ecuadorian newspapers: "El Universo" —private— and "El Telégrafo" —public—, starting three months before 30-S. Such analysis attempts to respond several questions and hypotheses focused on the "symbolic power" exercised by these media in such event. The interest remains far from establishing responsibilities, while intends to comprehend the structure of such newspaperságenda, contributing to study the facet of Ecuadorian media as political actors. The study also offers results of an empirical analysis of information broadcasted by both newspapers on Twitter, starting three months before 30-S. This process attempts to respond several hypotheses and questions focused on the flow of informative dissemination issued on the mentioned network. The period chosen for the study corresponds to the discussion stage of the "Law of Public Service" at the National Assembly of Ecuador, which is considered as one of the defining factors towards the police revolt. Results show that the information broadcasted by these media on "Twitter" implied a much more complex model than a two-step one. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to contribute in studying the communicational and political proceedings of Ecuadorian media, from both traditional (press) and virtual (Twitter) environments. ; En Ecuador, durante as últimas décadas, a medios tradicionais (radio, prensa e televisión) mantiveron a súa hexemonía na xestión da información. Estes medios, na súa maioría pertencentes a grupos financeiros eran a única forma de acceso á información para os cidadáns comúns, orientación da opinión pública de acordo cos seus intereses. Este poder político e comunicacional reforzouse con case ningunha presenza de medios de comunicación públicos e infraestruturas de comunicación pobres que limitan o acceso do público á Internet. Proba do poder político que mantivo a mídia en Ecuador foi a súa participación influente en eventos importantes na historia política do Ecuador como o derrubamento de presidentes Abdala Bucaram (1997), Jamil Mahuad (2000) e Lucio Gutiérrez (2005), amplamente estudado en literatura. Coa chegada de Rafael Correa á Presidencia da República do Ecuador, en xaneiro de 2007, a área política e comunicacional do Ecuador cambiou dramaticamente. Correa ten aplicado unha serie de políticas e accións de comunicación para contrarrestar o poder de comunicación da mídia tradicional. Neste novo contexto de cambio, os medios de comunicación teñen que chegou a desempeñar un papel político moi importante, -por mor ao forte descenso na credibilidade e forza dos partidos políticos, tornándose a principal forza de oposición contra o réxime de Correa. Durante o goberno de Rafael Correa, un dos eventos críticos foi a insubordinación dun grupo de membros da Policía e do Exército do Ecuador, que tivo lugar o 30 de setembro do 2010 (30-S). Nesta tese, analizamos este feito a partir de dous aspectos: en primeiro lugar, a axenda mediática dous maiores xornais de circulación en Ecuador: The Universe (medios privada) e The Telegraph (sector público), tres meses antes da 30- S; e, por outra, a propagación da emitidos por estes dous xornais a través de novas Twitter no mesmo período. A nosa hipótese é que este fluxo de información é unha estrutura multi-estadio e multi-direccional, o que corresponde a un modelo de enxame, dadas as características de conectividade de rede social en liña.

Den stigende interesse for den "grønne økonomi" som politiske agenda, har øget den globale opmærksomhed for øko-innovation, med problematikker relateret til vandstress identificeret som en af de største flaskehalse, for at opnå bæredygtig økonomisk udvikling og vækst. Vand er en kritisk ressource, og globalt indser flere og flere lande nødvendigheden, af at øge deres innovative kapacitet indenfor vand-sektoren. Med udgangspunkt i evolutionær økonomisk teori sigter denne afhandling på, at udføre en longitudinal og komparativ analyse af vand innovationsdynamikkerne i henholdsvis Kina og Europa. Afhandlingens mål er at vurdere ligheder og forskellige imellem de tendenser og mekanismer, som foregår i de to regioner, med et fokus på at identificere de faktorer, som driver øko-innovationsudvikling indenfor vand-sektoren. Mere specifikt bygger denne afhandling på innovations system begrebsrammen indenfor evolutionær økonomisk teori og inddrager tillige øko-innovation og vand-specifik litteratur. Forskningen føder ind til den stadig meget begrænsede vand innovationsforskning, så vel som grøn økonomi (green economy) og til dels 'catching up' litteraturen. Vi sætter fokus på at belyse de innovative betingelser for grøn økonomi i regioner, som befinder sig på forskellige udviklingstrin. Den empiriske analyse er baseret primært på patentdata, men inddrager også handelsdata i nogle af analyserne. Denne slags data er tidligere, kun i begrænset omfang, blevet anvendt indenfor vand innovationsstudier og endnu mindre indenfor et evolutionært økonomisk teoretisk perspektiv. Afhandlingen sammenligner og analyserer elementerne og dynamikkerne i henholdsvis det kinesiske og det europæiske vand- innovationssystem, fra tre forskellige vinkler. Først identificeres og karakteriseres; a) aktørerne indenfor vand innovations systemer, dernæst b) de drivende kræfter for den teknologiske udvikling og trends i den innovative kapacitet, og endeligt c) i hvilken grad Kina, som en centralt styret planøkonomi og late-mover indenfor grøn økonomi, har indhentet Europa, som er en veludviklet early mover indenfor grøn økonomi. Hovedfundene i denne afhandling er relateret til de klare forskellige i dynamikken indenfor vand innovations kontra øko-innovation i Kinesisk kontekst, hvor offentlige innovatører (universiteter og videns-institutioner) blev fundet til at spille en vigtigere rolle end i Europa indenfor øko-innovation end er tilfældet generelt indenfor vand-innovation. Dette indikerer en bedre association imellem de involverede aktører indenfor øko-innovations og vand- og innovations-lovgivning. Dette er et forventet fund på grund af den kinesiske planøkonomi, men det er ikke tidligere blevet dokumenteret eller diskuteret i analyser af vandsektoren. Derudover, identificeres og analyseres trends og drivkræfter for den samlede (øko) innovative kapacitetsudvikling for vandsektoren i de to regioner. Disse drivers blev fundet at være sammenlignelige og stærkt relateret til både dn nationale innovative strategier, såvel som de nationale budgetter, miljølovgivningen i regionen og udviklingen af R&D i sektoren. Generelt har Europa en højere (øko) innovativ kapacitet, men afhandlingen indikerer, at Kina i stigende grad øger sin innovative kapacitet i vandsektoren relativt til Europa. Specifikt blev det fundet at Kina er ved at indhente Europa på markedsplan, på trods af at de stadig på patentmæssigt ligger på et væsentligt lavere niveau end Europa. Begge regioner udviser sammenlignelige øko-innovative mønstre, med et vedvarende stærkt fokus på traditionelle vandforurenings- og spildevandsrensnings teknologier. Dette demonstrerer, at der stadig findes et stort uudforsket potentiale for grøn forretningsudvikling relateret til vandbesparelse og vand genindvinding i begge regioner som vil være vigtige for at sikre en fremtidig bæredygtig udvikling på vandområdet. Sammenfattende bidrager afhandlingens analyse til en mere nuanceret forståelse af vandinnovationsdynamikker såvel som globale vandinnovationstrends end hidtil. Nye bidrag til innovationssystemforskningen er den kombinerede belysning af mikroaspekter af vand innovationsdynamikkenerne (aktørerne), den økonometriske analyse af drivkræfter for innovations kapaciteten såvel som den longitudinale analyse af catch-up baseret på kombinerede patent og handelsdata indenfor forskellige teknologiske udviklingsspor. Den udviklede taxonomi for vand innovation samt listen over vandhandelsdata kan anvendes som nye indikatorer for øko-innovationsudviklingen og diffusionen i vandsektoren. På grund af emnets kompleksitet og den begrænsede forskning hidtil indenfor området og visse datamæssige begrænsninger, samt det forhold at mange nye grønne vand politiske tiltag i Kina endnu ikke reflekteres i de anvendte data, er resultaterne af de empiriske analyser ikke helt entydige. På nogle områder bevæger Kina sig imod Europæiske niveauer, hvorimod andre indikatorer er uændrede. Yderligere analyser er nødvendige for at opnå en mere komplet forståelse af dynamikkerne i vandinnovationssystemerne i både Kina og Europa. ; The recent rise of the 'green economy' agenda has increased the attention to eco-innovations globally, with issues related to water stress identified as one of the major bottlenecks for sustainable economic growth. Water being a critical resource, more and more countries worldwide are recognizing the need for increasing their innovative capacity within the water sector. Using evolutionary economic theory, this thesis undertakes a longitudinal and comparative analysis of the water innovation dynamics in Europe and China, representing respectively a developed, green early mover economy, and a centrally-planned economy and green late mover. The thesis aims to assess the similarities and differences in the mechanisms applied across these two regions, with a focus on outlining what drives eco-innovation development in the water sector. The thesis builds more specifically on the innovation system framework within evolutionary economic theory, as well as draws on eco-innovation and water specific literature. The analysis seeks to contribute to the still limited water innovation dynamics research, as well as the green economy and to some degree the 'catching up' literature, highlighting the innovation conditions of the green economy in regions with different stages of development. The empirical analysis is based primarily on patent data but also draws in trade data for some of the analysis. These data have been little used in water innovation studies and even less situated within an evolutionary economic theoretical perspective. The thesis compares and contrasts the elements and dynamics of the Chinese and European water innovation systems, working on multiple levels. The thesis identifies and characterizes: a) the actors of the water innovation system, b) trends in innovative capacity and the driving forces of the technological development, and c) the degree of Chinese catching up to Europe, both in general as well as related to different technological patterns of eco-innovation in the water sector. The main findings of the thesis are related to the clear differences in the dynamics of water innovation versus water eco-innovations in the Chinese context, where public innovators (universities and knowledge institutions) are found to have a more important role than in Europe in the development of eco-innovation – as opposed to the development of "general" water innovations. This points towards a better association among the actors involved in performing eco-innovation and the water regulations and innovation policies. This alignment is expected given the planned economy of China, but which has not been previously documented or discussed for the water sector. Additionally, the thesis identified and analysed the drivers for the overall (eco) innovative capacity development of the water sector in the two regions, and found them to be similar and strongly related to the national innovative strategy, as well as to public budgets, environmental regulations and R&D development. Generally, Europe presents a higher water (eco) innovative capacity; nevertheless, the thesis also indicates that China is increasing its innovative capacity in the water sector relative to Europe. In particular it could be seen that China is in the process of a "market" technological catch-up while remaining at a much lower patenting innovative performance level than Europe. Both regions present similar eco-innovative patterns, with a strong remaining focus on traditional water pollution technologies and wastewater treatment. This demonstrates there is still a huge potential for green business development related to water conservation and water recovery in both regions that hasn't been explored yet and may become crucial to the future transition towards sustainability. Overall, the analysis of the thesis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of water innovation dynamics, as well as global water innovation trends than has been conducted to-date. Novel contributions include the combined analysis of the micro aspects of water innovation dynamics, the econometric analysis of innovative capacity drivers, as well as the longitudinal catch-up analysis of combined patent and trade data, including the discussion of the development of different water technological trajectories. The suggested taxonomy for water (eco-) innovations and the trade data list of water technologies can be used as novel indicators to analyse eco-innovation developments and diffusion in the water sector. Given the limited prior research to draw on and limitations regarding data availability, as well as the many very recent green water policy tendencies in China whose effects are yet to be seen, the empirical results of this thesis are not that clear cut. In some respects, China is catching up in water innovations, in other respects not. Further analyses are needed to provide a more thorough understanding of the water innovation performances and dynamics of the European and Chinese water innovation systems.

У статті досліджено функціонування у системі вищої освіти Одеси кінця ХІХ – початку ХХ ст. форми самостійної роботи студентів, що полягала у написанні студентами наукових досліджень на історичну тематику, за найкращі з яких вони отримували винагороди у вигляді золотих і срібних медалей та почесних відгуків. ; Цель этой статьи – исследование функционирования в системе высшего образования Одессы конца XIX – начала ХХ вв. формы самостоятельной работы студентов, которая заключалась в написании студентами научных исследований на историческую тематику, за лучшие из которых они получали медали и почетные отзывы. Исследована история Новороссийского университета – единственного классического университета в указанное время не только на территории Южной Украины, но и на огромных просторах южных губерний Российской империи. Нами выявлено 125 тем, которые преподаватели предложили студентам в качестве медальных с 1870-х по 1919 г. Из них 87 тем нашли своих авторов. 38 тем так и не были проработаны, несмотря на то, что ряд из них предлагались преподавателями несколько лет подряд. На протяжении всей истории НУ было зафиксировано 123 случая награждения 118 студентов: 57 – золотыми медалями, 44 – серебряными, 21 – почетными отзывами. Только 5 студентов получали награды дважды за разные работы. М. Попруженко дважды получил золотые медали. М. Г. Попруженко и В. М. Мочульский были как авторами студенческих работ, так и авторами отзывов на студенческие работы, уже в качестве профессоров. М. Е. Слабченко был номинантом золотой и серебряной медалей, Б. В. Вахевич и К. Б. Бархин получили по две серебряные каждый. С. Вилинский получил одну золотую медаль и почетный отзыв. Работы на историческую тематику подготовили 23 студента юрфака. 9 из этих студентов написали 10 работ на темы, предложенные преподавателями историко-филологического факультета. 41 тема была посвящена истории Западной Европы, 34 – истории России. Только труд Д. Блюменфельда о первом этапе развития Ришельевского лицея посвящен краеведению. 7 тем можно трактовать как украиноведческие, т. к. они посвящены событиям, явлениям, учреждениям, которые происходили и находились на территории Украины, или украинским деятелям. Особенно выразительна украиноведческая составляющая в работах деятелей украинского национального движения вОдессе М. Слабченко и П. Клепацкого. Рукописи 15 работ были изданы. Таким образом, в Одесском университете существовала стабильная система вовлечения студентов в научную деятельность, которая никоим образом не уступала аналогичным системам в других университетах. ; The history of higher education is one of the traditional directions of historical research in Ukraine. Each of the educational institutions has an incentive to learn their own history in the form of a pragmatic reason – in the mass consciousness the longevity of the institution is a kind of high quality certification. The tradition of studying the history of University education started in the days of the existence of classical higher educational institutions on occasion of their anniversaries. A promising task of historiographical researches is the study of the history of historical education, because it was a significant part of the historiographical process and an integral part of historical science. Knowledge of previous pedagogical experience can help to eliminate outdated shortcomings and to improve the modern education system.The purpose of this article is to study the functioning of independent work form of students in the system of higher education in Odesa in the end of 19th – beginning of 20th century, which was writing of scientific researches on historical subjects by students, for the best of which they received medals and honorary testimonials. The history of Novorossiya University, the only classical university in the specified time, both in the territory of southern Ukraine and in the vast expanses of the southern provinces of the Russian Empire, is investigated.We have identified 125 topics that teachers offered to students as medal topics in the period from the 1870s to 1919. 87 of them found their authors. 38 topics have not been worked out, despite the fact that a number of them were offered by teachers for several years in a row.45 teachers, mainly professors: 35 from historical-philological and 10 from law faculties took part as authors of reviews in the process of formulating topics and nominating students. The greatest activity in attracting students to work independently had I. A. Lynnychenko (proposed 6 topics, 8 students have produced works, for which he received various degrees of difference), V. M. Mochulsky (6 topics, 7 students), F. I. Leontovych (5 topics, 8 students), F. I. Uspensky (4 topics, 7 students), O. O. Kotsubinsky and G. I. Peretyatkovich (4 topics, 5 students everyone), R. Y. Vipper (3 topics, 7 students). A kind of record was set by Professor of law V. V. Sokolsky. He offered a topic only once, but 5 students responded and received different degrees of difference for their 5 works, while the greatest success of other teachers was 3 works from 3 students on the same topic. In general, 25 topics were developed by two or more authors. Basically, teachers did not repeat any previously proposed topics or topics of other teachers, for which students received medals. Only once the same theme was offered two years in a row and twice had success. This is the the topic of I. A. Lynnychenko «the Peasant question in the Legislative Commission of Catherine II», for which M. E. Slabchenko, and A. V. Florovsky received silver and gold medals in 1906–1907.According to the updated and significantly supplemented data, summarized in the Appendix at the end of the article, throughout the history of the NU 123 cases of awarded 118 students were recorded: 57 of them received gold medals, 44 – silver, 21 – honorary reviews. Only 5 students received awards twice for different works. While M. Popruzhenko holds a unique record – he received twice the gold medals. In addition, only M. Popruzhenko and V. Mochulsky were both authors of student works and the authors of reviews on student works when they became professors. M. Slabchenko, was nominated for the golden and silver medals, B. V. Vakhevych and K. B. Barkhin received two silver medals each. S. Vilinsky received one gold medal and an honorary review.Works on historical subjects were prepared by the students of two (historical-philological and law) faculties of Novorossiya University. In general, the work on historical subjects has prepared 23 students of the faculty of law, for which they received medals and honorary reviews. 9 of these students wrote 10 works on the topics proposed by the teachers of the faculty of history and philology. Works about the historical drama in Ancient Rome, Herzen, Richelieu lyceum and Chekhov were obviously not connected with the legal issues and reflected the broad interests of the students. M. E. Slabchenko became the main star-historian of law school, he received two medals in the status of a student of law school for the work on the topics proposed by the Professor of the Department of Russian history I. Lynnychenko.About 90% of the nominees for medals and honorary reviews were at that time senior, 3rd and 4th year students. To the graduate-medalist his work was counted as the candidate's dissertation. Against this background, expressive achievements of 4 freshmen that have been awarded to: law student M. Slabchenko and historian student M. Golub – silver medals; the student-historian V. Gorodetsky and law student L. Butkis – honorary reviews. They are all wrote their works on the topic given by the Professor of history and philology.According to geographical criteria, 41 topics are devoted to the history of Western Europe, 34 – to the history of Russia. At the same time, the D. Blumenfeld's works on the first stage of development of the Richelieu Lyceum were an exception. None of the works presented for the medal were devoted to local history, which is perhaps the biggest difference from the modern historiographical and pedagogical situation. Seven topics can be interpreted as Ukrainian studies, because they are dedicated to the events, phenomena and institutions in the territory of Ukraine. The Ukrainian component in the works of figures of the Ukrainian national movement in Odesa M. Slabchenko and P. Klepatsky is the most expressive. These 7 topics include two other works «The Russian historical ornament» and «Azov seat», in which a lot of attention was paid to the Ukrainian theme. 4 were extraterritorial, claiming broad generalizations. Manuscripts of 15 works were published.Thus, there was a stable system of involvement of students in scientific activities in Odesa University, which in no way inferior to similar systems in other universities.

