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Since the Rose Revolution (2003), Georgia has encountered an unprecedented scale of institutional reforms concomitant with the rise of American and European involvement in the "democratization" process. Various scholars have suggested that Georgian nationalism developed from an ethno-cultural basis to a more civic/liberal orientation after the Rose Revolution. This paper analyzes Georgian nationalism under President Mikheil Saakashvili to demonstrate the significant divergence between political rhetoric on national identity, the selection of symbols, and state policy toward the Georgian Orthodox Church versus state policy toward ethnic minorities. The aim of this article is to examine the at times conflicting conceptions of national identity as reflected in the public policies of Saakashvili's government since the Rose Revolution. It attempts to problematize the typologies of nationalism when applied to the Georgian context and suggests conceptualizing the state-driven nationalism of the post-Rose Revolution government as "hybrid nationalism" as opposed to civic or ethno-cultural.

The initial excitement of the Rose Revolution has worn off. More than four years on, Georgia has made significant progress in reforming its laws, fighting corruption and in governance more generally, but it is now more clear than ever that democracy is one of the areas where the government still has some work to do.

Three revolutions, one after another, replaced the three post-communist leaders of Georgia: (1) the Round Table and Zviad Gamsakhurdia replaced the communists; (2) Gamsakhurdia's cabinet was replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, and (3) Mikhail Saakashvili removed Shevardnadze from his post. Each of them changed the fortunes of the country and the nation, but only the last event was tagged as a "revolution." It is obviously viewed as the most important among the three and prompts us to ask whether it is absolutely correct to describe Saakashvili's coming to power as a revolution. Is it not a ploy designed to boost the importance of the regime change in the eyes of the world community and the local population? To answer these questions we should answer another, broader, question: Did the regime change that removed Eduard Shevardnadze and became known as the Rose Revolution have the characteristics of a revolution? By revolution we mean the very specific and profound impact a regime exerts on social order-it is much more than a conflict that replaces the government. A revolution brings about changes in the political, economic, spiritual, and social spheres of the nation's life, which take some time to become obvious and are never immediately manifest the very day after forces come to power which choose to call themselves "revolutionary." The events of November 2003 in Georgia were called a revolution immediately after the coup was completed. During the three years that separate us from that time enough material has been accumulated to assess the nature of the changes that have taken place and were brought about by Mikhail Saakashvili's coming to power. The Rose Revolution is a term prompted by the immediate impressions of the non-constitutional power change in Georgia. A revolution is not merely a particular method of regime change-it is an event of profound importance for the country's economic, social, and political life. Those Western authors who have devoted much time to the theory of revolution and who have written extensively on the subject 1 interpret it as a particular method of regime change that brings more radical results than other seemingly similar actions. A revolution means replacement of the top leaders accomplished by a mass illegitimate movement that results in deep-cutting changes.

Representations of Mexican revolutionary hero, Emiliano Zapata, migrate across the Mexico/US borders. His specters inform and reflect sexual identities migrating across these borderlands. Theoretically guided by Madison's model of performative writing and Muñoz's disidentification, this experimental project highlights and challenges the heteronormativity that pervades these migratory representations and the discursive practices that bring them to life. Through a performative writing exercise, I travel through theory and time to (re)present the figure of Zapata in an intimate love story whose backdrop is violence and war.

In 2003–2005, democratic revolutions overthrew the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. However, disillusioned citizens witness today their new leaders creating a Bonapartist regime, entering into open conflict with former revolutionary allies or being forced to accept cohabitation with leaders of the previous regime. This article argues that despite internationally acclaimed civic mobilisation, civil society's weakness seriously affected the three revolutionary processes. These were in fact initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by former members of the authoritarian regimes' political elite. Finally, the supposedly democratic revolutions proved to be little more than a limited rotation of ruling elites within undemocratic political systems.

Ukraine has experienced two popular uprisings in a decade (2004, 2013–2014), which took place in four different circumstances. Firstly, the Orange Revolution began as a protest against election fraud during an election cycle while the Euromaidan began in protest at the abrupt end to European integration and was outside an election cycle. Secondly, whether the incumbent was leaving office (Leonid Kuchma, 2004) or seeking to be re-elected and remain in power indefinitely (Viktor Yanukovych, 2013–2014) had a direct bearing on regime strategies against the protestors. Thirdly, Russian intervention was limited to finances, the supply of political technologists and diplomatic support in the former whereas during the latter, Russia used its intelligence, special forces and military to intervene in the protests, annex territory and invade Ukraine. Fourthly, the type of leader which was in power (former Soviet nomenklatura versus thuggish and criminalized Donetsk clan) had a direct impact on whether the authorities would seek compromise and non-violence (Kuchma, 2004) or reject compromise and resort to violence through vigilantes, Berkut riot police and the Security Service (Yanukovch, 2013–2014).

Ukraine has experienced two popular uprisings in a decade (2004, 2013–2014), which took place in four different circumstances. Firstly, the Orange Revolution began as a protest against election fraud during an election cycle while the Euromaidan began in protest at the abrupt end to European integration and was outside an election cycle. Secondly, whether the incumbent was leaving office (Leonid Kuchma, 2004) or seeking to be re-elected and remain in power indefinitely (Viktor Yanukovych, 2013–2014) had a direct bearing on regime strategies against the protestors. Thirdly, Russian intervention was limited to finances, the supply of political technologists and diplomatic support in the former whereas during the latter, Russia used its intelligence, special forces and military to intervene in the protests, annex territory and invade Ukraine. Fourthly, the type of leader which was in power (former Soviet nomenklatura versus thuggish and criminalized Donetsk clan) had a direct impact on whether the authorities would seek compromise and non-violence (Kuchma, 2004) or reject compromise and resort to violence through vigilantes, Berkut riot police and the Security Service (Yanukovch, 2013–2014).

The trend started by youth movements that swept away Serbia's Milosevic, Georgia's Shevardnaze, and Ukraine's Kuchma in elections and demonstrations. It has now removed Kyrgyzstan's Akayev as well. Yet that doesn't mean that democracy is just around the corner. (TIP)

There is the opinion that the method by which a political leader is replaced, or his own attitude to his possible loss of power, is part of his political heritage and affects the country's democratic development. If the first leader of a newly formed political system is replaced, this heritage becomes even more important. The point is amply illustrated by fifteen years of Georgia's political independence. It changed its political leaders twice, each time with violence and violations of the Constitution. Each time the change was carried out under democratic banners, and each time authoritarian trends in the country's political system became more pronounced: after coming to power each of the new leaders wanted to preserve it. To achieve this, they sought for economic domination to get a grip on badly needed material and financial resources. So each of the new leaders tried to place private business under his political control. The Georgian Constitution, however, guarantees protection of private property; the new leaders are also limited by the liberal Constitution in many other respects, the country's financial and political dependence on the West, and its desire to integrate into the European structures. This forces each of the new leaders to use methods which will not damage the country's democratic image. Political pressure on the business community became especially obvious after the Rose Revolution; today it is barely concealed and rather harsh.