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Belief in electoral fraud has received heightened attention due to elite rhetoric and controversial voter identification (ID) laws. Using a two-wave national survey administered before and after the 2012 election, we examine the individual-level correlates of belief in a range of election-related conspiracy theories. Our data show that partisanship affects the timing and content of belief in election-related conspiracy theories, but a general disposition toward conspiratorial thinking strongly influences those beliefs. Support for voter ID laws, in contrast, appears to be driven largely by party identification through elite-mass linkages. Our analysis suggests that belief in election fraud is a common and predictable consequence of both underlying conspiratorial thinking and motivated partisan reasoning.

A large body of work shows that reasoning motivated by partisan cues and prior attitudes leads to unreflective decisions and disparities in empirical beliefs across groups. Surprisingly little research, however, has tested the limits of motivated reasoning. We argue that the publicly circulated findings of deliberative minipublics can spark a more reflective motivation in voters when these bodies provide policy‐relevant factual information. To test that proposition, we conducted a survey experiment using information generated by one such minipublic during an election. Results showed that exposure to the minipublic's findings improved the accuracy of voters' empirical beliefs regarding a ballot proposition on the regulation of genetically modified seeds. This treatment effect transcended voters' partisan identities and prior environmental attitudes. In some instances, the respondents showing the greatest knowledge gains were those who a directional motivated‐reasoning account would have expected to resist the treatment most effectively, owing to party identity or prior attitudes.

AbstractDespite a growing number of studies on how prior beliefs distort citizens' interpretation of performance information for service providers, little is known about whether prior beliefs matter equally across different services and types of providers. In this study, we provide a wide replication and extension of the experimental design used in Baekgaard and Serritzlew (2016) with three types of providers (public, non‐profit, and for‐profit) across two services (nursing homes and refuse collection). Based on two large‐N nationally representative experiments (N = 3018 and N = 3020), we find that citizens' sector preference does indeed impact their interpretation of performance information, corresponding to the original study. However, public sector preference plays a substantially different role in the two services. Our findings strengthen the external validity of previous research and simultaneously identify theoretical boundaries to its application across various services and providers. This, we argue, underlines the importance of replicating and extending pivotal studies on performance information.

In this article, we consider a novel criterion for evaluating representations of uncertainty ranges, namely, the extent to which a representation enhances motivated reasoning. In two studies, we show that perceptions of the distribution underlying ambiguous numerical ranges are affected by the motivations and worldviews of end users. This motivated reasoning effect remained after controlling for objective numeracy and fluid intelligence but was attenuated when the correct interpretation was made clear. We suggest that analysts and communicators explicitly consider the potential for motivated evaluation when evaluating uncertainty displays.

This article establishes that transitions of power from one presidential administration to the next can act as a source of uncertainty regarding whom citizens view as responsible for national conditions. I argue that citizens confront this ambiguity in a partisan manner when making responsibility attributions of credit and blame. Using the economy and the Iraq War as examples, ordinary partisans frequently ascribe responsibility using motivated reasoning by crediting the president of their own political party for perceived successes and blaming the president of the opposite party for perceived failures.

Studies linking local issue severity to public opinion often treat the effect as homogeneous, suggesting a straightforward relationship between issue exposure and policy opinions. It is more likely that individuals perceive local issues in conditional ways. We advance a theory of motivated reasoning whereby worldviews act as a lens through which individuals interpret the world around them. When the observed environment conforms to individuals' prior beliefs, they will be even more likely to perceive risk and call for policy action. When the information presented to them is incongruent with their worldview, increasing issue severity will have a minimal effect. We test our theory by combining an indicator of water scarcity with data from two nationally representative, probability-based panel surveys about water issues in the United States. Analyzing interactive models predicting risk perception and policy preferences, we find that water scarcity drives individuals with opposing environmental worldviews even further apart.

Research in political psychology has shown the importance of motivated reasoning as a prism through which individuals view the political world. From this we develop the hypothesis that, with strong positive beliefs firmly in place, partisan groups ignore or discount information about the performance of political figures they like. We then speculate about how this tendency should manifest itself in presidential approval ratings and test our hypotheses using monthly presidential approval data disaggregated by party identification for the 1955–2005 period. Our results show that partisan groups generally do reward and punish presidents for economic performance, but only those presidents of the opposite party. We also develop a model of presidential approval for self‐identified Independents and, finally, a model of the partisan gap, the difference in approval between Democrat and Republican identifiers.

How does the public assess the Supreme Court and its work? Using data from three surveys conducted over a span of ten years, we show that individuals' policy preferences drive evaluations of the Court and its willingness to reform the Court. We find strong evidence that the Court's hybrid legal-political nature enables a unique form of policy-motivated reasoning: respondents who agree with Court outputs view the Court and its work as more "legal" in nature, while those who disagree view both as more "political." Our findings stand in contrast to longstanding views in the literature that the public views the Court as a fundamentally different sort of institution that stands largely separate from politics. The fact that policy attitudes powerfully inform the public's assessment of the Court has crucial implications for the ongoing debates over Supreme Court power.

We draw from theories of motivated reasoning, dual-processing models, and attribution of responsibility to examine how scientific messages may increase public polarization with respect to emerging risk issues such as Lyme disease. A nationally representative sample of Americans ( N = 460) read messages about Lyme disease that varied the framing of responsibility for the prevalence of the disease (human/wildlife vs. wildlife only) and when its effects will occur (today vs. in the next 10 years). The influence of framing was contingent on participants' partisanship, which resulted in a boomerang effect among Republicans and increased the degree of political polarization regarding support for proenvironmental behaviors.

Abstract
On 19 December 2022, the United States House Select Committee referred former president Donald Trump to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution. Subsequently, Mr. Trump was indicted four times and charged with 91 felonies. Nevertheless, some Americans have remained steadfast in supporting him. Observers theorize that indifference to Mr. Trump's wrongdoing reflects white nationalism and politically motivated reasoning. We test this theory using experimental data from a national survey fielded before any public hearings or charges. Our analyses reveal that Americans who endorse white nationalism and those who hold right-wing political views are more likely to oppose criminal charges. Furthermore, the relationship between white nationalism and attitudes about criminally charging Mr. Trump is indirect, through identification with the political right.