La idea de las redes ad-hoc (MANET) nace con el fin de proporcionar servicios de comunicaciones sin el soporte de infraestructura alguna. Típicamente, el estudio de este tipo de redes ha sido orientado a aplicaciones militares o a escenarios de desastres naturales donde la infraestructura es escasa, inexistente o no funcional. Sin embargo, en los últimos años, con el desarrollo de la tecnología inalámbrica, los investigadores han vislumbrado la oportunidad de prestar nuevos servicios de comunicación entre usuarios de electrónica de consumo. Así, los esfuerzos de la comunidad investigadora en este campo se han centrado en el diseño y evaluación de algoritmos y protocolos para implementar comunicaciones eficientes en escenarios donde los nodos móviles colaboran y comparten recursos para proveer funcionalidades usuales en las redes con infraestructura. En ese contexto, las redes móviles ad-hoc (MANETs) y las redes vehiculares adhoc (VANETs) han sido un tópico de extensa investigación por muchos años, con un sinnúmero de propuestas en la literatura para hacer frente a los desafíos planteados principalmente por la movilidad de los dispositivos. Muchos autores han defendido las MANETs como un elemento crucial para el futuro de los servicios de comunicación ubicuos. De igual forma, el desarrollo de las tecnologías de comunicaciones inalámbricas nos permite vislumbrar que en un futuro cercano las VANETs se convertirán en una extensión del Internet cableado, allanando el camino a un conjunto de nuevos servicios de comunicaciones. Esas visiones requieren medios para tornar este tipo de redes en ambientes de comunicación más robustos, capaces de soportar la operación de sistemas distribuidos que cursen grandes cantidades de información multimedia. Desde esta perspectiva, investigadores del Instituto Tecnológico de Massachusetts (MIT) propusieron una capa de virtualización, denominada Virtual Node Layer (VNLayer), con procedimientos para que nodos móviles físicos emulasen colaborativamente nodos virtuales que podrían ser direccionados como servidores en localizaciones conocidas. Esta aproximación se demostró conveniente para facilitar el desarrollo de software de aplicación en entornos tradicionales de MANETs. Esta tesis analiza las potencialidades de la virtualización para brindar nuevos servicios de comunicación en ambientes MANETs y VANETs, diseñando, desarrollando y evaluando nuevos mecanismos en la capa de virtualización para alcanzar este objetivo. Así, en primera instancia, presentamos un grupo de mejoras y nuevos mecanismos orientados a incrementar el rendimiento de la capa de virtualización en entornos MANETs de mayor movilidad y con aplicaciones más demandantes, otorgándole flexibilidad para ajustarse a las necesidades de los usuarios, y una mayor robustez y rapidez para reaccionar ante los fallos provocados por la movilidad de los nodos o las condiciones adversas del medio inalámbrico (pérdida de paquetes de control debido a colisiones, ruido, etc.). De igual forma, proponemos una serie de mejoras a la versión virtualizada del protocolo de encaminamiento AODV para aprovechar las nuevas características de la capa de virtualización, así como nuevos procedimientos para evitar la pérdida de paquetes debido a la movilidad de los nodos físicos que le dan soporte. Ya en el campo de las VANETs, este trabajo introduce por primera vez el concepto de la capa de virtualización en estos ambientes. Para ello, hemos diseñado varios procesos que permiten (i) adaptar la forma y ubicación de las regiones cubiertas por los nodos virtuales a las condiciones de los planos de las calles y vías, propias del entorno urbano, y (ii) ofrecer una reacción más rápida y robusta de los nodos virtuales frente la alta variabilidad y movilidad de los vehículos y las condiciones de mayor pérdida de paquetes de las redes vehiculares. Adicionalmente, diseñamos un nuevo protocolo de encaminamiento que aprovecha las ventajas ofrecidas por la capa de virtualización en los entornos vehiculares para obtener un mejor rendimiento que algunos protocolos presentes en la literatura. Nuestras contribuciones a la capa de virtualización, tanto en el campo de las MANETs como en el de las VANETs, son validadas a través de una serie de experimentos de simulación, desarrollados en diferentes escenarios y aplicaciones, y contrastadas con varios protocolos relevantes en la literatura. Los resultados muestran que los nuevos mecanismos que hemos implementado superan notablemente el rendimiento de la VNLayer original, al tiempo que aseguran mejores prestaciones en las comunicaciones que varios algoritmos relevantes en el campo de los escenarios propuestos, asegurando una buena tasa de entrega de paquetes gracias a la efectiva explotación de las comunicaciones multisalto. ; Ad-hoc networks arose with the aim of providing communication services without the support of any fixed infrastructure. Typically, the study of these kind of networks has been focused on military applications or natural disaster scenarios where infrastructure is scarce, nonexistent or nonfunctional. However, in recent years, with the development of wireless technology, researchers have envisioned the opportunity to provide new communication services among users of consumer electronics. Thus, the efforts of the research community in this field have focused on the design and evaluation of algorithms and protocols to implement efficient communications in scenarios where mobile nodes collaborate and share resources to provide functionalities which are common in networks with infrastructure. In this context, mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) and vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have been a topic of extensive research for many years, with countless proposals in the literature dealing with the challenges raised mainly by the mobility of devices. Many authors have defended MANETs as a crucial element for the future of pervasive communication services. Similarly, the development of wireless communication technologies allows us to foresee that VANETs will become an extension of the wired Internet in the near future, paving the way to a set of new communication services. These visions require means to turn this kind of networks into more robust communication environments, capable of supporting the operation of distributed systems carrying large amounts of multimedia information. From this perspective, researchers from the Massachusetts Institute Technology (MIT) presented a layer of virtualization, called the Virtual Node Layer (VNLayer), with procedures for physical mobile nodes to collaboratively emulate virtual nodes that could be addressed as server devices in known locations. This approach has proven suitable for easy development of application software in traditional MANET environments. In this thesis we are interested in analyzing the potential of the virtualization to provide new communication services in MANET and VANET environments, designing, developing and testing new mechanisms within the virtualization layer to achieve this goal. So, firstly, we present a set of improvements and new mechanisms aimed at increasing the performance of the virtualization layer in MANET environments with higher mobility and more demanding applications, giving it flexibility to adapt to the needs of users, and greater robustness and speed to react to failures caused by the mobility of nodes or adverse conditions of the wireless medium (control packet loss due to collisions, noise, etc.). Likewise, we propose a set of enhancements to the virtualized version of the routing protocol AODV to exploit new features of the virtualization layer, as well as new procedures to avoid packet losses due to the mobility of physical nodes that support it. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first study to introduce the concept of virtualization layer in VANET environments. To do this, we designed several processes that allow (i) adapt the shape and location of the regions covered by the virtual nodes to the conditions of the layouts of the streets and roads, typical of urban environment, and (ii) provide a faster and more robust response of the virtual nodes to deal to high variability and mobility of vehicles, and the major conditions for packet loss in vehicular networks. Additionally, we design a new routing protocol that takes advantage of the virtualization layer to deliver better performance than recent protocols in the literature. Our contributions to the virtualization layer, both in the field of MANETs as in VANETs, are validated through a set of simulation experiments, developed in different scenarios and applications, and compared with several relevant protocols representative of the current state-of-the-art. The results of simulation experiments conducted in MANET and VANET environments show that the new mechanisms we have implemented significantly outperformthe original VNLayer, while ensuring best performance in communications that the most relevant algorithms in the field of the proposed scenarios. A good packet delivery rate is assured thanks to the effective operation of multi-hop communications.

How did bilateral relations between Italy and Ethiopia-Eritrea evolved after the colonial period? What was the impact of the Italian economic presence on the economy of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the post-colonial period? Why since the end of the World War II has been existing in Ethiopia a widespread pro-Italian judgment despite the colonial past? The purpose of this research is to answer to such questions. Description of the research Chapter 1 is dedicated to the evolution of the bilateral relations between Italy and Ethiopia between 1947 and 1955. The Treaty of Peace, signed in Paris on February 10, 1947, imposed to Italy, among the other provisions, the recognition of the independence of Ethiopia, the renouncement of claims to colonies including Eritrea and the payment of war reparations to Ethiopia. These issues took time to be actually solved. Especially with regard to the future of Eritrea the tensions between Italy and Ethiopia flared up despite the fact that diplomatic relations were resumed at the beginning of 1952. In addition there were complex negotiations on the amount of the war reparations to be paid. Finally, the artworks carried away from Ethiopia during the occupation period were returned with delay and in several tranches between 1954 and 2005. As a general consideration, the whole picture of the bilateral relations between 1947 and the beginning of the '70s shows the alternation of long periods of strong tension with shorter ones of détente. Chapter 2 and 3 outline the main characteristics and the evolution of the Italian economic presence in Ethiopia and in Eritrea between 1941 and 1974. The first years after 1941 were extremely troubled. Many Italians were expelled from the two countries, many were confined to concentration camps, and in Ethiopia many became clandestines in order not to be forced to leave the country. In the late '40s, Italians in Eritrea became the target of terrorist actions by the shifta. Many Italians were killed and several companies managed by them were destroyed or seriously damaged. Italians went through other serious difficulties in the early '70s when the growing guerrilla made Eritrea highly insecure. Despite these difficulties Italians kept on carrying out their activities that flourished in the '50s and the '60s but were decimated by the nationalizations of the Derg during the first half of the '70s. Main Results With regard to the bilateral relations Italian diplomatic documents show the will of both parties to reach an agreement on the post war issues. However it was a very tough negotiation, as expected. In contrast to the belief expressed in some relevant and well-known works, i.e. Del Boca's one, the complexity of such a negotiation seems to be due more to the Ethiopian tactics than to the alleged Italian purpose to delay the final settlement. Furthermore it is crystal clear that one of the top priority of the Italian Government in negotiating was to protect the Italian communities in Ethiopia and Eritrea. This result is in contrast with what affirmed by Del Boca in particular, who stressed a sort of lack of interest of Italy in the co-nationals resident in the two countries. Chapter 2 and 3 shows that the efforts of Italians workers and entrepreneurs in Ethiopia and Eritrea after the end of the occupation are worthy of note and memory. Such efforts testify to an extraordinary commitment. Italians arrived in Ethiopia and Eritrea with dreams and hopes that many were finally able to see come true. Some of their stories are uniquely interesting. Emperor Haile Selassie undoubtedly played a significant role in fostering the rapid development of Italian economic activities and in shaping fruitful and cooperative relations between Italians and Ethiopians. He protected the Italians because he was deeply convinced of the important economic role that Italians would still have been able to play in Ethiopia, not only in the early post-occupation period, but also for the future of the country. Italian economic presence was strong in quantity and quality both in Ethiopia and Eritrea. However it is quite clear that throughout the period between 1941 and 1974 the incidence of Italian economic activities was significantly higher in Eritrea than Ethiopia. Italian firms were modern and efficient, and they were the backbone of the economy of Eritrea. The higher impact of our entrepreneurs in Eritrea was due to the longer stay of Eritrea itself under the Italian Government, which resulted in a much larger Italian community in Eritrea than in Ethiopia, both in absolute and relative terms. Almost the entire industrial and advanced agricultural sectors in Eritrea was in hands of the Italians. Provided that at the beginning of the '50s, the 80% of manufacturing plants of the Ethio-Eritrean Federation was based in Eritrea, it must concluded that the incidence of the Italian companies in the whole industrial sector was huge. In addition, except for the Italian activities, there were only a few other companies, especially in the agricultural and commercial sectors, managed by Eritreans or expatriates of other communities. In agriculture, where traditional ways and means of cultivation and a subsistence production still prevailed, the big agricultural and agro-processing companies run by the Italians were extraordinarily efficient. The Italians used modern techniques and machinery. They diversified their production. They also built dams, irrigation systems and major infrastructure projects for the reclamation of land to production. Even before the 50's and increasingly in the following decades, the Italian agricultural firms were able to export to neighboring markets, after meeting domestic demand. For the rest, the Eritrean economy was based on subsistence and largely unproductive agriculture. Italian activities strongly contributed to the national economy. In the economy of the Empire, characterized by a very low incidence of industrial development and the export of a few agricultural products (coffee, hides, oilseeds), the production for export made by Italian companies represented a unique economic opportunity for the entire country. The contribution of Italian economic activities was more evident in Eritrea than in Ethiopia. According to many sources, if Eritrean exports and imports would have been precisely accounted for - that is without considering the value of the goods that passed through Eritrea, but whose final destination was Ethiopia - Eritrea's trade deficit would have been significantly reduced or even zeroed out. Furthermore, the presence of flourishing Italian companies had positive repercussions also on the Eritrean state budget thanks to the tax 5 income they produced. By the way, the rates applied to Italian companies were much higher than those applied to local ones. The Italian business elite was also able to translate in images the social renewal processes of the 50's and the 60's. The buildings designed by Arturo Mezzedimi were perhaps the most evident symbols of such ability. Such buildings represented the avant-garde architecture of those years. Another building contractor, Mario Buschi, very active throughout the Empire, highly contributed to shape the modern image of Addis Ababa. The statistics shows that from 1957 to 1974 Italy was, together with USA, the main commercial partner of the Ethiopian Empire. Even in the period 1941-1951, during which official diplomatic relations between Italy and Ethiopia were absent, the bilateral trade was relevant and in particular Italy was in those years the first importer from Ethiopia. These exceptional results were due indeed to Italian resident community that with its economic activities highly contributed to nurture commercial flows from and to Italy. The good relations between the Italians who remained after 1941 and the Ethiopians played a decisive role in rapidly archiving the memory of the Italians as colonizers. Indeed such relationship was generally dominated by a constructive spirit of cooperation and probably fueled by some deep affinity of character between our two peoples. They were the Italians that contributed to maintain a good image of Italy in Ethiopia even during the absence of official diplomatic relations or at times of misunderstandings and difficulties in the dialogue between the two governments. In decades of coexistence the Italians and Ethiopians have been able to establish a fruitful dialogue, marked by mutual understanding, esteem and respect. Workplaces were the main venue where such a dialogue has taken its shape. The author spent 4 years in Ethiopia, from 2008 to 2012, as head of the commercial section of the Italian Embassy. This experience allowed her to learn parts of the history of the Italian community in Ethiopia and in Eritrea between 1941 and 1974 directly from the present generations of Italian businessmen resident in Ethiopia. The author also had the opportunity to consult Italians' personal archives in which she could find documents and books that are not anymore on the market and difficult to find in libraries. Her personal experience and knowledge of the country and the people added depth to this work that is however based almost exclusively on written sources.

