Die Grundlagen für Japans gegenwärtige Politik, Gesetzgebungsorgane und Rege-lungen betreffend das nationale Kulturerbe sind tief in den beiden Epochen Edo (1600-1868) und Meiji (1868-1912) verwurzelt. Diese dreihundert Jahre sind beispiel-haft für das Paradigma der "Bewahrung und Erneuerung in der Umgestaltung" und stellen eine unermesslich wichtige Grundlage für die Kultur des heutigen Japan dar.Dieser Artikel, der den ersten Teil einer längeren Forschungsarbeit darstellt, er-forscht und versucht den späten historischen Hintergrund der Edo- und Meiji-Epochen sowie Vorläufer der heutigen japanischen Gesetzgebung über Kulturgüter (bunkazai) zu erklären. Teil zwei, der die gegenwärtige Gesetzeslage sowie die Funktion von nationalen Museen und anderer kultureller Einrichtungen von 1950 bis heute darstellt und kommentiert, wird in der nächsten Ausgaben dieser Zeitschrift erscheinen.Die Edo-Epoche war durch die Festigung und die Selbsterhaltung des feudalistischen gesellschaftspolitischen Systems sowie durch die Bildung der chônin gekenn-zeichnet, des städtischen Bürgertums, einer kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Kraft von höchster Wichtigkeit in der nachfolgenden Umgestaltung der Gesellschaft. Vollkommen versteinert und auf sich selbst konzentriert, brach der Edo-Feudalismus in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts schnell in sich zusammen. 1868 folgte ihm die Meiji-Ära nach, wörtlich die "Aufgeklärte Herrschaft", die auf volle Wiederherstellung der kaiserlichen Macht und auf Modernisierung abzielte (kindaika). "Japans Selbstisolierung" (sakoku), sanktioniert durch die Gesetze der Shôgun, folgte "Japans Öffnung" (kaikoku) gegen-über dem Rest der Welt und sein Eintritt in weltweiten politischen und wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb.Die Meiji-Reformen wurden über einen Zeitraum von über 100 Jahren (etwa 1790-1890) sowohl durch internen ideologischen Druck als auch durch politischen Druck von außerhalb vorbereitet. Ein merklicher Trend für ideologischen und politischen Wandel hatte im späten 18. Jahrhundert begonnen, kulminierte in der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, während der letzten Jahre des "Endes der Shogunats" (bakumatsu), und kam später, in den reifen Jahren der Meiji-Ära, zur Ruhe. Während dieser Zeit-spanne stellten die Entwicklung der politischen Wahrnehmung von Kunstproduktion, die Änderungen in der Kunstideologie und die fortschrittliche Ausarbeitung einer um-fassenden Sichtweise von kulturellem Erbe als nationales Erbe entscheidende Wende-punkte in der Entwicklung der Kulturgeschichte des modernen Japan dar. Die Meiji-Ära brachte beeindruckende, vielfältige Erneuerungen mit sich, die eine Modernisierung der politischen und verwaltungsrechtlichen Struktur des Landes bezweckten und aus Japan einen aktiven Protagonisten in der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen machten sollten. Die Meiji-Herrschaft war eine plötzliche und unwiderrufliche politische Kehrtwende, die dramatischen und weiten Konsequenzen für das kulturelle Erbe Raum gaben. In den frühen Jahren der Meiji-Herrschaft, als die neue Staatsideologie Shintô gegründet wurde, wurden ganze Teile der japanischen Gesellschaft – namentlich die Samurai-Kaste und der buddhistische Klerus – entweder vollkommen entlegitimiert oder radikal redimensioniert, während die Klasse der Künstler und Hand-werker, die ihnen über Jahrhunderte gedient hatte, in Armut, gesellschaftlicher Zurück-weisung und Bedeutungslosigkeit versank. In derselben Zeit mussten die umfangreichen Kunstsammlungen, die über die Jahrhunderte von vielen daimyô- und auch samurai-Traditionen aufgebaut worden waren, ideologische Vorurteile und Zerfall erleiden, während viele buddhistische Klöster, Denkmäler und Tempel, Bilder, Objekte und Relikte aufgrund des Bildersturms und der Fremdenfeindlichkeit der haibutsu-kishaku-Bewegung zerstört wurden. Erst viel später, im Jahre 1897, wurde das erste nationale Fürsorgegesetz unter dem Titel "Gesetz zum Schutz von alten Tempeln und Schreinen" (Koshaji hozon-hô) erlassen.Dennoch hing die Schärfung einer umfassenden Sichtweise von Japans kulturellem Erbe wie überall weithin von der Entwicklung einer breiten und beständigen Kenntnis des Staatsgebietes und seiner Kunst und Kultur ab; außerdem war sie von Methoden und Klassifikationssystemen abhängig, mit denen diese Kenntnisse dokumentiert, beschrieben, wiedergegeben und übermittelt werden konnten. Die erste Erhebung, die eine nationale Sichtweise von kulturellem Erbe ausdrückte, wurde 1795-96 durchgeführt. Konzipiert und angeordnet von den Mächten des Shogunats, sollte diese Erhebung Informationen und Dokumentationen über gewisse Kategorien von Objekten zusammentragen, die kulturelle und ideologische Symbole für die mächtigen Schichten der japanischen Gesellschaft darstellten.Während der Meiji-Herrschaft wurden verschiedene ausführliche Erhebungen in zu-nehmend größeren Teilen des japanischen Staatsgebiets und über zunehmend weitere Kategorien und Arten von Objekten durchgeführt. Die ideologische Fracht und die Ziele dieser Erhebungen – die 1872 unter der Führung und Verantwortung der Museumsabteilung (Hakubutsu Kyoku) des Bildungsministeriums (Monbushô) begannen und 1897 endeten – variierte je nach politischen Bedürfnissen zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten und je nach Prioritäten, die den Staatsinteressen geschuldet waren.Die politischen Strategien der Meiji-Zeit waren in Konzeption und Aktion an sich pragmatisch, wie es in den Slogans "ermutige die Industrie, fördere die Produktion" (shokusan kôgyô) und "das Alte schätzen, vom Neuen profitieren" (kôko rikon) zum Ausdruck kommt. Im Gebiet der Kultur verfolgten die Meiji-Herrscher Staatsherrschaft über religiöse Traditionen und eine deutliche Orientierung in Richtung auf utilitaristische Sichtweisen und Errungenschaften. Über buddhistische Tempel und ihre Kunstobjekte wurde eine starke Staatskontrolle aufgebaut, um ihre Bedeutung und Nutzen als Kulturwaren anstelle von religiösen Gegenständen zu betonen. Außerdem wurde alte japanische Kunst als nützlich angesehen, weil sie Inspirationsquellen für die zeitgenössische Kunstproduktion lieferte: Auf diese Weise konnte Japan teure Stücke ins Aus-land verkaufen und so Anerkennung in der Völkergemeinschaft ernten. In den 1880ern unternahmen Meiji-Herrscher verschiedene Initiativen und führten eine Kulturpolitik ein, welche die Kultur in die Einflusssphäre der Ideologie des kaiserlichen Systems (tennôsei ideorogii) brachte.Wichtige Einflüsse, Innovationen und Entdeckungen kamen von "angeworbenen Ausländern" (oyatoi gaikokujin) der westlichen Welt, aus Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, die in Japan als Lehrer und professionelle Berater auf den verschiedensten Gebieten von Kunst und Wissenschaft arbeiteten. Diese trugen zum Er-wecken und Ausweiten der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung in Bezug auf die Motivation der Erhebungen, der Bewahrung und des Schutzes von kulturellem Erbe in seinen verschiedenen Aspekten bei. Darüber hinaus hielten auf diesem Wege neue Kunsttechniken aus dem Westen Einzug sowie neue Methoden, archäologische Funde und Antiquitäten zu erforschen und zu interpretieren.Unter den Ideen, Begriffen, Konzeptionswerkzeugen und Klassifikationssystemen, die in der Atmosphäre der großen Kulturbürokratie der Meiji-Epoche in Gebrauch kamen, waren einige von feudalistischen Traditionen übernommen, und einige wurden in Japans Kultursystem aus den westlichen Kunstkategorien der Renaissance eingepflanzt. Zum Beispiel wurde der Schlüsselbegriff "Schatz" (hômotsu), der von den Meiji-Reformern aus dem Feudalismus übernommen worden war, zu kokuhô oder "nationaler Schatz" verändert. Dieses Konzept, das auch im heutigen Japan noch prä-sent ist, ist ein sehr wichtiges Mittel, um den Status, den Rang und die hochsymbolische Bedeutung von national anerkannten Meisterwerken zu definieren, die zur Darstellung von außergewöhnlichen ästhetischen und künstlerischen Werten bestimmt sind. Auf der anderen Seite existierten Begriffe und Konzepte entsprechend den westlichen Kategorien wie "die schönen Künste", "Malerei", "Bildhauerei" und "Architektur" in Japans Kunsttradition nicht. Sie mussten in der frühen Meiji-Epoche neu erfunden werden, indem die ursprünglichen westlichen Begriffe exakt übersetzt wurden. Auf diese Weise wurden die Wortschöpfungen bijutsu, kaiga, chôkoku und kenchiku entwickelt und seitdem als Klassifikationsmittel angewandt.Die Neubewertung der Edo-Stadtkultur und der Ukiyoe-Kunst, die in der Mitte der Meiji-Ära begann, und die Migei-Undō-Bewegung für das Volkshandwerk Mitte der 1920er Jahre erweiterten das Bewusstsein von der Komplexität und Reichhaltigkeit von populärer Kunst und Handwerkstraditionen.Gegen Ende der Meiji-Epoche war die ideologische Hauptströmung der Kulturerbe-Politik und der Staatsintervention im speziellen Gebiet von Kulturgütern klar festgelegt. Die Gesetze, die während der Taishô- (1912-1926) und Shôwa- (1926-1989) Epochen eingeführt wurden, veranschaulichen die Verpflichtung des Staates, fortschreitend seine Verantwortung für den Schutz von Natur, Umwelt und Architektur auszuweiten und das Bestreben, den Schutz für sowohl "nationale Schätze" (kokuhô) als auch "wichtige Kunstobjekte" (jûyô bijutsuhin) zu verbessern. Die Gesetze und Verordnungen, die zwischen 1919 und 1949 erlassen wurden – obwohl sie alle 1950 aufgehoben wurden – geben uns eine Gesamtidee von der erweiterten Staatsverpflichtung zum Schutz von Kulturgütern und nationalem Erbe zwischen den zwei Weltkriegen.Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg wurden zwei neue Abteilungen im Bildungsministerium eingerichtet: Die Abteilung für die Förderung der Künste (1945), deren Aufgabe darin bestand, nationale Kultur wiederzubeleben und aktiv zeitgenössische Kunst und Kultur zu fördern, und die Abteilung für den Schutz von Kulturgütern (1949). Das neue Gesetz zum Schutz von Kulturgütern (Bunkazai hogo-hô), das 1950 verkündet wurde und auch heute noch in Kraft ist, hob alle früheren Gesetze auf und führte in die Liste der geschützten Objekte zwei neue Kategorien ein: die "immateriellen Kulturgüter" (mukei bunkazai) und die "verschütteten Kulturgüter" (maizô bunkazai).(deutsche Übersetzung durch die Redaktion) ; Introductory Note by Stacey SteelePART ONEI. IntroductionII. The Political Perception of Culture and the Arts from the Late 18th to the Mid-19th Century, from the Bakumatsu to Meiji RestorationThe Abolition of Feudalism and Meiji Reforms: Consequences for Cultural HeritageIII. The Birth and Evolution of the New Ideology of Culture in Meiji Strategies of Political Pragmatism1. The First Period of Internationalization of Japan: the Contribution of the Iwakura Diplomatic Mission of 1871-73 to the Views of Art and Artistic Culture2. Aims and Results of the Surveys of Japan's Cultural Heritage Guided and Sponsored by the State in the 1870s and 1880s3. The Re-evaluation of the Feudal Past and the Birth of the "Edo period", a New Historical and Cultural Entity, at the End of the 1880sIV. The Western Influence on the Art Productions, the Art History, and the Scientific Culture of the Meiji Period1. The Contribution of "Hired Foreigners" to Modernisation and the Introduction of Western Art Techniques2. The Birth of Scientific Archaeology: Edward Sylvester Morse and William Gowland3. The Historical and Aesthetic Re-evaluation of Japanese Art Traditions: Ernest Francisco Fenollosa and Okakura TenshinV. The First Half of the 20th Century1. The Mingei Undô Movement for the Folk Crafts2. Summary of the Legislation Relating to Cultural Properties and National Heritage Between the two World Wars and after World War II until 1950PART TWO**[VI. The Second Half of the 20th Century and the Beginning of the 21st: Contemporary Japanese Policies on the Protection of Cultural Properties, 1950-2004VII. Contemporary Japan's Policies Promoting Cooperation and International Exchange in the Field of Cultural Properties]** Part Two will be published separately in the next issue of the Journal.
Le rôle clé que peut jouer l'orientation professionnelle dans la réalisation de quatre objectifs de politique publique – apprentissage tout au long de la vie, insertion sociale, efficience du marché du travail et développement économique – est de plus en plus largement reconnu. L'orientation aide les individus non seulement à développer leur assurance et leur autonomie mais aussi à connaître les possibilités qui leur sont offertes d'étudier, de se former, de travailler et de participer à des activités récréatives et sociales. Elle promeut l'employabilité et l'adaptabilité en aidant les individus à prendre des décisions concernant leur insertion et leur progression professionnelles. De plus, elle améliore l'efficacité et l'efficience de l'offre d'éducation et de formation et des instruments du marché du travail, en assurant un meilleur équilibre entre besoins des individus et besoins du marché du travail et en réduisant les taux d'abandon des programmes d'études et de formation. Ces objectifs politiques sont fondamentaux pour réaliser l'ambition du Conseil européen de Lisbonne (2000) de faire de l'Europe l'économie et la société de la connaissance les plus compétitives du monde d'ici à 2010. Dans le projet de rapport intermédiaire sur la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie de Lisbonne Éducation et formation 2010. L'urgence des réformes pour réussir la stratégie de Lisbonne (2003), l'orientation professionnelle est retenue comme l'une des quatre actions essentielles pour créer des environnements d'apprentissage ouverts, attrayants et accessibles. Ce document préconise de renforcer le rôle, la qualité et la coordination des services d'orientation professionnelle pour soutenir l'apprentissage à tout âge et dans des contextes diversifiés, afin de permettre aux citoyens de gérer de manière autonome leur apprentissage et leur trajectoire professionnelle. L'une des actions prioritaires énoncées à cet égard est d'élaborer des références et des principes européens communs pour soutenir les politiques nationales d'orientation professionnelle. Les rapports intermédiaires des groupes de travail (2003) mis en place par la Commission pour assurer le suivi des objectifs de Lisbonne, en particulier du groupe G («Citoyenneté active, égalité des chances et cohésion sociale») et du groupe H («Rendre l'apprentissage attrayant et renforcer les liens avec le monde du travail et de la recherche et avec la société dans son ensemble») soulignent la nécessité croissante pour les individus de pouvoir accéder à des services d'orientation de qualité dans le cadre de l'apprentissage tout au long de la vie, afin de mieux comprendre la multiplicité des options et des possibilités qui leur sont offertes dans des contextes tant formels que non formels. En 2001, l'OCDE a entrepris un examen des politiques d'information, d'orientation et de conseil, auquel ont participé 14 pays. En 2002, à la demande de la direction générale de l'éducation et de la culture de la Commission européenne, le Cedefop et la Fondation européenne pour la formation (ETF) ont étendu cet examen aux États membres de l'UE et aux pays adhérents qui n'avaient pas participé à l'enquête de l'OCDE. La même année, la Banque mondiale a entrepris un examen similaire dans 7 pays à revenu moyen. Pour conduire leurs examens respectifs, le Cedefop, l'ETF et la Banque mondiale ont utilisé le questionnaire élaboré par l'OCDE, avec l'accord de celle-ci. Ces quatre enquêtes ont ainsi permis d'examiner la situation dans un total de 37 pays (pays européens, pays à revenu moyen et pays développés non européens). Chacune des organisations participant au processus d'examen a produit son propre rapport de synthèse. Le présent rapport, produit par le Cedefop, a pour objet d'apporter une valeur ajoutée aux travaux déjà menés en fournissant une vue d'ensemble des résultats de la recherche, afin de faciliter l'analyse transversale et thématique des politiques d'orientation dans l'ensemble de l'Europe. Le lecteur trouvera en annexe un bref document comparatif sur les contrastes et les thèmes communs que l'on peut dégager de la situation des politiques d'orientation professionnelle en Europe par rapport à la situation des pays à revenu moyen et des pays développés non européens. Le Cedefop remercie vivement l'ETF, la Banque mondiale et tout particulièrement l'OCDE pour leur coopération dans la mise à disposition des résultats de leurs propres travaux, coopération sans laquelle la rédaction du présent rapport n'aurait pas été possible. Outre les éléments de comparaison qu'il fournit aux décideurs politiques et aux praticiens pour évaluer leurs propres activités, ce rapport servira de document de référence pour le groupe d'experts de la Commission sur l'orientation tout au long de la vie et contribuera à nourrir le débat et la réflexion. Les priorités de portée générale du Cedefop pour la période 2003-2006 s'articulent en trois axes: • améliorer l'accès à la formation, la mobilité et l'intégration sociale; • permettre et valoriser l'apprentissage; • soutenir les partenariats dans une Union européenne élargie. L'orientation professionnelle est un élément transversal à ces trois axes. Le Cedefop a créé des pages web spécifiquement destinées à promouvoir une large diffusion des résultats du groupe d'experts de la Commission sur l'orientation tout au long de la vie (http://www.trainingvillage.gr/etv/Projects_Networks/Guidance/). Nous avons établi une communauté virtuelle qui offre un forum de discussion et d'échange de points de vue entre ce groupe d'experts et d'autres acteurs de l'orientation professionnelle (http://cedefop.communityzero.com/lifelong_guidance). En outre, avec l'aimable autorisation de l'OCDE et de l'ETF, nous avons incorporé les résultats de l'examen des politiques d'orientation professionnelle conduit dans les 29 pays européens dans notre base de données eKnowVet, qui fait partie intégrante de notre système de gestion des connaissances. Dès lors, les utilisateurs peuvent non seulement consulter et imprimer chacun des rapports nationaux issus de cet examen, mais également extraire des données thématiques (par ex. sur les instruments politiques, les initiatives récentes, le rôle des parties prenantes, les publics prioritaires, les personnels, etc.) transversales aux 29 pays étudiés ou à un sous-groupe sélectionné de pays. Des données du présent rapport ont également été intégrées à la base de données eKnowVet, qui est accessible à partir des pages web consacrées à l'orientation. Le Cedefop organisera les 4 et 5 octobre 2004 une conférence Agora sur le thème «L'orientation tout au long de la vie – Autrement» (http://www.cedefop.eu.int/ events.asp?Actione=1). Les conférences Agora offrent un forum informel qui encourage le dialogue entre les chercheurs, les décideurs politiques et les partenaires sociaux concernés par la formation et l'enseignement professionnels. Par ailleurs, le Cedefop mènera plusieurs autres activités liées à l'orientation dans le cadre du soutien qu'il apporte au groupe d'experts de la Commission sur l'orientation tout au long de la vie et réalisera notamment: • une étude sur les critères de qualité et les lignes directrices pour les services et les produits d'orientation du point de vue du citoyen/de l'usager; • une étude de faisabilité sur les indicateurs et les critères de référence pour l'orientation professionnelle. ; peer-reviewed
The final paragraph of article 150 of the Constitution foresees as a power of Congress to issue the General Act of Public Administration Contracts. The question is: What does General Act, mean in Constitutional Terms, is it law Statute the same as law Statutory, is it law Statute the same as law Ordinary?, is it law Statutes the same as law Coding? Could at the same time a law Statutes be a Law General? Is it a law Statutes and such a law Ordinary and at the same time be a law General? After examining trough the Constitutional Doctrine the meaning of law Statute and what it means a Law General, it's been determined what we understand by Statute General, with the final object of defining later what we understand by General Act of Public Administration Contracts. We've determined so far what has been said by the Constitutional Doctrine aout the Constitutional Review of the Law 80, sanctioned in 1993, even though that most of the decisions have been obiter dicta. The proceeding year, as a Government initiative, the Congress had in it's powers to define the nature of the Public's Contract's Act as a Law General, but at the end that project wasn't approved. The question remains, Should Congress insist in it or should they establish in other terms the nature of the of the General Act of Public Administration Contracts? This is a fundamental issue, thus the nature of the regulations in the matter of the Public Contracts determines the frame of action of the administrative officers at the beginning of the selection process, the adjudication, the celebration, the execution and the settlement of the Public Contracts, as well as the remaining aspects that are in touch with this important matter.There is no doubt, according to article 352 of the Constitution, any rule regarding the capacity to be bided by contracts of the entities and organs of the state are and should be organic statues. is clear that other rules of authorizations are, the one issued by Congress (article 150-9 of the Constitution), the Departments Assemblies (article 300-9 of the Constitution) and the District and Municipal Councils (article 313-3 of the Constitution), in which they authorize the respective Governments: National, Departmental, District and Municipal to celebrate contracts. Ordinary rules, those —different from the latter— in which the Constitution demands the existence of a regulation of legal matter, like those that rules the cases in which applies the mechanism of the public hearing, the way to undergo the evaluation of the proposals, and the conditions to forgo the latter (article 273 of the Constitution) and those matters in concordance with the Constitution that should guarantee the principle of legality and the congressional clause, that would be the case of the rules that foresees the codes of prohibitions, incompatibilities, conflicts of interests or the punitive and sanction codes in Public Contracts; the ones defining the standards of the validity and the existence of contracts and its nullity and judicial review. The rest of the laws, by being general, they should only contain the principles, rules, the criteria and objectives according to which the administrative authorities, such as, the Government or the administrative authority appointed by congress, defining other spects of the Public Contracts and with submission to all of which the administrative officers should proceed to fulfill all of the stages of the public contract process. ; El inciso final del artículo 150 de la Constitución Política prevé, como competencia del Congreso de la República, la de expedir el estatuto general de contratación de la administración pública. ¿Qué sig- nifica en términos constitucionales estatuto general? ¿Ley estatuto es igual a ley estatutaria? ¿Ley estatuto es igual a ley ordinaria? ¿Ley estatuto es igual a ley código? ¿Puede una ley estatuto ser al mismo tiempo una ley general? ¿Es una ley estatuto y como tal una ley ordinaria y al mismo tiempo una ley general? Luego de estudiar, con base en la jurisprudencia constitucional, lo que significa una ley estatuto y lo que significa una ley general, se precisa qué se entiende entonces por un estatuto general, con el objeto de definir luego qué se entiende por estatuto general de contratación de la administración pública. A continuación se precisa lo que hasta ahora ha dicho la jurispruden- cia constitucional sobre el tema con motivo del análisis y de la revisión constitucional de la Ley 80 sancionada en el año de 1993, aunque la mayoría de las veces los pronunciamientos han sido obiter dicta. En el año inmediatamente anterior, a iniciativa del gobierno nacional, el Congreso de la República tuvo a su cargo la posibilidad de definir la naturaleza del estatuto de contratación como una ley general, pero dicho proyecto finalmente no fue aprobado. ¿Debe insistirse en él o debe precisarse en otros términos la naturaleza del Estatuto de Con- tratación de la Administración Pública? Se trata de un tema fundamental, puesto que la naturaleza de las nor- mas jurídicas en materia de contratación estatal determina el marco de acción de los operadores administrativos al momento de empezar el proceso de selección, la adjudicación, la celebración, la ejecución y la liquidación de los contratos estatales, así como los demás aspectos que guarden relación con esta importante materia. No hay duda que de acuerdo con el artículo 352 de la Constitución Política, deben ser y son normas orgánicas las relacionadas con la capacidad de los organismos y entidades estatales para contratar. Asimismo, son normas de autorizaciones aquellas que expiden el Con- greso de la República (150-9), las asambleas departamentales (300-9) y los concejos distritales y municipales (313-3) mediante las cuales se autoriza a los respectivos gobiernos nacional, departamental, distrital y municipal para celebrar contratos. Son normas ordinarias, aquéllas —diferentes a las anteriores— en las cuales la Constitución exige que haya una regulación de carácter legal como aquellas en las que se regulen los casos en los que se aplique el mecanismo de audiencia pública, la manera como se efectuará la eva- luación de las propuestas y las condiciones bajo las cuales se realizará aquélla (273) y todas aquellas materias en las que de acuerdo con la Constitución Política deban garantizarse los principios de legalidad y de reserva de ley, como sería el caso de las normas que consagren los regímenes de inhabilidades, incompatibilidades, conflictos de interés o los regímenes punitivos y sancionatorios en materia contractual; las que definan los requisitos de existencia y validez de los contratos y por lo mismo su régimen de nulidades y su régimen de control judicial. Las demás normas legales, por ser generales, sólo deben contener los principios, las reglas, los criterios y los objetivos conforme a los cuales una autoridad administrativa, —esto es, el gobierno nacional o la auto- ridad administrativa que señale el legislador— define los demás aspectos de la contratación estatal y con sujeción a todas las cuales los operadores administrativos deben proceder a cumplir todas las etapas del proceso de contratación estatal.
