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This article is an original contribution to the understanding of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and government size. Using a panel data set of the EU-15 countries, we analyse the effect of decentralization on aggregate, national and subnational government sizes by separating the long run effects of decentralization from its short run dynamics. In the long run, tax autonomy reduces central expenditure but increases--and to a greater extent--subnational public expenditure, leading to higher aggregate public expenditure. We find also that vertical imbalances tend to increase the sizes of subnational, national and aggregate governments. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines the relative effectiveness of cross‐national virtual decentralization and physical decentralization of government functions on corruption and the shadow economy. Results show that while virtual decentralization reduces both corruption and the shadow economy, physical decentralization reduces only the shadow economy. The e‐government results are robust to alternate measures and specifications, while those of government tiers are not.

Abstract
The article explores the effects of the decentralization process in Romania as part of the public administration reform, using a set of financial indicators revealing the territorial distribution of the capacity of local public administration to provide public services. These indicators are then correlated with quality of government and government effectiveness indexes at national level. As a result, the analysis reflects a territorial variation of financial independence of administrative units that can be explained by assuming the differences in the institutional set-up of different communities at local level. These results were used further to formulate a perspective on the decentralization process in Romania based on the assumption of non-homogeneity of socio-economic development of different regions in Romania.

Some reforms implemented in the Spanish municipal sector have led to an increasing managerial decentralization. This decentralization has made municipal financial statements lose relevance, since devolved entities are not disclosed in these statements. Accordingly, we have made an empirical analysis of 54 big Spanish municipalities in order to evaluate the impact of decentralization on the municipal financial statements. The survey shows a great concern among practitioners about the importance of global reports. Furthermore, devolved entities should be included in the global reports if the municipality has the authority to approve their budget. This feature shows a legal/budgetary bias of municipal officials, who focus on legal and budgetary constraints more than on managerial indicators. We think this bureaucratic approach should evolve to another one with a higher degree of private sector management techniques.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of fiscal decen- tralization on the size of regional governments in Spain, by controlling for economies of scale, interregional heterogeneity and institutional framework. We study it over 1985 to 2004 using a panel dataset of seventeen spanish regions. The results can be easily summarized. Firstly, it supports the classic public goods theory of a trade-off-between the economic benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. Secondly, it doesn't reject the "Leviathan" hypoth- esis and neither does the "common pool" hypothesis. Thirdly, by contrast, the paper partly rejects the "Wallis"' hypothesis. It argues that government size is mediated by financial resources obtained through intergovernmental grants, consistent with welfare economics and positive economic policies. We conclude that later advances in the decentralisation process must be compatible with the goal of reducing fiscal imbalances that emanate from the vertical structure of fiscal power. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

THIS PAPER FOCUSES ON THE RECENT EFFORTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IN CANADA IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO EFFECT CHANGE IN MANAGEMENT OF THE POLITICALBUREAUCRATIC INTERFACE. THIS EXPERIENCE ILLUSTRATES BOTH THE LIMITS OF CONTRACTION IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM ACCUSTOMED TO A CRITICAL ROLE FOR THE STATE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICIZATION IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM IN WHICH PARTISAN POLITICS IS CONFINED PRIMARILY TO ELECTORAL POLITICS. AT THE SAME TIME, IT ILLUSTRATES THE POSSIBILITIES OF MORE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE DEREGULATION GIVEN THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL STRUCTURES OF POWER IN THE CABINET SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS MORE ORGANIZATIONAL DECENTRALIZATION GIVEN THE PROFESSIONAL CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL BUREAUCRACY. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, TENSIONS WITHIN THIS EXPERIENCE GIVEN THAT THESE PHENOMENA ARE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL AND THUS INTERRELATED.

AbstractThe establishment of an effective local government system has been imperative in the Sudan both on account of the vast scale of the country and the decentralization policies of successive governments. District councils were initially established in 1951 following the Marshall Report, but were by stages superseded as budgetary authorities, and reduced to unimportance by the People's Local Government System in 1971, which vested responsibility in Councils at the Provincial level. The subsequent difficulties experienced by this system indicate the value of the District, now renamed Area, as a level for a multipurpose local authority in the Sudan, and explain the reemphasis of this level in the 1981 Local Government Act.This article summarizes the experience leading up to the 1981 Act, and examines the extent to which the new legislation offers an effective structure. The finance of local government, a recurrent problem in the Sudan, emerges as a critical issue, together with the future role of the Provincial Commissioner.

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