Kui rahvusvahelised ühistegevuse põhimõtted oleksid aluseks kõikide riikide seadusandjatele, oleks igal ühiskonna üksikliikmel võimalik ühistegevuse vahendusel oma majanduslikku olukorda parandada ning aktiivselt osaleda ka sotsiaalelus ja poliitikas. Ühistegevuse põhimõtetel on oluline tähendus ka riigi jaoks. Eriti oluline on see väikeste rahvusriikide puhul. Eduka ühistegevuse ja majanduslikult efektiivselt funktsioneerivate ühistute kaudu saab rahvas osaleda majanduses kaasomanikena ning ohjeldada väliskapitali osa tulude eksportijana. Ühistud ja kapitaliühingud erinevad mitte "ettevõtte", vaid eelkõige "inimkoosluse" aspektist lähtuvalt ning tulude ja kasumi jaotamise mehhanismis. Eesti madala ühistegevuse hõive kõige olulisem põhjus on, et 1990-ndatel tuli alustada ühistegevusega taas nullist ning uue koostöömeelse ja initsiatiivika põlvkonna kasvatamine alles kestab. Äriregistri andmete analüüsist selgus, et tulundusühistul on ettevõtlusvormide hulgas marginaalne osa. Tulundusühistute arv on aastate jooksul vähenenud, kuid nende müügitulu kokku pidevalt kasvanud kuni 2008. aastani. See näitab ühistute edukat konkureerimisvõimet turul. Ühiselt tegutsedes suudavad põllumajandustootjad tugevdada oma positsiooni tootmisahelas ning olla arvestatavateks partneriteks hinnaläbirääkimistel töötlejate ja kaubandusega. Ühistegevus Eesti põllumajandussektoris on tervikuna nõrk, aga mitte lootusetu. Riigi poolne toetus tulundusühistutele ei saa olla ühekordne, vajalik on stabiilne abi pikema perioodi jooksul. Ühistegevuseks on vajalikud järgmised kriteeriumid: kriitiline mass ühistegevusse uskuvaid inimesi, ausad ja ettevõtlikud juhid ja ühistegevust soodustav keskkond. Selleks, et kaasaegse riigi majandus funktsioneeriks, oleks jätkusuutlik ja säilitaks oma arengupotentsiaali, peaksid riigis olema esindatud enamus ettevõtlusvorme. Ühistu suudab tasakaalustada äriühingute kasuahnust ning muuta kapitalismi inimnäoliseks.Taastuvenergia tootmine kokku moodustas 2011. aastal 1,16 TWh ja selle jagunemist energiaallikate järgi on vastavalt jäätmed ja biomass 66%, tuuleenergia 31% ja hüdroenergia 3%. Elektrihind koosneb: kulud elektrienergiale 33%; võrgutasud moodustavad ca 36% elektriarvest; taastuvenergia tasu moodustab 10 % ja käibemaks ja elektriaktsiis moodustavad 21%. Nii puudutab elektrituru avamine vaid üht kolmandikku elektriarvest – elektrienergia hinda. Eesti elektrihind elektrienergia kodutarbija jaoks on Euroopa odavamaid, kuid lähiaastatel on vähemalt 50 % hinnatõusu oodata. Eeldatava prognoosi kohaselt tõuseb Eesti elektrienergia tarbimine aastaks 2020 umbes 30%. Elektri hinda Eestis tõstavad peamiselt 2013. aastast muutuvad CO2 heitmekaubanduse reeglid ja see juhtuks ka siis, kui elektriturg oleks suletud. Akadeemiku Ülo Rudi arvates põhineb elektritootmine Eestis tulevikus gaasiturbiinidel ja tuuleenergial (rannikul ja avamerel) ning alates 2025. aastast ka tuumaelektrijaamal. Julgustamaks arendajaid tegema kapitalimahukaid investeeringuid maksab riik taastuvenergia tootjatele 12 aasta jooksul toetust 5,3 senti kWh kohta ja tootes tõhusas elektri- ja soojuse koostootmise re˛iimis, saab ta toetust 3,2 senti kWh kohta. Ühetaolist toetust makstakse kõikidele tuuleparkidele ja koostootmisjaamadele olenemata võimsusest ja alginvesteeringu suurusest. Konkurentsi olukorra osas on see muret tekitav, sest võib tekkida olukord, kus mingi aja möödudes saavad toetust kõik tootjad ja seetõttu jääb Eestisse vaid subsideeritud elektritootmine. Konkurentsiamet leidis, et enamik taastuvenergia toetustest on liiga kõrged. Järelikult võib öelda, et toetuste mõjul ei lähtu investor tegelikust pakkumise-nõudluse suhtest tekkinud hinnast, vaid kogu äriprojekt ehitatakse üles toetuste baasil võimalikult lühikesele tasuvusajale. Lähtudes Eesti majanduse eesmärkidest aastaks 2018, milleks on avatud ja koostööd väärtustav ühiskond, uuendusmeelne ja proaktiivne riigivalitsemine, jõuline tegevus rohemajanduses ja fokuseeritud majanduspoliitika, peaksid tarbijad elektrihinna tõusule reageerima ning üks võimalustest on ühistegevuslik ettevõtlus elektriturul tegutsemiseks. Suurimat kasu energiaühistutest saavad kohalik kogukond ja ühistuliikmed. Ühistud aitavad osaleda ettevõtluses ja investeerida ka väikese kapitaliga inimestel. Vähenevad konfliktid kapitaliühingutega ja toimib demokraatlik osalus ettevõtluses ja tõuseb ka avalikuse teadlikus energiaküsimustes. Energiaühistud vajavad oma tegevuse alustamiseks ja arendamiseks riigi, kohalike omavalitsuste ja erialaliitude toetust. Elektrituru täielik avanemine Eestis võib saada ajendiks traditsioonilise suure liikmeskonnaga tulundusühistu loomiseks ning tingimused ühistu loomiseks on olemas, sest inimestel on vajadus eluasemekuludelt säästa on olemas aktiivne katus-organisatsioon Eesti Omanike Keskliit (ca 61400 liiget). Samuti pole inimesed rahul praeguse elektrimonopoliga ning taastuvenergia tootmise hea tasuvus. Inimeste teadlikus keskkonnaprobleemidest on tõusnud. Võimalused energiaühistu moodustamiseks: • EOK baasil. Tulevikus plaanitakse kaugküttesoojuse ja kütuste võimaliku ühisostu. Edasi võiks EOK elektriturul müüjana tegutseda ja tulevikus taastuvenergiat toota. • Energiaühistu võib moodustada kortermajade piirkonnas kopereerunud korteriühistute baasil.Sellise energiaühistu neli põhiülesannet on: - energiatarbijate koondamine; - energiasäästuprintsiipide massiivne rakendamine; - elektrimüüjalt elektri hulgiost või börsilt/tootjalt müüjana elektri ostmine; - ise taastuvenergia tootmine. Need neli ülesannet on energiaühistu võimalikud rakendused elektriturul: • Energiaühistu loomine on võimalik ka praegu töötavate põllumajandus - ja metsandusühistute baasil. Neil on olemas ühisettevõtluse kogemus, mis aitab algusjärgus kõvasti. Võimalik elektri- ja soojusenergia koostootmine biomassist. • Uuselamurajoonide kopereerumine energiaühistuteks. Nende võimalus on kulude optimeerimiseks kommunaalteenused (elekter, vesi, soojus) ise toota. • Keskonnateadlikest inimestest moodustuv energiühistu. Eestvedajaks võiks olla Eestimaa Looduse Fond või erakond Eestimaa Rohelised. • Eesti Energia partnerina moodustada energiaühistu (Middelgrundeni tuulepark). Teatud osa taastuvenergia projektis kuulub energiaühistule. Väljatoodud kuus moodust ühistuid tekitada ei ole kindlasti lõplik. Energiaühistu ei pea olema tuhandete liikmetega. Neid võivad luua ka piirkonna eramute omanikud, kes koos paigaldavad näiteks maakollektori. Väikeasulate kortermajades on sama mõte teostatav. Viru- Nigula näide (energiatootja toetab kohalikku piirkonda) annab lootust, et tulevikus on ka kohaliku kogukonna kaasamine tootmisse võimalik. Ühistuinkubaator Vormsi saarel - näitlik õppeprojekt on energiaühistute tekkimiseks hädavajalik. Tegutsedes elektriturul müüjana on energiaühistul võimalus kasumi arvelt oma liikmetele odavamat elektrit pakkuda. Müüjana tegutsedes saab elektrit osta otse tootjalt või börsilt. Võimalus pidevalt kasvavatelt energiahindadelt võita on saada elektrijaama omanikuks – astutada energiaühistu. Eestis ei ole taastuvenergia ressursipuudust. Suuremateks taastuvenergia ressursideks on: tuul, küttepuit, põllumajanduslikult kasutamata maa ning olme- ja pakendijäätmed. Biogaasi tootmine Eestis on tasuv, kui sisendiomanikud teevad koostööd ja loovad bioenergia ühistu. Vajalik on, et esimeste pilootühistute loomist toetadakse oskusteabe ja projektijuhtimise toetusega. Särevere asula võiks antud eeldustel toimida energiaühistu, bioenergia asumi ja asula energiasäästu terviklahenduste mudelina ja eeskujuks teistele. Kogukond peab muutuste elluviimiseks olema avatud ja innovatiivne ning inimesed peavad tahtma midagi muuta. Millist tulu ühistuliige energiaühistus päikeseenergiat tootes osalemisest saab: hea enesetunne; korteriühistu saab katta oma osakutega oma üldelektri kulu; teised MTÜd saavad omandada osakuid mingi osa või kogu oma elektritarbimise roheliseks muutmiseks; konkreetne panus CO2 emissiooni vähendamisse; raha hoiustamine õiges kohas ehk rohelist elektrit tootvas elektrijaamas; teenimine paigutatud rahalt esimestel aastatel 0 kuni 1 % aastas ja pikemas perspektiivis kuni 4% aastas. Tuuleenergia projekti rahastamine: omakapital investeeringu mahus vähemalt vahekorras 3:1; järelejäänud 2/3 laenuosa tagamist kas kinnisvara, käendava ettevõtte garantii, riikliku tagatissüsteemi või lisainvesteeringuga; probleemiks rahavoogude riskipuhvri puudumine; väikeprojektide puhul kommertsliising ja refinantseerimine läbi Keskkonna Investeeringute Keskuse (KIK). KIK pakub pikaajalist keskkonnalaenu 50% projektimaksumuse ulatuses. Võimalikud lisatulud: riikidevahelised Ühisrakendusprojektid (CO2 emissioonikaubandus), bilateraalsed abiprogrammid, ekspordikrediidid. Tuuleenergia turule on raske siseneda, kuna vajalik elektrivõrguga liitumisresurss on juba suurprojektide vahel ära jagatud. Energiaühistu moodustamine ja kapitalimahukate energiaprojektide tööle rakendamine on finantsiliselt keeruline. Eesti ühistule on finatskapitali leidmine võtmeküsimus. Energiaühistu sisemised ohud avatud elektriturul on kapitali ja garantiide leidmine ühistu seest, liikmete arusaam ühistegevusest võib erineda ning juhtide usaldusväärsus, oskusteabe puudumine, juhtimise ja aususe küsitavus. Energiaühistu välimised ohud avatud elektriturul on: • ühistegevus on tugevalt MTÜ keskne; • kapitali, garantiide leidmine; • nõrgad kohalikud omavalitsused; • ükskõikne suhtumine riigilt; • taastuvenergia sektor on ülekuumenemas; • turul on suure turujõuga globaalsed ettevõtted, raske konkureerida; • kogemustega, oskustega, teadmistega tööjõu puudus; • taastuvenergia toetusmäärade muutus. ; The master's thesis is written in Estonian on 91 pages and consists of three chapters: cooperative entrepreneurship, overview of Estonian electricity market and cooperation possibilities and threats on Estonian electricity market. There are 11 drawings, 3 tables and 8 appendixes in the thesis. Also there are 75 references in which 15 are foreign. The master's thesis on the topic cooperative entrepreneurship possibilities and threats for opening electricity market for small consumers in Estonia is topical at the moment. Electric energy is something we need in daily bases and the changes on the market affects every person. The purpose of the thesis is to highlight cooperations possibilities and threats for open electricity market in Estonia. In order to do that the present work gives an overview cooperative entrepreneurship and cooperations in Estonia, position cooperative entrepreneurship compared to other business models, explain present situation and trends on electricity market of Estonia and finally bring out the experiences from energy cooperatives ofother countries. The analysis, synthesis and comparison of literature that has been published earlier in the present field has been used and combined with the experience of cooperative activity in Estonia. The complete opening of electricity market in Estonia could become the stimulus for founding of traditional profit-seeking cooperative with large membership. All the circumstances for creating a cooperative are present: people need to save on dwelling expenses, excists and active roof organization Eesti Omanike Keskliit (about 61 400 members), people's dissatisfaction with current energy monopoly, the good productivity of renewable energy, the activity of regional communities and the rise of knowledge about environmental problems.