Estudiar y entender las Cooperativas de trabajo asociado, cobra gran vigencia ante las circunstancias que se presentan en la actualidad, como una nueva reforma laboral que busca flexibilizar las relaciones entre empleado–empresario; la política económica del presidente Uribe que busca convertir el sector de economía solidaria en el tercero más importante en el país; las iniciativas en ganar competitividad por parte de las empresas, las regiones y el país, a través de medios de producción eficientes, diferenciados, con valor agregado y control de costos y principalmente, las políticas socioeconómicas que buscan darle mejores condiciones al trabajador, convirtiéndolo en participe de los medios de producción. La ciudad de Manizales, no es ajena a esta realidad y cuenta con una importante diversidad de empresas en múltiples sectores económicos, con diferentes sistemas de producción, oferta de productos, sistemas de contratación, cantidad de mano de obra, en donde el modelo de Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado viene siendo utilizado desde hace algunos años y con un gran potencial de desarrollo, por las ventajas que ofrece tanto a empresarios como a trabajadores. Es por ello que el estudio, buscó "Caracterizar el Comportamiento de las Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado de Manizales, en aspectos Administrativos, Financieros, de Talento Humano, de Mercadeo y de Desarrollo Social de acuerdo a su desempeño en el año 2002". Mediante el análisis de la información obtenida en la investigación de los aspectos mencionados, se estableció el perfil de las cooperativas de trabajo asociado de Manizales, construyendo conocimiento en torno al sector y brindando herramientas, que permitan a gremios, gobierno y empresarios definir políticas y estrategias que den mayor competitividad al sector y logren que todos los involucrados en este, desde asociados hasta empresarios, obtengan los beneficios del modelo. ; Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM) ; INTRODUCCIÓN 14 1. REFERENTE CONCEPTUAL 17 1.1 ANTECEDENTES HISTÓRICOS 17 1.1.1 Los Precursores 18 1.1.2 Los Realizadores 20 1.1.3 Revolución Industrial 21 1.1.4 Origen del Cooperativismo en América 22 1.1.5 Origen de las Cooperativas en Colombia 24 1.2 LA ECONOMÍA SOLIDARIA 30 1.2.1 La Empresa de Economía Solidaria vs. Empresa Capitalista 31 1.2.2 Principios de la Economía Solidaria 33 1.2.3 Fines de la Economía Solidaria 34 1.2.4 Principios Económicos de la Economía Solidaria 34 1.2.5 Características de las Organizaciones de Economía Solidaria 35 1.2.6 Prohibiciones a las Organizaciones de Economía Solidaria 36 1.2.7 Organismos de apoyo a la Economía Solidaria 37 1.2.8 Entidades Estatales de Promoción, Fomento y Supervisión. 38 1.3 LAS COOPERATIVAS 44 1.3.1 Clasificación de las Cooperativas 46 1.3.2 Cooperativas de Trabajo Asociado 51 1.3.3 Las Precooperativas 55 1.3.4 Las Empresas Asociativas de Trabajo 57 1.4 ÁREA PROBLEMÁTICA 64 1.5 FORMULACIÓN DEL PROBLEMA 71 1.6 OBJETIVOS 72 1.6.1 OBJETIVO GENERAL 72 1.6.2 OBJETIVOS ESPECÍFICOS 72 1.7 ANTECEDENTES 73 1.8 JUSTIFICACIÓN 80 2. REFERENTE TEÓRICO 83 2.1 LAS COOPERATIVAS DE TRABAJO ASOCIADO 83 2.1.1 Características 84 2.1.2 Compromisos de los Asociados 87 2.1.3 Deberes y Derechos de los Asociados 88 2.1.4 Constitución de la Cooperativa de Trabajo Asociado 89 2.2 GESTIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA 94 2.2.1 Fundamento Teórico 94 2.2.2 Estructura administrativa de la Cooperativa de Trabajo Asociado 94 2.2.3 Inspección y vigilancia externa gubernamental 103 2.2.4 Modelos Administrativos 103 2.3 GESTIÓN FINANCIERA Y CONTABLE 115 2.3.1 Fundamento Teórico 115 2.3.2 Los objetivos de la información contable 117 2.3.3 Estados financieros 117 2.3.4 Régimen económico de las cooperativas de trabajo asociado 121 2.3.5 Balance – Distribución de Excedentes 123 2.3.6 Fondos 124 2.4 GESTIÓN DE MERCADEO 126 2.4.1 Fundamento Teórico 126 2.4.2 Mercadotecnia 126 2.4.3 Planeación 129 2.4.4 Planeación Estratégica 130 2.4.5 Desarrollo de productos 130 2.4.6 Estrategias de la organización 132 2.5 GESTIÓN DEL TALENTO HUMANO 133 2.5.1 Fundamento Teórico 133 2.5.2 Objetivos de la gestión de recurso humano 134 2.5.3 Desafíos 134 2.5.4 Planeación y selección 134 2.5.5 Aspectos disciplinarios de la cooperativa de trabajo asociado 136 2.5.6 Régimen de compensaciones 139 2.6 GESTIÓN SOCIAL 143 2.6.1 Ética y responsabilidad social 143 2.6.2 Gestión social en la cooperativa 145 2.6.3 Aplicabilidad de la gestión o control social: 146 3. ESTRATEGIA METODOLÓGICA 150 3.1 TIPO DE ESTUDIO 150 3.2 DISEÑO METODOLÓGICO 150 3.3 FUENTES 151 3.3.1 Población 151 3.3.2 Muestra 152 3.3.3 Fuentes 154 3.4 PROCEDIMIENTO DE RECOLECCIÓN DE INFORMACIÓN 154 3.4.1 Etapa 1 154 3.4.2 Etapa 2 155 3.4.3 Etapa 3 155 3.4.4 Etapa 4 155 3.4.5 Etapa 5 156 3.5 TÉCNICAS E INSTRUMENTOS 157 4. ANÁLISIS DE LA INFORMACIÓN 158 4.1 PERFIL GENERAL 158 4.1.1 Síntesis del perfil general 161 4.2 GESTIÓN ADMINISTRATIVA 162 4.2.1 Planeación Estratégica 163 4.2.2 Directivos 165 4.2.3 Cargos directivos 171 4.2.4 Cargos no directivos 173 4.2.5 Síntesis de gestión administrativa. 175 4.3 COMPORTAMIENTO FINANCIERO 176 4.3.1 Patrimonio 176 4.3.2 Activos 178 4.3.3 Pasivos 180 4.3.4 Estado de Pérdidas y Ganancias 181 4.3.5 Indicadores Financieros 184 4.3.6 Síntesis del capitulo financiero 186 4.4 GESTIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO DEL TALENTO HUMANO 187 4.4.1 Síntesis de gestión de desarrollo de talento humano. 196 4.4.2 Gestión de Mercadeo 197 4.4.3 Plan de mercadeo 199 4.5 GESTIÓN COMERCIAL 201 4.5.1 Síntesis Gestión de Mercadeo 208 4.6 GESTIÓN PARA EL DESARROLLO SOCIAL 209 4.6.1 Aporte sociales 209 4.6.2 Fondos sociales 211 4.6.3 Planificación social 214 4.6.4 Síntesis del capitulo de desarrollo social 216 5. SITUACIÓN ESTRATÉGICA DE LAS COOPERATIVAS DE TRABAJO ASOCIADO DE MANIZALES EN EL 2002. 218 5.1 DEBILIDADES 218 5.2 FORTALEZAS 220 5.3 OPORTUNIDADES 221 5.4 AMENAZAS 222 6. CONCLUSIONES Y RECOMENDACIONES 224 6.1 CONCLUSIONES 224 6.2 RECOMENDACIONES 228 BIBLIOGRAFÍA 231 ANEXOS 234 ; Maestría ; Studying and understanding Associated Work Cooperatives is highly effective in the current circumstances, such as a new labor reform that seeks to make employee-employer relations more flexible; President Uribe's economic policy that seeks to make the solidarity economy sector the third most important in the country; initiatives to gain competitiveness by companies, regions and the country, through efficient, differentiated means of production, with added value and cost control and mainly, socioeconomic policies that seek to give better conditions to the worker, making it participate in the means of production. The city of Manizales is not alien to this reality and has an important diversity of companies in multiple economic sectors, with different production systems, product offerings, contracting systems, and quantity of labor, where the Cooperatives model Associated Work has been used for some years and with great potential for development, due to the advantages it offers both employers and workers. That is why the study sought to "Characterize the Behavior of the Associated Work Cooperatives of Manizales, in Administrative, Financial, Human Talent, Marketing and Social Development aspects according to their performance in 2002". Through the analysis of the information obtained in the investigation of the aforementioned aspects, the profile of the associated work cooperatives of Manizales was established, building knowledge around the sector and providing tools that allow unions, government and businessmen to define policies and strategies that give the sector greater competitiveness and ensure that all those involved in it, from associates to entrepreneurs, obtain the benefits of the model.
One of the most intriguing and indeed progressive features of the Labour government is its willingness to have itself judged against a wide range of targets, as set out in the Public Service Agreements (PSAs) which accompanied the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) in 1998.The second Comprehensive Spending Review due in summer 2000 will be accompanied by a revised set of PSAs negotiated between the Treasury and individual departments. This second round of PSAs will rightly concentrate on the key policy outcomes which departments are aiming to deliver. The several hundred targets which assess the managerial effectiveness of the government machine will be covered by a separate series of Service Delivery Agreements. However, ironically the remarks by the Prime Minister on health service funding appear to undermine the whole CSR process, and threaten to turn the debate back to a focus on how much money gets spent on the public services, rather than the welcome focus on outcomes implied by the PSAs.The PSAs in effect set out in detail the government's strategy, which immediately raises the question of whether they should signal more clearly the government's priorities across the many different policy outcomes. Several of the articles in this issue of New Economy focus on the key areas of policy which should be central to the agenda of a centre‐left government: restoring full employment, eliminating child poverty and putting sustainable development at the heart of government strategy rather than at its margins. Matthew Taylor leads off by discussing the tensions which lie at the heart of the PSA process. Performance targets can have perverse outcomes if they are not designed carefully. The PSA process is highly centralising and may sti?e local initiative. It is not clear that modern government is best delivered by the Treasury telling everyone what to do.In an act of modest self‐indulgence the editor contributes an article to this issue which argues that a commitment to the attainment of full employment alongside a commitment to eliminating child poverty would represent a really powerful and radical agenda for the Government. Less weight should be given to closing the productivity gap, which is less of a problem than usually thought. Lisa Harker takes up the issues raised by the government's anti‐poverty strategy noting the absence of any debate about which of the poverty indicators the government intends to track should be given priority. She also notes that adopting a clear measure of income poverty brings challenges for government, raising the question of how far it should explicitly address poverty through higher bene?ts to provide 'security for those who cannot work'.The urgency of tackling child poverty is given weight by the chilling conclusion set out by John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart that on three key measures of child well‐being – child poverty, children in workless households and the teenage birth rate – the UK's performance is the worst in the EU. It is this 'child poverty gap' with our European partners which should make us ashamed not the productivity gap. Fran Bennett and Chris Roche argue for genuinely participatory approaches to the development of indicators of poverty and social exclusion which focus not just on what is measured, but also on who decides which indicators are important. This approach features heavily in debates in the developing world, but the OECD countries could learn from this experience. Chris Hewett and Matthew Rayment note discouragingly that seven major government departments made no reference to sustainable development in their aims and objectives as set out in the PSAs in 1998. By and large, the key environmental issues are still seen as only a priority for the DETR and no one else. It is not clear that any relationship between the PSAs and the government's sustainable development strategy is evidence of joined up government or merely coincidental overlapping government.The original PSAs made little or no reference to the goal of securing greater racial equality and Sarah Spencer takes up this omission by looking at a range of areas of public policy where a focus on outcome based measures relating to racial equality are needed. The achievement of race equality objectives necessitates a contribution from each of the key Whitehall departments responsible for domestic policy, and from all departments in relation to their own employment practices. Damian Tambini discusses the 'Ulysees Effect' by which the announcing of targets amid great fanfare forces the government to nail its colours to the mast. In the area of electronic service delivery, targets have so far been quite successful in jolting government agencies into taking action. If potential problems relating to data protection and social exclusion do not emerge, targets in this area will be seen as a useful tool of radical modernisation. However, if the negative effects of electronic service delivery do become more severe, then the government will have to face some difficult choices: abandon the targets, fudge the ?gures, or push them through despite the negative consequences. Andrea Westall discusses four recently published IPPR reports relating to business or industrial policy. A common theme is that government has a role as a market maker and catalyst by bringing players together to encourage the formation of innovative solutions rather than intervening in a broad and possibly blunt way. This role requires an element of risk and 'letting go' rather than devising programmes with clearly de?ned outcomes and targets – somewhat anathema to the Treasury with its emphasis on performance targets as set out in the PSAs. Rebecca Harding looks at the establishment of regional venture capital funds, arguing that in the north of England the main problem may be the lack of demand for venture capital, so that it may not be the correct tool for supporting innovative small businesses in all regions. Robert Atkinson explodes some of the myths held about the emerging 'new economy'. This includes the notion that technological change is destroying employment (preposterous when viewed against the tremendous jobs growth in the US economy) or that economic change calls into question the continued viability of large corporations or the role of the state.Finally David Osmon offers a different model from the government's proposed public private partnership for achieving a more efficient London Underground. The combined infrastructure and operations of some underground lines could be leased to the private sector which could then compete with the publicly operated lines. If the private companies achieved efficiency savings they could then bid for further franchises and in the meantime those lines still in public ownership would be subject to competitive pressures to increase their efficiency. With all the uncertainty surrounding the current PPP this idea is worthy of consideration.
This paper argues that neoliberal globalization is presenting a challenge to welfare provisioning in the industrialized countries and to the prospects for equitable social development in developing and transition economies. This challenge flows partly from the unregulated nature of the emerging global economy and partly from intellectual currents dominant in the global discourse concerning social policy and social development. The paper contends that certain global conditions are undermining the prospects for the alternative: equitable public social provision in both developed and developing countries. These conditions include the World Bank's preference for a safety-net and privatizing strategy for welfare; the self-interest of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in providing basic education, health and livelihood services that might otherwise be provided by the state; and the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) push for an open global market in health services, education and social insurance. Yet these disturbing trends are taking place in parallel with an apparent shift in the politics of globalization from orthodox economic liberalism to global social concern. The paper begins by reviewing the challenges faced by countries seeking to secure the social welfare of citizens and residents in the context of globalization. In the North, globalization has set welfare states in competition with each other. Moreover, the different kinds of welfare state are differently challenged by globalization, and have responded differently. Anglo-Saxon countries, which have residualized and privatized welfare provision, are in tune with liberalizing globalization, but at the cost of equity. Workplace-based welfare systems of the former state socialist countries, and payroll tax-based 'Bismarkian' insurance systems common in many Western European countries, are proving vulnerable to global competitive pressures. The social democratic, citizenship-based welfare systems funded out of consumption and income taxes, found in the Nordic countries, have been surprisingly sustainable in the face of global competitive pressures due to political will to maintain them. In the South, globalization has generated indebtedness that has undermined the capacity of governments to secure education, health and social protection. It has threatened social and labour standards, segmented social policy within countries and created zones excluded from any of the benefits of globalization. Next the paper considers the current global social policy discourse within and between international organizations and aid agencies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently shown signs of taking the social dimensions of globalization more seriously, by beginning to consider whether some degree of equity within countries is beneficial to economic growth. The World Bank has articulated more clearly its 'individual risk management approach' to social protection in the context of globalization. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has asserted that globalization may lead to the need for more, not less, social expenditure. While the International Labour Organization (ILO) has begun to show signs of making concessions to the Bank's views on privatizing some aspects of social security, it has also shown an interest in a new universalism emerging from bottom-up movements in several countries. The views of the WTO on the desirability of a global market in health and social service provision are assuming new prominence. International NGOs are now more clearly divided into those acting as substitutes for government, and those advocating greater government responsibility for welfare. Yet within this discordant global discourse can be discerned elements of a new politics of global social responsibility. Orthodox economic liberalism and inhumane structural adjustment appear to be giving way to concern in the World Bank and the IMF with the social consequences of globalization. International development assistance is increasingly focusing on social development. United Nations agencies are giving more attention to the negative social consequences of globalization. Among the shifts in policy thinking and concrete steps that are being taken, which could herald more socially responsible globalization, are moves to globalize social rights, indications that social policy issues are moving up the development agenda and steps to regulate the global economy. The paper looks at each of these in turn, and at the disagreements as to how to proceed with this new orientation. It examines the dangers of the North moralizing about global social rights without providing the resources to realize them in practice. It also discusses whether the initiative to establish a code of principles and best practice for social policy will enable these dangers to be overcome. The paper then questions whether the move to establish development targets, such as basic education for all by 2015, represents global social progress or the legitimation of residual social policy. The obstacles to progressive North-South social policy and social development dialogue are also examined. In terms of the moves to inject social concerns into the global economy, the paper reviews conflicts of interest surrounding the failed WTO conference in Seattle, the proliferation of codes of conduct for transnational corporations and the debate about raising global taxes to finance social programmes. The paper argues that despite the apparent shift from global neoliberalism to global social responsibility, four tendencies within the new global paradigm, if pursued, will undermine equitable social progress and development-at a time when the resources exist to fund such advances. These tendencies are: the World Bank's belief that governments should provide only minimal levels of social protection; the concern of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to focus funding on only basic education and healthcare; the self-interest of international NGOs in substituting for government provision of services; and the moves being made within the WTO to open the global market in private healthcare, education and social insurance. Within the context of minimal and basic-level-only state provision, the middle classes of developing and transition economies will be enticed to purchase private social security schemes, private secondary and tertiary education, and private hospital and medical care. The wider repercussions are predictable. We know that only services for the neediest will remain-and that services for the poor are poor services. We know that those developed countries without universal public health and education provision are not only more unequal than those that do, but also more unsafe and crime ridden. This is the prospect for all countries that buy into this new global social development paradigm. Some policy measures to counteract this trend and to re-establish the place of equity in the discourse and practice of global social policy and development are suggested in this paper, together with an assessment of global forces that might be sympathetic to them. It is concluded that a major problem is the fragmentation and functional separation of agencies (WTO, World Bank, IMF, ILO, WHO, UNDP, UNESCO, OECD, regional groupings), and conflict and competition within and between them for the right to determine the content and other aspects of global social policy. Whether the five-year review of the World Summit for Social Development (Geneva 2000) begins the process of establishing a responsible and accountable global system of governance in the social sphere will depend to a large extent on political support from the European Union. It will also hinge on progressive voices from the South speaking out for improvements in the structure of global governance-in the interests of the North and the South, and of equity within and between countries.
ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to make an analysis of Turkish foreign policy in northern Iraq in the post-cold war era by focusing on the developments in the Gulf Crisis. It can be stated that one of the most important problems of Turkey after the Cold War has been the issue of redefinig itself, particularly its foreign policy in the new international environment which took place as a result of the collapse of "communism", the dissolution of Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It is clear that there is a close relationship between a country's domestic political dynamics and international settings. They influence each other and define each other's limits and possibilities. From this point of view, it can be argued that, in 1990s , "internationalist" and "nationalist" foreign policy vision have been competing to establish the direction of Turkish foreign policy in the emerging new world order. However, it will not be so true to claim that effects of the developments in international environment have remained limited with only the sphere of foreign policy. It is apparent that the events which occurred in the world politics in the beginning of the 90s are descriptive in initiating the discussions focusing on the social and political structure of Turkey. Thus, it seems that the "nationalist-internationalist" dichotomy is getting clear within the framework of the new strategies adopted by the Western Pact, or -in particular- by the USA, in the post-cold war era on the axis of the role given to Turkey and the Turkey's foreign policy in northern Iraq. In this context, existence of "Kurdish issue", which Turkey has not been able to overcome since the mid 80s, has been producing problems in both internal and external affairs of Turkey. "Kurdish issue", which has also an external dimension stemming from the power vacuum in northern Iraq particularly since 1991, can be considered as the dilemma of Turkish foreign policy in the new world order. In fact, the different approaches about Turkish foreign policy towards northern Iraq reflect the differences in the solution of "Kurdish issue" . During the period, the fact that the 1991 Gulf Crisis has become an "Iraq Crisis" and continuity of the crisis makes Turkey's foreign policy in northern Iraq open to foreign interventions. In other words, it has been more difficult for Turkey to pursue a foreign policy on behalf of its own national interests in northern Iraq because of its own "Kurdish issue". On the other hand, the power vacuum in northern Iraq has also been playing a hardening role on "Kurdish issue" in Turkey. In the context of what is expected from Turkey in the new world order in the axis of Middle East- Caucasus-Central Asia, "Kurdish question", which, essentially, is a socio-economic issue exploited by regional and other foreign powers in addition to underdeveloped character of the Turkey's southeastern region rather that a "national question", and northern Iraq issue will have a considerable importance as the context of the Turkey's domestic politics and problems. Turkey's foreign policy towards northern Iraq during the Gulf Crisis, during which "Kurdish issue" also began to internationalize, and bifurcation in implementation of the policy constitutes the focus of this study. It is observed that the United States wanted Turkey to recognize and support the establishment of a Kurdish state in the northern Iraq since the Gulf War. In this context, there seem to be two options with regard to northern Iraq. The first one is the establishment of a "Kurdish state" under Turkey's "protection" and supervised by the USA and the second one is the cooperation among countries in the region and Kurdish organisation to refuse the US initiative and find solution together. Therefore, the effects of the USA and its plans towards northern Iraq have to be taken into consideration in examining the decision making process of the Turkish foreign policy in northern Iraq. One of the aims of this study is to examine the US' effects on Turkish foreing policy towards northern Iraq and to clarify the bifurcation in the foreign policy decision-making process of Turkey in this context , particularly in the period of 1990-91 Gulf Crisis. ÖZET Bu çalışmanın amacı, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak politikasının çözümlemesini yapmaktır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında "komünizm"in çöküp, Sovyetler Birliği ve Varşova Paktı'nın dağıldığı uluslararası ortamda, Türkiye'nin en önemli dış politika problemlerinden birinin kendini, özellikle de dış politikasını, "yeniden tanımlama" sorunu olduğu söylenebilir. Bir ülkenin kendi iç politik ortamı ile uluslararası ilişkilerin dinamizmi arasında doğrudan bir ilişki olduğu ; bu karşılıklı ilişkinin bazı sınırlamalar ve olanaklar getirdiği inkar edilemez. Bu perspektiften bakıldığında, 90'lı yıllarda "ulusalcı" ve "uluslararasıcı" (enternasyonalist) dış politika eğilimlerinin Türkiye'nin dış politikasının yönünü belirlemede çatıştıkları görülmektedir. Bununla beraber, uluslararası ortamdaki gelişmelerin etkisinin sadece dış politika alanı ile sınırlı kaldığını iddia etmek de pek doğru olmayacaktır. 90'ların başında Türkiye'nin sosyal ve siyasal yaşamı üzerine yapılan tartışmalarda uluslararası ilişkilerdeki gelişmelerin de etkili olduğu açıktır. Bu "ulusalcı-uluslararasıcı" ikilemi, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, Balkanlar-Kafkaslar-Ortadoğu ekseninde Batı , özellikle de ABD, tarafında Türkiye'ye biçilen rol ve Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'a yönelik dış politikası bağlamında açıklık kazanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin 80'lerin ortasından beri bir türlü üstesinden gelemediği "Kürt sorunu" hem iç hem de dış politikayı etkileyen sonuçlar yaratmaktadır. 1991'den beri Kuzey Irak'taki otorite boşluğundan kaynaklanan bir dış boyuta da sahip olan "Kürt sorunu"nun, "Yeni Dünya Düzeni"nde Türkiye'nin en önemli dış politika maddelerinden biri olduğu söylenebilir. Aslında, Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'a yönelik dış politikasındaki değişik yaklaşımlar, Türkiye'nin kendi "Kürt sorunu"nu çözme konusundaki yaklaşım farklılıklarını da yansıtmaktadır. Ayrıca, Körfez Savaşı'nın bir "Irak Krizi"ne dönüşmesi ve bunun kalıcılık kazanması Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak politikasını da dış müdahalelere açık hale getirmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'ta kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda bir dış politika izlemesi her geçen gün daha da zorlaşmaktadır. Öte yandan, Kuzey Irak'taki otorite boşluğu da Türkiye'nin kendi "Kürt sorunu" üzerinde olumsuz etkiler yaratmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası, Balkanlar-Kafkasya-Ortadoğu ekseninde Türkiye'ye verilen rol bağlamında, aslında hem bölgesel hem de dış güçler tarafında kullanılan, temelde "ulusal" olmaktan çok sosyo-ekonomik karakterdeki bir sorun olarak nitelenebilecek Kürt sorunu" dikkate değer bir önem kazanmaktadır. Kürt sorununun "uluslararası" bir boyut kazanmaya başladığı Körfez Krizi dönemindeki Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'a yönelik dış politikası ve bu politikanın uygulanmasında ortaya çıkan "çatallaşma" bu çalışmanın ana eksenini oluşturmaktadır. ABD'nin, Körfez Krizi'nden beri, Kuzey Irak'ta kurulacak bir "Kürt devletinin", Türkiye tarafından tanınmasını ve himaye edilmesini istediği görülmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'de iki yaklaşım dikkati çekmektedir : Birincisi, Türkiye'nin himayesinde, ABD tarafından denetlenecek bir "Kürt devletinin" kurulmasını benimseyen anlayıştır. Diğeri ise, ABD girişimlerini reddederek, bölge ülkeleri ve Kürt örgütleri ile işbirliği çerçevesinde soruna ortak bir çözüm bulmayı esas alan görüştür. Dolayısıyla, ABD ve Kuzey Irak konusundaki planları, Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'a yönelik dış politika yapım sürecinde dikkate alınması gereken önemli unsurlardandır. Bu çalışmanın amaçlarından biri de, ABD'nin Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak politikası üzerindeki etkilerinin incelenmesi ve bu bağlamda, Türk dış politikasındaki "çatallaşmanın", özellikle 1990-91 Körfez Krizi dönemi esas alınarak, aydınlatılmasıdır.
