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The complexity of the 21st century threat landscape contrasts significantly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear & conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside antisatellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, & other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers & commanders confronted emerging threats to vital American military systems in space & cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, & cyberspace), & cross-domain deterrence poses serious problems in practice. This text steps back to assess the theoretical relevance of cross-domain deterrence for the field of international relations.

Growing reliance on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the effort to combat militant groups has led to considerable debate about the consequences of this new mode of warfare. While critics have focused on the impact of civilian casualties on militant recruitment and the resulting use of terrorism, evidence suggests that 'drones' are paradoxically more effective in limiting civilian deaths compared to other forms of military force. This article demonstrates a different causal pathway connecting militant use of force to terrorist attacks. Drone strikes encourage militants to displace operations to urban centers. Confronted with unfamiliar terrain and greater government capacity, militants emphasize terrorist attacks against civilians. The article explores these dynamics in the longest running drone campaign, in Pakistan. While civilian casualties from drone strikes have no discernible effect on terrorism, strikes that kill militants increase terrorist attacks against civilians in urban settings, while failing to reduce attacks on government targets.

Much of international behavior is linked spatially and temporally. Yet, analyses of interstate interactions generally either assume independence among units or resort to technical solutions to dependence that "throw away" relevant information. We detail a more informative and satisfying approach to modeling spatial dependence from extra-dyadic linkages in alliance ties and geographical proximity as specific pathways of conflict contagion. Beyond deterrence, the purpose of alliances is to draw other parties into dyadic contests, but most existing research on conflict onset generally only considers alliance ties within an individual dyad or external intervention in the same dispute. We develop new measures on third- and fourth-party alliance ties, demonstrating direct and indirect spatial effects of alliances on conflict onset. Similarly, ongoing contests can spread geographically, but dyads in some locations are much more at risk for conflict onset than others. We provide a new theory of geographic "inbetweenness" in conflict and show that dyads involving specific locations and ties to the ongoing conflict are much more likely to see dispute onset, even accounting for other purely dyadic factors. Beyond the intrinsic interest in the impacts of extra-dyadic position and alliances on conflict, our spatial approach can be applied more broadly to other extra-dyadic ties.

Abstract
Much of international behavior is linked spatially and temporally. Yet, analyses of interstate interactions generally either assume independence among units or resort to technical solutions to dependence that "throw away" relevant information. We detail a more informative and satisfying approach to modeling spatial dependence from extra-dyadic linkages in alliance ties and geographical proximity as specific pathways of conflict contagion. Beyond deterrence, the purpose of alliances is to draw other parties into dyadic contests, but most existing research on conflict onset generally only considers alliance ties within an individual dyad or external intervention in the same dispute. We develop new measures on third- and fourth-party alliance ties, demonstrating direct and indirect spatial effects of alliances on conflict onset. Similarly, ongoing contests can spread geographically, but dyads in some locations are much more at risk for conflict onset than others. We provide a new theory of geographic "inbetweenness" in conflict and show that dyads involving specific locations and ties to the ongoing conflict are much more likely to see dispute onset, even accounting for other purely dyadic factors. Beyond the intrinsic interest in the impacts of extra-dyadic position and alliances on conflict, our spatial approach can be applied more broadly to other extra-dyadic ties.

Uncertainty about military power is widely considered an important determinant of international conflict, but research in international relations provides relatively little guidance about the origins of uncertainty. What factors influence the validity of actors' assessments of military capabilities? When would one expect uncertainty about military capabilities to be particularly high, or especially low? We examine a series of factors capable of explaining the sources of uncertainty in international relations, positing that the uncertainty of assessments is a function of both characteristics of the state being assessed and the overall strategic environment. We test our theory using new measures of uncertainty that we derive from analyzing publicly available estimates of national military capabilities. Our findings offer a novel set of implications both for research that relies on uncertainty as a key cause of conflict and for policymakers faced with evaluating foreign military assessments.