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected young leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in two blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation and the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and second, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as artificial intelligence, including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by administrations, businesses, and citizens because of their promises of enormous opportunities, the potential solution to global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. These technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. AI is increasingly considered as a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, the swift progress is also filled with risks, including challenges to fundamental rights, which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological issues. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are still many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in those areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, security instability and growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report aimed at establishing a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas – such as the digital economy or the protection of human rights in cyberspace – where the international community should collaborate and cooperate with regards to the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, among others, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22).The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the ambition to avoid the fragmentation of the internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of artificial intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – but also uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems (keeping a whole life-cycle approach, from design to deployment and use), and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of "courage", which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in dthe development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU also adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council. These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own regulation – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to elements such as human rights – and even implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability.However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiple global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the velocity of technological change and development, it is difficult to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, in the regulation of technologies, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted regulations do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer countries to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues which are managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This lack of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies by different actors. As such, there is a lack of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and fundamental freedoms protection for every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicization and securitization of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the European Union and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and dominate the standard setting of these technologies in order to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary over the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.The lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. And, while paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent hyperactivity in digital advances shows the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multistakeholder approach, for example in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact, as well as a top-down multilateral approach that still gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multistakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow – which implies the subordination of multistakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialized conversation with a small pool of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be fit for purpose for non-Western realities.Besides more representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must also see their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In sum, democratic and participatory elements must be incorporated into the governance of technology on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. One of the main concerns and challenges of the current efforts is the need to ensure policy coordination, the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community and, as such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts. However, while regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract. Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. The unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be key to ensuring that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. In parallel, regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns, to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Secondly, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. Furthermore, these spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards – based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches – for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Thirdly, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technological advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity, and ensure that it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multistakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

This document is based on the debates of the Santander-CIDOB Future Leaders Forum online session titled "Bridging the digital global governance gap: international cooperation and the regulation of emerging technologies" that took place on November 21st, 2023; and the video interviews with the selected leaders from the Santander-CIDOB 35 under 35 List. The document is structured in three blocs: first, it introduces the current landscape of international digital cooperation, second, it identifies the key challenges to achieve a global framework to regulate technology; and finally, it highlights three proposals for international digital cooperation identified by the participants. The text was finalized on December 21st, 2023.The rapid development of emerging technologies is driving unprecedented changes with profound implications for our societies. On the one hand, innovations such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), including its generative capabilities, are welcomed by public administrations, businesses, and citizens because they bear the promise of enormous opportunities, the potential to help solve global challenges and the positive transformation of our societies. In fact, these technological innovations are already being used by governments and businesses alike. Indeed, AI is increasingly considered a common good, with the potential to help us in decision-making processes, improving efficiency and service delivery, and addressing some of the global challenges, such as climate change or pandemic prevention. On the other hand, this swift progress is filled with risks which need to be prevented if possible and mitigated if not. While some of these risks are still unknown, it has become evident that societies cannot afford the cost of not regulating these technologies. The potential disruption of established social structures, rising inequality, the concentration of power in digital companies, the material and social costs linked to new technologies, threats to fundamental rights – such as privacy or freedom of expression – and the increase of cyber threats are some of the reasons why regulation is imperative. This situation has become evident in the past years, with renewed enthusiasm and hyperactivity in the governance of digital technologies alongside the development of multiple initiatives to promote international cooperation in digital and technological areas. However, the ever-changing landscape of emerging and disruptive technologies has evidenced the lack of global governance and international cooperation frameworks capable of responding to the challenges arising from these developments, with many of these initiatives only finding traction in a reactive – rather than proactive – manner. Additionally, as the United Nations highlights, there are many gaps in global digital cooperation, with multiple areas of digital governance and new technologies still unregulated. Moreover, in areas where some progress has been achieved, it has been at the cost of fragmentation and voluntary frameworks. Thus, a new push towards global digital cooperation is more needed than ever, especially in a complex context characterised by permacrises, growing conflict, changing globalisation patterns, and the erosion of democratic governance.1. What is global digital cooperation?In May 2020, as the world was grappling with the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report to establish a Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. This effort, which signals the relevance of digital technologies for rethinking the role of effective multilateralism, aimed to identify a set of five areas where the international community should collaborate and cooperate regarding the use of digital technologies while, at the same time, reducing and mitigating potential risks. One of these five key areas is fostering global digital cooperation, which is defined as a multi-stakeholder effort in which governmental actors and other stakeholders, including the private sector, technology companies, civil society, or academia, jointly work to achieve an interoperable framework for digital technologies. This approach aims to guarantee the adoption of effective, inclusive, and practical solutions and policies in the digital and technological domains (UN, 2020, p. 22). The prioritisation of global digital cooperation within the UN framework was further emphasised under the Secretary-General report in 2021, titled Our Common Agenda. This document invoked the adoption of a Global Digital Compact based on shared principles for an "open, free and secure digital future for all" for the first time (p. 63). Between 2022 and 2023, negotiations between member states and consultations with relevant stakeholders have advanced within the UN with the intention to avoid the fragmentation of the Internet, increase digital connectivity, build trust within cyberspace and promote the regulation of Artificial Intelligence. The culmination of this process will be the adoption of the Global Digital Compact during the 2024 Summit of the Future. However, the UN hasn't been the sole institution promoting new initiatives of global digital cooperation. Indeed, the unprecedented irruption of generative AI at the end of 2022 set off a global – although uncoordinated – push towards regulation, with significant advances in technical and standard-setting procedures and around social and ethical aspects of AI. Initiatives by other international organisations, like the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); plurilateral agreements such as the Bletchley Declaration on security risks of AI adopted by 30 countries – including China – during the United Kingdom's AI Safety Summit in 2023; as well as regulations at national level and guidelines by private actors are rapidly proliferating. The most recent example is the G-7 adoption of the Hiroshima AI Process Comprehensive Policy Framework in December 2023, which includes guiding principles for the development of AI systems and a code of conduct with multiple recommendations for developers and users, with an explicit focus on disinformation, as well as project-based cooperation. The European Union (EU) has been at the forefront of many of these efforts, aiming to provide the world's first comprehensive legislation with solid standards in AI. The AI Act represents an act of 'courage', which will establish a series of technical standards, but it will also create moral ones. Through a de-risking approach to regulation, this initiative aims to identify some no-go zones in the development, deployment, and use of AI technologies – especially for those considered high-risk. In December 2023, the European Parliament and the European Council reached a provisional agreement on the AI Act, which will be ratified in early 2024.The EU's AI Act is the latest addition to Brussels' arsenal of digital regulations, including the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA). In 2022, the EU adopted the Declaration on European Digital Rights, proposing a digital transition defined by European values and six principles, including a people-centric approach, solidarity and inclusion, freedom of choice, sustainability, safety and security, and participation. Moreover, the EU has also adopted further legislation in highly specialised domains, such as the management of crypto assets, with the adoption of the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MICA) in 2023. Concurrently, the EU and the United States have strengthened cooperation on standards and technical underpinnings of regulation through the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). These elements are setting the framework for the future development of the data economy, the European industry, and the digital future of Europe – but with potential expansion beyond European borders, reminiscing the 'Brussels Effect' after the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adoption. Cities are another actor of utmost relevance. While local governance is embedded and affected by national regulations, cities are also key players in experimentation, cross-border collaboration, and regulation. Trying to close the global governance gap, local governments are also adopting their own frameworks – such as AI strategies or public procurement clauses sensitive to human rights – and implementing bans on specific applications, including facial recognition technologies. One of the successful examples of good practices on AI governance at this level is the adoption of AI registries by cities such as Helsinki or Amsterdam to ensure transparency and accountability. However, no actor – country, organisation or forum - has become the centre for digital cooperation and technology regulation. While no single approach can address the multiplicity of global challenges of emerging technologies given the transnational nature of the digital and cyber domains, as well as growing digital interdependence, what these examples show is how the current governance landscape is fragmented, nationally and internationally (Fay, 2022). Furthermore, there is a considerable overlap between the different initiatives, regulations and mechanisms addressing digital issues. This creates a highly complex architecture for coordination and cooperation without the certainty of its effectiveness (UN, 2019).2. What are the challenges to adopt an effective global governance framework to regulate emerging technologies?While there have been increasing calls from different stakeholders to adopt a global approach in the regulations of these technologies, especially AI, it is important to ask why we have failed to do so until now.Firstly, given the transnational nature of digital issues alongside the speed of technological change and development, it is challenging to rely on traditional forms of governance based on sovereignty and territoriality to regulate technology. Our current tools and structures for regulation are insufficiently agile and lack the flexibility to ensure adaptation to future challenges, needs and unknown risks (Wheeler, 2023). Indeed, deep, continuous international collaboration will be fundamental to adapt to groundbreaking developments and ensure that adopted frameworks do not foreclose the opportunity for civil society and latecomer actors to get their perspectives on the table. Moreover, the multidimensional impact of digital technologies cuts across different policy issues managed by different governmental structures or international organisations. The lack of a global institution with a substantive mandate to develop a policy model or regulation of technology that is truly universal further complicates the efforts to adopt a global framework for cooperation.Secondly, there has been a lack of consensus on critical and baseline issues. Taking the example of artificial intelligence, the first of these barriers has been the lack of consensus in such fundamental issues such as its definition, the venue or process that is desirable for the governance of disrupting technologies, the authority and responsibility of actors involved in regulation – including the role of the private sector and big tech – or the digital future (a more utopian or a dystopian one?) that we imagine (Colomina, 2023). This absence of consensus is also visible in the lack of a shared understanding by different actors of how basic foundations and principles of international law apply to the use of technologies. As such, there is a mismatch of focus and agreement on what we are regulating, which tools we have or should create or which areas we should prioritise in global cooperation.Thirdly, past efforts to adopt a global framework have failed given the diversity of interests, values, or approaches to risks. Regulation faces an inherent tension between the promotion and defence of national interests and values, the balance of ethical issues and human rights and the protection of the fundamental freedoms of every citizen. In other words, it is a tension between protecting rights and promoting innovation. A clear example is the more consumer-oriented approach of EU regulation of technologies, which contrasts with the security and control-focused Chinese model or the US' laissez-faire. According to Tiberghien, Luo and Pourmalek (2022) digital governance is fragmenting around the US, European, Chinese and Indian models – marked by multiple splits on the role of state, data ownership, industrial innovation and competitiveness, and protection and fundamental rights. In contrast, there is a significant disparity of substantive participation between the actors involved in global digital cooperation. Developing countries, for example, are still facing significant digital divides and may lack the resources for a successful participation in some of these debates and initiatives, being then forced to follow systems that do not fit their realities, concerns or needs. A similar trend is also visible in a more individual-focused perspective, where non-experts, indigenous communities, women, youth and elderly, and people with disabilities are not able to join the discussions or may lack the capacity to participate in a meaningful way. Fourthly, the most evident challenge is the growing trend of politicisation and securitisation of digital technologies and its intersection with growing geopolitical rivalries between the United States and China. Together with the EU and India, these actors are bidding to achieve technological supremacy and to dominate the standard setting of these technologies to harvest the benefits of their development and use. In parallel, each jurisdiction is becoming wary of the risks from data and digital technologies, prompting the adoption of more protectionist measures to achieve data sovereignty. The centrality of technology in their competition heavily influences the capability to reach a consensus on international standards while promoting contrasting approaches to regulate digital issues.In conclusion, the lack of a coherent, global approach is unsettling the international order in digital governance and negatively impacting the delivery of effective and innovative solutions for the governance of digital and technological issues. This situation has consequential risks, such as the splintering of the Internet or the incapacity of successfully responding to critical problems, given the failure to conduct a comprehensive and in-depth assessment of multiple risks, vulnerabilities, and outcomes of digital and technological developments. The different rules and regulations – as well as the existing gaps, for example, the military use of these technologies – can have deep impacts on governance and, as a result, on citizens' lives. Paradoxically, guidelines and regulations are more needed than ever in the current context.3. Towards an effective global digital cooperationTaking into consideration the challenges of establishing a set of shared values to guide technology development and deployment, global digital cooperation should be people-centered, transparent, open, ethical, inclusive, and equitable while keeping in mind the multi-level, multi-issue and multi-stakeholder nature of digital and tech governance.Considering the current challenges and developments, the international community should focus on making progress in three different areas: Meaningful multi-stakeholderism The recent digital advances show the tension and interplay between two different cultures of governance: a bottom-up multi-stakeholder approach – for example, in the open consultation processes adopted by the UN for the Global Digital Compact – and a top-down multilateral approach which gives primacy to the role of states. However, even in these multi-stakeholder initiatives, the current objective is a multilateral solution for a better tomorrow, implying the subordination of multi-stakeholder processes to multilateral solutions.As a result, the emphasis must be placed on achieving meaningful multi-stakeholderism while upholding inclusivity and effective participation. Current efforts at regulating these technologies are being led and dominated by traditional technological powerhouses – such as the US, the EU or China–, creating a highly specialised conversation with a limited number of countries alongside a small pool of big tech companies. Countries from the Global South are mostly absent or overlooked in ongoing regulatory processes. As such, adopted international agreements may not be suitable for non-Western realities.Besides more a representative global cooperation in terms of geography, the different actors involved – governmental representatives, civil society actors, academia and the private sector – should have the opportunity to participate and influence the conversations on an equal footing. Diversity of genders, generations, and underrepresented communities – including most vulnerable populations, indigenous communities, and people with disabilities – must have their participation ensured. This is also especially relevant when addressing and ensuring youth participation – as the decisions taken today will ultimately define their future. Each of these groups can bring a unique perspective to the table and, through communication and trust-building measures, these initiatives can help build consensus and common understandings, and identify shared challenges and risks. In conclusion, the governance of technology must incorporate democratic and participatory elements on national and international levels.Ensuring interoperability across regulatory frameworks and enforcementThe current hyperactivity in the international landscape risks creating a patchwork approach with too many loopholes that allow easy forum shopping. As a result, the most urgent task at hand is the need for coordination. Feedback loops should be established between ad hoc, regional and international initiatives to avoid duplication, overlapping – and contradicting – efforts. As Internet governance is a cross-cutting issue, the current siloed governance should be connected to accurately address and respond to related issues around digital technologies that cross borders, topics, rights, and regulations. As such, for a truly comprehensive and harmonised regulatory framework, intergovernmental processes and global multilateral forums should be aligned, with a clear division of labour and consistency when it comes to the rules that apply to the work of these forums. Beyond ensuring policy coordination, two further concerns and challenges that arise from current efforts are the interoperability of regulations and the consequent protection of citizens who could be subjected to different jurisprudential criteria depending on applicable legislation. By building international frameworks grounded in consensus-adopted shared values, different jurisdictions should be committed to following this leadership by the international community while retaining enough flexibility to develop regimes tailored to their domestic environments. This can be further encouraged through capacity-building initiatives in the digital and cyber domains at a global level, using cooperation to assist countries with practical insights on regulation and implementation. Moreover, further collaboration through bringing legal expertise and knowledge will be necessary to support other countries in transposing international agreements and standards in their own legislations as well as its implementation and enforcement.Finally, a further challenge will be how to fulfil the promises made in regulations to safeguard rights effectively. Enforcement and sanctioning will be a requirement for the international community. As such, these international agreements need to become binding. The development of global, joint enforcement mechanisms and a sanctions framework for those who fail to comply should also be part of global digital cooperation debates and efforts.Going beyond regulationBesides the challenges of interoperability and enforcement, global digital cooperation should extend beyond regulation. While regulation is a fundamental first step, it is important to acknowledge that it is not enough to produce the desired change of cooperation and risk mitigation of emerging technologies. Previous experiences, such as the GDPR, offer relevant insights into the limitations of regulation to promote a shift in business models or different Internet behaviour. While the GDPR established clear obligations on the processing of personal data by operators, some have managed to circumvent or avoid these obligations. The €1.2 billion fine to Meta for violating the data privacy rules established in the GDPR is a clear example of how enforcement is not working. As such, other creative and innovative approaches should be considered – including the establishment of a new, digital social contract.Moreover, the unequal development and adoption of technologies around the world and the knowledge of these issues require further research and the development of capacity-building actions. Sharing best practices, promoting training for public administrations and the private sector, and ensuring the exchange of knowledge will be essential to guarantee that the benefits of these technological changes are equally shared. Regulations should also be coupled with awareness-raising campaigns to ensure that citizens, users, and developers are aware of their rights and responsibilities under these new frameworks.Additionally, given the unpredictable risks and impacts of these disruptive technologies, it is crucial to establish common safe spaces for experimental development, including sandboxes, funded by public bodies. The deployment of these spaces can help us identify and understand in the early stages of the development process the risks of specific technologies, but also, to test the effectiveness of regulations. These spaces will be useful in risk assessments. Adopting standards based on a value-sensitive design and participatory approaches for assessing the impact of these technologies before they are deployed in the market will test their respect for human rights and limit their negative externalities.Furthermore, global digital cooperation needs to provide public global goods and technological solutions for all. Government involvement can further enhance innovation, adopting a supporter investor and early customer role for these technology advancements. As such, countries should invest and develop open, shared digital public infrastructure – from computing power to democratically and justly governed data layers –, to boost global digital connectivity and ensure it is accessible for entrepreneurs and citizens. More critically, technological transfer will also be key between developed, emerging, and developing countries to leverage the opportunities of digital technologies and close the digital divide.Finally, one ambitious proposal concerns the need to establish new effective and flexible institutions of global governance that manage the profound changes that digital technologies pose for our societies. From international agencies to monitor and verify compliance, to global advisory bodies for truly multi-stakeholder and all-inclusive processes, public participation must be ensured to build the foundations of the future and take ownership of the governance of the unprecedented transformations for our societies.ReferencesColomina, Carme. "Una IA ética: la UE y la gobernanza algorítmica". CIDOB Opinion, 784 (December 2023). (online) https://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/serie_de_publicacion/opinion_cidob/2023/una_ia_etica_la_ue_y_la_gobernanza_algoritmicaFay, Robert. "Global Governance of Data and Digital Technologies: A Framework for Peaceful Cooperation". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022. (online) https://www.cigionline.org/articles/global-governance-of-data-and-digital-technologies-a-framework-for-peaceful-cooperation/Tiberghien, Yves; Luo, Danielle and Pourmalek, Panthea. "Existential Gap: Digital/AI Acceleration and the Missing Global Governance Capacity". Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), February 2022 (online). https://www.cigionline.org/articles/existential-gap-digitalai-acceleration-and-the-missing-global-governance-capacity/United Nations (UN). Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation. International Governance Forum, 2019 (online). https://intgovforum.org/en/content/report-of-the-un-secretary-general%E2%80%99s-high-level-panel-on-digital-cooperationUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Roadmap for Digital Cooperation. New York: United Nations, May 2020 (online). https://www.un.org/techenvoy/sites/www.un.org.techenvoy/files/general/Roadmap_for_Digital_Cooperation_9June.pdfUN. Report of the Secretary-General: Our Common Agenda. New York: United Nations, 2021 (online).https://www.un.org/en/content/common-agenda-report/assets/pdf/Common_Agenda_Report_English.pdfWheeler, Tom. "The three challenges of AI regulation" Brookings Commentary, June 2023 (online). https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-three-challenges-of-ai-regulation/