Experience-based Training and Development (EBTD) or Corporate Adventure Training (CAT) has had a short history of usage and a long history of problems· with its credibility. Proponents of EBTD/CAT have claimed it was an effective and appropriate way to build teams, develop individuals and improve companies. They stated their case on a moderate collection of personal anecdotes and testimonies. Opponents of EBTD/CAT have claimed it was a sham, like many of the group oriented encounter techniques of the sixties. They cemented their opinion by pointing to a clear lack of research evidence, failing to substantiate the impact of such programs. With the decreasing value of the development dollar, more companies have questioned the efficacy of EBTD/CAT programming and called for hard data to support its transfer of learning. This study examined changes, over a two year period, in the corporate climate of an Australian company, which chose total employee participation in an EBTD/CAT program. A major Australian government-owned corporation, primarily involved with public service delivery, chose EBTD/CAT as the sole means of training and development for its entire complement of (approximately) 5,000 employees. The main focus of this training was to alter the climate of the organization around the two new cultural concepts of teamwork and empowerment A sample of 100 employees, stratified for gender (male 65% and female 35%) and management level (upper 10%, middle 30% and lower 60% ), was randomly selected from the population of about 500 managers in a company of 5,000 employees. The sample of 100 were surveyed three times (before, during and after treatment), but all 5,000 employees underwent the treatment Treatment consisted of a five day residential EBTD/CAT program during the most recent year (between the dates of July 1, 1990 and June 30, 1991). No other training and development schemes were underway during the two year period of study (from December 1, 1989 to December 31, 1991 ). The EBTD/CAT program.was fairly standard in design, with the first day devoted to socialization activities, icebreakers and deinhibitizers. The next two days consisted of cooperation, communication and trust exercises followed by common group initiative activities and problem solving tasks. The fourth day consisted of a high ropes course, with choice of egress by rappelling or zip wire. The final day incorporated a great deal of personal reflection, solo time and group dialogue around action plans for future challenges. Evening were spent attending lectures by the company facilitators and presenting dramatic skits interpreting the daily events. Although attendance was mandated by the company, the program operated under a "challenge by choice" philosophy and, once in attendance, no employees were forced to participate in any activity against their will. Survey rounds, consisting of three instruments, were administered to subjects on three separate occasions, each approximately one year apart. Instrumentation included three surveys: section m of the Individual-Team-Organization (ITO) survey (Anderson, 1987); the short form of the Organizational-Health (OH) survey (Phillips, 1989): and the Motivational Analysis of Organizations-Climate (MAO-C) survey (Pareek, 1989). The 17% attrition over two years was likely due to employee turnover from company downsizing (estimated at 13% ), and yet attrition was proportionate across strata and reasonable (with a return rate over 80%, non-respondent bias was not an issue). Data met all normality requirements, therefore, two factor ANOVAs were conducted. Two main effects for management level were noted, indicating that in these two cases the three management levels differed on the average of their opinions. All, but a few, analyses showed main effect changes in means across the three times of surveying: before, during and after, indicating that opinions changed over the treatment period. Since the limited studies in EBTD/CAT have concentrated on benefits and changes to the group or to the employee, and have apparently ignored the bottom line of organizational benefit and change (a concern prevalent for many companies) the intent of this study was to track changes in the one aspect of corporate climate. This study does not claim that the EBTD/CAT program caused the changes discussed Regardless of the testimonials from the company executive, the EBTD/CAT program may have contributed to the improvements, but without a control company (almost impossible to obtain under most circumstances) the certainty of causality should not be stated Furthermore, these findings must not be generalized beyond the parameters of this study: changes in corporate climate for a major Australian company government-owned and primarily involved in public service delivery, with management response to the surveys and total employee participation in an EBTD/CAT program over the period 1989-1991. In summary, and in the opinion of three levels of management, but not necessarily all employees, this particular company successfully changed its corporate climate over a period of two years, during which all employees participated in an experience-based training and development or corporate adventure training program only. Overall, the company improved on its planning utility, structure flexibility, systems functioning ( upper managers were least pleased with systematic changes), sensible & supportive roles, positive relationships, excessive delays in workflow, reflection time, and mission and goal clarity during the first year; while concern for getting the job done (rather than accounting for time and cost), alignment, marketplace impact, and profit versus growth decreased over the same period, although decreases were not seen as necessarily detrimental in this case, since the company moved through a desired period of well needed readjustment. During the second year, reflection time decreased, but work enjoyment improved (lower managers enjoyed their work least), even though workloads increased over both years. Decreases in planning seriousness, crisis avoidance, purpose contribution, and responsiveness index; increases in stretch; and fluctuations in resource provision, strategic position, purpose clarity, and individual versus organizational goals, were all overshadowed by by complex interactions between the time of survey (before, during or after treatment) and the level of manager (upper, middle or lower) responding. Feedback from the company executive committee highlighted the expected influence of several extraneous environmental variables on.these interactions and attributed some interaction to the treatment of the EBTD/CAT program. Future research ought to broaden the base of knowledge concerning the impact of EBTD/CAT programs on other aspects of corporate climate (motivation, etc.) and deepen the base of knowledge by replicating or extending this study with companies from other nations, involved in other areas of business, and consider all types of employees, not just managers. Despite the inherent problems of controlling for environmental factors, either by formal control group or informal speculation, this type of research is valuable as companies seek evidence on the efficacy of this kind of outdoor learning.
The crisis of authority in the U.S.S.R. (1988 - July 1991). After a preliminary reference to the ideological options open to Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of the break-up of Stalinism, and the mistrust which be inspires, both among some of his opponents as well as among right-wing conservatives, the author considers the recent evolution of the Soviet Union, from the monopoly of Party rule to the difficult birth of a pluralistic regime. He first raises the question of the Party's attitude to perestroika. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1977, which aknowledges the leading role of the Party, was reluctantly annulled by Gorbachev, but annuled it was, thus leaving the way open for pluralism. Condemnation of factionalism within the body of the Party has not prevented the emergence of various "tendencies" (particularly the democratic Platform and the marxist Platform) which find official expression. Similarly, political and social groupings, independent of authority, began to proliferate : from groupings moved by a common principle, for example tne Safeguarding of the national heritage, or the defense of the environment, they rapidly became popular fronts, lending the system a de facto pluralism which would only later enjoy a de jure existence. This spontaneous development took shape first of all in the Baltic countries, and then with increasing momentum spread to all the republics. In parallel with this, the communist Party leadership initiated a reform of the political system, which found expression in the semi-free elections of March 1989, marked by the defeat of various party and State notables. This was the beginning of a multi-party system, there having been two major opposing tendencies during the campaign for the regional elections in the spring of 1990 : the democratic Russia bloc (liberal) and the patriotic Russian bloc (conservative), surrounded by a multiplicity of organizations of the most diverse and constantly evolving tendencies. The charge levelled against them is that they have no autonomous ideas or initiative, and have only one single programme : mass rejection of the Party apparatus. Some observers are of the opinion that a deep schism will develop within the CPSU, and that this will give rise to a real multi-party system. The first stage of this development has just begun, with the movement for democratic reforms, which was launched in July 1991 by frontline reformers. The other major problem which arises is that of the preservation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The authority of the Center is in question, and already six republics have decided to leave the union, proclaiming their sovereignty loud and long (the three Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia). But although the right of scission is officially acknowledged, its implementation is a vast battleground (see the law of 3rd April 1990). The upsurge of centrifugal forces has led the republics, one after the other, to proclame their sovereignty (primacy of republican laws over federal laws, economic autonomy, ownership of the soil and mineral deposits, etc.) or their outright indépendance. Autonomous Republics and territories followed suit, opposing the authorities of the republics to which they belonged. Inter-ethnic conflict broke out all over. The dispute over federal authority led to a "way over laws", setting the Centre at odd with republics resolved to insist on recognition of their rights (ownership of all the ressources found on their territory, freedom to exploit these resources, etc.). In this context, the question of finance and the budget had pride of place, together with that of material and technological supplies. The entire supply system was disorganized, with the republics refusing to carry out the orders of the State, or to deliver consumers' goods outside of their frontiers, in order to avoid a worsening of their own shortages. The Soviet government tried to combat the supply problems, at least in part, by setting up commodity markets. A series of economic programms was worked out, including V. Pavlov's anti-crisis plan (April 1991) which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but it is not entirely clear how the economic responsabilities will be apportioned among the Central authorities, the republics and the lower-rank administrative bodies, and what will be the share of the state and private sectors. Also, it is not known how he proposes to overcome the present crisis, and how long this will take. Another major source of discord is the army and the police. The republics demand the right to raise armed forces, and to assume the responsability for maintaning order within their territory. Certain of them, who have been the victims of attacks by the special forces of the Ministry of Interior, the OMON, have organized militias and defense groups, wich are virtually republican armies in embryo. In the end, there was an overriding necessity for redefining the Union, and the first version of the new Union Treaty was adopted by referendum on the 17th March 1991. A slightly modified version of it was published on the 19th June, but neither the one nor the other gives a very clear idea of the respective areas of competence and the common areas of competence of the Centre and the constituent republics of the Union (and still less of the fate in store for secessionist republics). On the other hand, one can be sure that the Treaty will be the source of innumerable controversies and disputes, especially on the particularly explosive issue of the budget, taxation and the distribution of ressources. In the final part, the author ventures some thoughts on the future. He sets perestroika in the continuing context of the history of the Russian empire, recalling that the demands made (individual freedoms and democracy, self-determination and decolonization) were already those of the protagonists of the Russian democratic revolution of February-March 1917, which was "taken over" by the Bolshevik coup d'Etat. Now that the empire has fallen victim to its contradictions and weaknesses, and finally disintegrated, what will take its place ? The cure prescribed by the Union Treaty seems ill-adapted to the task, and several outcomes are possible : a resolute commitment to the way of democracy and decolonization, a return to an authoritarian régime but one establishing a market economy, the option of passivity while waiting for a solution "which will come of itself, or a return to thorough-going, tough dictatorship accompanied by a blood bath. If Gorbachev does not once more take his courage in both hands, and proceeds to decolonize the empire, however slow and piecemeal the process, others will do it for him. And in that case, we may fear the worst.
[SPA] Internet of Things (IoT) o Internet de las Cosas está cobrando importancia y adquiriendo una participación cada vez mayor en todo ámbito a nivel mundial. Esta tendencia no aplica solo a personas en su vida cotidiana, sino que se convierte también en un factor determinante para las empresas. Lo que hace unos años era una tecnología potencial para habilitar nuevas iniciativas de negocio y mejoras operacionales, hoy en día ha pasado a la fase de implementación donde es posible interconectar un elevado número de dispositivos. La conexión de tal ingente cantidad de objetos prevista, supone nuevos retos para las redes que les den soporte, debiendo tener una alta escalabilidad para absorber el crecimiento exponencial previsto y simplicidad en el registro de nuevos dispositivos. Además, son factores críticos la autonomía, el alcance de la señal transmitida y el ancho de banda. Bajo esta premisa, la tecnología de red que mejor se adapta a los requisitos descritos es LPWAN (Low Power Wide Area Network), que describe redes de área amplia y baja potencia específicas para IoT. En este trabajo nos apoyamos en dos de los sistemas más populares de comunicaciones LPWAN para redes IoT: Sigfox y LoRa. Para ello, se ha realizado un estudio de las capacidades y prestaciones de cada uno de ellos, así como un análisis de cobertura en casos reales. Basándose en estas tecnologías, se ha diseñado una arquitectura propia de red mixta y flexible, capaz de combinar diferentes soluciones de comunicación IoT, que permite la conexión de objetos IoT sin la restricción de la tecnología empleada y capaz de adaptarse durante el despliegue a las necesidades de cada aplicación. Con esta solución se habilita la coexistencia tanto de dispositivos Sigfox como LoRaWAN y queda abierta la posibilidad de otras tecnologías. Además se facilita la interoperabilidad tanto de los dispositivos desarrollados en este trabajo, como los comercialmente disponibles aunque provengan de diferentes fabricantes. La arquitectura propuesta se ha validado sobre un caso real aplicado a la telelectura y telecontrol en contadores de consumo de agua residencial. Se ha llevado a cabo el diseño, implementación y evaluación de una solución especializada en el manejo de agua residencial mediante el desarrollo y conexión de dispositivos inteligentes de medición de consumo de agua integrados en una arquitectura IoT mixta LoRaWAN-Sigfox. Esta solución permite hacer una gestión eficiente de la red de distribución. A diferencia de la mayoría de los sistemas actuales, y haciendo uso de comunicación bidireccional, permite, además de la telelectura, actuar a distancia sobre el equipo del cliente interrumpiendo el suministro en caso de incidencias. La telelectura inteligente proporciona un mayor volumen de datos sobre el agua consumida, lo que posibilita un ahorro en el consumo de agua contribuyendo al desarrollo de la directiva para el agua de la Unión Europea y a un mejor desarrollo de las Smart Cities o ciudades inteligentes. Los resultados obtenidos durante el despliegue y con respecto a un sistema de telelectura en servicio en banda ISM de 169 MHz, demuestran que se ha mejorado la tasa de recepción de datos aplicando tecnologías LPWAN para IoT, lo que convierte a estos dispositivos en una alternativa viable frente a soluciones comerciales disponibles. Se ofrece una solución innovadora y de bajo coste para ampliar el área de cobertura de la red a zonas de sombra en ubicaciones adversas utilizando también tecnologías IoT. [ENG] The "Internet of Things" (IoT) is gaining importance and increasing participation in every field worldwide. This trend does not only apply to people in their daily lives, but also becomes a determining factor for companies. What some years ago was a potential technology of enabling new digital business initiatives and operational improvements, today it has evolved to the implementation phase where is possible to interconnect a large number of devices. The planned connection of such an enormous amount of objects, envisages new challenges for the networks supporting them, and must have a high scalability to absorb the expected exponential growth as well as simplicity in the registration of new devices. Network coverage, energy consumption of devices and transmission bandwidth, are critical factors to be considered. Under this premise, the network technology that best adapts to the described requirements is LPWAN (Low Power Wide Area Network), which describes wide area and low power networks specific for IoT applications. In this work we rely on two of the most popular LPWAN communication systems for IoT networks, such as Sigfox and LoRa. To this end, a study of the capacities and benefits of each of them has been carried out, as well as a coverage analysis in real cases. Based on these technologies, an own mixed and flexible network architecture has been designed. It is able to combine different IoT communication solutions and allows the connection of IoT objects without the restriction of the used technology. In this way it can be adapted during the deployment to the needs of each application. With this solution the coexistence of both device types, Sigfox and LoRaWAN, is enabled and the possibility of other technologies is open. It also facilitates the interoperability of both, the devices developed in this work, and the commercially available from different manufacturers. The proposed architecture has been validated in a real case study applied to remote metering and remote control over water supply service. The design, implementation and evaluation of a specialized solution in residential water management has been carried out through the development and connection of smart water meter devices integrated in a mixed Sigfox- LoRaWAN IoT architecture. This solution allows efficient management of the distribution network. Unlike most of the current systems, and making use of bidirectional communication, it allows, in addition to remote reading, to act remotely on the client's equipment interrupting the supply in case of incidents. Smart remote metering provides a greater volume of data on the water consumed, which allows savings in water consumption, contributing to the development of the directive for water efficiency in the European Union and to a better development of Smart Cities. The results obtained during the deployment regarding to a system of remote metering in service in the ISM band of 169 MHz, show that the reception data rate has been improved by applying LPWAN technologies for IoT, which makes these devices a viable alternative to other available commercial solutions. An innovative and low-cost solution is offered to extend the coverage area of the network within shadow areas in adverse locations, also using IoT technologies. ; Escuela Internacional de Doctorado de la Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Programa de Doctorado en Tecnologías Industriales por la Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena
BACKGROUND: Prenatal exposure to air pollution has been associated with childhood respiratory disease and other adverse outcomes. Epigenetics is a suggested link between exposures and health outcomes. OBJECTIVES: We aimed to investigate associations between prenatal exposure to particulate matter (PM) with diameter [Formula: see text] ([Formula: see text]) or [Formula: see text] ([Formula: see text]) and DNA methylation in newborns and children. METHODS: We meta-analyzed associations between exposure to [Formula: see text] ([Formula: see text]) and [Formula: see text] ([Formula: see text]) at maternal home addresses during pregnancy and newborn DNA methylation assessed by Illumina Infinium HumanMethylation450K BeadChip in nine European and American studies, with replication in 688 independent newborns and look-up analyses in 2,118 older children. We used two approaches, one focusing on single cytosine-phosphate-guanine (CpG) sites and another on differentially methylated regions (DMRs). We also related PM exposures to blood mRNA expression. RESULTS: Six CpGs were significantly associated [false discovery rate (FDR) [Formula: see text]] with prenatal [Formula: see text] and 14 with [Formula: see text] exposure. Two of the [Formula: see text] CpGs mapped to FAM13A (cg00905156) and NOTCH4 (cg06849931) previously associated with lung function and asthma. Although these associations did not replicate in the smaller newborn sample, both CpGs were significant ([Formula: see text]) in 7- to 9-y-olds. For cg06849931, however, the direction of the association was inconsistent. Concurrent [Formula: see text] exposure was associated with a significantly higher NOTCH4 expression at age 16 y. We also identified several DMRs associated with either prenatal [Formula: see text] and or [Formula: see text] exposure, of which two [Formula: see text] DMRs, including H19 and MARCH11, replicated in newborns. CONCLUSIONS: Several differentially methylated CpGs and DMRs associated with prenatal PM exposure were identified in newborns, with annotation to genes previously implicated in lung-related outcomes. https://doi.org/10.1289/EHP4522. ; The UK Medical Research Council and the Wellcome Trust (Grant ref. 102215/2/13/2) provides core support for ALSPAC. A comprehensive list of grants funding is available on the ALSPAC website (http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/external/documents/grant-acknowledgements.pdf). This research was specifically funded by a joint grant from the UK Economic & Social and Biotechnology & Biological Sciences Research Councils (Grant ref. ES/N000498/1). ALSPAC was funded by the BBSRC (BBI025751/1 and BB/I025263/1). Air pollution exposure assessment was funded by Public Health England as part of the MRC-PHE Centre for Environment and Health, funded also by the UK Medical Research Council (Grant ref. MR/L01341X/1). BAMSE was supported by a European Union (grant agreement No. 261357), Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF) (RBc08-0027). E.M. is supported by a grant from the European Research Council under the European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 (H2020) research and innovation programme (grant agreement number 757919, TRIBALCHS: This work was supported by NIEHS grants K01ES017801, R01ES022216, and P30ES007048. EARLI was supported by NIH grants R01ES016443, R01ES023780, and R01ES017646 as well as by Autism Speaks (AS 5938). The ENVIRONAGE birth cohort is funded by the European Research Counsil (ERC-2012-StG.310898) and by funds of the Flemisch Scientific Research Council (FWO, N1516112/G.0.873.11N.10). The methylation assays were funded by the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 project EXPOsOMICS (grant no. 308610). Z.H. is supported by the Exposomics EC FP7 grant (Grant agreement no. 308610). ZH and A.G. and the Epigenetics Group at IARC are supported by grants from the Institut National du Cancer (INCa, Plan Cancer-EVA-Inserm, France) and Association pour la Recherche sur le Cancer (ARC, France). The EWAS data was funded by a grant to VWJ from Netherlands Genomics Initiative (NGI)/Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) Netherlands Consortium for Healthy Aging (NCHA; project no. 050-060-810), by funds from the Genetic Laboratory of the Department of Internal Medicine, Erasmus MC. V.W.J. also received a grant from Netherlands Organization for Health Research and Development (VIDI 016.136.361) and a Consolidator Grant from the European Research Council (ERC-2014-CoG-648916). J.F.F. has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement no. 633595 (DynaHEALTH). This project received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (733206, LIFECYCLE). HELIX was supported by funding from the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-206) under grant agreement no 308333 – the HELIX project. R.G. received the grant of the Lithuanian Agency for Science Innovation and Technology (No. 45 31V-66). The Norwegian Mother and Child Cohort Study (MoBa) is supported by the Ministry of Health and Care Services and the Ministry of Education and Research, NIH/NIEHS (contract no. N01-ES-75558), NIH/NINDS (grant no. 1 UO1 NS 047537-01 and grant no. 2 UO1 NS 047537-06A1). INMA was funded by grants from Instituto de Salud Carlos III (Red INMA G03/176), Generalitat de Catalunya-CIRIT 1999SGR 00241, and EU Commission (261357; 211250; 268479). Piccolipiù was funded by the Italian National Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (CCM grant 2010). The methylation assays were funded by the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007–2013 project EXPOsOMICS (grant no. 308610). Z.H. is supported by the Exposomics EC FP7 grant (Grant agreement no: 308610). Z.H. and A.G. and the Epigenetics Group at IARC are supported by grants from the Institut National du Cancer (INCa, Plan Cancer-EVA-INSERM, France) and Association pour la Recherche sur le Cancer (ARC, France). Rhea: The methylation assays were funded by the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme FP7/2007-2013 project EXPOsOMICS (grant no. 308610). Z.H. is supported by the Exposomics EC FP7 grant (grant agreement no. 308610). ZH and A.G. and the Epigenetics Group at IARC are supported by grants from the Institut National du Cancer (INCa, Plan Cancer-EVA-INSERM, France) and Association pour la Recherche sur le Cancer (ARC, France). PRISM: R.J.W. received funding for the PRISM cohort under R01 HL095606 and R01 HL1143396. A.C.J. is supported by R00 ES023450. Project Viva was supported by grants from the NIH (NIH R01 HL 111108, R01 NR013945, R01 HD 034568, K24 HD069408, K23 ES022242, P01ES009825, R01AI102960, P30 ES000002) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (R832416, RD834798). MeDALL: The methylation study of MeDALL cohorts was funded by MEDALL, a collaborative project supported by the European Union under the Health Cooperation Work Programme of the 7th Framework Programme (grant agreement no. 261357). The Biobank-Based Integrative Omics Studies (BIOS) Consortium is funded by BBMRI-NL, a research infrastructure financed by the Dutch government (NWO 184.021.007). BAMSE: was supported by the Project b2014110
Background: The Pan-African Society of Cardiology (PASCAR) has identified hypertension as the highest area of priority action to reduce heart disease and stroke on the continent.Objectives: The aim of this PASCAR roadmap on hypertension was to develop practical guidance on how to implement strategies that translate existing knowledge into effective action and improve detection, treatment and control of hypertension and cardiovascular health in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) by the year 2025.Methods: Development of this roadmap started with the creation of a consortium of experts with leadership skills in hypertension. In 2014, experts in different fields, including physicians and nonphysicians, were invited to join. Via face-to-face meetings and teleconferences, the consortium made a situation analysis, set a goal, identified roadblocks and solutions to the management of hypertension and customized the World Heart Federation roadmap to Africa.Results: Hypertension is a major crisis on the continent but very few randomized controlled trials have been conducted on its management. Also, only 25.8% of the countries have developed or adopted guidelines for management of hypertension. Other major roadblocks are either government and health-system related or health care professional or patient related. The PASCAR hypertension task force identified a 10-point action plan to be implemented by African ministries of health to achieve 25% control of hypertension in Africa by 2025.Conclusions: Hypertension affects millions of people in SSA and if left untreated, is a major cause of heart disease and stroke. Very few SSA countries have a clear hypertension policy. This PASCAR roadmap identifies practical and effective solutions that would improve detection, treatment and control of hypertension on the continent and could be implemented as is or adapted to specific national settings.