There is a growing sense that US military effectiveness has been on the wane in recent years. Is this the case? If so, what are the reasons for the decay in American combat performance? We first examine the available systematic evidence for American military decline, showing that the United States has indeed experienced a drop in the quality of outcomes of its military contests. Observers have offered a number of explanations for declining American military success, most predominantly an increase in intrastate conflict after the Second World War. After showing that a decline in performance is observed even after fully excluding intrastate conflict, we propose an alternative explanation: the increasing distance from home at which the United States has been fighting. Distance is tyrannical: it saps military strength and increases the cost of contests, even as it reduces US expertise and motivations to prevail. We then show that the distance from home at which the United States fights is the best predictor of the outcome of the conflict. We conclude by noting some avenues for future research and policy implications as the world returns to great power competition.

Despite considerable interest and debate, it has proven surprisingly difficult to demonstrate a systematic link between technological change and patterns of war and peace. At least part of the challenge may reside in finding the right place to "look" for such relationships. Technological change alters what nations can do to one another (capabilities), but in ways that are typically reflected by deals (diplomatic bargains) rather than actions. We theorize that reconnaissance satellites have revolutionized the use of information gleaned from spying in ways that discourage states from engaging in serious conflicts with one another. We analyze the impact of reconnaissance satellites on high-casualty militarized interstate disputes (MIDS) between dyads from 1950 to 2010. We find that when either the potential aggressor or target in a dyad possess reconnaissance satellites, they are significantly less likely to become involved in serious MIDs. This effect is especially powerful when both states possess reconnaissance satellites.

AbstractThere is a growing sense that US military effectiveness has been on the wane in recent years. Is this the case? If so, what are the reasons for the decay in American combat performance? We first examine the available systematic evidence for American military decline, showing that the United States has indeed experienced a drop in the quality of outcomes of its military contests. Observers have offered a number of explanations for declining American military success, most predominantly an increase in intrastate conflict after the Second World War. After showing that a decline in performance is observed even after fully excluding intrastate conflict, we propose an alternative explanation: the increasing distance from home at which the United States has been fighting. Distance is tyrannical: it saps military strength and increases the cost of contests, even as it reduces US expertise and motivations to prevail. We then show that the distance from home at which the United States fights is the best predictor of the outcome of the conflict. We conclude by noting some avenues for future research and policy implications as the world returns to great power competition.

Final Technical Report for PASCC Award #N00244-15-1-0003 An earlier draft of this project was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2015, San Francisco, CA. ; Researchers have now produced a number of quantitative studies of the determinants of nuclear proliferation, using data on all known nuclear weapons programs. But while scholars have laid important groundwork in understanding the causes of nuclear pursuit, these studies are primarily focused on explaining rather than predicting proliferation. Drawing from existing quantitative work, this project uses statistical learning methods to construct a predictive model of proliferation, focusing on the ability of different nuclear proliferation theories to make accurate out-of-sample predictions. This study makes two contributions to the literature on nuclear proliferation and the larger policy debate. First, it identifies for the first time an empirically grounded set of nuclear "triggers"— conditions under which countries are most likely to shift from latent nuclear capacity to a full-fledged nuclear weapons effort. Understanding these triggers has become increasingly important, as more states have begun to pursue a nuclear hedging strategy in which they seek dual-use nuclear capabilities without committing to a weapons program. Second, this study helps to reconcile conflicting empirical findings in the literature. Predictive analytics provide a new and useful way of understanding the substantive significance of existing empirical findings, and of comparing the relative importance of different theoretical approaches. ; Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) at the Naval Postgraduate School, Award #N00244-15-1-0003

Performer: University of California at San Diego Project Lead: Erik Gartzke Project Cost: $121,000 FY15-16 ; Objective: Scholars have spent decades studying and explaining nuclear proliferation. This project will develop a model to predict the behavior of states regarding their pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons. An accurate prediction model will allow for action against potential suppliers, interdiction of nuclear trade, intelligence collection on covert nuclear activities, and credible military action against countries of concern. The model will not only be a yes or no predictor; it will assess the probability of a state pursuing or acquiring nuclear weapons under a particular set of conditions. It is hoped that this model will be replicated and adjusted to suit the needs of analysts and scholars. Additionally, the model will provide the foundation for future predictive work. ; PASCC