In my review I do not recommend the Fat Decimator System . This is because it's actually a very intense program that requires a great deal of effort. The diet and exercise regime would be difficult for most people to stick to for the required time to lose that stubborn belly fat. Can you stick to a diet of 17 vegetables and milkshake? Can you do 24 hour fasting? Do you want to do those things? There is an easy way You can actually lose 1lb of belly fat every 72 hours with no exercise regime, watch this video now to discover how. The video will teach you about a hot new African tea diet that stops you feeling hungry. Learn how to shed your unwanted belly fat fast and easy with this fantastic new diet that's getting many raving reviews. What is The Fat Decimator System? If you are tired of using those boring fad diets that never deliver results, this is the right time for you to tap into the right solution. No more relying on information that doesn't work. The Fat Decimator System is a new fat-busting diet and exercise program that claims to be able to eliminate 1 pound of belly fat every 72 hours. It is available as a ebook written by ex-US marine Kyle Cooper, and promises quick and long-lasting results. As you enter your 30's and 40's, physical fitness becomes harder to maintain as the body slows down and the effects of ageing become apparent. This system offers all you need to burn fat fast and get yourself into shape, whatever your age may be. You will be educated about how the human body controls fat levels, and how to use this information to your advantage in your quest to burn fat. It encompasses education, diet and exercise techniques, and how to maintain the correct mindset. These things in combination are the secret to this system's extraordinary success. A lot of people have noticed unbelievable results, and you will be amazed with the outcome; all you need to do is carefully understand what the program is all about and how you can make a positive change in your body. Now, before delving deep into the program and how it can help you achieve your weight loss goals, let's talk about the creator of this one-of-a-kind fitness program! Who is Kyle Cooper? Kyle Cooper is an ex-US marine gunnery sergeant, who developed this fat-busting technique whilst stationed in Afghanistan. He also has a feature in the LA times, and runs boot camps in Missouri, and is someone who has dedicated himself to health and fitness. He is now a well-renowned expert in this field. Kyle has served in the marines for most of his adult life and has therefore built up a huge amount of knowledge about health and fitness, but he also genuinely cares about his customers and strives to help them see incredible results. He is a very dedicated and determined individual, but also someone who gets a great deal of personal satisfaction from helping others. How Does The Fat Decimator Work? The techniques and formulas are based on 100% science facts; no more wasting your time and money on useless "facts". The technique relies on a principle of mobilising the body's fat reserves before creating a calorie deficit to eliminate the now mobile fat. All fat loss programs require a calorie deficit over time, otherwise they would not work, and this can be achieved by eating less or exercising more. The first three weeks will be about creating new routines and good habits, and mobilising your fat reserves, and from then on you can begin to quickly melt away your fat. The system includes quick response email support, as well as support via the private Facebook page for anyone who has queries about the system. The Fat Decimator System Phases The Fat Decimator System initially runs for three weeks, with four separate phases during that time. Here's what each one does. Phase 1 This is what kicks the whole process off and runs for the first week. The idea is to cleanse your gut and get your body ready for action. It is not unusual to lose 10 pounds or more during this one week phase. The first week restricts the types of food you can eat. There are 17 vegetables to choose from, including carrots, cabbage, and spinach. These may be steamed, microwaved, or eaten raw – but not fried, roasted, grilled, or cooked in any other way. Chicken, beef, eggs and other protein sources are allowed in limited amounts, and lots of water must be taken in order to detox the liver. Phase 2 Phase 2 is just day 8 on its own, and you may be grateful for that – it's a 24 hour fast. This helps cleanse your body even further and sets you up for the next phase. Your last meal will be in the evening of day 7, and your next meal will be in the evening of day 8, so it's not too much to worry about. It isn't a whole day without eating from rising to sleeping, but it does cover a 24 hour period. Phase 3 Phase 3 continues to tune up the liver, and to burn off more body fat. Phase 3 lasts for three days (days 8, 9, and 10) and involves a drastic change to your diet. Each day, you need to attempt to get 80% of your calories from fat – that is to say natural fat, not processed trans-fat. Studies have shown that limiting carb intake can accelerate fat loss, and with the priming of the first two phases, phase 3 is likely to show a great change in the composition of your body. Whether eating in this manner is healthy in the long run is up for debate, but for a three-day period the benefits seriously outweigh any potential pitfalls. Phase 4 This is the come-down phase, bringing your eating habits closer to what you may have been used to previously, but with a calorie restriction based on the actual needs of your body for the last few days. Using a formula to calculate your BMR (Basal Metabolic Rate), you will discover how many calories your body burns while at rest. Using this number to restrict the number of calories you consume will help you to lose further weight, but allows your eating patterns to return to a maintainable state. When it's all said and done After Phase 4 is complete, you are free to start adding other foods back into your diet. The Fat Decimator System recommends that certain foods are avoided (or at least limited in quantity) in order to avoid weight regain. After all your hard work, it would be pointless to give up – you need to maintain a healthy weight for the rest of your life. What Food Can You Eat on The Fat Decimator System? The Fat Decimator System is designed to work with your body in order to help you lose excess weight. As part of the system, a reduction in carbohydrate consumption is recommended, but this is for the initial period only – you don't need to permanently eliminate carbs like some diets recommend. The Fat Decimator System is more about optimizing the food you put in your mouth, ensuring your body gets all the nutrients it needs at the right time. This includes meat, fruit, vegetables, and importantly making sure you drink enough water. The Building Blocks of Food You might be wondering what a carbohydrate actually is. In simple terms, it's the starchy or sugary component of any food. If the food isn't sugary or starchy, it probably has little or no carbohydrate in it. Your body doesn't need carbs in order to survive, and so by limiting the amount of carbohydrate you consume can affect your weight loss progress. The body likes to use carbs as an energy source, but this essentially makes the body lazy – and as you can imagine, a lazy body is not a healthy body. The other main components of food are protein and fat – together, these three (including carbs) are called macronutrients. Protein is the main constituent of foods like meat and eggs, while fat are found in many places, not just oil and butter. There are good and bad types of fat. The Fat Decimator System is careful to identify these fats as part of your weight loss process, as the notion that eating fat makes you fat is outdated. Fats from sources such as coconut oil, avocados and nuts, can actually help accelerate your weight loss when used in the right way. When you consider that the majority of your brain is made of fat, you might begin to understand the benefit of allowing some fat in your diet. Furthermore, particular types of fat can improve your bodily function. Omega-3 oils, for example, are found in fish and help to reduce inflammation, reduce joint pain, and give you better hair, skin, and nails! Drink, Drink, Drink Alcohol is never ideal for losing weight, so don't get the wrong idea – if you're drinking, your best option is to choose water. Your kidneys and your liver work together to help regulate the amount of fat in your body. If you don't drink enough water, your kidneys can't operate at their full capacity, limiting your capability to get rid of excess fat. Milkshake Surprise The Fat Decimator System recommends that you drink delicious high-protein milkshakes throughout the day. This will help tremendously with keeping you feeling full. One milkshake should keep you feeling full for about three hours. This one trick will make your weight loss mission so much easier. Do Calories Count? Traditional diets will have you counting calories with no thought as to the source. Think about it – what's more likely to be good for your body? 200 calories of broccoli, or 200 calories of processed sugar? With a regular diet, both would be treated in the same way. Clearly, when the Fat Decimator System recognizes the difference between the two foods, it's a much more sensible way to try to lose weight. The Fat Decimator System Exercise The bane of many overweight lives, exercise is necessary to strengthen your body, help your metabolism, and facilitate your weight loss. The Fat Decimator System is keen to point out that diet is the most important thing to modify in your quest to lose weight, but exercise also has its place. A body that never moves will naturally have a low metabolic rate. Exercise will increase the metabolism, as the body becomes prepared to move a moment's notice. Exercising without changing your diet in anyway is a recipe for disaster. Certainly, moving more and increasing your metabolism will help you lose weight, but the amount will be minimal without drastic changes elsewhere. Before starting any exercise program, it is always wise to consult a doctor as you may have underlying medical issues that would make starting to exercise a dangerous choice. Be Consistent If you find you are able to start to exercise, the key to success is consistency. This doesn't mean you need to exercise at 4:30 every Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday, but does mean you can't pick and choose. If you exercise 3 days one week, 2 days the next, skip a week, do 2 days the week after, take a week off, and so on, you'll never experience any great progress. You might have heard of some complicated exercise routine that is designed to "confuse your muscles" – in truth, there's no such thing as a confused muscle. It either gets worked out, or it doesn't. If it doesn't get worked out regularly, it gives up, and just stays as it is – what you need are active muscles that are ready for action. Why? Because more muscle burns more fat. The Fat Decimator System 21 Day Workout Just as the eating plan runs for 21 days, the Fat Decimator System has a workout plan for the same period. These are high intensity exercises, designed to be completed within 30 minutes, rather than the traditional hour long workouts you might expect. Starting with a warm up, progressing to body movements with small weights, planks and stretches, every inch of your body will be put through its paces in order to get the most benefit from your motion. What are The Pros and Cons?ProsThe book contains lots of dietary information, including advice about superfoods which can revolutionise your diet. It includes recipes for tasty, healthy foods and information about what foods you should avoid. Interestingly, you will see Kyle recommend some calorie rich foods which can actually help you to burn fat.You can expect to see visible results in as little as 1 week of following the program.There is a money-back guarantee if you do not see results.The program will help you build and maintain healthy habits, including diet, exercise and mindset.You will learn about the physiology of the human body, and how it deals with fat.You will have access to personal coaching via the internet.It has been tried and tested in the US military and found to be extremely effective.ConsThe Fat Decimator is an intense program and requires a great deal of effort and concentration. If you are not ready to put in the effort, you will not get the desired results.Even though the diet is varied and interesting, sugar is definitely out. No cheating is allowed!The book is quite detailed and extensive, and you will have to read the entire thing. Make sure you have proper time to go through everything.You have to stick with the program carefully if you want spectacular results.