This issue of the journal "History of Science and Technology" has been prepared in difficult conditions. In difficult conditions for authors… In difficult conditions for reviewers . In difficult conditions for the editorial board… In difficult conditions for the whole world in general!!! This issue contains ten articles. The first of these articles came in late 2019, when the world did not know yet these terrible words: Corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19); severe acute respiratory syndrome Corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)… COVID-19 was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, and has since spread worldwide, resulting in an ongoing pandemic. As on May 29, 2020, when these lines were written, more than 5800000 cases were recorded in 188 countries, killing more than 359000 people. We hope that humanity will invent a vaccine as soon as possible, and these horrific death statistics will first stop growing and then stop altogether. For this, many events and activities are important, as history shows. Including the history of the development of science and technology, that is the subject area of our publication. In many sources on the history of electric power production the evolution of electric power production was studied both in developed and developing countries and its impact on economy. The growing demand for electric power became the most problem that stood before the power sector of Ghana. This issue begins with an article examining activities that in many ways helped to create a sustainable electricity supply for households and industries in Ghana, especially in the cities of Accra and Kumasi, between 1900 and 1960. Scientific-technical borrowings are one of those types of scientific support for the work of industrial sectors, whose role in the conditions of exiting the crisis to acquiring the particular importance. Since the mid-1920s, they have become the main way of scientific support for the organization of the development of Ukrainian electric machine-building industry in the context of large-scale electrification of the country. That was due to the need for a quick withdrawal of this industry from the previous crisis in the absence in the Ukrainian SSR of its own scientific support system for the electric machine engineering. An example of this measure, which was considered in the study, was an attempt to achieve the fastest possible increase in productivity of the Kharkiv Electromechanical Plant at minimal financial cost. The next article analyzes the activities of the mining industry in the south of the Russian Empire, of which Ukraine was a part of that time. An analysis of the so-called "coal crisis" and the role of large miners in collusion has been made. Market monopolization has been considered. Emphasis is made on the customs policy of the tsarist government, speculation on temporary fuel difficulties. The study shows that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a consolidation and monopolization of the mining industry in the south of the Russian Empire. In the 21st century, every reputable journal also has an online version, which makes the dissemination of scientific information almost instantaneous. We are so accustomed to the conveniences of the information age that it is difficult for us to imagine the difficulties that scientists faced a little over 150 years ago. The genesis of science launched the process of forming branch of scientific communities and demanded stable ways of communication for productive and effective development of the branch. Scientific journals have become an ideal means of disseminating information, and a scientific article has been transformed from an ordinary letter into a modern form and has taken on an ideal form. The importance of international communication between scientists, on the example of consideration of the activities of Valerian Mykolaiovych Lihin, is discussed in the following study. He became the first Russian-speaking member of one of the oldest Mathematical Societies in Europe - the French. V. Lihin broke the tradition of "isolated" science when discoveries in the Russian Empire (and later in the USSR) were made separately from the rest of the world. In the next article an attempt to investigate in a chronological order the historical circumstances on the formation and development of the mainline electric locomotives engineering at the Luhansk diesel locomotives engineering plant (1957–2014) has been made. Historical and biographical research is continued by the article, which considers the factors shaping the scientific worldview of Mykola Pavlovych Petrov - an outstanding scientist and engineer against the background of his initiative and organizational efforts to develop the domestic scientific and technical space of the late nineteenth - early twentieth The article devoted to highlighting the contribution of academician Mariia Vasylivna Pavlova (Gortynska) in the development of palaeozoology science at the end of the XIX – the first third of the XX centuries continues the cycle of historical and biographical researches. We hope that our readers will be interested in scientific work, examining the research of Russian women in the field of human genetics in 1920-1930. The main task of the article was to determine the contribution of women scientists to the development of different fields of human genetics. Particular attention was given to reconstructing women's geneticists' research work, reviewing the content of their publications, and analyzing the theoretical and methodological approaches they employed in solving various scientific problems. In the history of Ukrainian archeology, there are many names of outstanding researchers who have devoted their lives to the study of our antiquity. Among them is Yulian Kulakovskyi, a well-known domestic historian and archeologist. In 1883 Yu. A. Kulakovskyi joined the Nestor Chronicler Historical Society. Since that time, his life and career have been closely linked to this scientific union. The analysis of the results of researches in the field of late antique archeology of the Crimea, published on the pages of "Readings of the Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler", is discussed in the next article. The development of the spread of COVID-19 shows that in the fight against it in the first place are such measures and actions as unrestricted access to information on methods of combating the spread of the virus; exchange of data at the international level on treatment methods of the disease; communication between scientists from different countries; timely quarantine measures, etc. In this sense, it is important to study the historical experience of mankind in the fight against pandemics. This issue of the journal History of Science and Technology concludes with an article on a critical analysis of nineteenth-century military interventions as the main cause of the spread of infectious diseases internationally. Emerging problems and solutions obtained as a result of a critical analysis of the materials of the International Sanitary Conferences reveal the history of the spread of infectious diseases and the methods of early statistics used for epidemiological purposes. Concluding this Preface, we emphasize once again the importance of a comprehensive study of international historical experience in the development of science and technology. Not limited to any one field or field of science, we are ready to provide the pages of our journal for the opportunity to exchange views with the international scientific community. Let peace and health be with everyone in these hard times! ; This issue of the journal "History of Science and Technology" has been prepared in difficult conditions. In difficult conditions for authors… In difficult conditions for reviewers . In difficult conditions for the editorial board… In difficult conditions for the whole world in general!!! This issue contains ten articles. The first of these articles came in late 2019, when the world did not know yet these terrible words: Corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19); severe acute respiratory syndrome Corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)… COVID-19 was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, and has since spread worldwide, resulting in an ongoing pandemic. As on May 29, 2020, when these lines were written, more than 5800000 cases were recorded in 188 countries, killing more than 359000 people. We hope that humanity will invent a vaccine as soon as possible, and these horrific death statistics will first stop growing and then stop altogether. For this, many events and activities are important, as history shows. Including the history of the development of science and technology, that is the subject area of our publication. In many sources on the history of electric power production the evolution of electric power production was studied both in developed and developing countries and its impact on economy. The growing demand for electric power became the most problem that stood before the power sector of Ghana. This issue begins with an article examining activities that in many ways helped to create a sustainable electricity supply for households and industries in Ghana, especially in the cities of Accra and Kumasi, between 1900 and 1960. Scientific-technical borrowings are one of those types of scientific support for the work of industrial sectors, whose role in the conditions of exiting the crisis to acquiring the particular importance. Since the mid-1920s, they have become the main way of scientific support for the organization of the development of Ukrainian electric machine-building industry in the context of large-scale electrification of the country. That was due to the need for a quick withdrawal of this industry from the previous crisis in the absence in the Ukrainian SSR of its own scientific support system for the electric machine engineering. An example of this measure, which was considered in the study, was an attempt to achieve the fastest possible increase in productivity of the Kharkiv Electromechanical Plant at minimal financial cost. The next article analyzes the activities of the mining industry in the south of the Russian Empire, of which Ukraine was a part of that time. An analysis of the so-called "coal crisis" and the role of large miners in collusion has been made. Market monopolization has been considered. Emphasis is made on the customs policy of the tsarist government, speculation on temporary fuel difficulties. The study shows that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a consolidation and monopolization of the mining industry in the south of the Russian Empire. In the 21st century, every reputable journal also has an online version, which makes the dissemination of scientific information almost instantaneous. We are so accustomed to the conveniences of the information age that it is difficult for us to imagine the difficulties that scientists faced a little over 150 years ago. The genesis of science launched the process of forming branch of scientific communities and demanded stable ways of communication for productive and effective development of the branch. Scientific journals have become an ideal means of disseminating information, and a scientific article has been transformed from an ordinary letter into a modern form and has taken on an ideal form. The importance of international communication between scientists, on the example of consideration of the activities of Valerian Mykolaiovych Lihin, is discussed in the following study. He became the first Russian-speaking member of one of the oldest Mathematical Societies in Europe - the French. V. Lihin broke the tradition of "isolated" science when discoveries in the Russian Empire (and later in the USSR) were made separately from the rest of the world. In the next article an attempt to investigate in a chronological order the historical circumstances on the formation and development of the mainline electric locomotives engineering at the Luhansk diesel locomotives engineering plant (1957–2014) has been made. Historical and biographical research is continued by the article, which considers the factors shaping the scientific worldview of Mykola Pavlovych Petrov - an outstanding scientist and engineer against the background of his initiative and organizational efforts to develop the domestic scientific and technical space of the late nineteenth - early twentieth The article devoted to highlighting the contribution of academician Mariia Vasylivna Pavlova (Gortynska) in the development of palaeozoology science at the end of the XIX – the first third of the XX centuries continues the cycle of historical and biographical researches. We hope that our readers will be interested in scientific work, examining the research of Russian women in the field of human genetics in 1920-1930. The main task of the article was to determine the contribution of women scientists to the development of different fields of human genetics. Particular attention was given to reconstructing women's geneticists' research work, reviewing the content of their publications, and analyzing the theoretical and methodological approaches they employed in solving various scientific problems. In the history of Ukrainian archeology, there are many names of outstanding researchers who have devoted their lives to the study of our antiquity. Among them is Yulian Kulakovskyi, a well-known domestic historian and archeologist. In 1883 Yu. A. Kulakovskyi joined the Nestor Chronicler Historical Society. Since that time, his life and career have been closely linked to this scientific union. The analysis of the results of researches in the field of late antique archeology of the Crimea, published on the pages of "Readings of the Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler", is discussed in the next article. The development of the spread of COVID-19 shows that in the fight against it in the first place are such measures and actions as unrestricted access to information on methods of combating the spread of the virus; exchange of data at the international level on treatment methods of the disease; communication between scientists from different countries; timely quarantine measures, etc. In this sense, it is important to study the historical experience of mankind in the fight against pandemics. This issue of the journal History of Science and Technology concludes with an article on a critical analysis of nineteenth-century military interventions as the main cause of the spread of infectious diseases internationally. Emerging problems and solutions obtained as a result of a critical analysis of the materials of the International Sanitary Conferences reveal the history of the spread of infectious diseases and the methods of early statistics used for epidemiological purposes. Concluding this Preface, we emphasize once again the importance of a comprehensive study of international historical experience in the development of science and technology. Not limited to any one field or field of science, we are ready to provide the pages of our journal for the opportunity to exchange views with the international scientific community. Let peace and health be with everyone in these hard times! ; This issue of the journal "History of Science and Technology" has been prepared in difficult conditions. In difficult conditions for authors… In difficult conditions for reviewers . In difficult conditions for the editorial board… In difficult conditions for the whole world in general!!! This issue contains ten articles. The first of these articles came in late 2019, when the world did not know yet these terrible words: Corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19); severe acute respiratory syndrome Corona virus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)… COVID-19 was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, China, and has since spread worldwide, resulting in an ongoing pandemic. As on May 29, 2020, when these lines were written, more than 5800000 cases were recorded in 188 countries, killing more than 359000 people. We hope that humanity will invent a vaccine as soon as possible, and these horrific death statistics will first stop growing and then stop altogether. For this, many events and activities are important, as history shows. Including the history of the development of science and technology, that is the subject area of our publication. In many sources on the history of electric power production the evolution of electric power production was studied both in developed and developing countries and its impact on economy. The growing demand for electric power became the most problem that stood before the power sector of Ghana. This issue begins with an article examining activities that in many ways helped to create a sustainable electricity supply for households and industries in Ghana, especially in the cities of Accra and Kumasi, between 1900 and 1960. Scientific-technical borrowings are one of those types of scientific support for the work of industrial sectors, whose role in the conditions of exiting the crisis to acquiring the particular importance. Since the mid-1920s, they have become the main way of scientific support for the organization of the development of Ukrainian electric machine-building industry in the context of large-scale electrification of the country. That was due to the need for a quick withdrawal of this industry from the previous crisis in the absence in the Ukrainian SSR of its own scientific support system for the electric machine engineering. An example of this measure, which was considered in the study, was an attempt to achieve the fastest possible increase in productivity of the Kharkiv Electromechanical Plant at minimal financial cost. The next article analyzes the activities of the mining industry in the south of the Russian Empire, of which Ukraine was a part of that time. An analysis of the so-called "coal crisis" and the role of large miners in collusion has been made. Market monopolization has been considered. Emphasis is made on the customs policy of the tsarist government, speculation on temporary fuel difficulties. The study shows that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century there was a consolidation and monopolization of the mining industry in the south of the Russian Empire. In the 21st century, every reputable journal also has an online version, which makes the dissemination of scientific information almost instantaneous. We are so accustomed to the conveniences of the information age that it is difficult for us to imagine the difficulties that scientists faced a little over 150 years ago. The genesis of science launched the process of forming branch of scientific communities and demanded stable ways of communication for productive and effective development of the branch. Scientific journals have become an ideal means of disseminating information, and a scientific article has been transformed from an ordinary letter into a modern form and has taken on an ideal form. The importance of international communication between scientists, on the example of consideration of the activities of Valerian Mykolaiovych Lihin, is discussed in the following study. He became the first Russian-speaking member of one of the oldest Mathematical Societies in Europe - the French. V. Lihin broke the tradition of "isolated" science when discoveries in the Russian Empire (and later in the USSR) were made separately from the rest of the world. In the next article an attempt to investigate in a chronological order the historical circumstances on the formation and development of the mainline electric locomotives engineering at the Luhansk diesel locomotives engineering plant (1957–2014) has been made. Historical and biographical research is continued by the article, which considers the factors shaping the scientific worldview of Mykola Pavlovych Petrov - an outstanding scientist and engineer against the background of his initiative and organizational efforts to develop the domestic scientific and technical space of the late nineteenth - early twentieth The article devoted to highlighting the contribution of academician Mariia Vasylivna Pavlova (Gortynska) in the development of palaeozoology science at the end of the XIX – the first third of the XX centuries continues the cycle of historical and biographical researches. We hope that our readers will be interested in scientific work, examining the research of Russian women in the field of human genetics in 1920-1930. The main task of the article was to determine the contribution of women scientists to the development of different fields of human genetics. Particular attention was given to reconstructing women's geneticists' research work, reviewing the content of their publications, and analyzing the theoretical and methodological approaches they employed in solving various scientific problems. In the history of Ukrainian archeology, there are many names of outstanding researchers who have devoted their lives to the study of our antiquity. Among them is Yulian Kulakovskyi, a well-known domestic historian and archeologist. In 1883 Yu. A. Kulakovskyi joined the Nestor Chronicler Historical Society. Since that time, his life and career have been closely linked to this scientific union. The analysis of the results of researches in the field of late antique archeology of the Crimea, published on the pages of "Readings of the Historical Society of Nestor the Chronicler", is discussed in the next article. The development of the spread of COVID-19 shows that in the fight against it in the first place are such measures and actions as unrestricted access to information on methods of combating the spread of the virus; exchange of data at the international level on treatment methods of the disease; communication between scientists from different countries; timely quarantine measures, etc. In this sense, it is important to study the historical experience of mankind in the fight against pandemics. This issue of the journal History of Science and Technology concludes with an article on a critical analysis of nineteenth-century military interventions as the main cause of the spread of infectious diseases internationally. Emerging problems and solutions obtained as a result of a critical analysis of the materials of the International Sanitary Conferences reveal the history of the spread of infectious diseases and the methods of early statistics used for epidemiological purposes. Concluding this Preface, we emphasize once again the importance of a comprehensive study of international historical experience in the development of science and technology. Not limited to any one field or field of science, we are ready to provide the pages of our journal for the opportunity to exchange views with the international scientific community. Let peace and health be with everyone in these hard times!
n/a ; Timeline of key events: March 2011: Anti-government protests broke out in Deraa governorate calling for political reforms, end of emergency laws and more freedoms. After government crackdown on protestors, demonstrations were nationwide demanding the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad and his government. July 2011: Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS), paid his first visit to Syria, after his assumption of duties, and demanded the regime to end violence, and release detainees. August 2011: LAS Ministerial Council requested its Secretary General to present President Assad with a 13-point Arab initiative (attached) to resolve the crisis. It included cessation of violence, release of political detainees, genuine political reforms, pluralistic presidential elections, national political dialogue with all opposition factions, and the formation of a transitional national unity government, which all needed to be implemented within a fixed time frame and a team to monitor the above. - The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed of army defectors, led by Col. Riad al-Asaad, and backed by Arab and western powers militarily. September 2011: In light of the 13-Point Arab Initiative, LAS Secretary General's and an Arab Ministerial group visited Damascus to meet President Assad, they were assured that a series of conciliatory measures were to be taken by the Syrian government that focused on national dialogue. October 2011: An Arab Ministerial Committee on Syria was set up, including Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Sudan and LAS Secretary General, mandated to liaise with Syrian government to halt violence and commence dialogue under the auspices of the Arab League with the Syrian opposition on the implementation of political reforms that would meet the aspirations of the people. - On October 26, the Ministerial Committee held discussions in Damascus with President Assad. - The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) in Istanbul, the first opposition coalition of different groups, but failed to gain international recognition because of deep divisions. November 2011: Syrian government agreed to implement a new Arab Action Plan (attached) endorsed by LAS Ministerial Council to end all acts of violence, release detainees, withdraw Syrian military and armed forces from cities, and ensure freedom of movement for journalists and observers throughout the country. -LAS Ministerial Council suspended the membership of Syria (November 16), and imposed economic sanctions (November 27) and some member states withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, as it failed to comply with the Action Plan. December 2011: Negotiations with Damascus were resumed and an agreement is finally reached on the implementation of the Action Plan. LAS Observer Mission was deployed in Syria to monitor the implementation of the plan (December 24). - The Mission later submitted a report (attached) covering the period from 24 December 2011 to 18 January 2012 in accordance with the mandate conferred by the protocol concluded between the Syrian government and LAS. The report was divisive among the members of the Arab League, as it blamed both the regime and the opposition for the violence. January 2012: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7444 (attached) which called on the Syrian President to immediately hand over power to his deputy in order to begin the process of a political transition, which would include negotiations with the opposition, the formation of a national unity government, and the holding of elections. The resolution also, requested the Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and the Secretary General to brief the United Nations Security Council on the developments and get it to endorse the plan. - On January 22, Saudi Arabia withdrew its monitors, followed by the other GCC members on January 24. - On January 28, the Secretary-General of LAS announced the suspension of the activities of the observer mission, given the serious deterioration of the security situation. - On January 31, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al-Thani, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar, Chair of the Arab Ministerial Committee and Dr. Nabil Elaraby, Secretary General of the League of Arab States briefed the Security Council (attached) on Arab efforts and called on the council to adopt a draft resolution submitted by Morocco, supporting Arab League resolution 7444 (which called on the Syrian President to hand over power to his deputy) February 2012: - On February 4, Russia and China vetoed a draft Security Council resolution (attached), tabled by Morocco (the Arab member of the Security Council) and others. - On February 12, the Arab League adopted its resolution 7446 (attached), practically "transferring the file" to the United Nations Security Council. - On February 16, the issue was taken to the General Assembly, which adopted its Resolution 66/253, calling-among other things- for the appointment of a Special Envoy. - On February 23, former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy (JSE) of the United Nations and the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis, to facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution. - On February 24, and upon the initiative of President Sarkozy of France, the first meeting of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People was held in Tunis, with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States to discuss the worsening situation in Syria. The group noted the Arab League's request to the United Nations Security Council to issue a resolution to form a joint Arab-UN peacekeeping force following a cessation of violence by the regime, and called on LAS to convene a meeting of all disparate opposition groups to agree on a clear statement of shared principles for a transition in Syria. The meeting recognized the SNC as a legitimate representative of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change. Text of the Conclusions of the Meeting. March 2012: The SNC formed a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance. - The JSE, Kofi Anan, submitted a six-point peace plan to the UN Security Council (which the council adopted in April in its resolution 2042), that called for commitment to a Syrian-led political process, achieve an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties, ensure provision of humanitarian assistance, intensify the release of arbitrarily detained persons, ensure freedom of movement for journalists and respect the freedom of demonstrating peacefully. It was later approved by the Syrian government, and the opposition remained skeptical. April 2012: United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was established by United Nations Security Council resolution 2043 (attached) initially for a 90-day period, to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan on ending the conflict in Syria. June 2012: The Action Group for Syria, with the participation of the Secretary Generals of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, chaired by the JSE, met in Geneva and adopted the Geneva Final Communique (attached) which called for the establishment of a transitional governing body, with full executive powers, as part of the agreed principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led political transition. July 2012: The Syrian Opposition meeting was held under the auspices of LAS in Cairo, and reached an agreement on a national compact and a detailed transition plan. The two documents complemented the guidelines and principles laid out by the Action Group in Geneva. August 2012: UNSMIS mandate came to an end owing to an intensification of armed violence and use of heavy weapons. - Prime Minister Riad Hijab defected, and US President Obama's first direct threat of force against Syria, if Assad's regime deploys or uses chemical or biological weapons, calling such action a "red line" for the US. - Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan announced his resignation because of the Security Council failure to reach binding resolutions; Lakhdar Brahimi succeeded Annan as the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab states for Syria (JSR). September 2012: Egypt hosted the high level preparatory meeting of the regional Quartet on Syria on September 10, which included Turkey and Saudi Arabia key backers of the Syrian Revolution, and Iran the major supporter of al-Assad regime, in an initiative to bring together regional powers to voice their positions on how to end the Syrian conflict. - On September 17, the Quartet's ministerial meeting took place in Cairo; Saudi Arabia opted out while Iran proposed a peace plan which called on all parties to cease violence and stop all financial and military support to the opposition, and suggested the deployment of observers from the quartet's nations to Syria. The participants failed to reach an agreement. October 2012: a four-day ceasefire attempt was announced towards late October, in respect to Eid al-Adha Holiday, which was breached on the first day in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. November 2012: National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Qatar, responding to repeated calls from their Western and Arab supporters to create a cohesive and representative leadership, it excluded Islamist militias. December 2012: US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognized SOC as "legitimate representative" of the Syrian people. January 2013: the Emir of Kuwait hosted the first pledging conference on Syria, international donors pledged more than $1.5bn to help civilians affected by the conflict in Syria. March 2013: LAS Ministerial Council adopted resolution 7595 (attached) to recognize SOC as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Syrian people and called on the SOC to establish an executive body to take up Syria's seat. April 2013: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, released a recorded audio message announcing Jabhat al-Nusra as an extension of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria. The leader of al-Nusra, Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, refused the merger. Divisions among the jihadists emerged. - Hezbollah's involvement deepened when it led the ground assault on Al-Qusayr, a Sunni town in Homs province by the Lebanese border. August 2013: The Assad regime was accused of using chemical weapons in Eastern Ghouta to kill hundreds of civilians. The government denied using chemical weapons. President Obama sought congressional authorization for the use of force. September 2013: UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2118 (attached) requiring the Syrian regime to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal by mid-2014, and avoid military strikes. December 2013: US and Britain suspended "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports Islamist rebels seized some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army. January 2014: the Geneva II Conference on Syria was held in Montreux on January 22, and attended by 37 states, 4 organizations and both Syrian parties. Iran was invited by SG Ban Ki- Moon on January 19, the Opposition declared its refusal to attend if Iran was not excluded, the US viewed Iran's invitation "as conditioned on Iran's explicit and public support for the full implementation of the Geneva Communique"; Iran refused any preconditions to the talks, and refused to endorse the Geneva Communique specially the transitional governing body. February 2014: two rounds of negotiations to discuss: 1- ending violence and 2-combating terrorism, 3-transitional governing body, national institutions, and 4- national reconciliation and national debate. The Syrian government refused to discuss a transitional government and insisted on discussing combating terrorism. The talks came to a halt. May 2014: JSR Brahimi announced his resignation because of the lack of progress and failure to agree on an agenda. - Iran proposed a political settlement of four points; a comprehensive cease-fire at national level, forming a national unity government consisting of the regime and the internal Syrian opposition, by transferring presidential powers to the government whereby the government will enjoy wide-ranging powers in years to come, and preparation for presidential and parliamentary elections. - Syrian rebels withdrew from the Old City of Homs, under an Iranian brokered deal and facilitated by the UN, after three years of Syrian government bombardment and siege. June 2014: President Assad held presidential elections, he was re-elected for another seven-year term allegedly winning 88.7% of the votes. July 2014: UN Secretary-General announced the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria (SE)- NOT as a joint envoy with LAS. August 2014: US-led coalition began its airstrikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and expanded its strikes to Syria the following month, focusing on the city of Raqqa. September 2014: SE held his first round of consultations with concerned capitals, since taking up his office, it included his a visit to Damascus where he met with President Assad, senior officials and the tolerated internal Syrian opposition. October 2014: SE focused on establishing a series of local ceasefires, "freeze zones", starting with Aleppo, which aimed at the de-escalation of violence and allowance of the return of normalcy to it. February 2015: SE briefed the Security Council members on the 17th, announcing Syria's willingness to halt all aerial bombardment over Aleppo for a period of six weeks. It was not clear when would the freeze go into effect, reporting that a date would be announced from Damascus. June 2015: Egypt hosted the second Syrian Opposition meeting in Cairo, which excluded the National Coalition and announced a new road map to resolve the crisis which did not abolish Assad's government. July 2015: SE announced that his office would facilitate intra-Syrian working groups to generate a "Syrian-owned framework document" on the implementation of the Geneva Communiqué. Main themes of the groups were Safety and Protection for All, Political and Constitutional Issues, Military and Security Issues, and Public Institutions, Reconstruction and Development. September 2015: Russia conducted its first airstrikes against IS in Syria. The US and the Syrian Opposition claim it is targeting rebel-held areas instead. October 2015: First meeting of International Syria Support Group (ISSG) took place in Vienna, it included China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States. They agreed on a nine-point plan, but still had substantial divisions on the future of Assad. It was the first time Iran and Saudi Arabia were brought to the same table. November 2015: Second meeting of the ISSG was held in Vienna adding LAS to its members. They set a time frame to prepare for a parallel ceasefire and political process by January 2016 that would lead to credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance within six months, followed by the drafting of a constitution and elections within 18 months. Jordan was tasked to develop a list of groups and individuals identified as terrorists, and Saudi Arabia to hold a meeting to unify the Syrian opposition and prep for the talks with the government. December 2015: - Syrian political and armed opposition factions met in Riyadh, to agree on a common position to negotiate with Syrian government, and resulted in the formation of the High Negotiating Committee (HNC). The main Kurdish group was excluded, while Islamist hardliners such as Jaysh Al-Islam and Ahrar Al-Sham were present. - The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) joined the follow-up meeting of the ISSG in New York, Saudi Arabia and Jordan briefed the group on their tasks. There was no agreement on the list of identified terrorists, especially with Russia's insistence on adding Ahrar Al-Sham to the list, which is considered pivotal to the unified Opposition bloc. - UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2254 (attached) which reaffirmed the road map set out by the ISSG and urged the Support Group to apply pressure on the Syrian parties to put an immediate end to the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilians, and allow unimpeded access to humanitarian aid convoys. January 2016: the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian participants, in accordance with the parameters outlined in Security Council resolution 2254, to start on the 25th with proximity talks and had expected to last for six months. The HNC requested assurances of goodwill from the government as precondition to beginning of talks, such as release of prisoners or lifting of sieges. February 2016: Talks were delayed and lasted two days before they were suspended for three weeks. - The ISSG met on the margins of the Munich Security Conference and decided that humanitarian access will commence same week of meeting to besieged areas, and an ISSG task force would elaborate within one week modalities for a nationwide cessation of hostilities. - The US and Russia announced the adoption of the terms for a cessation of hostilities in Syria, and proposed that the cessation of hostilities commence at 00:00 (Damascus time) on February 27, 2016. The cessation of hostilities does not apply to "Daesh", "Jabhat al-Nusra", or other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council. - The Security Council endorsed the announcement in its resolution 2268 (attached). March 2016: SE announced March 9 set as target date of resumption of talks in Geneva. On March 14, SE resumed the intra-Syrian proximity talks in Geneva, which mainly discussed procedural matters to reach a shared list of principles and relied on Security Council resolution 2254 as its agenda. - SE briefed the Security Council on the cessation of hostilities which lowered overall levels of violence and more than 238,000 people had been reached with humanitarian aid. - On the same day, President Putin announced the withdrawal of most Russian forces from Syria, after it had largely fulfilled their objectives in Syria, and SE stated that it would have a positive impact on the negotiations. - On March 17, the PYD announced the establishment of a federal system in Kobane, Afrin and Cizire cantons in northern Syria, and its Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria-Rojava (DFNS) announced its final declaration. Both the Syrian government and other opposition affiliates denounced the plan, as well as the United States. - On March 24, the SE ended the first round by submitting a paper on the commonalities between the Syrian sides regarding the future of Syria and would help structure the next round that would address political transition. - Syrian government forces retook Palmyra from the Islamic State, with Russian air assistance. April 2016: The SE paid visits to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran ahead of the new round of talks. - The third round of proximity talks were set to start on April 13, which coincided with the parliamentary elections in the government-controlled areas in Syria. The SE met with the High Negotiations Committee delegation (Syrian Opposition) in Geneva and was expected to meet with the Syrian Government delegation within the following days. - During the 13-27 April round of negotiations, the SE developed a Mediator's Summary that identified eighteen points necessary to move forward on political transition arrangements. - on April 28, airstrikes in Aleppo on al-Quds hospital supported by both Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross, which killed dozens of civilians and medical personnel. May 2016: The Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2286 (attached) which called for the protection of civilians and medical facilities during armed conflict. - On May 4, the US-Russia brokered a 48-hour ceasefire in which helped reduce the violence, and was later extended for another 72 hours. - On May 9, France held a ministerial Friends of Syria meeting in "Paris Format", attended by the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Jordan, and issued a statement that called on the resumption of negotiations, unimpeded access of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of international law obligations to the protection of civilians. - Later on the same day, the United States and Russia issued a joint statement on Syria to reconfirm their commitment to intensify their efforts to implement a nationwide ceasefire and promote humanitarian assistance in accordance to security council resolution 2254. - On May 17, the fourth meeting of the ISSG took place in Vienna and reaffirmed its determination to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition. Australia, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands and Spain joined the group. June 2016: The SE announced that the time is not yet right for a resumption of the intra-Syrian talks because of the escalation of violence in Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia and other rural areas around Damascus, but the intention is to begin an official third round as soon as possible. - Riad Hijab, the Coordinator of the Opposition High Negotiations Committee, proposed a nationwide truce throughout the month of Ramadan. - On June 16, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria announced that 16 of the 18 besieged areas have been reached since the humanitarian taskforce started in late February. - On June 21, the SE briefed the United Nations General Assembly on the situation in Syria regarding the cessation of hostilities and humanitarian assistance access, as for the resumption of talks, it is yet to be decided and the OSE currently holds technical meetings with the parties on core issues. July 2016: - On July 6, the Syrian army declared a three-day nationwide "regime of calm" in respect to Eid al-Fitr holidays nonetheless pro-regime forces continued to engage in clashes and airstrikes across the country, particularly near the flashpoints of Damascus and Aleppo City. - On July 14, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow to discuss a proposal for bilateral military cooperation in the Syria; The proposal calls for the establishment of a 'Joint Implementation Group' (attached) based in Amman, Jordan to "support deliberate targeting" of Syrian Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and "maximize independent but synchronized efforts" against ISIS in Syria, according to a draft memorandum leaked by the Washington Post. - On July 25, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefed the security council (attached) on the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Aleppo due to the escalation of violence over the Castello Road, the last access route in and out of eastern Aleppo, and the continuous attacks on medical facilities. O'brien called on the security council not to allow turning Aleppo into another besieged area where 250,000 to 275,000 people reside, and called to establish a weekly, 48-hour humanitarian pause to enable humanitarian aid deliveries across borders. - On July 28, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced, right after the Syrian government announced it has cut off the Castello Road and encircled the city of Aleppo, setting up three humanitarian corridors in Aleppo City to allow in food and medical aid, and help people flee the besieged city; the fourth corridor would be established in northern Aleppo near the Castello Road to allow the withdrawal of armed insurgents, and appealed to the Syrian government to provide guarantees to the amnesty provided to rebels to lay down their weapons. - On the same day, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, Jabhat al-Nusra's Leader announced split from al- Qaeda and mentioned that its new name would be Jabhet Fateh al-Sham, in order to get the group off the terrorist list and "to remove the excuse used by the international community – spearheaded by America and Russia – to bombard and displace Muslims in the Levant: that they are targeting al-Nusra Front, which is associated with al-Qaida". - On July 29, the SE commented on the Russian initiative in a press stakeout, that it should take into consideration a few improvements such as putting the 48-hour humanitarian pause into place on a sustainable basis irrespective of the humanitarian corridors; and suggested "to actually leave the delivery of aid through corridors to the UN and its partners"; and stressed that civilians should leave voluntarily, and given the option of leaving to areas of their own choice. August 2016: - On August 1, a Russian helicopter was downed near Saraqeb, in rebel-held Idlib province, on its way back to Russia's main air base in Hmyeim in the western province of Latakia, killing the five Russian military personnel on board. The downing of the helicopter marked the single deadliest event for Russia since its air campaign began in Syria on September 29, 2015. No group claimed the shooting down of the helicopter. - Since then, Russian warplanes conducted retaliatory airstrikes against several small opposition-held areas in the vicinity of Saraqeb. Syrian rebels accuse Russia of using incendiary munitions while conducting airstrikes against Idlib City on August 7, suggesting that Russia intended to achieve punitive and deterrent effects against opposition forces in the province. - In the early weeks of August, rebel forces launched a major assault, known as the "battle for Aleppo", on government-held southwestern towns of Aleppo City, to break the siege, and control supply lines in the south connected to eastern Aleppo. They claimed breaking the siege and capturing Ramouseh Artillery Academy, parts of the cement plant and Khan Touman-Ramouseh road. Intense fighting between warring parties continues to claim control over previously lost vicinities. - On August 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Turkish President Recep Tayip Erdogan in St. Petersburg, after the Turkish President officially apologized for the downing of a Russian military aircraft on June 27, 2016, and announced during a press conference that they discussed lifting of Russia's ban on imports of Turkish products, resumption of charter flights, the Turkish Stream project, Syrian settlement, and anti-terrorism efforts. - On August 10, Lieutenant-General Sergei Rudskoi, a senior Russian Defence Ministry official, announced a daily three-hour ceasefires in Aleppo, starting August 11, to allow humanitarian convoys enter the city safely, and would run from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. local time. - On August 16, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian aircrafts took off from Iranian airbase Hamedan to carry out airstrikes on ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra-held facilities in the provinces of Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zour. - On August 18, the SE adjourned the HTF meeting as humanitarian convoys could not reach any of the besieged towns during the month, and called for at least a 48 hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo to deliver UN humanitarian assistance, through the Castello Road, to all parts of Aleppo City. - Also, on August 18, the Syrian government forces, unprecedentedly, launched strikes against Kurdish forces in Hasakeh in Northern Syria, after pro-government National Defense Forces (NDF) were engaged in clashes with the military wing of the Kurdish Workers Party, known as Asayish. The Syrian government claimed that "Asayish had escalated their acts of provocation attacking state establishments, stealing oil and cotton, disrupting examinations, carrying out abductions, and causing a state of chaos and instability, in addition to targeting positions of the Syrian Arab Army which required a suitable response by the Army as it targeted the sources of artillery fire and the gatherings of armed elements responsible for these criminal actions." - On August 19th, while the Kurdish fighters pushed back government forces and their allies, the Pentagon threatened to shoot down Syrian government aircrafts as they pose a threat to the US Special Forces deployed in the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) area. - On August 21, it was announced that a truce agreement had been reached between YPG and NDF, through Russian mediation, to start on August 21, 2016 at 17:00, which involved evacuating the wounded and transporting them to hospitals in Qamishli, and restore the situation to how it was prior to the clashes and hold talks on August 22 to resolve the remaining unresolved issues. - On August 22, most likely the ceasefires agreement failed as fighting escalated. - On August 24, Turkey and the International Coalition Air Forces launched "Operation Euphrates Shield" offenses to support the Free Syrian Army aligned with U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces SDF against IS militants in Jarablus, in northern Syria. - On August 26, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, addressing a joint press conference after their meeting in Geneva, announced that they failed to reach a breakthrough deal on military cooperation and a nationwide cessation of hostilities in Syria, saying they still have issues to resolve before an agreement could be announced. - On August 27, Kurdish militias targeted Diyarbakir airport in southeast Turkey, near the borders with Syria. Turkey retaliated by warplanes and artillery on targets held by Kurdish-backed forces the following day, despite US pentagon's criticism of the fighting. September 2016: - On September 4, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildrim announced that Turkish military forces and Ankara-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) had successfully purged the border region, from Azaz to Jarablus, from "terrorist organizations." - On September 9, the US and Russia reached a deal which called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, and unimpeded humanitarian access to all besieged areas starting on September 12th. If sustained for seven continuous days, the U.S. and Russia would establish a Joint Implementation Center (JIC) in order to share intelligence and coordinate airstrikes against both ISIS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). - On September 21, the cessation of hostilities deal was implemented with regular violations, while the Syrian government continued to block humanitarian access to opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo City despite the agreement. - On September 17, the US-led coalition accidentally launched an air strike on Syrian government forces in Deir ez-Zour. - On September 19, a UN humanitarian convoy was shelled near Urum al-Kubra near Aleppo, killing 20 humanitarian aid workers and drivers, and destroying 18 out of 31 trucks. The US blamed Russia and the Syrian government for the attack; the latter declared unilaterally the end of the ceasefire agreement. - On September 20, the UN temporarily suspended its humanitarian aid to Syria after the attack, while international powers failed to reach a consensus to restore the ceasefire during an acrimonious UN Security Council Meeting on September 21st as well as two separate meetings of the International Syria Support Group on September 20 and September 22. - On September 22, the Syrian government announced a new military offensive in the rebel-held eastern Aleppo, and further escalation in a bombing campaign by Russian and Syrian airstrikes that had already intensified the day before. - On September 25, the Security Council Meeting discussed the recent escalation of violence in Aleppo after the Syrian government announced its intention to retake all of Aleppo City, and the SE called on the Security Council to "to press for a cessation of violence, and for the protection of civilians, and the civilian infrastructure; secondly to press for weekly 48-hour pauses in the fighting to ensure that the United Nations and its partners can reach eastern Aleppo, without preconditions from either the Government or the Opposition; and thirdly to press for medical evacuations of urgent cases." - On September 27, the Syrian government launched a large scale ground offensive in eastern Aleppo, and state media announced that it recaptured the central district of Al-Farafirah northwest of the Aleppo Citadel. - On September 29, the YPG set conditions to participate in operations to seize IS-held Raqqa City: the US provides arms to the YPG, recognizes its autonomy of the Federation of Northern Syria, and ensures that the Syrian Kurds are officially invited to participate in peace talks. October 2016: - On October 1, continuous airstrikes in eastern Aleppo damaged a major hospital codenamed M10, which was partially closed because of the raids. - On October 2, Stephen O'brien, the Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, urged warring parties and their supporters to bring about a cessation of all hostilities, a medical evacuation system for eastern Aleppo, and regular unimpeded humanitarian access to eastern Aleppo, and he reiterated his plea to the Security Council for a 48-hours weekly humanitarian pause in fighting, at the very least. - In an official statement, the Syrian Army offered amnesty to fighters and their families to leave Aleppo under guarantee of safe passage to other rebel-held areas, after the Syrian regime forces recaptured strategic areas on the northern outskirts of the city. - On October 3, the EU announced an emergency humanitarian initiative for Aleppo, in cooperation with the United Nations and civil society organizations, in order to facilitate the urgent delivery of basic life-saving assistance to civilians in eastern Aleppo, and ensure medical evacuations with focus on women, children and the elderly. The EU has mobilized 25 million euros to support its humanitarian partners' response to cover medical, water and sanitation, and food assistance in Aleppo. The HNC issued a statement welcoming the European initiative to protect civilians in Aleppo. - The Security Council began negotiations over a draft resolution, circulated by France and Spain, which demanded all parties to the Syrian conflict "implement and ensure full implementation of cessation of hostilities, including an end to all aerial bombardments", and called on the US and Russia to "undertake joint efforts to stabilize the situation in Syria, with special measures for the Aleppo region", as well as the UN Secretary-General to propose options for a UN-supervised monitoring mechanism of the ceasefire and to "take further measures" in case of non-compliance of any party, without invoking chapter 7 of the UN Charter. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault headed to Moscow and Washington to push for a vote on the draft resolution. - The United States suspended talks with Russia on trying to end the violence in Syria and accused Moscow of not complying with its commitments under the ceasefire agreement and would withdraw all personnel that were dispatched to prepare for military cooperation with Russia. - On October 4, Prince Zeid Ra'ad, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, warned over the use of incendiary weapons in Syria, and demanded bold initiatives such as limiting the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Russia rejected Zeid's call. - The Russian Defense Ministry declared its deployment of S-300 missile system to its Tartus naval base in Syria. - On October 6, the SE offered in a press conference to escort up to 1000 al-Nusra fighters to bring an end to the bombardment by Russian and Syrian forces to Idlib or anywhere else of their choice. While the Russian Defense Ministry announced it would shoot down US-led coalition jets if the US launches airstrikes against pro-government forces in Syria, after American officials had discussed using limited airstrikes to force government forces to halt its raids on Aleppo. - On October 7, Russia called for a Security Council emergency meeting to hear the SE's briefing (attached) on the situation in Aleppo, while the Russian Parliament ratified Moscow's deal with Syria on its "indefinite" deployment of forces. - On October 8, the Security Council held a meeting on Aleppo, and voted on the Russian-drafted resolution calling for the revival of the ceasefire deal, without mention of ending military fights in the city, and on the French-drafted resolution. The French draft received eleven votes in favor, China and Angola abstained, while Russia and Venezuela voted against. The Russian text only received four votes in favor of China, Egypt and Venezuela, Angola and Uruguay abstained, while the remaining nine council members voted against. - On October 9, France announced its intention to call the ICC for war crimes investigation in Syria, and shall contact the ICC Prosecutor on how to launch these investigations, putting into consideration that the only way is through the Security Council referral, which had been vetoed before by Russia in May 2014. - On October 13, the Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy confirmed the Syrian Government's approval of the October aid plan and for convoys to reach 25 of 29 besieged and hard-to-reach areas across Syria, but not to eastern Aleppo and three parts of the rural Damascus province. - On October 15, US Secretary of State John Kerry hosted a meeting on Syria in Lausanne, with the participation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and seven foreign ministers from the region, from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt, with the presence of the SE. The meeting failed to reach a joint statement on how to end the bombardment of Aleppo or on the aid delivery to the besieged towns. - On October 16, the UK's Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson held a meeting with his US, French and German counterparts and "like-minded" Gulf Arab states on the Syrian conflict in London. The UK and the US announced their consideration of imposing more sanctions against Russia and the Syrian Government to halt their ongoing raids on Aleppo. - On October 17, the European Council condemned the Syrian regime and Russia for their deliberate and indiscriminate bombardment of civilians and infrastructure in Eastern Aleppo, and called for a monitored cessation of hostilities, lift of sieges, and a nationwide sustainable humanitarian access. - On October 18, the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced the cease of Russian and Syrian airstrikes on Aleppo to hold an 8-hour humanitarian pause on October 20th, in order to allow civilians and medical evacuations through six humanitarian corridors, and expected militants would withdraw with their weapons through two corridors, one via the Castello Road and the other near the souq al-Hai area in the south of the city. It was later announced that the eight-hour pause will be extended to eleven hours for four days. The armed opposition groups (AOGs) rejected the proposal in a joint statement claiming that "the initiative came at the same time as forced displacement operations are being carried out by the Assad regime in the Damascus suburbs of al-Mouadamiya, Qudsiya and al-Hama, and before that in Daraya." - On October 20, in conclusion of the EU summit, the EU failed to reach an agreement on imposing sanctions on Russia for the escalation of violence in Aleppo, and stated that "the EU is considering all available options should the current atrocities continue." The unilateral ceasefire took effect, and the Syrian Army declared that it would last for three days while artillery exchanges erupted around a crossing point near the rebel-controlled Bustan al-Qasr district shortly after the pause began. The Secretary-General and the SE briefed the General Assembly in an informal session on the situation in Syria, in response to an initiative led by Canada, after the Security Council failed to take action to end the aerial bombardment on Aleppo and revive peace efforts. - On October 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council held a special session on the deteriorating situation of human rights in Aleppo, upon the request of Britain (letter attached) that was submitted on behalf of a core group of 11 Western and Arab states. The Council adopted a resolution by a 24 in favor vote, seven against and 16 abstentions. It urged "the immediate implementation of the cessation of hostilities, and demanded that the regime and its allies put an immediate end to all aerial bombardments of and military flights over Aleppo city. The Council demanded that all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities and its supporters, promptly allowed rapid, safe, unhindered and sustained humanitarian access, including across conflict lines and borders." The Council further "requested the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic to conduct a comprehensive, independent special inquiry into the events in Aleppo, and identify all those responsible for alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law. It further requested the Commission of Inquiry to support efforts to ensure that perpetrators of alleged abuses and violations be held accountable, and to provide a full report of the findings of its special inquiry to the Human Rights Council no later than its thirty-fourth session." - On October 22, the humanitarian pause expired without any evacuations made and without further renewal despite the UN request. No medical evacuations had been made as no security guarantees had not been granted as requested by the UN. - On October 23, Turkey intensified its strikes targeting IS militants and Kurdish YPG forces in the town of al-Bab, in an attempt to sweep them away from its borders. The Turkish-backed FSA gained control over three areas of Tuways, al-Gharz and Tlatinah south of Akhtarin in northern Aleppo two days later. - On October 25, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov stated Moscow's willingness to restore the ceasefire in Aleppo and that the Western-backed opposition forces should be separated from terrorist groups in order to be able to move forward; after the UN had blamed all parties for the failure of evacuating injured people in Eastern Aleppo during the three-day ceasefires and called for "a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire so that life-saving humanitarian activities, including medical evacuations, can resume," meanwhile the Syrian Ambassador to Moscow ruled out any opportunity to restore the ceasefires. - On October 26, a school in the village of Haas, in rebel-held Idlib, was hit by a raid of airstrikes, causing the death of twenty-two children and six teachers. The UN Secretary-General called for an immediate investigation on this attack, as it could amount as war crimes if deliberate. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that the damage was not consistent with an airstrike. - On October 27, Virginia Gamba, the head of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism, presented the mechanism's findings to the Security Council. The report indicated that of the nine cases the JIM investigated, the Syrian regime used chlorine gas against civilians in three cases and the IS used mustard gas in one case. In the remaining five cases, the JIM investigated allegations that the government dropped chlorine bombs in rebel-held areas. While the JIM could not make a conclusive determination in three of these five cases, it was able to establish that government airstrikes had occurred and the presence of a toxic substance, but it was unable to fully determine the link between the two, or the actors responsible. Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin questioned the JIM's findings, and expressed reservations over the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the mechanism for another year, which would end on 31 October 2016. - The EU added ten top Syrian officials to its sanctions list who are held responsible for "violent repression against the civilian population in Syria." - On October 28, Syrian rebels relaunched Aleppo counter-attack aiming to break the siege imposed on Eastern Aleppo. The factions included the FSA and Jaish al-Fath targetting government-held Western Aleppo. - Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem met with his Russian and Iranian counterparts in Moscow to discuss counterterrorism, the cessation of hostilities and improvement of humanitarian operations, and the resumption of the intra-Syrian talks. The three ministers held a joint press conference following their meeting. - On October 30, SE condemned Syrian rebels for the indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Western Aleppo, raising the number of casualties in the last 48 hours. - On October 31, the Security Council extended the mandate of the UN-OPCW JIM until November 18, 2016. November 2016: - On November 1, in a teleconference with the leaders of the Russian Armed Forces, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu mentioned that Russia had halted air strikes on eastern Aleppo for 16 days, following western criticism over a Russian-Syrian government assault that killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure. - On November 2, DM Shoigu announced that it would enforce a 10-hour humanitarian pause in Aleppo on November 4, to allow civilians and fighters to exit the city through eight safe corridors. - On November 4, despite the announced unilateral ceasefire in Aleppo, there were no sign of civilians or fighters leaving the city, and opposition fighters vowed to continue fighting to break the siege. - On November 6, the SDF declared the launch of Operation "Wrath of the Euphrates" in the IS capital of Raqqa, which aimed at surrounding and isolating the city as an initial phase, in coordination with the US-led coalition airstrikes. The SDF had rejected any Turkish role to liberate the city. - On November 8, the Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that the first attack from the Admiral Kuznetsov, the aircraft carrier, and heavily armed escort ships were to bomb rebel positions in Aleppo. - On November 10, Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, declared in a press stakeout following the weekly HTF meeting that Eastern Aleppo had run out of food rations, and that the UN had proposed an initiative of four elements which included delivery of food and medical supplies, medical evacuations and access for health workers. - On November 11, the OPCW Executive Council condemned all parties for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, after voting on a US-tabled text in a closed session. The text was supported by 28 members, including Germany, France, the United States and Britain; it was opposed by Russia, China, Sudan and Iran, and there were nine abstentions. - On November 15, Russia launched its "major operation" targeting the IS and Jabhat al-Nusra's positions in Idlib and Homs provinces. Heavy airstrikes and barrel bombs pounded Eastern Aleppo after the pause declared by Russia and the Syrian Government on October 18. It is considered the first mission operated from the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. - The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a draft resolution tabled by Saudi Arabia on the human rights situation in Syria, by a vote of 116 in favor, to 15 against with 49 abstentions. It called upon the Syrian regime and the IS to cease using chemical weapons, and stop their attacks on civilians. - On November 17, the UN Security Council adopted the US-draft resolution to extend the mandate of the UN-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism to 18 November 2017. - On November 20, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem held talks with the SE in Damascus, on the latest escalation of violence, the targeting of medical facilities and infrastructure, and the humanitarian initiative in Eastern Aleppo. The UN proposal of the withdrawal of al-Nusra fighters while maintaining the opposition's local administration of Eastern Aleppo; the proposal was rejected by the Syrian Government and called it a violation of "national sovereignty". - On November 23, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Ayrault announced that France would hold a meeting on Syria early December 2016. - On November 24, Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria briefed the press on the HTF meeting and the assistance deliveries of the month of November, not being able to reach besieged areas because of the absence of government approvals for convoys to enter and the escalation of violence. Egeland stated that the UN had received written approvals of the AOGs in eastern Aleppo and Russian support of the UN four-point plan, and still waiting for the government's approval. - On November 27, the rebels in Khan al-Shih town, in the outskirts of Damascus, handed in their weapons, as part of a local agreement with the Syrian government to withdraw to rebel-held Idlib province, so as government siege would be lifted. It was the only town not under government control on a major supply route from Damascus to Quneitra, in southern Syria. - On November 29, Egypt, New Zealand and Spain put in blue their draft resolution calling to put an end to all attacks on Aleppo, and allow unimpeded humanitarian access for the period of 7-days with consideration of further extension. The draft was later vetoed on 5 December by Russia and China, Venezuela voted against, and Angola abstained. It is Russia's sixth veto on a Syria draft resolution, and China's fifth veto. - After the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo briefed Council members during Syria's chemical weapons consultations; the P3 announced they would circulate a draft resolution to impose sanctions on Syria for its use of chemical weapons against its own population. - On November 30, upon the request of France and the UK to hold an emergency meeting on Aleppo, SE Staffan de Mistura, USG Emergency Relief Coordinator Stephen O'brien and UNICEF Regional Director Geert Cappelaere briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, who agreed on the growing number of civilians fleeing eastern Aleppo and the dire need for safe humanitarian access. December 2016: - On December 1, ten AOGs announced the formation of 'Jaysh Halab' in Eastern Aleppo, in an attempt to unite their efforts to lift the siege and restore the districts where the pro-government militias took over in northeast and east Aleppo. It was led by Abu Abdul Rahman Nour, a senior commander in 'Jabhat al-Sham'. While Jan Egeland, Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, and the SE briefed the press on the humanitarian situation in Aleppo after the HTF meeting; they mentioned that over 400,000 IDPs are in west Aleppo, and UN convoys reached reached all towns under the Four-Towns Agreement, including Madaya, al-Foua and Kafraya, and Zabadani, and that the December Plan was yet to be approved by the Syrian government. - On December 3, the Syrian armed forces and its supporting militias advanced into east Aleppo, taking over 60 percent of the city that was once under rebel control since mid-2012. More than 80,000 civilians fled the area since the beginning of the regime's offense on November 15. - On December 7, AOGs called for a five-day ceasefire in Aleppo, and medical and civilian evacuations without mentioning the withdrawal of their fighters as demanded by Moscow and Damascus. Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Germany to discuss the evacuation of opposition-held districts of Eastern Aleppo, and no agreement was reached. While leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States released a joint statement on the situation in Aleppo calling for an immediate ceasefire and the resumption of political negotiations. - On December 8, the SE briefed the Security Council in closed consultations after the Russian announcement that it paused its operations in eastern Aleppo to allow the evacuation of civilians. Jan Egeland had said, after the weekly HTF meeting, that the co-chairs are "poles apart" on a united humanitarian diplomacy. IS launched a major offensive on Palmyra, seizing a number of gas fields in the north and few mountains in the south. - On December 9, the General Assembly adopted the Canadian-drafted resolution A/RES/71/130, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolutions 2268 and 2254. The resolution passed by a vote of 122 to 13, with 36 abstentions. Russia, Iran and China opposed the resolution. - On December 10, Paris hosted a meeting of "like-minded" counterparts on Syria; it brought together US Secretary of State John Kerry, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, along with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. They discussed the humanitarian situation, and called for a ceasefire and a post Aleppo plan, as Syrian government forces neared victory over rebels there. - On December 11, ISIS recaptured the city of Palmyra in Eastern Homs Province forces despite heavy air support provided by Russia. - On December 13, the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon briefed the Security Council on the situation in Aleppo, the growing number of IDPs and allegations of torture and executions. Meanwhile, AOGs agreed to evacuate their remaining positions in eastern Aleppo after the Syrian government recaptured the city and following an agreement between Russia and Turkey. The evacuation was initially scheduled to take place on 14 December, but was delayed after Iran called for simultaneous evacuations from the besieged Shi'a-majority towns of Fu'ah and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On December 15, the LAS held an emergency meeting at the level of representatives, based on Qatar's request, and adopted resolution 8105 condemning the attacks on civilians in Eastern Aleppo. - On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted the French-drafted resolution 2328 which demanded that the UN and other relevant agencies to carry out adequate and neutral monitoring of evacuations from eastern Aleppo, ensure the deployment of staff members for this purpose, and emphasized that the evacuations of civilians must be voluntary and to final destinations of their choice. Also, the LAS Ministerial Council welcomed resolution 8106 reiterating the necessity to establish a full cease-fire in Aleppo in accordance with the Security Council resolution 2328, and condemned terrorism in all its forms and crimes committed against civilians by ISIS, Fateh al- Sham Front, and that actions of both the Syrian regime and other militant groups may amount to war crimes. - Following the adoption of resolution 2328, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria announced "the intention of the United Nations to convene the intra-Syrian negotiations mandated by Security Council resolution 2254 in Geneva on 8 February 2017." - On December 20th, the foreign and defense ministers of Russia, Turkey and Iran held parallel trilateral meetings in Moscow, despite the assassination of the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov on December 19, and adopted the "Moscow Declaration" by which they agreed to act as guarantor powers for a peace accord between the Syrian government and the opposition. - On December 21, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a mechanism to assist in the investigation of serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011. The resolution received 105 votes for, with 52 abstentions, and 15 votes against (Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Burundi, China, Cuba, DPRK, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe). The UN Secretary-General submitted the report of the UN Headquarters Board of Inquiry that was established to investigate the humanitarian convoy incident in Urum al-Kubra on 19 September 2016., which stated that there is no enough evidence to conclude that the convoy was deliberately attacked. - On December 22, the Syrian army announced its full control over Aleppo, after the evacuations of the remaining rebel fighters. Evacuations had faced many delays because of Iran's demands to evacuate 1500 individuals from the opposition-besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya. On the following day, the Russian military deployed a battalion to clear the city from improvised explosive devices. - On December 23, USG Stephen O'brien briefed the Security Council, upon the request of France, "on the modalities of the evacuation of civilians and delivery of humanitarian aid in East Aleppo." Meanwhile, Syrian government forces bombed the water pumping station during its raid on opposition-held Wadi Barada, disrupting water supply to Damascus. - On December 26, Kazakhstan accepted the Russian proposal to host peace negotiations between the Syrian government and opposition forces to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, in January 2017. - On December 27, the Russian and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria, separate moderate opposition groups from UN designated terrorist groups, and prepare for the Astana talks. - On December 28-30, the DFNS met in the city of Rmeilan to approve the draft constitution, known as the social contract, which was adopted on January 29, 2014 to form its administrative system and prepare for elections. Kurdish leaders voted to drop the word "Rojava" from the official name to include other ethnic and religious components in northern Syria. - On December 29, Russia and Turkey submitted the countrywide ceasefire plan to the warring parties, which had taken effect at midnight on 30 December 2016 Damascus time. - On December 31, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2336 in support of the Russian- Turkish agreement and the meeting to be held in Astana on 23 January 2017. January 2017: - On January 2, the Russian and Turkish air raids targeted IS militants in northern Syrian city of al-Bab; while 10 rebel factions threatened they would suspend talks regarding Astana until the ceasefire is fully implemented because of "major and frequent violations" in the rebel-held areas of Wadi Barada and Eastern Ghouta near Damascus. - On January 5, the SE welcomed the nationwide ceasefire, and the Security Council resolutions on Aleppo and Astana talks, in a press briefing after the weekly HTF meeting. Jan Egeland Advisor to the Special Envoy for Syria, voiced disappointment over the government's denied aid access to 5 out 21 locations including places in Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. - On January 6, the Russian military started to cut down on its presence in Syria, Military Chief Valery Gerasimov mentioned that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov would be the first to withdraw from the Mediterranean. - On January 8, Syrian government airstrikes resumed on Wadi Barada after failing to reach an agreement with opposition groups to repair the damaged water springs. Later on January 14th, the retired army officer Ahmad al-Ghadban who negotiated the deal to restore the water was killed amid heavy clashes between rebels and pro-regime forces. Both sides accused each other. - On January 12, the US imposed sanctions on 18 senior Syrian officials who were connected to the development and use of chemical weapons including chlorine gas against civilians. It marked the first time the US sanctioned Syrian military officials. While Russia and Turkey signed an agreement to coordinate their airstrikes against terrorists in Syria. - On January 13, the Syrian state television accused Israel of targeting Mezzeh Airbase outside of Damascus. - On January 14, IS launched a major offensive against pro-regime forces (Hezboallah) in Deir al-Zor Province, cutting the communication between the military base and the city. - On January 16, the High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini will host an international conference on the future of Syria in Brussels, which "aims to identify with regional partners common ground on the post-conflict arrangements and examine the scope for reconsciliation and reconstruction of Syria." - On January 19, an agreement was reached in Wadi Barada, allowing regime maintenance teams to enter the area to fix the water pipes and grant rebels amnesty or safe passage to opposition-held Idlib. - On January 20, IS militants destroyed Palmyra's Tetrapylon with only four of sixteen columns still standing, and the facade of its Roman Theatre. The UNESCO condemned the act as a new war crime. - Russia and Syria concluded a bilateral agreement on expanding and modernizing of the Russian Naval Facility in Tartus. The agreement extends the current lease for the next forty-nine years with automatic extensions and permits the simultaneous deployment of up to eleven warships to the port. - On January 23-24, indirect talks between the Syrian government and opposition were held in Astana; the delegations refused to sign the joint declaration issued by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on setting up a "trilateral mechanism" to monitor and enforce the ceasefire. The new US administration was invited, despite Iran's objection, and was represented by its ambassador to Kazakhstan. The UN SE was present, and hoped Astana talks would support the intra-Syrian negotiations to be held in Geneva in February. - On January 24, the Russian delegation shared its draft of the Syrian Constitution with the Syrian delegations, and advocated the creation of a Constitutional Committee consisting of members of both delegations. - On January 23-24, Finland and UN agencies hosted the Helsinki Conference on Supporting Syrians and the Region, which launched the 2017-2018 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). - On January 25, the US President Donald Trump called for establishing safe zones for refugees in Syria, after suspending visas for Syrians and other middle eastern states. President Trump later held telephone conversations with Saudi King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and United Arab Emirates Armed Forces Deputy Supreme Commander Mohammed bin Zayed on January 29 to seek their support for his unidentified initiative. - On January 28-30, 1100 opposition fighters and 750 civilians evacuated Wadi Barada to Idlib Province, after reaching a reconciliation deal with pro-regime forces. The Syrian Forces reached Ain Fijeh spring to restore water to Damascus. - On January 30, the US delivered armored vehicles, medium and heavy weapons to SDF, in an attempt to isolate IS in al-Raqqa City. - On January 31, the SE briefed the Security Council in a closed session on the outcomes of the Astana talks and the upcoming intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which was pushed to February 20. He mentioned if the Syrian opposition could not form an inclusive delegation by 8 February, he would select its representatives himself. The Council members welcomed the International Meeting on Syria in Astana, in a press statement. February 2017: - On February 6, high-level experts from Russia, Iran, Turkey, Jordan and the UN held their first technical meeting in Astana to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire mechanism, and cooperation on humanitarian issues; they agreed on the Concept Paper on the Joint Group. The Joint Group held its first meeting and managed to identify all areas controlled by IS and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; the participants received two draft documents prepared by the Russians to be discussed in future Joint Group meetings, which are the Protocol to the Agreement on the mechanism to record violations of the cessation of hostilities in Syria announced on December 30, 2016 and the Procedure for imposing sanctions on violators, as well as the Regulation on Reconciled Areas. - On February 7, Amnesty International released its report (attached) on mass executions of as many as 13,000 detainees at Saydnaya Military Prison. Syrian authorities rejected the accusations. - On February 9, Russian airstrikes mistakenly kill three Turkish soldiers and injured eleven others near al-Bab city held by Turkish Armed Forces as part of Operation Euphrates Shield. Both sides agreed to strengthen their coordination. - On February 10-11, the HNC met in Riyadh and formed a delegation of 21 members, headed by Nasr al-Hariri; it included one representative each from the Cairo and Moscow groups. The HNC stated (Arabic statement attached) that the goal of the negotiations was a political transition under U.N. auspices in which Assad had no role in the future of the country. - On February 12, Turkish President Recep Erdogan stressed that the Operation Euphrates Shield aims to establish a five-thousand square kilometer 'safe zone' that includes Al-Bab, Manbij, and al-Raqqa City in Northern Syria. The safe zone would require the implementation of a no-fly zone, mentioning that he had discussed the issue with both the U.S. and Russia. - On February 13, the SE sent out invitations to the Syrian delegations for the intra-Syrian negotiations set to begin on February 23. - On February 15-16, the second round of talks took place in Astana a day later than scheduled; the opposition delegation was represented by only 9 armed groups from 14 groups which attended the first meeting; no direct meetings between the Syrian delegations were held and it ended without a final statement. The three guarantor states agreed to the Concept Paper on the Joint Group of the trilateral mechanism to observe the ceasefire, share information regarding the investigation of violations and promote confidence-building measures such as the release of detainees and abductees. - On February 17, a meeting between the "like-minded" states on Syria was held on the margins of the Bonn G20 Summit, and discussed Syria peace talks in Geneva. - On February 18, Turkey offered the US two proposals for an offensive against IS in al-Raqqa City that excludes the YPG. The preferred proposal calls for the insertion of opposition groups backed by Turkey into Tel Abyad in Northern al-Raqqa Province in order to advance against al- Raqqa City through a twelve-mile-wide corridor through terrain currently held by the SDF. The second proposal calls for opposition groups in Operation Euphrates Shield to advance more than one hundred miles from Northern Aleppo Province to Western al-Raqqa Province. - On February 21, the US CIA froze assistance to the FSA and its affiliated factions fighting in Northwestern Syria, after they came under an attack from Hay'at Tahrir al-sham HTS (successor of Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) in January. The aid included salaries, training, ammunition and in some cases guided anti-tank missiles. - On February 23, a fourth round of the intra-Syrian talks commenced in Geneva with no expectations of a breakthrough; the SE reiterated that that resolution 2254 sets the framework of the negotiations, which calls for the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, and sets a timeline for drafting a new constitution and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A day before in the ISSG Ceasefire Task Force meeting (CTF), Russia had called on the Syrian Government to halt aerial bombings during the discussions. - The Opposition groups backed by the Operation Euphrates Shield fully seized al-Bab in Northern Aleppo Province, after three months of clashes. - On February 24, the SE shared a paper on procedural issues, in bilateral meetings with the Syrian parties. The HNC held the Cairo and Moscow platforms responsible for the delay of direct talks, as they participated separately. - While Iraq conducted its first cross-border airstrikes against IS in Deir ez-Zour Province on the Syrian-Iraqi Border. The F-16 airstrikes were coordinated with the Syrian Government through a joint intelligence-sharing unit in Baghdad that includes Iraq, Syria, Russia, and Iran. Also, The U.S. provided intelligence in support of the operation. - On February 25, HTS claimed responsibility of a suicide attack on the State Security and Military Intelligence Offices in Homs City, killing at least forty pro-regime officers including Military Intelligence Branch Chief Brig. Gen. Hassan Dabul, so as to undermine the ongoing peace talks. The attacks prompted heavy airstrikes on al-Waer District, the Opposition's last strong-hold in the city. The HNC condemned the terrorist attack as per the Government's ultimatum. - On February 28, the UN Security Council voted on the French-British draft resolution which sought to ban the sale or supply of helicopters to the Syrian Government, and to blacklist 10 government and related entities involved in the production of chemical weapons. Nine countries voted in favor; Bolivia voted against the text, while Ethiopia, Egypt and Kazakhstan abstained. Russia casted its sixth veto backed by China. Britain and France had circulated the text in mid- December 2016, in response to the OPCW report findings proving government use of chlorine gas in three cases of the nine investigated cases. It was put on hold to asses US policy on Syria, the US later became a co-penholder after its unilateral sanctions on 18 Syrian senior officials on January 12. March 2017: - On March 1, the Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria issued its report on the violations committed by warring parties in the last battle of eastern Aleppo, and considered the targeting of vital civilian infrastructure, withholding the distribution of humanitarian aid, and the use of civilians as human shields and forced evacuation agreements amount to war crimes. - On March 2, the Syrian forces backed by Russian airstrikes and Shi'a militias recaptured the city of Palmyra for the second time after heavy clashes. - On March 3, the fourth round of talks concluded with a political agenda for the upcoming round, which comprises of three baskets addressing the establishment of credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, drafting a new constitution, and holding free and fair elections within 18 months. A fourth basket was added upon the request of the Syrian Government to address "strategies of counter terrorism, security, governance and also medium-term confidence building measures." - On March 6, Russia announced a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta until March 20, despite the continuation of airstrikes and mutual shelling. - On March 7, the US-allied SDF agreed to handover six villages near Manbij, on the frontline with Turkey-backed rebels to Syrian government control, under a Russian-brokered deal, in an attempt to stop further Turkish incursion. - On March 8, the SE de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the course of the talks, which aims to address the aforementioned baskets in parallel, and concluded that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed unless the sides decide otherwise." The Syrian groups are invited to resume talks on March 23. - Meanwhile, Russian, US, Turkish high-level military officials met in Antalya to discuss additional coordination measures and "operational de-confliction of military operations" in northern Syria. - On March 13, a Russian-brokered agreement was reached to evacuate rebel fighters from Homs city, which would be carried out within six to eight weeks, between 10,000-15,000 people were expected to leave Homs in weekly batches. The neighborhood was besieged by regime forces since 2013. - On March 14, the EU unveiled its plan in Syria "in contributing to a lasting political solution under the existing UN-agreed framework and in helping to build resilience and stability in the country, as well as supporting post-agreement reconstruction once a credible political transition is underway." - On March 14-15, the third round of talks was held in Astana, even though the AOGs had called for the postponement of the meeting to assess the commitment to the declared ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta. Invitations were sent to the United Nations, the United States and Jordan. On March 14, preliminary consultations were held while a plenary meeting was due on March 15. The results of the intra-Syrian consultations were expected to be discussed. Talks failed to reach any significant agreement, and the three guarantor states issued a joint statement, and scheduled the next high-level meeting in Astana on May 3-4, 2017 and agreed to hold preliminary expert consultations on April 18-19, 2017 in Tehran. - On March 15, two suicide bombs targeted Damascus on the sixth war anniversary; one of them hit the main judicial building, and both killed 74 people and wounding a hundred other. It was later claimed by Fateh al-Sham Front. - On March 18, rebels began to evacuate al-Waer neighborhood in Homs City, to the opposition-held northern town of Jarablus on the borders with Turkey. - On March 20, the EU imposed sanctions against four Syrian high-ranked military officials related to the use of chemical weapons. The ban includes assets freeze and travel ban, and it is considered the first time the EU blacklists military officials. - On March 21, the US-led coalition dropped the SDF fighters on the southern side of the Euphrates to to cut the Aleppo - al-Raqqa Highway. the SDF launched an operation to seize the Tabqa Dam west of al-Raqqa City on March 22 with extensive support from the US. - On March 22, a US-led coalition strike on a center for displaced families in al-Mansoura town held by ISIL in northern Raqqa, killed 33 people. Earlier this month, the coalition declared that its raids in Syria and Iraq unintentionally killed at least 220 civilians. - On March 23-31, the fifth round of talks in Geneva was held despite of the escalation of fighting in Damascus and Hama; the SE shared non-papers with all Syrian sides with some political principles reached during the five rounds, and received their comments and amendments. - On March 24, Russia proposed a draft resolution on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, that was reviewed in April 2016 and the UN Security Council did not support it. It was co-authored by China and Russia. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, forced displacement of populations, and called to hold all those responsible to account. - On March 27, the second phase of evacuations from al-Waer neighborhood took place, moving 466 citizens and 129 fighters. Meanwhile, the UN SE briefed the LAS Ministerial Council on the recent developments of the Geneva intra-Syrian talks and the Astana process. - On March 28, Russia condemned the US-led coalition airstrikes on the Tabqa Dam, and accused it of trying to "completely destroy critical infrastructure in Syria and complicate post-war reconstruction as much as possible." It further claimed that the coalition destroyed four bridges over the Euphrates river. - On March 29, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres addressed the annual Arab Summit, which was held in the Dead Sea, Jordan. He appealed to the Arab leaders to set aside differences and end the Syrian war. - An agreement was brokered by Iran and Qatar to swap Shi'ite citizens from the two pro-government towns of al-Foua and Kafraya, in the northwestern province of Idlib besieged by rebel fighters, with Sunni fighters and their families from the opposition-held towns of Zabadani and Madaya besieged by pro-government forces. The agreement was due to start on April 4 and would last 60 days; it included a ceasefire in the areas south of Damascus, aid deliveries, and the release of 1,500 prisoners held by the government. - On March 31, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson disclosed during his visit to Ankara that "longer-term status of President Assad will be decided by the Syrian people" and defeating ISIL is its priority, while U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said the priority was no longer "getting Assad out"; it was later reiterated by the White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer's briefing. April 2017: - On April 3, the European Foreign Affairs Council chaired by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini took place in Luxembourg, and adopted the EU Strategy on Syria. It held the Syrian regime responsible for the violations against human rights, and reaffirmed that "there can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime." - On April 4-5, the EU and its co-sponsors hosted the Brussels Conference on Supporting the future of Syria and the region. The co-chairs declaration took note of UN appeals requesting $8 billion in 2017 to cover the required needs inside Syria and its neighboring countries, and announced pledges raised worth about $11 billion for humanitarian aid programs. - On April 4, an alleged chemical attack on Khan Shaykhun in the province of Idlib was carried out during a Syrian government air raid on the city, which claimed the lives of at least 72 civilians. Russia denied its responsibility and claimed that Syrian airstrikes targeted a rebel chemical weapons warehouse which leaked poisonous gas. While the implementation of the evacuation deal of 30,000 people from the four towns of Kafraya, al-Foua, Madaya and Zabadani was delayed because of reservations of their residents. All 16,000 residents of al-Foua and Kafraya are expected to leave under the deal. - On April 5, the UN Security Council was briefed on the attack by the Acting High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Kim Won-soo on the reported use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. The US, UK and France had informally circulated a draft resolution which demands that the Syrian government must provide the JIM and the FFM with flight plans and logs of April 4, the names of all helicopter squadron commanders and provide access to air bases where investigators believe chemical attacks may have been launched. Russia criticized the text, and produced its own draft; it did not condemn neither the attack nor the Syrian government, but rather expressed deep concern over the alleged "incident with chemical weapons" and called for a full-scale investigation. Later on April 6, the ten elected members (E10) of the Security Council met at ambassador level to express their frustration for not being included in the negotiating process and discussed an alternative text which would substitute language in the P3 draft on the Syrian government's obligation to provide information on its activities with agreed language from resolution 2118. Neither resolution were tabled for a vote. - On April 6, the US waged retaliatory airstrikes against al-Shayrat airbase outside of Homs, where the chemical attack was launched. 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles had hit the airfield in Syria. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets and other infrastructure. - On April 7, Bolivia called for a Security Council briefing after the US airstrikes, and Russia announced its suspension of "the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents in the course of operations in Syria signed with the US." - On April 11, the White House released a declassified report drawn up by the National Security Council which confirmed that the Assad regime used sarin gas on its own people, and accused Russia for shielding for its allies. - On April 12, the Security Council held a meeting to vote on the P3 revised draft resolution (4th draft), which incorporated the language from resolution 2118 proposed in the E10 draft; after the SE had provided the council with his monthly briefing on the assessment of the intra-Syrian talks held in Geneva. Ten members voted in favor of the text, China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan abstained, while Bolivia joined Russia in voting against it. It is Russia's eighth veto against a Syria-related resolution. - On April 14, the evacuation of residents from the Shi'ite towns of al-Foua and Kafraya (besieged by opposition groups) began and their convoys headed towards the government-held Aleppo; meanwhile rebel fighters and their families left the town of Madaya (besieged by government forces) and headed towards Idlib. While the evacuation from Zabadani was delayed and expected to begin later the day. The four towns agreement began with the exchange of thirty prisoners and nine bodies on April 12. The evacuations resumed after a suicide attack that targeted a government loyalties convoy killing some hundred people including women, children and rebel fighters on April 15. - On April 19-20, over 2000 opposition fighters and civilians were evacuated from the besieged towns of Zabadani and Madaya in exchange for the evacuation of nearly 8000 pro-regime fighters and civilians from the besieged towns of al-Foua and Kafraya in Idlib Province. - On April 24, the US sanctioned 271 Syrians employed by the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center, related to the development of chemical weapons. The sanction froze the individuals' assets and prohibited US companies to conduct business with them. May 2017: - On May 3-4, military experts from the three guarantors held technical consultations ahead of the two-day fourth round of the Astana process, with the participation of the Director of the UN Mine Action Service Agnes Marcaillou. The SE de Mistura and Nawaf Uasfi Tel, Political Adviser to Jordan's Foreign Minister attended as observers, and the US was represented at a higher-level (for the first time) by US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs Stuart Jones. - Despite the Syrian Opposition delegation suspended their participation in opposition to the ongoing bombardments across Syria, the three guarantors signed the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in Syria, setting up four "de-escalation zones" in Idlib, parts of Homs, Eastern Ghouta, and parts of Deraa and al-Quneitra provinces in southern Syria. The Syrian government welcomed the Russian initiative while the Opposition rejected Iran's involvement as a guarantor. - On May 5, Russia sought UN endorsement to the agreement reached in Astana, and circulated a draft resolution calling on member states to contribute to the implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation zones in Syria. The resolution failed to pass for a vote on May 8, as western member states had reservations on the draft. - On May 6, Riad Seif was elected as the sixth president of the SOC, beating Khaled Khoja with 58 votes from the 102 member coalition. He would replace the current head Anas al-Abdeh, who was elected in March 2016. Also, Abdulrahman Mustafa and Salwa Ktaw were elected as vice presidents. - On May 8, the evacuation process of the government-besieged Damascus suburb of Barzeh began, around 1,022 people, including 568 rebels, headed towards Idlib and northern town of Jarablus near the Turkish borders; the second convoy of 700 rebels moved on May 12. While Walid al-Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, rejected any international forces under UN supervision to monitor the de-escalation zones deal. Meanwhile, the White House approved providing arms to Kurdish fighters as support to their operation to retake al-Raqqa City, despite Turkey's strong opposition. - On May 16, the FFM's report confirmed the use of sulfur mustard in the attack on Aleppo on Sept. 16, 2016, and was made public. The report was raised to the UN Security Council on May 5. The FFM, also, confirmed in its report, regarding its investigation of the April 4 attack on Khan Shaykhun, the use of sarin-gas or a sarin-like substance. The FFM is only mandated for indicating whether chemical weapons were used, while the JIM is mandated to determine responsibility for the attacks. - While the US Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned ten additional entities for providing support to the Syrian regime. - On May 16-19, the UN SE held the sixth round of the Intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, which ended without covering the four baskets of the agenda, only focusing on the constitutional issues. The SE shared a proposal with the parties to establish "a Technical Consultative Mechanism on Constitutional and Legal Issues;" the proposal would identify "options for the process of constitutional drafting, and for the conduct of a national conference/national dialogue, and identify for review specific options for ensuring a sound constitutional and legal basis for any framework agreed in Geneva embodying a package and including providing for credible, all-inclusive, non-sectarian governance," and that is through UN-facilitated expert-level meetings with both Syrian sides. - On May 18, while the EU Parliament adopted a resolution pertaining the EU Strategy on Syria, which the European Council for Foreign Affairs had passed on 3 April 2017; the US-led coalition's airstrikes destroyed a pro-Syrian regime convoy of the Iraqi Shi'ite militia of Kata'ib Imam Ali, that advanced along the Damascus-Baghdad Highway towards al-Tanf base (where the US, UK and Jordan train fighters of Jaysh Mughawir al-Thawra against IS in Eastern Syria). - On May 20-21, the evacuation of nearly 3000 people, some 700 fighters and their families, was completed from al-Waer district, the last opposition-held district in the province of Homs. According to Talal Barazi, Governor of Homs, more than 14,000 people had left al-Waer in several phases since the "reconciliation deal" began to be implemented in March. Among them were some 3,700 rebels, allowed to leave with their light weapons. Russia later deployed 50 to 150 Military Police into the district. - On May 22, the SE briefed the Security Council on the latest developments, and on the last round of the Intra-Syrian talks. He commended the Astana process for the reduction of violence in the agreed de-escalation areas, and urged its guarantors to finalize their agreement addressing the subjects of detainees, abductees and humanitarian demining. The SE asserted that the rounds' focus on legal and constitutional issues does not