La edición del volumen XIX No 1 del año 2018 de la revista Tendencias incluye un total de 10 artículos: cinco de investigación, tres de revisión, uno de reflexión y un artículo adicional incluido en la tradicional sección vida universitaria.La sección de los artículos de investigación inicia con el escrito magistral del Dr. Julio Silva Colmenares, Director del Observatorio sobre Desarrollo Humano de la Universidad Autónoma de Colombia, quien busca comprobar que la tan comentada "desindustrialización" del sector manufacturero Colombiano, no existe o es una verdad a medias. Su hipótesis se desarrolla con base en argumentos teóricos y empíricos y nos lleva a conclusiones acertadas sobre la falacia de la distribución equitativa del valor agregado generado por las empresas nacionales de mayor envergadura en el país.En el segundo artículo de investigación Joel Cruz Díaz, Alexander Blandon López y Diego Cruz Rincón, exponen la necesidad de fortalecer el desarrollo empresarial del Quindío a partir de la conjugación de diferentes políticas y programas de desarrollo empresarial, que se pueden ejecutar desde una fortalecida Comisión Regional de Competitividad. Proponen que es indispensable la sinergia de diferentes instituciones para potencializar el sector empresarial.En el tercer artículo David Camargo Mayorga, Octavio Cardona García y Ángel Roncancio García, profesores de la Universidad Militar Nueva Granada ubicada en Colombia, pretenden determinar las diferencias existentes en la prestación de servicios de telecomunicaciones y los factores que las explican, examinando 69 países para el periodo de los años 2010 a 2015. Para ello inician su escrito con sustentación teórica que da cuenta de los antecedentes sobre isomorfismo empresarial, concluyendo que, a pesar de existir trabajos previos, hay vacíos de conocimiento frente a esta temática. Luego utilizando el modelo de datos panel, el test de Hausman, el de Sargan-Hansen, entre otros, concluyen que los servicios de telecomunicaciones entre países no son homogéneos.En el cuarto artículo, Hugo Alonso Plazas y Jennyfer Alejandra Castellanos profesores del departamento de diseño de la Universidad de Nariño, ubicada en Colombia, analizan el desarrollo de la industria editorial en la Provincia de Pasto de 1837 a 1900 a partir de los emprendimientos de la época. Hacen un recorrido histórico y se mencionan algunas iniciativas enmarcándolas en el contexto político, económico y social de Colombia en el período de estudio.En el quinto artículo, Mario Uribe Macías, profesor de la Universidad del Tolima, ubicada en Colombia, presenta los resultados de dos proyectos relacionados con el análisis de la Responsabilidad Social Empresarial, RSE, en dos sectores de Ibagué: el industrial y el financiero, obtenidos mediante la aplicación de un cuestionario dirigido a gerentes o responsables de la RSE y que consta de dos grandes partes: la primera, indaga acerca del enfoque estratégico y la segunda, se refiere a la relación de la empresa con sus diferentes stakeholders. Se concluye que la RSE es más fuerte en el sector financiero que en el industrial.En la sección de artículos de revisión en el primero de ellos Omaira Calvo Giraldo profesora de la Universidad del Cauca, ubicada en Colombia, hace una revisión de la literatura existente sobre la gestión del conocimiento, sus diferentes modelos y enfoques, en el marco de la llamada "nueva economía" o "economía del conocimiento" y su aplicación en los ámbitos empresarial y regional, con el propósito de lograr y mantener su desarrollo y competitividad.El segundo artículo de revisión, los profesores Saúl Fernández, Diego Castillo y Luz Ángela Martínez, en su artículo Clúster virtual: nueva alternativa a la competitividad eficaz en las empresas, hacen énfasis en la importancia de su conformación mediante el networking, como mecanismo potencializador del desarrollo de las organizaciones; se describen sus ventajas y desventajas y se propone el clúster virtual empresarial como alternativa innovadora para establecer redes empresariales que redunden en mayores beneficios para sus integrantes.En el tercer artículo de revisión, Brigitte González y Carlos Arturo Ramírez, estudiante de último semestre del departamento de administración de empresas y profesor del mismo departamento respectivamente, de la Universidad de Nariño ubicada en Colombia, hacen una revisión de los modelos de calidad en Colombia para programas de pregrado, tanto de acreditación de alta calidad otorgado por el CNA (Consejo Nacional de Acreditación), como de certificación en normas técnicas de calidad ISO 9001:2015 y NTC GP 1000:2009, que otorga el ICONTEC (Instituto Colombiano de Normas Técnicas). En el artículo se tejen explicaciones teóricas y prácticas alrededor del tema y se encuentran puntos de convergencia entre ambos modelos. Es interesante la propuesta por cuanto se construye una matriz de congruencia que puede servir de modelo de gestión para orientar y controlar de manera novedosa y efectiva los procesos educativos,En la sección de artículos de reflexión se encuentra el escrito de Carlos Javier Martínez quien propone que el sector empresarial se enfrenta cada día más a un mundo complejo y cambiante; de ahí que sea relevante el estudio de las denominadas ciencias de la complejidad o teoría del caos para ser involucrados en los procesos de planificación y dirección de empresas. Se hace un interesante recorrido teórico y una disertación en torno al análisis constante del entorno y sus coyunturas que debe estar presente en las organizaciones para potencializar las oportunidades, lograr sus objetivos estratégicos y navegar en el difícil mundo empresarial global.En la sección vida universitaria, se presenta un interesante y pertinente artículo escrito por Edgar Mesa Manosalva, profesor de la Facultad de Educación de la Universidad de Nariño, ubicada en Colombia, quien propone "cosmovisiones y prácticas ancestrales de los Pastos en torno a la pachamama, minga, religiosidad, cuento pastuso y carnaval de negros y blancos, con el objetivo de redimensionar sus aportes epistemológicos y pedagógicos para cimentar y construir la paz regional". ; The edition of volume XIX No. 1 of the year 2018 of the Tendencias jounal includes a total of 10 articles: five of investigation, three of review, one of reflection and an additional article included in the traditional university life section.The section of the research articles begins with the masterly paper of PhD. Julio Silva Colmenares, Director of the Human Development Observatory of the Universidad Autónoma de Colombia, who seeks to verify that the much commented "deindustrialization" of the Colombian manufacturing sector does not exist or Is a half-truth. His hypothesis is developed based on theoretical and empirical arguments and lead us to correct conclusions about the fallacy of the equitable distribution of added value generated by the largest national companies in the country.In the second research article, Joel Cruz Díaz, Alexander Blandon López and Diego Cruz Rincón, explain the need to strengthen the business development of Quindío by combining different policies and business development programs, which can be implemented from a strengthened Comisión Regional de Competitividad. They propose that the synergy of different institutions is essential to strengthen the business sector.In the third article, David Camargo Mayorga, Octavio Cardona García and Ángel Roncancio García, professors of the Universidad Militar Nueva Granada located in Colombia, intend to determine the differences in the provision of telecommunications services and the factors that explain them, examining 69 countries for the period of the years 2010 to 2015. For this they begin their writing with theoretical support that accounts for the background on business isomorphism, concluding that, in spite of previous work, there are knowledge gaps regarding this topic. Then using the panel data model, the Hausman test, the Sargan-Hansen test, among others, conclude that telecommunications services between countries are not homogeneous.In the fourth article, Hugo Alonso Plazas and Jennyfer Alejandra Castellanos professors of the design department of the Universidad de Nariño, located in Colombia, analyze the development of the publishing industry in the Province of Pasto from 1837 to 1900, starting with the entrepreneurship of the time. They make a historical tour and mention some initiatives framing them in the political, economic and social context of Colombia in the period of study.In the fifth article, Mario Uribe Macías, a professor at the Universidad del Tolima, located in Colombia, presents the results of two projects related to the analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility, CSR, in two sectors of Ibagué: the industrial and the financial, obtained through the application of a questionnaire aimed at managers or heads of CSR and consisting of two major parts: the first, inquires about the strategic approach and the second, refers to the relationship of the company with its different stakeholders. It is concluded that CSR is stronger in the financial sector than in the industrial sector.In the section of review articles in the first of them, Omaira Calvo Giraldo, professor at the Universidad del Cauca, located in Colombia, reviews the existing literature on knowledge management, its different models and approaches, within the framework of the called "new economy" or "knowledge economy" and its application in business and regional areas, with the purpose of achieving and maintaining its development and competitiveness.The second review article, Professors Saúl Fernández, Diego Castillo and Luz Ángela Martínez, in their article Virtual Cluster: a new alternative to effective competitiveness in companies, emphasizes the importance of their conformation through networking, as a potential mechanism of the development of organizations; Its advantages and disadvantages are described and the virtual business cluster is proposed as an innovative alternative to establish business networks that result in greater benefits for its members.In the third review article, Brigitte Gonzalez and Carlos Arturo Ramírez, a student of the last semester of the department of business administration and professor of the same department, respectively, of the University of Nariño located in Colombia, make a review of the quality models in Colombia for undergraduate programs, both for high quality accreditation granted by the CNA (Consejo Nacional de Acreditación), and for certification in quality technical standards ISO 9001: 2015 and NTC GP 1000: 2009, granted by ICONTEC (Instituto Colombiano de Normas Técnicas). In the article theoretical and practical explanations are woven around the subject and convergence points are found between both models. The proposal is interesting because it builds a congruence matrix that can serve as a management model to orient and control educational processes in a new and effective way.In the section of articles of reflection is the writing of Carlos Javier Martínez who proposes that the business sector is faced every day more to a complex and changing world; hence, the study of the so-called complexity sciences or chaos theory to be involved in the planning and business management processes is relevant. There is an interesting theoretical journey and a dissertation around the constant analysis of the environment and its conjunctures that must be present in organizations to maximize opportunities, achieve their strategic objectives and navigate the difficult global business world.In the university life section, an interesting and pertinent article written by Edgar Mesa Manosalva, professor of the faculty of education of the Universidad de Nariño, located in Colombia, is presented, who proposes "worldviews and ancestral practices of the pastures around the pachamama , minga, religiosity, cuento pastuso and carnaval of negros y blancos, with the aim of resizing their epistemological and pedagogical contributions to cement and build regional peace". ; A edição do volume XIX No. 1 do ano de 2018 da revista Tendencias inclui um total de 10 artigos: cinco de investigação, três de revisão, um de reflexão e um artigo adicional incluído na seção tradicional de vida universitária.A seção dos artigos de pesquisa começa com o papel magistral do Dr. Julio Silva Colmenares, Diretor do Observatório de Desenvolvimento Humano da Universidade Autônoma da Colômbia, que procura verificar que a muito comentada "desindustrialização" do setor manufatureiro colombiano não existe ou É uma meia verdade. Sua hipótese é desenvolvida com base em argumentos teóricos e empíricos e nos leva a corrigir conclusões sobre a falácia da distribuição eqüitativa do valor agregado gerado pelas maiores empresas nacionais do país.No segundo artigo de pesquisa, Joel Cruz Díaz, Alexandre Blandon López e Diego Cruz Rincón, explicam a necessidade de fortalecer o desenvolvimento empresarial do Quindío, combinando diferentes políticas e programas de desenvolvimento de negócios, que podem ser implementados a partir de um fortalecimento da Comisión.Regional de competitiviad Eles propõem que a sinergia de diferentes instituições é essencial para fortalecer o setor empresarial.No terceiro artigo, David Camargo Mayorga, Octávio Cardona García e Ángel Roncancio García, professores da Universidad Militar de Nueva Granada localizada na Colômbia, pretendem determinar as diferenças na prestação de serviços de telecomunicações e os fatores que os explicam, examinando 69 países para o período dos anos de 2010 a 2015. Para isso iniciam a escrita com apoio teórico que explica o histórico de isomorfismo nos negócios, concluindo que, apesar dos trabalhos anteriores, existem lacunas de conhecimento sobre esse tema. Em seguida, usando o modelo de dados em painel, o teste de Hausman, o teste de Sargan-Hansen, entre outros, concluem que os serviços de telecomunicações entre os países não são homogéneos.No quarto artigo, Hugo Alonso Plazas e Jennyfer Alejandra Castellanos professores do departamento de design da Universidad de de Nariño, localizada na Colômbia, analisam o desenvolvimento da indústria editorial na província de Pasto de 1837 a 1900, começando com o empreendedorismo do setor. época Eles fazem um tour histórico e mencionam algumas iniciativas que os enquadram no contexto político, econômico e social da Colômbia no período de estudo.No quinto artigo, Mario Uribe Macías, professor da Universidad del Tolima, localizada na Colômbia, apresenta os resultados de dois projetos relacionados à análise da Responsabilidade Social Empresarial, RSE, em dois setores de Ibagué: o industrial e o financeiro, obtido através da aplicação de um questionário dirigido a gestores ou chefes de RSE e composto por duas partes principais: a primeira, indaga sobre a abordagem estratégica e a segunda, refere-se à relação da empresa com os diferentes stakeholders. Conclui-se que a RSE é mais forte no setor financeiro do que no setor industrial.Na seção de artigos de revisão no primeiro deles, Omaira Calvo Giraldo, professor da Universidad del Cauca, localizada na Colômbia, revisa a literatura existente sobre gestão do conhecimento, seus diferentes modelos e abordagens, no âmbito do denominada "nova economia" ou "economia do conhecimento" e sua aplicação nas áreas comercial e regional, com o objetivo de alcançar e manter seu desenvolvimento e competitividade.O segundo artigo de revisão, os professores Saúl Fernández, Diego Castillo e Luz Ángela Martínez, em seu artigo Virtual Cluster: uma nova alternativa à efetiva competitividade nas empresas, enfatiza a importância de sua conformação através do trabalho em rede, como um potencial mecanismo do desenvolvimento de organizações; Suas vantagens e desvantagens são descritas e o cluster virtual de negócios é proposto como uma alternativa inovadora para estabelecer redes de negócios que resultem em maiores benefícios para seus membros.No terceiro artigo de revisão, Brigitte Gonzalez e Carlos Arturo Ramírez, aluno do último semestre do departamento de administração de empresas e professor do mesmo departamento, respectivamente, da Universidad de de Nariño, localizados na Colômbia, fazem uma revisão dos modelos de qualidade na Colômbia. para cursos de graduação, tanto para credenciamento de alta qualidade outorgado pelo CNA (Consejo Nacional de Acreditación), quanto para certificação nas normas técnicas de qualidade ISO 9001: 2015 e NTC GP 1000: 2009, concedidas pelo ICONTEC (Instituto Colombiano de Normas Técnicas). No artigo, explicações teóricas e práticas são tecidas em torno do assunto e pontos de convergência são encontrados entre os dois modelos. A proposta é interessante porque constrói uma matriz de congruência que pode servir como modelo de gestão para orientar e controlar os processos educacionais de maneira nova e efetiva.Na seção de artigos de reflexão encontra-se a redação de Carlos Javier Martínez, que propõe que o setor empresarial enfrente cada vez mais um mundo complexo e cambiante; portanto, o estudo das chamadas ciências da complexidade ou teoria do caos a ser envolvido nos processos de planejamento e gestão de negócios é relevante. Há um interessante percurso teórico e uma dissertação em torno da constante análise do ambiente e suas conjunturas que devem estar presentes nas organizações para maximizar oportunidades, atingir seus objetivos estratégicos e navegar pelo difícil mundo dos negócios globais.Na seção de vida universitária, é apresentado um interessante e pertinente artigo escrito por Edgar Mesa Manosalva, professor da faculdade de educação da Universidad de Nariño, localizada na Colômbia, que propõe "visões de mundo e práticas ancestrais das pastos em torno do pachamama , minga, religiosidade, cuento pastuso e carnaval de negros e brancos, com o objetivo de redimensionar suas contribuições epistemológicas e pedagógicas para cimentar e construir a paz regional".

Timothy Mitchell on
Infra-Theory, the State Effect, and the Technopolitics of Oil










This is the first in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 







The unrest in the Arab
world put the region firmly in the spotlights of IR. Where many scholars focus
on the conflicts in relation to democratization as a local or regional dynamic,
political events there do not stand in isolation from broader international
relations or other—for instance economic—concerns. Among the scholars who has
insisted on such broader linkages and associations that co-constitute political
dynamics in the region, Timothy Mitchell stands out. The work of Mitchell has
largely focused on highly specific aspects of politics and development in Egypt
and the broader Middle East, such as the relations between the building of the
Aswan Dam and redistribution of expertise, and the way in which the differences
between coal and oil condition democratic politics. His consistently nuanced
and enticing analyses have gained him a wide readership, and Mitchell's
analyses powerfully resonate across qualitative politically oriented social
sciences.  In this Talk, Timothy Mitchell discusses, amongst others, the birth of 'the
economy' as a powerful modern political phenomenon, how we can understand the
state as an effect rather than an actor, and the importance of taking
technicalities seriously to understand the politics of oil.