rule out "the principle of parallelism" in addressing the agenda, and that a new consultative process at a technical level was introduced to discuss relevant constitutional and legal matters. - On May 25, NATO leaders agreed in Brussels to become full members of the Global Coalition against ISIS; the organization would not engage in combat operations, but would provide air refueling to the Coalition's aircrafts, capacity building through the deployment of special forces to train local partners, and would establish an intelligence information cell to ensure information-sharing on foreign fighters. - On May 29, the final convoy of fighters and their families moved from the opposition-held besieged district of Barzeh in Damascus to Idlib Province; estimately more than 4000 fighters and civilians were evacuated from Barzeh and Eastern Ghouta under the Russian-brokered deal. - On May 30, the US delivered its first shipment of arms to the Kurdish-led SDF, which had advanced against IS in the eastern outskirts of al-Raqqa, seizing eight villages and taking control over the Ba'ath Dam. - On May 31, Russia's Grigorovich-Class Frigate Admiral Essen and Kilo-Class Submarine Krasnodar launched four cruise missiles targeting IS near Palmyra; it targetted arms depots of fighters relocating from al-Raqqa to Eastern Homs. Russia had notified the US, Turkey, and Israel of the strikes-On June 2, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini met with newly-elected President of the Syrian Opposition Council (SOC), Riad Seif, and Syrian Interim Government (SIG) Prime Minister, Jawad Abou Hatab, to discuss the political process and EU support for Syrian resilience. Both parties reiterated their commitment to the UN-led Geneva process. June 2017: -On June 4, pro-government forces gained control of Maskanah city, the last remaining ISIS stronghold in Aleppo governorate. The advances brought pro-government forces within 10 km of Raqqa's provincial border. -US-backed SDF captured a hydroelectric facility (Baath Dam) from ISIS militants, securing the final of three major dams along the Euphrates river. -On June 5, pro-government forces captured the areas of al-Alb, Bir Dahlon and Sharot Dahlon in Eastern Homs governorate, reportedly capturing over 6,000 sq km of ISIS-held territory. -On June 6, US-backed SDF announced the launch of the fifth phase of the campaign to capture Raqqa, ISIS' self-declared capital, with forces advancing from the north, east and west and the US-led Coalition supporting the offensive with air and artillery strikes. - The US-led Coalition conducted airstrikes against pro-government forces advancing near al- Tanf, a de-confliction zone in southeastern Syria. This marks the second strike in the area in less than a month, amid escalating tensions between the US and Iran-backed forces over control of Syria's southeastern frontier. - On June 8, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the UNSE de Mistura in Moscow to discuss "the consolidation of the cessation of hostilities, the fight against terrorism, the continuation of the political settlement on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254," according to the Russian Presidential Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The consultations were held prior to the fifth round of the Astana Process, which was set to take place in June, but was later postponed till the month of July. -On June 9, during a press briefing in Geneva at the conclusion of a meeting of the humanitarian task force set up by the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the SE declared that the time was not right to resume the UN-led intra-Syrian talks. -On June 13, the WFP delivered food to more than 80,000 displaced people in seven hard-to-reach areas in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor governorates in northern Syria, where regular deliveries of humanitarian assistance had been suspended for over three years. -On June 14, Chairman of the CoI, Paulo Pinheiro, expressed concern for the "staggering loss of civilian life" caused by US-led Coalition airstrikes as part of the Raqqa campaign, stating that airstrikes had led to the displacement of 160,000 civilians. He also stressed that the Astana agreement had led to a reduction in violence in just one of the four zones outlined in the memorandum. -On June 15, during a briefing to Council members, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, noted that "some progress" had been made in the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria. However, she highlighted the continued lack of safe access to two above-ground stationary facilities scheduled for destruction under OPCW supervision. -Pro-government forces targeted the opposition-held neighborhoods of Jobar and Eastern Ghouta in the first major attack since the announcement of four "de-escalation zones" at the Astana talks in May. Syrian Armed Forces seized the Arak gas field in the region of Badiya, which had been captured by IS since 2015; the SAF declared that it recaptured 20 percent of the Badiya region. -On June 16, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria declared that it had facilitated a meeting of technical experts from three opposition groups: the High Negotiating Committee, the Cairo Platform and the Moscow Platform as part of a technical consultation process announced at the end of the sixth round of intra-Syrian talks. The meetings focused on the timeline and process for drafting a new constitution. -On June 17, the SE announced that the seventh round of intra-Syrian talks would begin in Geneva on July 10, with further rounds tentatively planned for August and September. -The Syrian government declared a 48-hour ceasefire in the southern city of Daraa. The agreement, reportedly brokered by Russia, the US and Jordan, comes after an escalation in violence between pro-government forces and AOGs in Daraa. -On June 18, US-led coalition forces shot down a piloted Syrian government aircraft in southern Raqqa province. According to the Coalition statement, the aircraft was downed after it displayed hostile intent and advanced on coalition forces. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) released a statement following the incident claiming that the US shot down the Syrian jet while it was conducting an offensive against ISIS, and accusing the US of failing to use the "de-confliction channel". The MOD statement announced that Russia was cutting off participation in the de-confliction channel pending an investigation and that all kinds of airborne vehicles operating in combat mission zones west of the Euphrates River would be tracked by Russia as air targets. -Iran launched several ballistic missiles targeting ISIS positions in eastern Syria, reportedly carried out in retaliation for a terrorist attack in Tehran two weeks prior. This was Iran's first missile attack abroad in 15 years and its first in the Syrian conflict, representing an escalation of its role. -On June 19, the Syria Institute and PAX published the Sixth Quarterly Siege Watch Report, covering events from February to April 2017. -On June 20, an American fighter jet downed an "Iranian-made" armed drone in southern Syria after it "displayed hostile intent" when it approached coalition forces stationed at a base located in a de-escalation zone. It marked the second time in a month that the US had shot down an armed drone near Tanf camp. -On June 21, after opening a new front to the south of Raqqa, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came within several kilometers of fully encircling the city after having already surrounded Raqqa to the north, east and west. - Turkey deployed reinforcements to the towns of Azaz and Marea in northern Syria, held by turkey-backed Syrian opposition forces, in preparation of anticipated battles with its rival Kurdish forces. - French President Emmanuel Macron, contradicting previous French policy, that France sees "no legitimate successor" to Assad and no longer considers his departure as a precondition to resolve the ongoing conflict. On July 5, the president met with Riad Hijab, Head of the HNC, to reiterate France's support to the Syrian Opposition. -On June 22, Turkish and Russian troops were deployed to Syria's northern Idlib province as part of a de-escalation agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey and Iran in May. - WFP announced that the first aid convoy had reached 15000 civilians in the city of Qamishli by land route, since it had been inaccessible in 2015, and humanitarian aid was sent through air drops instead. -On June 24, the Syrian government released 672 detainees in a move it said was aimed at bolstering the reconciliation process. -On June 27, the SE briefed the Council on the situation in Syria, expressing his readiness to facilitate direct talks between the Syrian government and opposition either at a formal or technical level. -On June 28, OPCW-JIM published its sixth report updating the SC on the status of its review of two cases identified by the FFM concerning incidents reported in Umm Hawsh in Aleppo Governorate in September 2016 and Khan Shaykhun in Idlib Governorate on April 4, 2017. -On June 29, OCHA head Stephen O'brien briefed the Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite a reduction in violence in some areas of the country, humanitarian convoys remained unable to reach civilians in besieged and hard-to-reach places due to bureaucratic restrictions. O'brien also detailed the Secretary-General's monthly report on the situation in Syria, released June 23, that highlighted the Astana memorandum signed by Iran, Russia and Turkey in May and the escalation of anti-ISIS operations in Syria. -The OPCW released a report on progress in the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons program, verifying the destruction of 25 of the 27 chemical weapons production facilities previously declared by the Syrian government. However, the OPCW continues to express consideration that the initial declaration was incomplete. July 2017: -On July 1, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a strike against pro-government positions near al-Baath in Quneitra governorate in response to two stray artillery shells fired from Syria that landed in the Golan Heights. This is the fifth Israeli strike on pro-government positions near the area of al-Baath within a week. -On July 3, the UNSC appointed Catherine Marchi-Uhel to head the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, the UN legal team tasked with collecting and preserving evidence of the most serious crimes committed in Syria since 2011 to be used by national courts or an international tribunal. The Mechanism was established by the General Assembly on December 21, 2016 despite fierce resistance from Russia, which had previously used its veto status to block criminal investigations into the conflict. -The Syrian Army announced the suspension of all combat operations in the southern governorates of Daraa, Suweida and Quneitra for four days ahead of upcoming peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan. It is the second unilateral ceasefire by the Syrian Army; it had announced a ceasefire in Daraa along the border with Israel on June 17. -On July 4-5, the fifth round of Astana talks co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey, convened in the Kazakh capital. The talks failed to finalize details on the boundaries and monitoring mechanisms of the four safe zones agreed to during the fourth round of Astana talks in May. In a joint statement, the guarantors welcomed the establishment of an expert-level joint working group tasked with finalizing the operational and technical parameters of the de-escalation zones, and scheduled the next Joint Working Group meeting in Tehran, on August 1-2. -On July 6, Edmond Mulet, head of the three-member leadership panel of the OPCW-JIM briefed Security Council members on the June 28 report of its investigations into the culpability for chemical attacks in Syria and urged the international community to allow the Mechanism to conduct its work in an independent and impartial manner. -On July 7, the United States, Russia and Jordan reached a ceasefire and "de-escalation" agreement for southwestern Syria to take effect July 9. The specificities of an enforcement mechanism and the precise boundaries of the ceasefire zone. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that the ceasefire would cover the areas of Daraa, al-Suweida and Quneitra governorates without providing exact boundaries. The ceasefire agreement in southwestern Syria is separate from the Astana memorandum, and was reached during the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Hamburg. The SG welcomed the ceasefire announcement, calling it a significant step towards reducing violence and humanitarian access in Syria; while Israel voiced its objections on the deal. -On July 10, the seventh round of UN-led intra-Syrian talks convened in Geneva. The UN-sponsored talks were scheduled to focus on four points: drafting a new constitution, combating terrorism, governance and elections. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed hope that the talks would help solidify de-escalation zones created through the Astana process. The SE stated that de-escalation zones can be beneficial but must only be interim measure to avoid the partition of Syria. The Geneva talks ended July 14 with no apparent progress. Representatives of the HNC accused the Syrian government of refusing to enter into serious negotiations. The SE noted that there had been "no breakthrough, no breakdown" during the talks and expressed hope that recent international momentum would push the parties face-to-face for substantive discussions. -On July 11, SOHR reported that it had "confirmed information" that ISIS leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi had been killed in the eastern province of Deir Ezzor. US-led Coalition Spokesperson Colonel Ryan Dillon could not confirm the report, nor could various media sources or Iraqi or Kurdish officials. -On July 12, following the opening of a land route connecting Aleppo to Hasakah governorate, WFP announced that it had successfully delivered food aid to two locations in the Raqqa governorate for the first time in three years. -On July 13, Brett McGurk, US Special Envoy for the Global Coalition fighting ISIS, revealed that Russia had expressed willingness to deploy military police to monitor compliance and prevent violations of the recently implemented ceasefire in southwestern Syria. -On July 14, Russia's parliament approved an agreement between Russian and Syrian officials that provides for the long-term deployment of Russian aircraft and personnel to Syria. Defense Minister Nikolay Pankov said the deal will help legalize Russia's military activities in Syria "within an international framework". -France proposed the creation of a contact group comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Council and regional actors to support UN efforts to formulate a political road map after the conflict ends. -On July 17, the EU added 16 scientists and military officials to the list of those targeted by sanctions against the Syrian regime due to their suspected involvement in a chemical attack against civilians in April. - The Syrian army, backed by Iranian-militias managed to seize oil fields of Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash and several other villages in the southwest of Raqqa province, while Russian strikes targeted the town of Sukhna, the gateway to Deir ez-zour. - The Turkish state-run Andalou Agency exposed ten US military locations in northern Syria, giving exact numbers of US and French special forces stationed there. The US-led Coalition against ISIS condemned Turkey for "leaking sensitive military information shared between two allies." -On July 19, it was made public that President Donald Trump ended a covert CIA program that provided arms and training to Syrian rebel groups. The program was a central feature of the Obama Administration's policy in Syria. -On July 20, 150 fighters from the Turkey-backed Euphrates Shield operation had crossed from Turkey through Bab alhawa to support Ahrar al-Sham in its fight against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), dominated by the Fateh al-Sham faction formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, in Idlib. -On July 21, the SG submitted to the Security Council the forty first report on the humanitarian situation in Syria for the period from 1 to 30 June 2017, highlighting the approximately 20,000 people displaced across northeast Syria in June due to the Raqqa offensive. According to the report, the Syrian government removed medical supplies sufficient for more than 84,000 treatments. -Hezbollah and the Syrian Army launched a joint offensive against militant groups in the town of Arsal and the western Qalamoun mountain range along the Lebanon-Syrian border, an area purported to hold over 3,000 militants, including al-Qaeda-linked insurgents and members of ISIS. -On July 24, 14 heads of mission in Geneva signed a letter addressed to Security Council President, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, raising "serious concerns" about the implementation of seven Security Council resolutions on humanitarian access and urging Liu to raise the issue at the upcoming Council meeting. The signatories include the United States, Saudi Arabia, Britain, France Turkey, Qatar, Japan, Australia, the European Union, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Canada and Italy. -General Sergei Rudskoi, chief of the Russian General Staff, announced the deployment of Russian military police to monitor compliance after a ceasefire, mediated by the Egyptian government, was declared in the Eastern Ghouta area of Damascus on July 22. Despite the reported ceasefire, part of the four proposed "de-escalation zones" outlined in the Astana memorandum, Syrian government forces continued to attack several towns in Eastern Ghouta. -On July 26, fighting on the Syrian-Lebanese border near the town of Arsal halted after a ceasefire agreement was reached between Hezbollah and HTS. The cessation of hostilities ended a six-day campaign to drive al-Qaeda-linked militants from the border region, which is also home to tens of thousands of refugees. The agreement included the evacuation of some 1000 HTS fighters, along with more than 6000 Syrians (in nearby refugee camps) from the Lebanese border town of Arsal to rebel-controlled Idlib province, as well as exchange of prisoners between Hezboallah, HTS and the Lebanese Armed Forces, which later took place on August 1. -On July 27, Ursula Mueller, Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, briefed Council members on the humanitarian situation in Syria, noting that despite reduced violence, there had not been a noticeable increase in areas reached for aid delivery. -The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates addressed two letters to the UNSG and the Security Council calling for immediate action in the militant-besieged towns of Kefraya and al-Foua. -The US-led coalition fighting ISIS told its local Syrian allies that they must exclusively fight ISIS, a directive that prompted Shohada al-Quartyan to depart a joint coalition base in Southern Syria to carry out independent operations against Syrian regime forces. -On July 28, the OPCW released its monthly report, noting that the security situation now allows safe access to confirm the condition of the final two above-ground facilities with planning underway to verify their destruction. -On July 30, for the first time in five years, UN aid was delivered to almost 7,2000 people in besieged al-Nashabiye located in Eastern Ghouta, a rebel-held area on the outskirts of Damascus. August 2017: -On August 2, the evacuation of at least 7,000 people, including al-Qaeda-linked fighters and refugees, from Lebanese border enclave of Arsal for rebel-controlled Idlib province commenced. The transfer agreement, the largest formal repatriation of refugees to Syria since 2011, was carried out without the involvement of aid groups generating concern about the welfare of the refugees. -On August 3, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire in northern Homs and southern Hama, in what is being billed as the third of four planned ceasefires agreed to under the Astana memorandum. Russia deployed police military to several checkpoints in northern Homs, later on August 4. Opposition groups called for a guarantor role for Turkey. According to SOHR, the ceasefire, which covered territory populated by more than 147,000 people, held for the first 10 hours before experiencing repeated violations by pro-government and rebel forces. -The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria of the Human Rights Council (CoI) called on the international community to recognize the crime of genocide being committed against the Yazidis in Iraq. -On August 8, experts from the guarantor states met in Tehran to discuss ways to strengthen the de-escalation zones and determine the agenda for the upcoming sixth round of Astana talks. -On August 8-11, twenty-four FSA-affiliated groups formed new group "Liwa Tahrir Deir ez- Zour" to liberate the province of Deir ez-Zour from IS; the new faction welcomed any cooperation with local and international parties, ruling out the SDF. -On August 9, OCHA expressed concern about the safety and protection of an estimated 10,000- 25,000 people trapped inside Raqqa without access to safe drinking water for 48 days. Due to the fighting on the ground, the UN has currently no access to Raqqa city. - Russian Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzya briefed the Security Council on the progress of establishing de-escalated zones in Syria, behind closed doors, and called on the UN to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in those areas. -On August 10, SDF US-backed forces encircled ISIS militants in central Raqqa, effectively cutting off ISIS' last remaining route to the Euphrates. -On August 12, the Syrian government captured al-Sukhna, the final ISIS stronghold in Homs governorate, as part of its multi-pronged campaign to take eastern Syria. The recent gains position the pro-government coalition 50 km (30 miles) away from Deir ez-Zour province, the last major ISIS foothold in Syria. -On August 14, approximately 300 FSA-affiliated Saraya Ahl al-Sham fighters and 3,000 refugees began evacuating the Lebanese border town of Arsal as part of a repatriation agreement brokered in early August between Lebanese and Syrian officials. Lebanon's Maj. Gen. Abbas Ibrahim, who is overseeing the transfer, said that civilians will head to the government held area of Assal al-Ward. The rebel fighters and their families are destined for the rebel-held town of al- Ruhaiba in the Eastern Qalamoun region where, according to Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, they have been granted amnesty by the Syrian government. Their departure leaves the Islamic State as the last militant force straddling the border near Arsal. -Nearly 50,000 people remain stranded on the Jordanian border, in an area known as the berm, and are facing an increasing scarcity of food, healthcare and other basic services. The UN stressed that it will continue to support Jordanian authorities in the protection of affected Syrians. -On August 17, the UNSC adopted a presidential statement, read by Council President for August and Ambassador of Nigeria, Joy Ogwu, in support of a political transition process in Syria in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Communique. The adoption of the text signals, for the first time in two years, the consensus of the Council and its five permanent members on the need to establish a transitional government. -On August 17-20, Damascus hosted the 59th International Trade Fair, for the first time since 2011, and involved hundreds of delegations and private companies from at least forty-three states including Russia, Iran, China, and Egypt. -On August 20, President Assad announced in a speech before Syrian diplomats that Syria would not work with any Western nations until they ended their support for opposition and insurgent groups. -On August 21, UN experts launched an investigation into purported weapons deals between Syria and North Korea after two shipments to a Syrian government agency responsible for its chemical weapons program, the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC), were intercepted. -Saudi-based High Negotiations Committee (HNC) met with delegations from the moderate Cairo and Moscow camps in Riyadh in an effort to establish a unified front for upcoming peace talks. Despite pressure from international allies calling for a more pragmatic approach, the HNC refused to accept a transition scenario in which Assad retained power. -On August 22, the next round of Astana talks was pushed back from late August to mid- September to allow the guarantor states to hold a technical meeting to set the meeting agenda. -On 23 August, a joint monitoring center was established in Amman for the southwestern de-escalation zone, which is located in the provinces of Daraa and Quneitra. The center is tasked with ensuring ceasefire compliance, ensuring humanitarian access and other forms of civilian assistance. -On August 24, the UN called for a humanitarian pause in US-led Coalition airstrikes on Raqqa to permit civilians to leave the city. This comes after the release of an Amnesty International report calling for greater protection efforts for the estimated 20,000 remaining civilians in Raqqa. -On August 25, the Russian army announced that it had dismantled the two remaining Syrian chemical weapons facilities targeted for destruction by OPCW. The OPCW has not confirmed the Russian report. -On August 28, hundreds of ISIS fighters and their families were evacuated from the Lebanese- Syrian border to militant-held eastern Syria following simultaneous Lebanese army and Hezbollah campaigns against ISIS positions. The transfer marks the first time ISIS agreed to a forced evacuation from territory it held in Syria. - The Secretary-General presented his monthly report on the situation in Syria, highlighting the recent efforts to reduce violence through de-escalation agreements and expressing hope that the Astana guarantors will reach an agreement on the finalization of operational and technical modalities for all de-escalation areas. -On August 30, Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura briefed the Security Council on the political path forward which includes a new round of Astana and Geneva talks. The SE highlighted the important role Syrian opposition allies stand to play in fostering cohesion and unity among the AOGs. - In his final address to the Council after two years as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Stephen O'Brien appealed to members of the Council to take action to end the civil war in the name of common humanity, calling for a referral to the International Criminal Court. -On August 31, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, stressed that the protection and assistance of citizens must take priority before defeating the Islamic State, citing reports of heavy civilian casualties in Raqqa as evidence of the threat the remaining 20,000 civilians face. -US airstrikes stalled a convoy of 300 ISIS fighters and their families in a government-controlled part of the Syrian desert in an effort to prevent their advancement into ISIS-held territory near the Iraqi border. The convoy was traveling from the Syrian-Lebanese border to Syria's eastern province as part of an evacuation deal brokered between ISIS, Hezbollah and the Syrian Army. -Pro-government forces captured strategic al-Bishri mountain overlooking ISIS-controlled Deir Ezzor province, bringing government coalition forces within close range of ISIS positions. September 2017: On September 1, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian rejected a role for Assad in a political transition in Syria. -The Syrian Islamic Council called for Syria's AOGs to end their fragmentation and unite as one armed body under the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian Interim Government. Ahrar al-Sham, Failaq al-Sham, Liwa Ansar al-Sunnah and Jabha al-Shamiya supported the initiative. -SDF spokesperson, Jihan Ahmad, announced that the SDF had gained control over an estimated 65 percent of Raqqa city after capturing the Old City, the Great Mosque and al-Dariya neighborhood. SOHR reported that the SDF were still fighting to gain control over pockets of the Old City but added that the US-backed opposition forces held more than 90 percent of the surrounding area. -On September 2, Russian Aerospace Forces reported they had destroyed a convoy of 12 ISIS trucks carrying ammunition and weapons in Deir Ezzor province. -It was made public that the British Ministry of Defense had quietly halted its FSA training program and called back its training forces from Syria in late June 2017. -On September 3, pro-government coalition forces gained control of the remaining ISIS stronghold in Hama Governorate after capturing the town of Uqayribat and its surrounding areas. -On September 4, Syrian Interim Government Prime Minister Jawad Abu Hatab was appointed interim Defense Minister as part of a unification initiative launched by the Syrian Islamic Council in early September. Free Syrian Army factions formed a committee to select a Chief of Staff in consultation with the Prime Minister. -On September 5, the Secretary-General submitted the OPCW's forty seventh monthly report on the progress to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria to the Security Council. The report highlighted the preparations underway to confirm the status of the two remaining stationary above-ground facilities now that the security situation allows safe access and the upcoming high- level consultations with Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Dr. Faisal Mekdad, to clarify outstanding issues regarding the Syrian government's initial declaration. -Pro-government coalition forces reached the western perimeter of Deir Ezzor city, breaking a three-year ISIS siege of the government-held areas that had impacted 93,500 people. In support of the offensive, a Russian warship located in the Mediterranean Sea launched cruise missiles at ISIS positions near Deir Ezzor. -On September 6, SE Mistura said he expects a national ceasefire to follow shortly after ISIS has been pushed from its strongholds in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor. Although he stressed that the government "cannot announce victory", he called on opposition forces to accept defeat and focus on winning the peace through negotiations in October. -The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria released a report on the major human rights and humanitarian law violations committed between March and July 2017. The Commission accused the Syrian government of using sarin gas in the April 4 Khan Sheikhoun attack and found US forces culpable of not taking "all feasible precautions" to protect civilians in the March 16 attack on al-Jinah Mosque. -According to Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey made progress towards an agreement "on the parameters, configuration and methods of ensuring security in the de-escalation zone in the Idlib province" in Syria. -On September 7, Israel conducted airstrikes on the Scientific Studies and Research Center, a facility believed to house a chemical weapons manufacturing center, and a military base storing surface-to-surface missiles near government-stronghold Masyaf in Hama province. The Syrian Foreign Ministry called on the Security Council to denounce the airstrikes. -US-led coalition forces fighting ISIS announced that airstrikes had killed two ISIS leaders near Mayadin in the Deir Ezzor province on September 4, 2017. -The Head of the High Negotiations Committee, Riyad Hijab, rejected the SE Mistura's call for the opposition to accept defeat, declaring the UN mediation process a failure and calling on Syrians to demonstrate in support of the continuation of the revolution. On September 8, a convoy of 42 trucks carrying humanitarian aid for 80,000 people reached Deir Ezzor for the first time by land in three years. -US-led coalition surveillance aircraft departed its position monitoring an 11-bus convoy of ISIS fighters and their families after attempting to prevent its advance into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor since August 29. The surveillance aircraft departed the airspace at the request of Russian military officials who were conducting an operation with pro-government forces close to the convoy's position. -The Syrian National Coalition (NCSRF) condemned calls from "regional and external parties" for Western-backed opposition groups Ahmed Al-Abdu and Ussoud Al-Sharqiya to cease fighting government forces in southeastern Syria and withdraw to Jordan. Both groups refused the request. -On September 9, pro-government forces broke a years-long siege of Deir Ezzor airbase and captured the Damascus-Deir Ezzor highway from ISIS. -SDF launched Operation Jazeera Storm to liberate Deir Ezzor province from ISIS. -On September 10, SDF reached the industrial zone to the east of Deir Ezzor city putting the US-backed coalition within 15 km (10 miles) of pro-government forces positioned to the west of the Euphrates river. -On September 11, the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, declared the ceasefire brokered by Jordan, Russia and the United States in the southern Syrian provinces of Daraa, Quneitra and Suweida on July 9 a success and reiterated their commitment to the establishment a de-escalation zone in the area as a step towards achieving a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a political solution to the crisis. On September 12, pro-government coalition forces continued their push into ISIS-held territory in Deir Ezzor city. Russia and Syria warplanes conduct heavy bombardment in support, killing an estimated 69 people over the course of 72 hours. -Hezbollah leader, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, declared the war in Syria over, referring to the remaining fighting as "scattered battles". -ISIS defectors have massed in Syria's Idlib province with many planning to cross into Turkey before continuing to other parts of the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. -Iran and Syria sign a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in Syria's electricity sector. The arrangement, part of a series of bilateral deals formalizing Iran's role in Syria's reconstruction process, provides for the establishment of a new power generation station in Latakia and the rehabilitation of gas units and power generating plants in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir Ezzo and Homs. -On September 13, the remaining buses of the convoy of ISIS fighters and their families stranded for over two weeks in the Syrian desert reportedly reached Mayadin, in militant-held Deir Ezzor province, following the withdrawal of US surveillance aircraft on September 8 in respect of de-confliction arrangements with Russia. -The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that pro-government coalition forces controlled 85 percent of Syrian territory. SOHR disputed the claim, saying government forces held 48 percent of Syria. -Experts from Russia, Iran and Turkey met ahead of the sixth round of talks in Astana, Kazakhstan to "lay the groundwork" for negotiations on the establishment of de-escalation zone in Idlib province. -On September 14, Col. Ryan Dillon, spokesperson for the US-led coalition fighting ISIS, said SDF forces will not enter Deir Ezzor city, and will instead focus operations on areas south of the city along the Euphrates river. He also said US-backed SDF was in control of 63 percent of Raqqa city. -On September 15, Ahmad Abu Khawla, commander of the SDF-affiliated Deir Ezzor Military Council, declared that it will not allow government forces to cross to the eastern banks of the Euphrates river. -Representatives from Russia, Iran and Turkey reached an agreement on the delineation and monitoring mechanism for the implementation of a de-escalation zone in Idlib province and agreed to position observers in "safe zones". Russia circulated a draft resolution among the permanent members of the Council to welcome the outcome of the Astana talks. -On September 16, the SDF and US Coalition officials accused pro-government forces of attacking one of their positions in the industrial zone east of Deir Ezzor city, injuring 6 SDF fighters. According to US Coalition sources, Russia conducted the airstrike after the United States had denied its request to target the area. Russian Defense Ministry spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov rejected the allegations, saying warplanes carried out "pinpoint strikes only on Islamic State targets that have been observed and confirmed through several channels." -High-level consultations commenced between the Syrian government and the OPCW aimed at clarifying all outstanding issues regarding Syria's initial declaration of its chemical weapons facilities. -On September 17, a convoy of 80 Turkish military vehicles deployed to Turkey's southern border, close to the Bab Al-Hawa and Rihaniyah crossings with Syria's Idlib Governorate, ahead of the implementation of a de-escalation zone agreement brokered at the recent Astana talks. -On September 18, pro-government coalition forces crossed to the eastern bank of the Euphrates river to within five kilometers of SDF positions. In the first sign of direct contact between the SDF and the pro-government forces, US-led coalition spokesperson Col. Ryan Dillon said "open lines" of communication were being maintained to prevent clashes between the two forces as they converge on ISIS positions. -After capturing the Deir Ezzor Military Airporst from ISIS fighters, pro-government forces began operating combat and supply missions from the airport. -The World Food Programme (WFP) reached formerly besieged parts of Deir Ezzor city by land for the first time since May 2014. WFP has discontinued its high-altitude airdrop operations in favor of road deliveries which will allow for more affordable, sustainable humanitarian access. -In a meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, Members of the "Friends of Syria" Group agreed they will not support reconstruction in Syria until there is a political transition "away from Assad." -During its 36th session, the Human Rights Council held an interactive dialogue with the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria to discuss the continued targeting of civilians and the use of chemical weapons in the conflict, appealing to all parties to redouble their efforts to protect civilians and preserve civilian infrastructure. -On September 19, AOGs led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), the Turkistan Islamic Party and Free Syrian Army affiliates launched an offensive against pro-government forces in northern Hama province in an effort to dismantle the de-escalation zone agreement on Idlib province brokered at the recent Astana talks. The offensive sparked intense Russian and Syrian bombardment of opposition-held territory in Hama and Idlib Governorates. Syrian government forces claimed the airstrikes targeted "terrorist supply lines" but SOHR alleged the strikes hit hospitals and towns, killing civilians. -The Syrian government asserted it will not accept Turkish forces on Syrian soil, effectively contradicting
Only Vanderbilt University affiliated authors are listed on VUIR. For a full list of authors, access the version of record at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6715680/ ; Fanconi anemia (FA) is a genetically heterogeneous disorder with 22 disease-causing genes reported to date. In some FA genes, monoallelic mutations have been found to be associated with breast cancer risk, while the risk associations of others remain unknown. The gene for FA type C, FANCC, has been proposed as a breast cancer susceptibility gene based on epidemiological and sequencing studies. We used the Oncoarray project to genotype two truncating FANCC variants (p.R185X and p.R548X) in 64,760 breast cancer cases and 49,793 controls of European descent. FANCC mutations were observed in 25 cases (14 with p.R185X, 11 with p.R548X) and 26 controls (18 with p.R185X, 8 with p.R548X). There was no evidence of an association with the risk of breast cancer, neither overall (odds ratio 0.77, 95% CI 0.44-1.33, p = 0.4) nor by histology, hormone receptor status, age or family history. We conclude that the breast cancer risk association of these two FANCC variants, if any, is much smaller than for BRCA1, BRCA2 or PALB2 mutations. If this applies to all truncating variants in FANCC it would suggest there are differences between FA genes in their roles on breast cancer risk and demonstrates the merit of large consortia for clarifying risk associations of rare variants. ; We thank all the individuals who took part in these studies and all the researchers, clinicians, technicians and administrative staff who have enabled this work to be carried out. We acknowledge all contributors to the COGS and OncoArray study design, chip design, genotyping, and genotype analyses. ABCFS thank Maggie Angelakos, Judi Maskiell, Gillian Dite. ABCS thanks the Blood bank Sanquin, The Netherlands. ABCTB Investigators: C.L.C., Rosemary Balleine, Robert Baxter, Stephen Braye, Jane Carpenter, Jane Dahlstrom, John Forbes, Soon Lee, Deborah Marsh, Adrienne Morey, Nirmala Pathmanathan, Rodney Scott, Allan Spigelman, Nicholas Wilcken, Desmond Yip. Samples are made available to researchers on a non-exclusive basis. The ACP study wishes to thank the participants in the Thai Breast Cancer study. Special Thanks also go to the Thai Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), doctors and nurses who helped with the data collection process. Finally, the study would like to thank Dr Prat Boonyawongviroj, the former Permanent Secretary of MOPH and Dr Pornthep Siriwanarungsan, the Department Director-General of Disease Control who have supported the study throughout. BBCS thanks Eileen Williams, Elaine Ryder-Mills, Kara Sargus. BCEES thanks Allyson Thomson, Christobel Saunders, Terry Slevin, BreastScreen Western Australia, Elizabeth Wylie, Rachel Lloyd. The BCINIS study would not have been possible without the contributions of Dr. K. Landsman, Dr. N. Gronich, Dr. A. Flugelman, Dr. W. Saliba, Dr. E. Liani, Dr. I. Cohen, Dr. S. Kalet, Dr. V. Friedman, Dr. O. Barnet of the NICCC in Haifa, and all the contributing family medicine, surgery, pathology and oncology teams in all medical institutes in Northern Israel. The BREOGAN study would not have been possible without the contributions of the following: Jose Esteban Castelao, Angel Carracedo, Victor Munoz Garzon, Alejandro Novo Dominguez, Sara Miranda Ponte, Carmen Redondo Marey, Maite Pena Fernandez, Manuel Enguix Castelo, Maria Torres, Manuel Calaza (BREOGAN), Jose Antunez, Maximo Fraga and the staff of the Department of Pathology and Biobank of the University Hospital Complex of Santiago-CHUS, Instituto de Investigacion Sanitaria de Santiago, IDIS, Xerencia de Xestion Integrada de Santiago-SERGAS; Joaquin Gonzalez-Carrero and the staff of the Department of Pathology and Biobank of University Hospital Complex of Vigo, Instituto de Investigacion Biomedica Galicia Sur, SERGAS, Vigo, Spain. BSUCH thanks Peter Bugert, Medical Faculty Mannheim. The CAMA study would like to recognize CONACyT for the financial support provided for this work and all physicians responsible for the project in the different participating hospitals: Dr. German Castelazo (IMSS, Ciudad de Mexico, DF), Dr. Sinhue Barroso Bravo (IMSS, Ciudad de Mexico, DF), Dr. Fernando Mainero Ratchelous (IMSS, Ciudad de Mexico, DF), Dr. Joaquin Zarco Mendez (ISSSTE, Ciudad de Mexico, DF), Dr. Edelmiro Perez Rodriguez (Hospital Universitario, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon), Dr. Jesus Pablo Esparza Cano (IMSS, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon), Dr. Heriberto Fabela (IMSS, Monterrey, Nuevo Leon), Dr. Fausto Hernandez Morales (ISSSTE, Veracruz, Veracruz), Dr. Pedro Coronel Brizio (CECAN SS, Xalapa, Veracruz) and Dr. Vicente A. Saldana Quiroz (IMSS, Veracruz, Veracruz). CBCS thanks study participants, co-investigators, collaborators and staff of the Canadian Breast Cancer Study, and project coordinators Agnes Lai and Celine Morissette. CCGP thanks Styliani Apostolaki, Anna Margiolaki, Georgios Nintos, Maria Perraki, Georgia Saloustrou, Georgia Sevastaki, Konstantinos Pompodakis. CGPS thanks staff and participants of the Copenhagen General Population Study. For the excellent technical assistance: Dorthe Uldall Andersen, Maria Birna Arnadottir, Anne Bank, Dorthe Kjeldgard Hansen. The Danish Cancer Biobank is acknowledged for providing infrastructure for the collection of blood samples for the cases. COLBCCC thanks all patients, the physicians Justo G. Olaya, Mauricio Tawil, Lilian Torregrosa, Elias Quintero, Sebastian Quintero, Claudia Ramirez, Jose J. Caicedo, and Jose F. Robledo, the researchers Ignacio Briceno, Fabian Gil, Angela Umana, Angela Beltran and Viviana Ariza, and the technician Michael Gilbert for their contributions and commitment to this study. Investigators from the CPSII cohort thank the participants and Study Management Group for their invaluable contributions to this research. They also acknowledge the contribution to this study from central cancer registries supported through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Program of Cancer Registries, as well as cancer registries supported by the National Cancer Institute Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results program. CTS Investigators include Leslie Bernstein, S.L.N., James Lacey, Sophia Wang, and Huiyan Ma at the Beckman Research Institute of City of Hope, Jessica Clague DeHart at the School of Community and Global Health Claremont Graduate University, Dennis Deapen, Rich Pinder, and Eunjung Lee at the University of Southern California, Pam Horn-Ross, Christina Clarke Dur and David Nelson at the Cancer Prevention Institute of California, Peggy Reynolds, at the Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics, University of California San Francisco, H.A-C, A.Z., and Hannah Park at the University of California Irvine, and Fred Schumacher at Case Western University. DIETCOMPLYF thanks the patients, nurses and clinical staff involved in the study. We thank the participants and the investigators of EPIC (European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition). ESTHER thanks Hartwig Ziegler, Sonja Wolf, Volker Hermann, Christa Stegmaier, Katja Butterbach. FHRISK thanks NIHR for funding. GC-HBOC thanks Stefanie Engert, Heide Hellebrand, Sandra Krober and LIFE -Leipzig Research Centre for Civilization Diseases (Markus Loeffler, Joachim Thiery, Matthias Nuchter, Ronny Baber). The GENICA Network: Dr. Margarete Fischer-Bosch-Institute of Clinical Pharmacology, Stuttgart, and University of Tubingen, Germany [H.B., W-Y.L.], German Cancer Consortium (DKTK) and German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ) [H. B.], Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany's Excellence Strategy - EXC 2180 -390900677, Department of Internal Medicine, Evangelische Kliniken Bonn gGmbH, Johanniter Krankenhaus, Bonn, Germany [Yon-Dschun Ko, Christian Baisch], Institute of Pathology, University of Bonn, Germany [Hans-Peter Fischer], Molecular Genetics of Breast Cancer, Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum (DKFZ), Heidelberg, Germany [UH], Institute for Prevention and Occupational Medicine of the German Social Accident Insurance, Institute of the Ruhr University Bochum (IPA), Bochum, Germany [Thomas Bruning, Beate Pesch, Sylvia Rabstein, Anne Lotz]; and Institute of Occupational Medicine and Maritime Medicine, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany [Volker Harth]. HABCS thanks Michael Bremer and Johann H. Karstens. HEBCS thanks Sofia Khan, Johanna Kiiski, Kristiina Aittomaki, Rainer Fagerholm, Kirsimari Aaltonen, Karl von Smitten, Irja Erkkila. HKBCS thanks Hong Kong Sanatorium and Hospital, Dr Ellen Li Charitable Foundation, The Kerry Group Kuok Foundation, National Institute of Health 1R03CA130065 and the North California Cancer Center for support. HMBCS thanks Johann H. Karstens. HUBCS thanks Shamil Gantsev. KARMA thanks the Swedish Medical Research Counsel. KBCP thanks Eija Myohanen, Helena Kemilainen. We thank all investigators of the KOHBRA (Korean Hereditary Breast Cancer) Study. LMBC thanks Gilian Peuteman, Thomas Van Brussel, EvyVanderheyden and Kathleen Corthouts. MABCS thanks Milena Jakimovska (RCGEB "Georgi D. Efremov), Emilija Lazarova (University Clinic of Radiotherapy and Oncology), Katerina Kubelka-Sabit, Mitko Karadjozov (Adzibadem-Sistina Hospital), Andrej Arsovski and Liljana Stojanovska (Re-Medika Hospital) for their contributions and commitment to this study. MARIE thanks Petra Seibold, Dieter Flesch-Janys, Judith Heinz, Nadia Obi, Alina Vrieling, Sabine Behrens, Ursula Eilber, Muhabbet Celik, Til Olchers and Stefan Nickels. MBCSG (Milan Breast Cancer Study Group): Bernard Peissel, Jacopo Azzollini, Dario Zimbalatti, Daniela Zaffaroni, Bernardo Bonanni, Mariarosaria Calvello, Davide Bondavalli, Aliana Guerrieri Gonzaga, Monica Marabelli, Irene Feroce, and the personnel of the Cogentech Cancer Genetic Test Laboratory. We thank the coordinators, the research staff and especially the MMHS participants for their continued collaboration on research studies in breast cancer. MSKCC thanks Marina Corines, Lauren Jacobs. MTLGEBCS would like to thank Martine Tranchant (CHU de QuebecUniversite Laval Research Center), Marie-France Valois, Annie Turgeon and Lea Heguy (McGill University Health Center, Royal Victoria Hospital; McGill University) for DNA extraction, sample management and skillful technical assistance. J. S. is Chair holder of the Canada Research Chair in Oncogenetics. MYBRCA thanks study participants and research staff (particularly Patsy Ng, Nurhidayu Hassan, Yoon Sook-Yee, Daphne Lee, Lee Sheau Yee, Phuah Sze Yee and Norhashimah Hassan) for their contributions and commitment to this study. The NBCS Collaborators would like to thank the Oslo Breast Cancer Research Consortium, OSBREAC (breastcancerresearch. no/osbreac/), for providing samples and phenotype data. NBHS and SBCGS thank study participants and research staff for their contributions and commitment to the studies. We would like to thank the participants and staff of the Nurses' Health Study and Nurses' Health Study II for their valuable contributions as well as the following state cancer registries for their help: AL, AZ, AR, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, IN, IA, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, NE, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, VA, WA, WY. The authors assume full responsibility for analyses and interpretation of these data. OFBCR thanks Teresa Selander, Nayana Weerasooriya. ORIGO thanks E. Krol-Warmerdam, and J. Blom for patient accrual, administering questionnaires, and managing clinical information. The ORIGO survival data were retrieved from the Leiden hospital-based cancer registry system (ONCDOC) with the help of Dr. J. Molenaar. PBCS thanks Louise Brinton, Mark Sherman, Neonila Szeszenia-Dabrowska, Beata Peplonska, Witold Zatonski, Pei Chao, Michael Stagner. The ethical approval for the POSH study is MREC/00/6/69, UKCRN ID: 1137. We thank staff in the Experimental Cancer Medicine Centre (ECMC) supported Faculty of Medicine Tissue Bank and the Faculty of Medicine DNA Banking resource. PREFACE thanks Sonja Oeser and Silke Landrith. PROCAS thanks NIHR for funding. RBCS thanks Petra Bos, Jannet Blom, Ellen Crepin, Elisabeth Huijskens, Anja Kromwijk-Nieuwlaat, Annette Heemskerk, the Erasmus MC Family Cancer Clinic. We thank the SEARCH and EPIC teams. SGBCC thanks the participants and research coordinator Ms Tan Siew Li. SKKDKFZS thanks all study participants, clinicians, family doctors, researchers and technicians for their contributions and commitment to this study. We thank the SUCCESS Study teams in Munich, Duessldorf, Erlangen and Ulm. SZBCS thanks Ewa Putresza. UCIBCS thanks Irene Masunaka. UKBGS thanks Breast Cancer Now and the Institute of Cancer Research for support and funding of the Breakthrough Generations Study, and the study participants, study staff, and the doctors, nurses and other health care providers and health information sources who have contributed to the study. We acknowledge NHS funding to the Royal Marsden/ICR NIHR Biomedical Research Centre. BCAC is funded by Cancer Research UK [C1287/A16563, C1287/A10118], the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (grant numbers 634935 and 633784 for BRIDGES and B-CAST respectively), and by the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement number 223175 (Grant Number HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) (COGS). The EU Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme funding source had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation or writing of the report. Genotyping of the OncoArray was funded by the NIH Grant U19 CA148065, and Cancer UK Grant C1287/A16563 and the PERSPECTIVE project supported by the Government of Canada through Genome Canada and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (grant GPH-129344) and, the Ministere de l'Economie, Science et Innovation du Quebec through Genome Quebec and the PSR-SIIRI-701 grant, and the Quebec Breast Cancer Foundation. Funding for the iCOGS infrastructure came from: the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 223175 (HEALTH-F2-2009-223175) (COGS), Cancer Research UK (C1287/A10118, C1287/A10710, C12292/A11174, C1281/A12014, C5047/A8384, C5047/A15007, C5047/A10692, C8197/A16565), the National Institutes of Health (CA128978) and Post-Cancer GWAS initiative (1U19 CA148537, 1U19 CA148065 and 1U19 CA148112 -the GAME-ON initiative), the Department of Defence (W81XWH-10-1-0341), the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR) for the CIHR Team in Familial Risks of Breast Cancer, and Komen Foundation for the Cure, the Breast Cancer Research Foundation, and the Ovarian Cancer Research Fund. The DRIVE Consortium was funded by U19 CA148065. The Australian Breast Cancer Family Study (ABCFS), BCFR-NY, BCFR-PA, BCFR-UTAH, the Northern California Breast Cancer Family Registry (NCBCFR) and Ontario Familial Breast Cancer Registry (OFBCR) were supported by grant UM1 CA164920 from the National Cancer Institute (USA). The content of this manuscript does not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Cancer Institute or any of the collaborating centers in the Breast Cancer Family Registry (BCFR), nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the USA Government or the BCFR. The ABCFS was also supported by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, the New South Wales Cancer Council, the Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (Australia) and the Victorian Breast Cancer Research Consortium. J.L.H. is a National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Senior Principal Research Fellow. M.C.S. is a NHMRC Senior Research Fellow. The ABCS study was supported by the Dutch Cancer Society [grants NKI 2007-3839; 2009 4363]. The Australian Breast Cancer Tissue Bank (ABCTB) was supported by the National Health and Medical Research Council of Australia, The Cancer Institute NSW and the National Breast Cancer Foundation. C.L.C is a NHMRC Principal Research Fellow. The ACP study is funded by the Breast Cancer Research Trust, UK and KM and AL are supported by the NIHR Manchester Biomedical Research Centre and by the ICEP ("This work was also supported by CRUK [grant number C18281/A19169]"). The AHS study is supported by the intramural research program of the National Institutes of Health, the National Cancer Institute (grant number Z01-CP010119), and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (grant number Z01-ES049030). The work of the BBCC was partly funded by ELAN-Fond of the University Hospital of Erlangen. The BBCS is funded by Cancer Research UK and Breast Cancer Now and acknowledges NHS funding to the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre, and the National Cancer Research Network (NCRN). The BCEES was funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council, Australia and the Cancer Council Western Australia and acknowledges funding from the National Breast Cancer Foundation (J.S.). The BREast Oncology GAlician Network (BREOGAN) is funded by Accion Estrategica de Salud del Instituto de Salud Carlos III FIS PI12/02125/Cofinanciado FEDER; Accion Estrategica de Salud del Instituto de Salud Carlos III FIS Intrasalud (PI13/01136); Programa Grupos Emergentes, Cancer Genetics Unit, Instituto de Investigacion Biomedica Galicia Sur. Xerencia de Xestion Integrada de Vigo-SERGAS, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, Spain; Grant 10CSA012E, Conselleria de Industria Programa Sectorial de Investigacion Aplicada, PEME I+ D e I + D Suma del Plan Gallego de Investigacion, Desarrollo e Innovacion Tecnologica de la Conselleria de Industria de la Xunta de Galicia, Spain; Grant EC11-192. Fomento de la Investigacion Clinica Independiente, Ministerio de Sanidad, Servicios Sociales e Igualdad, Spain; and Grant FEDER-Innterconecta. Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad, Xunta de Galicia, Spain. The BSUCH study was supported by the Dietmar-Hopp Foundation, the Helmholtz Society and the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ). The CAMA study was funded by Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia (CONACyT) (SALUD-2002-C01-7462). Sample collection and processing was funded in part by grants from the National Cancer Institute (NCI R01CA120120 and K24CA169004). CBCS is funded by the Canadian Cancer Society (grant #313404) and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research. CCGP is supported by funding from the University of Crete. The CECILE study was supported by Fondation de France, Institut National du Cancer (INCa), Ligue Nationale contre le Cancer, Agence Nationale de Securite Sanitaire, de l'Alimentation, de l'Environnement et du Travail (ANSES), Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR). The CGPS was supported by the Chief Physician Johan Boserup and Lise Boserup Fund, the Danish Medical Research Council, and Herlev and Gentofte Hospital. COLBCCC is supported by the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Heidelberg, Germany. Diana Torres was in part supported by a postdoctoral fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. The American Cancer Society funds the creation, maintenance, and updating of the CPSII cohort. The CTS was supported by the California Breast Cancer Act of 1993, the California Breast Cancer Research Fund (contract 97-10500) and the National Institutes of Health (R01 CA77398, K05 CA136967, UM1 CA164917, and U01 CA199277). Collection of cancer incidence data was supported by the California Department of Public Health as part of the statewide cancer reporting program mandated by California Health and Safety Code Section 103885. HAC receives support from the Lon V Smith Foundation (LVS39420). The University of Westminster curates the DietCompLyf database funded by the charity Against Breast Cancer (Registered Charity No. 1121258) and the NCRN. The coordination of EPIC is financially supported by the European Commission (DG-SANCO) and the International Agency for Research on Cancer. The national cohorts are supported by: Ligue Contre le Cancer, Institut Gustave Roussy, Mutuelle Generale de l'Education Nationale, Institut National de la Sante et de la Recherche Medicale (INSERM) (France); German Cancer Aid, German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ), Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) (Germany); the Hellenic Health Foundation, the Stavros Niarchos Foundation (Greece); Associazione Italiana per la Ricerca sul Cancro-AIRC-Italy and National Research Council (Italy); Dutch Ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports (VWS), Netherlands Cancer Registry (NKR), LK Research Funds, Dutch Prevention Funds, Dutch ZON (Zorg Onderzoek Nederland), World Cancer Research Fund (WCRF), Statistics Netherlands (The Netherlands); Health Research Fund (FIS), PI13/00061 to Granada, PI13/01162 to EPIC-Murcia, Regional Governments of Andalucia, Asturias, Basque Country, Murcia and Navarra, ISCIII RETIC (RD06/0020) (Spain); Cancer Research UK (14136 to EPIC-Norfolk; C570/A16491 and C8221/A19170 to EPIC-Oxford), Medical Research Council (1000143 to EPIC-Norfolk, MR/M012190/1 to EPIC-Oxford) (United Kingdom). The ESTHER study was supported by a grant from the Baden Wurttemberg Ministry of Science, Research and Arts. Additional cases were recruited in the context of the VERDI study, which was supported by a grant from the German Cancer Aid (Deutsche Krebshilfe). FHRISK is funded from NIHR grant PGfAR 0707-10031. DGE is supported by the all Manchester NIHR Biomedical Research Centre (IS-BRC-1215-20007). The GC-HBOC (German Consortium of Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer) is supported by the German Cancer Aid (grant no 110837, coordinator: R.K.S., Cologne). This work was also funded by the European Regional Development Fund and Free State of Saxony, Germany (LIFE - Leipzig Research Centre for Civilization Diseases, project numbers 713-241202, 713-241202, 14505/2470, 14575/2470). The GENICA was funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Germany grants 01KW9975/5, 01KW9976/8, 01KW9977/0 and 01KW0114, the Robert Bosch Foundation, Stuttgart, Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum (DKFZ), Heidelberg, the Institute for Prevention and Occupational Medicine of the German Social Accident Insurance, Institute of the Ruhr University Bochum (IPA), Bochum, as well as the Department of Internal Medicine, Evangelische Kliniken Bonn gGmbH, Johanniter Krankenhaus, Bonn, Germany. The GEPARSIXTO study was conducted by the German Breast Group GmbH. The GESBC was supported by the Deutsche Krebshilfe e.V. [70492] and the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ). The HABCS study was supported by the Claudia von Schilling Foundation for Breast Cancer Research, by the Lower Saxonian Cancer Society, by the Friends of Hannover Medical School and by the Rudolf Bartling Foundation. The HEBCS was financially supported by the Helsinki University Central Hospital Research Fund, Academy of Finland (266528), the Finnish Cancer Society, and the Sigrid Juselius Foundation. The HERPACC was supported by MEXT Kakenhi (No. 170150181 and 26253041) from the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, Culture and Technology of Japan, by a Grant-in-Aid for the Third Term Comprehensive 10-Year Strategy for Cancer Control from Ministry Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, by Health and Labour Sciences Research Grants for Research on Applying Health Technology from Ministry Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan, by National Cancer Center Research and Development Fund, and "Practical Research for Innovative Cancer Control (15ck0106177h0001)" from Japan Agency for Medical Research and development, AMED, and Cancer Bio Bank Aichi. The HMBCS and HUBCS were funded by the German Research Foundation (Do761/10-1) and by the Rudolf Bartling Foundation. The HUBCS was further supported by a grant from the German Federal Ministry of Research and Education (RUS08/017), and by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research and the Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations for support the Bioresource collections and RFBR grants 14-04-97088, 17-29-06014 and 17-44-020498. Financial support for KARBAC was provided through the regional agreement on medical training and clinical research (ALF) between Stockholm County Council and Karolinska Institutet, the Swedish Cancer Society, The Gustav V Jubilee foundation and Bert von Kantzows foundation. The KARMA study was supported by Marit and Hans Rausings Initiative Against Breast Cancer. The KBCP was financially supported by the special Government Funding (EVO) of Kuopio University Hospital grants, Cancer Fund of North Savo, the Finnish Cancer Organizations, and by the strategic funding of the University of Eastern Finland. The KOHBRA study was partially supported by a grant from the Korea Health Technology R&D Project through the Korea Health Industry Development Institute (KHIDI), and the National R&D Program for Cancer Control, Ministry of Health & Welfare, Republic of Korea (HI16C1127; 1020350; 1420190). LMBC is supported by the 'Stichting tegen Kanker'. DL is supported by the FWO. The MABCS study is funded by the Research Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology "Georgi D. Efremov" and supported by the German Academic Exchange Program, DAAD. The MARIE study was supported by the Deutsche Krebshilfe e. V. [70-2892-BR I, 106332, 108253, 108419, 110826, 110828], the Hamburg Cancer Society, the German Cancer Research Center (DKFZ) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) Germany [01KH0402]. MBCSG is supported by grants from the Italian Association for Cancer Research (AIRC) and by funds from the Italian citizens who allocated the 5/1000 share of their tax payment in support of the Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Nazionale Tumori, according to Italian laws (INT-Institutional strategic projects "5 x 1000"). The MCBCS was supported by the NIH grants CA192393, CA116167, CA176785 an NIH Specialized Program of Research Excellence (SPORE) in Breast Cancer [CA116201], and the Breast Cancer Research Foundation and a generous gift from the David F. and Margaret T. Grohne Family Foundation. MCCS cohort recruitment was funded by VicHealth and Cancer Council Victoria. The MCCS was further supported by Australian NHMRC grants 209057 and 396414, and by infrastructure provided by Cancer Council Victoria. Cases and their vital status were ascertained through the Victorian Cancer Registry (VCR) and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), including the National Death Index and the Australian Cancer Database. The MEC was supported by NIH grants CA63464, CA54281, CA098758, CA132839 and CA164973. The MISS study is supported by funding from ERC-2011-294576 Advanced grant, Swedish Cancer Society, Swedish Research Council, Local hospital funds, Berta Kamprad Foundation, Gunnar Nilsson. The MMHS study was supported by NIH grants CA97396, CA128931, CA116201, CA140286 and CA177150. MSKCC is supported by grants from the Breast Cancer Research Foundation and Robert and Kate Niehaus Clinical Cancer Genetics Initiative. The work of MTLGEBCS was supported by the Quebec Breast Cancer Foundation, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research for the " CIHR Team in Familial Risks of Breast Cancer" program -grant #CRN-87521 and the Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation and Export Trade - grant #PSR-SIIRI-701. MYBRCA is funded by research grants from the Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education (UM. C/HlR/MOHE/06) and Cancer Research Malaysia. MYMAMMO is supported by research grants from Yayasan Sime Darby LPGA Tournament and Malaysian Ministry of Higher Education (RP046B-15HTM). The NBCS has received funding from the K.G. Jebsen Centre for Breast Cancer Research; the Research Council of Norway grant 193387/V50 (to A-L Borresen-Dale and V.N.K.) and grant 193387/H10 (to A-L Borresen-Dale and V. N. K.), South Eastern Norway Health Authority (grant 39346 to A-L Borresen-Dale) and the Norwegian Cancer Society (to A-L Borresen-Dale and V. N. K.). The NBHS was supported by NIH grant R01CA100374. Biological sample preparation was conducted the Survey and Biospecimen Shared Resource, which is supported by P30 CA68485. The Carolina Breast Cancer Study (NCBCS) was funded by Komen Foundation, the National Cancer Institute (National Cancer Institute CA058223, U54 CA156733, U01 CA179715), and the North Carolina University Cancer Research Fund. The NGOBCS was supported by the National Cancer Center Research and Development Fund. The NHS was supported by NIH grants P01 CA87969, UM1 CA186107, and U19 CA148065. The NHS2 was supported by NIH grants UM1 CA176726 and U19 CA148065. The ORIGO study was supported by the Dutch Cancer Society (RUL 1997-1505) and the Biobanking and Biomolecular Resources Research Infrastructure (BBMRI-NL CP16). The PBCS was funded by Intramural Research Funds of the National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. Genotyping for PLCO was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the National Institutes of Health, NCI, Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics. The PLCO is supported by the Intramural Research Program of the Division of Cancer Epidemiology and Genetics and supported by contracts from the Division of Cancer Prevention, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health. The POSH study is funded by Cancer Research UK (grants C1275/A11699, C1275/C22524, C1275/A19187, C1275/A15956 and Breast Cancer Campaign 2010PR62, 2013PR044. PROCAS is funded from NIHR grant PGfAR 0707-10031. The RBCS was funded by the Dutch Cancer Society (DDHK 2004-3124, DDHK 2009-4318). The SASBAC study was supported by funding from the Agency for Science, Technology and Research of Singapore (A*STAR), the US National Institute of Health (NIH) and the Susan G. Komen Breast Cancer Foundation. The SBCGS was supported primarily by NIH grants R01CA64277, R01CA148667, UMCA182910, and R37CA70867. Biological sample preparation was conducted the Survey and Biospecimen Shared Resource, which is supported by P30 CA68485. The scientific development and funding of this project were, in part, supported by the Genetic Associations and Mechanisms in Oncology (GAME-ON) Network U19 CA148065. SEARCH is funded by Cancer Research UK [C490/A10124, C490/A16561] and supported by the UK National Institute for Health Research Biomedical Research Centre at the University of Cambridge. The University of Cambridge has received salary support for PDPP from the NHS in the East of England through the Clinical Academic Reserve. SEBCS was supported by the BRL (Basic Research Laboratory) program through the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2012-0000347). SGBCC is funded by the NUS start-up Grant, National University Cancer Institute Singapore (NCIS) Centre Grant and the NMRC Clinician Scientist Award. Additional controls were recruited by the Singapore Consortium of Cohort StudiesMulti-ethnic cohort (SCCS-MEC), which was funded by the Biomedical Research Council, grant number: 05/1/21/19/425. The Sister Study (SISTER) is supported by the Intramural Research Program of the NIH, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (Z01-ES044005 and Z01-ES049033). The Two Sister Study (2SISTER) was supported by the Intramural Research Program of the NIH, National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (Z01-ES044005 and Z01-ES102245), and, also by a grant from Susan G. Komen for the Cure, grant FAS0703856. SKKDKFZS is supported by the DKFZ. The SMC is funded by the Swedish Cancer Foundation. The SZBCS was supported by Grant PBZ_KBN_122/P05/2004. The TNBCC was supported by: a Specialized Program of Research Excellence (SPORE) in Breast Cancer (CA116201), a grant from the Breast Cancer Research Foundation, a generous gift from the David F. and Margaret T. Grohne Family Foundation and the Ohio State University Comprehensive Cancer Center. The TWBCS is supported by the Taiwan Biobank project of the Institute of Biomedical Sciences, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. The UCIBCS component of this research was supported by the NIH [CA58860, CA92044] and the Lon V Smith Foundation [LVS39420]. The UKBGS is funded by Breast Cancer Now and the Institute of Cancer Research (ICR), London. ICR acknowledges NHS funding to the NIHR Biomedical Research Centre. The UKOPS study was funded by The Eve Appeal (The Oak Foundation) and supported by the National Institute for Health Research University College London Hospitals Biomedical Research Centre. The USRT Study was funded by Intramural Research Funds of the National Cancer Institute, Department of Health and Human Services, USA. The WAABCS study was supported by grants from the National Cancer Institute of the National Institutes of Health (R01 CA89085 and P50 CA125183 and the D43 TW009112 grant), Susan G. Komen (SAC110026), the Dr. Ralph and Marian Falk Medical Research Trust, and the Avon Foundation for Women.