Print version of this Talk (pdf)



What is, according to you,
the biggest challenge / principal debate in current globally oriented studies?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



I'm not myself interested in, or good at, big debates,
the kinds of debates that define and drive forward an academic field. The
reason for that is partly that once a topic has become a debate, it has tended
to have sort of hardened into a field, in which there are two or three
positions, and as a scholar you have to take one of those positions. In the
days when I was first trained in Political Science and studied International
Relations, that was so much my sense of the field and indeed of the whole
discipline of political science. This is part of one's initially training in
any field: it is laid out as a
serious debate. I found this something I just could not deal with; I did not
find it intellectually interesting which I think sort of stayed with me all the
way through to where I am now. So although big debates are important for a
certain defining and sustaining of academic fields and training new generations
of students, it is not the kind of way in which I myself have tended to work. I
have tended to work by moving away from what the big debates have been in a
particular moment. My academic interests always started when I found something
curious that interests me and that I try to begin to see in a different way.



However, I suppose with my most recent book Carbon Democracy (2011), in a sense there was a big debate going on, which was the debate about the resource
curse and oil democracy. That was an old debate going back to the 70's, but had
been reinvigorated by the Iraq war in 2003. But that to me is an example of the
problem with big debates, because the terms in which that debate was argued
back and forth—and is still argued—did not seem to make sense as a way to
understand the role of energy in 20th century democratic politics.
Was oil good for democracy or bad for democracy? The existing debate began with
those as two different things—as a dependent or independent variable—so you
would already determine things in advance that I would have wanted to open up.
In general I'm not a good person for figuring out what the big debates are.



But I think, moving from International Relations as a
field to 'globally oriented studies', to
use your phrase, one of the biggest
challenges—just on an academic level, leaving aside challenges that we face as
a global community—is to learn to develop ways of seeing even what seem like
the most global and most international issues, as things that are very local.
Part of the problem with fields such as 'global studies', the term
'globalization', and other terms of that sort, is that they tend to define
their objects of study in opposition to the local, in opposition to even
national-level modes of analysis. By consequence, they assume that the actors
or the forces that they're going to study must themselves be in some sense
global, because that is the premise of the field. So whether it is nation
states acting as world powers; whether it is capitalism understood as a global
system—they have to exist on this plane of the global, on some sort of
universal level, to be topics of IR and global studies. And yet, on close
inspection, most of the concerns or actors central to those modes of inquiry
tend to operate on quite local levels; they tend to be made up of very small
agents, very particular arrangements that somehow have managed to put
themselves together in ways that allow them take on this appearance and
sometimes this effectiveness of things that are global. I'm very interested in
taking things apart that are local, on a particular level, to understand what
it is that enables such small things, such local and particular agents, to act
in a way that creates the appearance of the global or the international world.



Now this relates back to the second part of your
question, about substantive concerns that we face as a global community. When I
was writing Carbon Democracy there
was all this attention on the problem of 'creating a more democratic Middle
East', as it was understood at the time of the Iraq war. It struck me that when
debating this problem—of oil and democracy, of energy and democracy—we saw it
as somehow specific to these countries and to the part of the world where many
countries were very large-scale energy producers. We were not thinking about
the fact that we are all in a sense caught up in this problem that I call
carbon democracy, and that there are issues—whether it is in terms of the
increasing difficulty of extracting energy from the earth, or the consequences
of having extracted the carbon and put it up in the atmosphere—that we, as
democracies, are very, very challenged by. Those issues—and I think in
particular the concerns around climate change—when you look at them from the
perspective of U.S. politics, and the inability of the U.S. even to take the
relatively minor steps that other industrialized democracies have taken: this
inaction suggests a larger problem of oil and democracy that needs explaining
and understanding and working on and organizing about. I also think there is a
whole range of contemporary issues related to energy production and consumption
that revolve around the building of more egalitarian and more socially just
worlds. And, again, those issues present themselves very powerfully as concerns
in American politics, but are experienced in other ways in other parts of the
world. I would not single out any one of them as more urgent or important than
another, and I do think we still have a long struggle ahead of us here. 





How did
you arrive at where you currently are in your approach to issues?



Well,
I had a strange training as a scholar because I kept shifting fields. I
actually began as a student of law and then moved into history while I was
still an undergraduate, but then became interested in political theory; decided
that I liked it better than political science. But by the time I arrived in
political science to study for a PhD, I had become interested in politics of
the Middle East. This was partly from just travelling there when I was a
student growing up in England, but I also suppose in some ways the events of
the seventies had really drawn attention to the region. So the first important
thing that shaped me was this constant shifting of fields and disciplines,
which was not to me a problem—it was rather that there was a kind of
intellectual curiosity that drove me from academic field to field. And so if
there was one thing that helped me arrive at where I am, it was this constant
moving outside of the boundaries of one discipline and trespassing on the next
one—trying to do it for long enough that they started to accept me as someone
who they could debate with. And I think all along that has been important to
the kind of scholarship I do; yet therefore I would say where I currently am in
my thinking about my field is difficult in itself to define. But I think it is
probably defined by the sense that there are many, many fields—and it is moving
across them and trying to do justice to the scholarship in them, but at the
same time trying to connect insights from one field with what one can do in
another field. I have always tried to draw things together in that sense, a
sense that one can call an interdisciplinary or post-disciplinary sensitivity.



I
think the other part of what has shaped me intellectually was that, in ways I
explained before, I was always drawn into the local and the particular and the
specific and I was never very good at thinking at that certain level of
large-scale grand theory. So having found myself in the field of Middle Eastern
politics in a PhD-program, and being told that it involves studying Arabic which
I was very glad to do, I then went off to spend summers in the Arab world, and
later over more extended periods of time for field research. But to me, Egypt
and other places I've worked—but principally Egypt—became not just a field
site, but a place where I have now been going for more than 30 years and where
I have developed very close ties and intellectual relationships, friendships,
that I think have constantly shaped and reshaped my thinking. And even when I
am reading about things that are not specifically related to Egypt—the work I
do on the history of economics, or the work I have done on oil politics that
are not directly connected with my research on Egypt—I am often thinking in
relation to places and people and communities there that have profoundly shaped
me as a scholar. 



So
traveling across different contexts I'd say I have not developed a kind of set
of theoretical lenses I take with me. Rather, I would say I have developed a way of seeing—I would not
necessarily call it 'meta', I see it as much more as sort of 'infra': much more
mundane and everyday. While I have this sort of intellectual history of moving
across disciplines and social sciences in an academic way, there is another
sort of moving across fields, another sensibility, and that sensibility
provides me with a sense of rootedness or grounding. And that is a more
traditional way of moving across fields, because whether when one is writing
about contemporary politics or more historically about politics, one is dealing
constantly with areas of technical concern of one sort or another, with
specialist knowledge. Engaging with that expert knowledge has always provided
both a political grounding in specific concerns and with a kind of concern with
local, real-world, struggles on the ground. So that might have been things like
the transformation of irrigation in nineteenth-century Egypt, or the remaking
of the system of law; or it might be the history of malaria epidemics in the
twentieth century, or the relationship between those epidemics and
transformations taking place in the crops that were grown; or, more
recently—and more obviously—of oil and the history of energy, and the way
different forms of energy are brought out of the ground. And I should mention
beside those areas of technical expertise already listed, economics as well: a
discipline I was never trained in, but that I realized I had to understand if I
was to make sense of contemporary Egyptian politics—just as much as I had to
understand agricultural hydraulics or something of the petroleum geology as a
form of technical expertise that is shaping the common world.



In
sum, what keeps me grounded is the idea that to really make sense of the
politics of any of those fields, one has got to do one's best to sort of enter
and explore the more technical level—with the closest attention that one can
muster to the technical and the material dimensions of what is involved—whether
it is in agricultural irrigation, building dams or combating disease. And
entering this level of issues does not only mean interviewing experts but
arriving at the level of understanding the disease, the parasite, the modes of
its movement, the hydraulics of the river, the properties of different kinds of
oil... So as you can see it is not really 'meta', it really is 'infra' in the
anthropological way of staying close to the ground, staying close to processes
and things and materials.





What
would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a
global way?



A
couple of things. I think one is precisely the thing I just mentioned in answer
to your last question: that is, the kind of interest in going inside technical
processes, learning about material objects, not being afraid of taking up an
investigation of something that is a body of knowledge totally outside one's
area of training and expertise. So, if I was advising someone or looking for a
student, I would not say there is a particular skill or expertise, but rather a
willingness to really get one's hands dirty with the messy technical details of
an area—and that can be an area of specialist knowledge such as economics, but
also technical and physical processes of, for instance, mineral extraction. I
think to me this is—for the kind of work I am interested in doing—enormously
important.



The
other thing that I would stress in the area of globally-oriented studies, is
that one could think of two ways of approaching a field of study. One is to
move around the world and gather together information, often with a notion of
improving things, such as development work, human rights work, international
security work. This entails gathering from one's own research and from other
experts in the field, with a certain notion of best practices and the state of
field, and of what works, and therefore what can then be moved from one place
to another as a form of expert knowledge. Some people really want that mobile
knowledge, which I suppose is often associated with the ability to generalize
from a particular case and to establish more universal principles about
whatever the topic is. And in this case one's own expertise becomes the
carrying or transmission of that expert knowledge. One saw a lot of that around
the whole issue of democratization that I mentioned before in the Middle East,
around the Iraq war when experts were brought in. They had done democracy
elsewhere in the world and then they turned up to do it in Iraq, and again
following the Arab Spring.



Against
that, to me, there is another mode of learning, which is not to learn about what is happening but to learn from. So to give the example, if there
is an uprising and a struggle for democracy going on in the streets of Cairo,
one could try and learn about that and then make it fit one's models and
classify it within a broader range of series of democratizations across the
world, or one could try and learn from it, and say 'how do we rethink what the
possibilities of democracy might be on the basis of what is happening?' To me
those are two distinct modes of work. They are not completely mutually
exclusive, but I think people are more disposed towards one or the other. I
have never been disposed, or good at, the first kind and do like the second, so
I would mention that as the second skill or attitude that is useful for doing
this sort of work.





In which discipline or field would you situate
yourself, or would we have to invent a discipline to match your work?



I
like disciplines, but I do not always feel that I entirely belong to any of
them. That said, I read with enormous profit the works of historians, political
theorist, anthropologists, of people in the field of science and technology
studies, geographers, political economists and scholars in environmental
studies. There are so many different disciplines that are well organized and
have their practitioners from which there is a lot to learn! But conversely, I
also think, in ways I have described already, there is something to be learnt
for some people from working in a much more deliberately post-disciplinary
fashion. The Middle East, South Asian and African Studies department to which I
have been attached here in Columbia for about five years, represents a
deliberate attempt by myself and my colleagues to produce some kind of
post-disciplinary space. Not in order to do away with the disciplines, but to
have another place for doing theoretical work, one that is able to take
advantage of not being bound by disciplinary fields, as even broad
disciplines—say history—tend to restrict you with a kind of positive liberty of
creating a place where you can do anything you want—as long as you do it in an
archive. I quite deliberately situate myself outside of any one discipline,
while continuing to learn from and trespass into the fields of many individual
disciplines. They range from all of those and others, because I am here among a
community of people who are also philologists; people interested in Arabic
literature and the history of Islamic science; and all kinds of fields, which I
also find fascinating. The first article I ever published was in the field of
Arabic grammar! So I have interests that fit in a very sort of
trans-disciplinary, post-disciplinary environment and I thrive on that.



Yet
doing this kind of post-disciplinary work is in a practical sense actually
absolutely impossible. If only for the simple fact that if it is already hardly
possible to keep up with 'the literature' if one is firmly situated within one
field, then one can never keep up with important developments in all the
disciplines one is interested in. There are some people that manage to do this
and do it justice. My information about contemporary debates in every
imaginable field is so limited; I do not manage to do justice to any field. In
the particular piece of research I might be engaged in, I try to get quickly up
to pace on what's going on, and I often come back again and again to similar
areas of research. I am currently interested in questions around the early
history of international development in the 1940's and 1950's, and that is
something I have worked on before, but I have come back to it and I found that
the World Bank archives are now open and there is a whole new set of
literatures. I had not been keeping up with all of that work. It is hard and
that is why I am very bad at answering emails and doing many of the other
everyday things that one is ought to do; because it always seems to me, in the
evening at the computer when one ought to be catching up with emails, there is
something you have come across in an article or footnotes and before you know
it you are miles away and it has got nothing to do with what you were working
on at the moment, but it really connects with a set of issues you have been
interested in and has taken you off into contemporary work going on in law or
the history of architecture… The internet has made that possible in a
completely new way and some of these post-disciplinary research interests are
actually a reflection of where we are with the internet and with the
accessibility of scholarship in any field only just a few clicks away. Which on
the one hand is fascinating, but mostly it is just a complete curse. It is the
enemy of writing dissertations and finishing books and articles and everything
else!





What role does expertise, which is kind of a central
term in underpinning much of the diverse work or topics you do, play in the
historical unfolding of modern government?



That
is a big question, so let me suggest only a couple of thoughts here. One is
that modern government has unfolded—especially if one thinks of government itself
as a wider process than just a state—through the development of new forms of
expertise, which among other things define problems and issues upon which
government can operate. This can concern many things, whether it is problems of
public health in the 19th or 20th century; or problems of
economic development in the 20th century; or problems of energy,
climate change and the environment today. Again and again government itself
operates—as Foucault has taught us—simultaneously as fields of knowledge and fields
of power. And the objects brought into being in this way—defined in important
ways through the development of expert knowledge—become in themselves modes
through which political power operates. Thanks to Foucault and many others,
that is a way of thinking or field of research that has been widely developed,
even though there are vast amounts of work still to do.



But
I think there is another relationship between modes of government and
expertise, and this goes back to things I have been thinking about ever since I
wrote an article about the theory of the state (The Limits of the State, pdf here) that was published in American
Political Science Review a long time ago (1991). The point I made then, is that
it is interesting to observe how one of the central aspects of modern modes of
power is the way that the distinction between what is the state and what is not
the state; between what is public and what is private, is constantly elaborated
and redefined. So politics itself is happening not so much by some agency
called 'state' or 'government' imposing its will on some other preformed
object—the social, the population, the people—but rather that it concerns a
series of techniques that create what I have called the effect of a state: the very distinction between what appears as a
sort of structure or apparatus of power, and the objects on which that power
works.



More
recently one of the ways I have thought about this, is in terms of the history
of the idea of the economy. Most people think of 'the economy' either as
something that has always existed (and people may or may not have realized its
existence) or as something that came into being with the rise of political
economy and commercial society in the European 18th and 19th
century. One of the things I discovered when I was doing research on the
history of development, is that no economist talked routinely about an object
called 'the economy' before the 1940's! I think that is a good example of the
history of a mode of expertise that exists not within the operations of an
apparatus of government but precisely outside of government.



If
you look in detail at how the term 'the economy' was first regularly used, you
find that it was in the context of governing the U.S. in the 1940's immediately
after the Second World War. In the aftermath of the war there was enormous
political pressure for quite a radical restructuring of American society: there
were waves of strikes, demands for worker control of industries, or at least a
share of management. And of course in Europe, similar demands led to new forms
of economy altogether, in the building of postwar Germany and in the forms of
democratic socialism that were experimented with in various parts of Western
Europe. As we know, the U.S. did not follow that path. And I think part of the
way in which it was steered away from that path, was by constructing the
economy as the central object of government, coupled with precisely this
American cultural fear of things where government did not belong. So this was
radically opposed to how the Europeans related government to economy: European
governments had become involved in all kinds of ways, deciding how the relation
between management and labor should operate in thinking about prices and wages;
instituting forms of national health insurance and health care; and the whole
state management of health care itself... Now this was threatening to emerge in
the U.S., and was emerging in many ways in the wartime with state control of
prices and production. In order to prevent the U.S. from following the European
path after the war, this object outside of
government with its own experts was
created: the economy. And the economists were precisely people who are not in government, but who knew the laws and
regularities of economic life and could explain them to people. It is
interesting to think about expertise both as something that develops within the
state, but also as something that happens as a creation of objects that
precisely represent what is not the
state, or the sphere of government.





Your most recent book Carbon Democracy (2011) focuses on the political structures
afforded, or engendered, by modes of extraction of minerals and investigates
how oil was constitutes a dominant source of energy on which we depend.
Can you give an example of how that works?



Let
me take an example from the book even though I might have to give it in very a
simplified form in order to make it work. I was interested in what appeared to
be the way in which the rise of coal—the dominant source of energy in the 19th
century and in the emergence of modern industrialized states—seemed to be very
strongly associated with the emergence of mass democracy, whereas the rise of
oil in the 20th century seemed to have if anything the opposite set
of consequences for states that were highly dependent on the production of oil.
I wanted to examine these relations between forms of energy and democratic
politics in a way that was not simply some kind of technical- or energy
determinism, because it is very easy to point to many cases that simply do not
fit that pattern—and, besides, it simply would not be very interesting to begin
with. But it did seem to me, that at a particular moment in the history of the
emergence of industrialized countries—particularly in the late 19th
century—it became possible for the first time in history and really only for a
brief period, to take advantage of certain kinds of vulnerabilities and
possibilities offered by the dependence on coal to organize a new kind of
political agency and forms of mass politics, which successfully struggled for
much more representative and egalitarian forms of democracy, roughly between
the 1880's and the mid 20th century. In general terms, that story is
known; but it had been told without thinking in particular about the energy
itself. The energy was just present in these stories as that which made
possible industrialization; industrialization made possible urbanization;
therefore you had lots of workers and their consciousness must somehow have
changed and made them democratic or something.



That
story did not make sense to me, and that prompted me to research in detail, and
drawing on the work of others who had looked even more in detail at, the
history of struggles for a whole set of democratic rights. The accounts of
people at the time were clear: what was distinctive was this peculiar ability
to shut down an economy because of a specific vulnerability to the supply of
energy. Very briefly, when I switched to telling the story in the middle of the
20th with oil, it is different: partly just because oil was a
supplementary source of energy—countries and people now had a choice between
different energy sources—but also because oil did not create the same points of
vulnerability. There are fewer workers involved, it is a liquid, so it can be
routed along different channels more easily; there is a whole set of technical
properties of oil and its production that are different. That does not mean to
say that the energy is determining the outcome of history or of political
struggles, and I am careful to introduce examples that do not work easily one
way or the other in the history of oil industry in Baku,
which is much more similar to the history of coal or the oil industry in
California for that matter. But you can pay attention to the technical
dimensions in a certain way, and the to the sheer possibilities that arise with
this enormous concentration of sources of energy—which reflects both an
exponential increase in the amount of energy but also an unprecedented
concentration of the sites at which energy is available and through which it
flows—that you can tell a new story about democratic politics and about that
moment in the history of industrialized countries, but also the subsequent
history in oil-producing countries in a different way. That would be an example
of how attention for technical expertise translates into a different
understanding of the politics of oil.





This leads to my next question, which is how do you
speak about materials or technologies without falling into the trap of either
radical social reductionism or a kind of Marxist technological determinism? Do
you get these accusations sometimes?



Yes,
I think so, but more so from people who have not read my work and who just hear
some talks about it or some secondary accounts. To me, so much of the
literature that already existed on these questions around oil and democracy, or
even earlier research on coal, industrialization and democracy, suffered from a
kind of technical determinism because they actually did not go into the
technical. They said: 'look, you've got all this oil' or 'look, you had all that
coal and steam power' and out of that, in a very determinist fashion, emerged
social movements or emerged political repression. This was determinist because
such accounts had actually jumped over the technical side much too fast:
talking about oil in the case of the resource curse literature, it was only
interested in the oil once it had already
become money. And once it was money, then it of course corrupts, or you buy
people off, or you do not have to seek their votes. The whole question of how
oil becomes money and how you put
together that technical system that turns oil into forms of political power or
turns coal into forms of political power, does not get opened up. And that to
me makes those arguments—even though there is not much of the technical in
them—technically very determinist. Because as soon as you start opening up the
technical side of it, you realize there are so many ways things can go and so
many different ways things can get built. Energy networks can be built in
different ways and there can be different mixes of energy. Of course most of
the differences are technical differences, but they are also human differences.
It is precisely by being very attentive to the technical aspects of
politics—like energy or anything else, it could be in agriculture, it could be
in disease, it could be in any area of collective socio-technical life—that one
finds the only way to get away from a certain kind of technical determinism
that otherwise sort of rules us. In the economics of growth, for instance,
there is this great externality of technological change that drives every sort
of grand historical explanation. Technology is just something that is kept
external to the explanatory model and accounts for everything else that the
model cannot explain. That ends up being a terrible kind of technical
determinism.



The
other half of the question is how this might differ from Marxist approaches to
some of these problems. I like to think that if Marx was studying oil, his
approach would be very little different. Because if you read Marx himself,
there is an extraordinary level of interest in the technical; that is, whether
in the technical aspects of political economy as a field of knowledge in the 19th
century, or in the factory as a technical space. So, conventional political
economy to him was not just an ideological mask that had to be torn away so
that you could reveal the true workings of capitalism. Political economy has
produced a set of concepts—notions of value, notions of exchange, notions of
labor—that actually formed part of the technical workings of capitalism. The
factory was organized at a technical level that had very specific consequences.
The trouble with a significant part of Marx's theories is that he stopped doing
that kind of technical work and Marxism froze itself with a set of categories
that may or may not have been relevant to a moment of 19th century
capitalism. There is still a lot of interesting Marxist theory going on, and
some of the contemporary Italian Marxist theory I find really interesting and
profitable to read, for example. Some of the work in Marxist geography
continues to be very productive. But at the same time there are aspects of my
work that are different from that—such as my drawing on Foucault in
understanding expertise and modes of power.





How come so many of the social sciences seem to stick
so rigidly to the human or social side of the Cartesian divide? It seems to be
constitutive of social science disciplines but on the other hand also radically
reduces the scope of what it can actually 'see' and talk about. 



I
think you are right and it has never made much sense to me. I suppose I have
approached it in two kinds of ways in my work. First, this kind of dualism was
much more clearly an object of concern in some of the early work I published on
the colonial era, including my first
book, Colonising Egypt (1988), where
I was trying to understand the process by which Europeans had, as it were, come
to be Cartesians; had come to see the world as very neatly defined it into mind
on the one hand and matter or on the other—or, as they tended to think of it,
representations on the one hand and reality on the other. And I actually looked
in some detail, at the technical level, at this—beginning with world
exhibitions, but moving on to department stores and school systems and modern
legal orders—to understand the processes by which our incredibly complicated
world was engineered so as to produce the effect of this world divided into the
two—of mind or representation or culture on the one hand, and reality, nature,
material on the other.



Second,
what were the effects, what were the repetitive practices, that made that kind
of simple dualism seem so self-evident and taken for granted? All that early
work still informs my current work, although I do not necessarily explore this
as directly as I did. One of the things I try to do is avoid all the vocabulary
that draws you into that kind of dualism. So, nowhere when I write, do I use a
term like 'culture', because you are just heading straight down that Cartesian
road as soon as you assume that there is some hermetic world of shared meanings—as opposed to what? As opposed to
machines that do not involve instructions and all kinds of other things that we
would think of as meaningful? So I just work more by avoiding some of the
dualistic language; the other kind would be the entire set of debates—in almost
every discipline of the social sciences—around the question of 'structure
versus agency' which just doesn't seems to me particularly productive. And I
have been very lucky, recently, in coming across work in the fields of science
and technology studies, because it is a field of people studying machines,
studying laboratories and studying people, a field that took nature itself as
something to be opened-up and investigated. In taking apart these things, they
realized that those kinds of dualisms made absolutely no sense. And they have
done away with them in their modes of explanation quite a long time ago. So
there was already a lot in my own work before I encountered Science and
Technology Studies (STS) that was working in that direction; but the STS people
have been at it for a long time and figured out a lot of things that I had only
just discovered.





Can you explain why it seems that perhaps implicitly
decolonization, or the postcolonial moment—which is understood within political
science and in development literature as a radical moment of rupture in which a
complete transfer of responsibility has taken place, instituted in sovereignty—is
an important theme in your work?



I
have actually been coming back to this in recent work, because I am currently
looking again at that moment of decolonization in Egypt. The period after World
War II, around the 1952 revolution and the debacle around the building and the financing of the Aswan Dam,
constitutes a wonderful way to explore questions on how much change
decolonization really engendered and to see how remarkably short-lived that
sort of optimism about decolonization, meaning a transfer of responsibility and
sovereignty, actually was. Of course decolonization did transfer responsibility
and sovereignty in all kinds of ways, but then that was exactly the problem for
the former colonial regimes: because, from their perspective, then, how were
all the people who had profited before from things like colonialism to continue
to make profits? The plan to build the High Dam at Aswan—although there has
always been Egyptians interested in it—initially got going because of some
German engineering firms… For them, there was no opportunity in doing any kind
of this large-scale work in Europe at
the time because of the dire economic situation there. But they knew that Egypt
had rapidly growing revenues from the Suez Canal and so they got together with
the British and the French, and said: let's put forward this scheme for a dam
so that we can recycle those revenues—particularly the income from the Suez
Canal, which was about to revert to Egyptian ownership—back into the pockets of
the engineering firms, or of the banks that will make the loans and charge the
fees. And that is where the scheme came from. Then the World Bank got involved,
because it too had found it had got nothing to do in Europe in the way of
development and reconstruction, so it invented this new field of development.
And it became a conduit to get the Wall Street banks involved as well. And the
whole thing became politicized and led to a rupture, which provided then the
excuse for another group, the militarists, the MI6 people, to invade and try to
overthrow Nasser. So just in the space of barely four years from that moment of
decolonization, Egypt had been reinvaded by the French, the British, working
with the Israelis, and had to deal with the consequences and the costs of
destroyed cities and military spending. That is an example of how quickly
things went wrong; but also of how part of their going wrong was in this
desperate attempt by a series of
European banks and engineering firms trying to recover the opportunities for a
certain profit-making and business that they had enjoyed in the colonial period
and now they suddenly were being deprived of. 






Last question. Has your work helped you make sense of
what is currently going on in Egypt and would you shine your enlightened light
on that a bit? Not on the whole general situation but perhaps on parts which
are overlooked or which you find particularly relevant. 



May
be in a couple of aspects. One of them is this kind of very uneasy and
disjunctive assemblage relationship between the West and forms of political Islam.
It sometimes seemed shocking and disturbing and destabilizing that the
political process in Egypt led to the rise and consolidation of power of the
Muslim Brotherhood. But of course the U.S. and other Western powers have had a
very long relationship going back at least to the 1950's—if not before—with
exactly these kinds of political forces or people who were locally in alliance
with them, in places like Saudi Arabia. I have a chapter in Carbon Democracy that explores that
relationship and its disjunctions. And I think it is important to get away from
the notion that is just a sort of electoral politics and uneasy alliances, but
it is actually the outcome of a longer problem. Both domestically within the
politics in the Arab states, of how to found a form of legitimacy that does not
seem to be based on close ideological ties with the West, but at the same time
operates in such in a way, that in practical terms, that kind of alliance can
work. So that would be one aspect of it, to have a slightly longer-term
perspective on those kinds of relationships and how disjunctively they
function.



The
other thing, drawing it a little more directly on some of the work on democracy
in Carbon Democracy, is that so much of the scholarship on democracy is about
equipping people with the right mental tools to be democrats; the right levels
of trust or interpersonal relations or whatever. There is a very different view
in my book, that the opportunities for effective democratic politics require
very different sets of skills and kinds of actions—actions that are much more
as it were obstructionist, and forms of sabotage, quite literally, in the usage
of the term as it comes into being in the early 20th century to
describe the role of strikes and stoppages. These are, I attempt to show, the
effective tools to leverage demands for representation in more egalitarian
democratic politics. I have been very interested in the case of Egypt, in the
particular places and points of vulnerability, that gave rise to the
possibility of sabotage. For instance, one of the less noted aspects of the
Egyptian revolution in general, was the very important role played by the labor
movement; this was not just a Twitter or Facebook revolution, but that was
important as well. Although the labor movement was very heavily concentrated in
industries—in the textile industry—the first group of workers who actually
successfully formed an independent union were the property tax collectors. And
there is a reason for that: there was a certain kind of fiscal crisis of the
state—which had to do with declining oil revenues and other things—and there
was the attempt to completely revise the tax system and to revise it not around
income tax—because there were too few people making a significant income to
raise tax revenues—but around property taxes.
And that was a point of vulnerability and contestation that produced not just
some of the first large-scale strikes but strikes that were effective enough
that the government was forced to recognize a newly independent labor movement.
This case is an instance of how the kind of work I did in the book might be
useful for thinking about how the revolutionary situation emerged in
Egypt. 



Timothy Mitchell is a political theorist and historian. His areas of research
include the place of colonialism in the making of modernity, the material and
technical politics of the Middle East, and the role of economics and other
forms of expert knowledge in the government of collective life. Much of his
current work is concerned with ways of thinking about politics that allow
material and technical things more weight than they are given in conventional
political theory.  Educated at Queens' College, Cambridge, where he
received a first-class honours degree in History, Mitchell completed his Ph.D.
in Politics and Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University in 1984. He joined
Columbia University in 2008 after teaching for twenty-five years at New York
University, where he served as Director of the Center for Near Eastern
Studies. At Columbia he teaches courses on the history and politics of the
Middle East, colonialism, and the politics of technical things.





Related links:





Faculty Profile at Colombia University
Read
Mitchell's Rethinking Economy (Geoforum
2008) here (pdf)
Read
Mitchell's The Limits of the State:
Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics (The American Political Science
Review 1991) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's McJihad: Islam and the U.S.
Global Order (Social Text 2002) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's The Stage of Modernity (Chapter
from book 'Questions of Modernity', 2000) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's The World as Exhibition
(Chapter from book 'Colonising Egypt' 1991) here (pdf) 



Print version of this Talk (pdf)



  

Sri Lanka's population is still largely rural, nearly 85 percent lives outside of cities. There will probably be rural-to-urban migration in the future, which represents a potential opportunity to m-money providers. People working in cities often wish to repatriate their savings to their rural families conveniently and at a low cost. Income is fairly evenly spread across Sri Lanka s provinces, with the exception of the Western Province where Colombo, the largest city, is situated. Its GDP per capita places Sri Lanka near the average of comparable Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia is clearly an outlier with a considerably higher GDP per capita, but Sri Lanka s GDP is higher than that of the Philippines, where m-money has taken off dramatically. Poverty is less of a problem in Sri Lanka relative to countries like Bangladesh or Cambodia, where GDP per capita is much lower. The key point is that Sri Lanka is at a different stage in its economic development and is unlikely to have the same socioeconomic conditions that made m-money in Kenya accelerate so rapidly.